


PLATO

PROTAGORAS

TOWLE

103-3



LOWER LIBRARY

COLLEGE SERIES OF GREEK AUTHORS

GREEK CLASSICS.

EDITED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE AND THOMAS D. SEYMOUR.

PLATO
PROTAGORAS

WITH THE COMMENTARY OF
HERMANN SAUPPE

TRANSLATED WITH ADDITIONS

BY

JAMES A. TOWLE

PRINCIPAL OF THE ROBBINS SCHOOL



BOSTON, U.S.A., AND LONDON
PUBLISHED BY GINN & COMPANY

1889

ENTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL.

COPYRIGHT, 1889, BY
JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE AND THOMAS D. SEYMOUR.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

TYPOGRAPHY BY J. S. CUSHING & Co., BOSTON, U.S.A.

PRESSWORK BY GINN & Co., BOSTON, U.S.A.

PA 3411.
C7 P 78
1889a

PREFACE.

THE commentary to this edition of the *Protagoras* of Plato is in the main a translation of that of the fourth German edition by the venerable and distinguished scholar, Dr. Hermann Sauppe, Professor in the University of Göttingen and Privy Councillor of State. The critical notes have been somewhat abridged, and the commentary has received such additions as seemed needful for those students who begin the study of Plato with this dialogue.

The American editor trusts that the extreme pleasure which he has found in the preparation of this volume will be shared by those who shall here meet the Platonic Socrates. He makes grateful acknowledgments to Professor Sauppe for his very cordial permission to give to American students the use of his admirable work; and expresses his thanks to Professor Seymour, whose suggestions and aid, throughout the progress of the volume, have been invaluable.

NORFOLK, CONN., March, 1889.

✓13989

INTRODUCTION.

1. LIFE AND TEACHING OF PROTAGORAS.

PROTAGORAS was the first to call himself a *Sophist*, — that is, a teacher of wisdom, — and gained applause, admiration, and influence to an extraordinary degree. Of his personal history very little has come down to us.¹ He was born on the southern shore of Thrace, in the Ionian city Abdera, which the inhabitants of Teos had founded some two generations before. For the purpose of teaching and gaining wealth and fame, he travelled in Greece, Sicily, and Lower Italy. In Athens especially he tarried often and long, as this city was the focus of intellectual life, the resort of all who cultivated art and science and sought the recognition of their attainments. Before he accompanied the colonists to Thurii in 443 B.C., he must have gained the confidence of Pericles in a somewhat extended acquaintance, as this statesman appointed him to draw up a code of laws for the new community; and we find him again, not long before the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, intimately associated with Pericles (about 432 B.C.). During the plague (430, 429 B.C.) he was a witness of the magnanimity of Pericles; for he says, in the only fragment of any length which is preserved from his writings (in Plut. *Mor.* 118 e), τῶν γὰρ υἱέων νεηγιέων ὄντων καὶ καλῶν, ἐν ὀκτῶ δὲ τῆσι πάσῃσιν ἡμέρησιν ἀποθανόντων, νηπενθέως ἀνέτλη. εὐδίας γὰρ εἶχετο· ἐξ ἧς πολλὸν ὤνητο κατὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέρην εἰς εὐποτμίην καὶ ἀνωδυνίην καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖσι δόξαν· πᾶς γὰρ τίς μιν ὀρέων τὰ ἐωυτοῦ πένθεα ἐρρωμένως φέροντα μεγαλόφρονά τε καὶ ἀνδρήιον ἐδόκεε εἶναι καὶ ἐωυτοῦ κρέσσω, κάρτα εἰδὼς τὴν ἐωυτοῦ ἐν τοιοῖσιδε πράγμασι ἀμηχανίην. Furthermore, according to Athenaeus, the Κόλακες of Eupolis² (brought out in

¹ See further, Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, i. 862³ ff. (Eng. trans. ii. 407 ff.); Schanz, *Beiträge zur vorso-cratischen Philosophie aus Platon*, i. 20 ff.

² Eupolis was born, according to Suidas, 424 B.C., and was a rival of Aristophanes, with whom he vied in elegance. Following the example of

the spring of 421 B.C.) showed that Protagoras had been in Athens during its composition and public performance, — some time, therefore, after 422 B.C. We can hardly suppose, however, that he remained in Athens from this time until his death. It was probably on a later visit to that city that he was accused of impiety on account of one of his books, which began with the declaration, *περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὐθ' ὡς εἰσὶν οὐθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν · πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι, ἢ τε ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*. To escape condemnation he fled, but only to perish upon the sea.¹

When did this flight and death take place? The statement in *Meno* 91e οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα, τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα, must be received as correct, and was undoubtedly followed by Apollodorus of Athens, when he says, according to Diogenes Laërtius, ix. 56, *τελευτήσαι αὐτὸν βιώσαντα ἔτη . . . ἑβδομήκοντα, σοφιστεῦσαι δὲ τεσσαράκοντα*. When now we hear Protagoras say (*Protag.* 317c) that in age he might be the father of any present, thus including Socrates, who was born about 468 B.C., we might infer that Plato considered him as at least seventeen to twenty years older than Socrates; and we might conclude that he was born between 488 and 485 B.C., and died 418 to 415 B.C. With this, to be sure, the statement in Diogenes Laërtius, ix. 54, does not agree: *κατηγόρησε δ' αὐτοῦ Πυθόδωρος Πολυζήλου, εἰς τῶν τετρακοσίων*, which can only mean that he was indicted in the time of the Four Hundred (in the summer of 411 B.C.). For, according to this statement, the year of his birth would have been 481 B.C., and he would have been only some thirteen years older than Socrates. This is entirely possible, if we assume that Plato represents him as wishing to seem the more venerable, and so as making himself a little older, and Socrates a little younger. Still, the relation to Prodicus and Hippias, who equalled Protagoras in fame, yet were in-

Cratinus, he was bitter and abusive. The *Κόλακες* (a body of Flatterers forming the Chorus) satirized the unbridled and sensual career of Callias, and took the first prize over the *Pax* of Aristophanes, which received the sec-

ond. The death of the poet occurred sometime after the year 412 B.C.

¹ Euripides alluded to this in *Ixion* (Philochorus in *Diog. L.* ix. 55), as does Plato in *Theaet.* 171c (Müller-Strübing, *Jahrb. d. Philol.* cxxi. 96).

cluded with the rest in his expression, argues a greater age for Protagoras. Furthermore, judicial proceedings for impiety would certainly not have been brought against a foreigner under the Four Hundred, since these oligarchs, during their brief term of power, had much more urgent cares. Diogenes may easily have misunderstood some remark of the authority whom he quoted, to the effect that Pythodorus, the accuser of Protagoras, was the same one who afterwards belonged to the Four Hundred; or, in condensing, he may have misquoted. In the spring of 415 B.C. the trials for the mutilation of the figures of Hermes were held, and with this time, into which falls also the condemnation of Diagoras, the charge of impiety against Protagoras very well agrees. Apparently, then, this must be regarded as the date of the death of Protagoras.¹

Protagoras accepted the doctrine of Heraclitus² that there is no permanent being, but all things are in unceasing motion and transformation. Man perceives the existence and qualities of things only in so far as they come into contact with his senses, and thus arises a reciprocal interaction of the percipient subject and a perceived object. What the senses perceive is true. But the senses of different men apprehend differently, as also those of the same man at different times; correction of the perceptions is impossible, for one is as true as another; the work of the teacher

¹ Müller-Strübing, *l. c.* pp. 84 ff. Vater (*Rerum Andocidearum*, Part II. in the 9th Suppl. [1st series] *Jahrbb. d. Philol.*, p. 210) places the death of Protagoras still earlier (about 417 B.C.). 411 B.C. is the date adopted by Curtius (*Hist. Greece*, iii. 479), Diels, *Rhein. Mus.* xxxi. 41. The question would be decided for 415 B.C., if Müller-Strübing's ingenious conjecture were established, that Aristophanes, *Av.* 1072, wrote *Διαγόραν τὸν Τήσιον* and meant Protagoras.

² Heraclitus of Ephesus, who flourished about 500 B.C., was called *ὁ σκοτεινός* on account of the obscurity of his style. His view of Being was the

opposite of that of Parmenides, whose Real or Absolute was extended and continuous, indivisible and unchangeable. Heraclitus used various symbols to convey the thought of the universal change; especially fire and the motion of a river. Generation and destruction were ceaseless and identical, nothing was permanent but the endless transition. There was indeed a certain measure of fixity in the particulars, but this was only a brief halt, and was itself an encroachment. No individual, nor any number of individuals, can gain truth: this is possessed alone by the All.

is only to bring to the senses of his pupil the good and the useful. This is the meaning of the Protagorean principle, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος.

Protagoras, however, boasted that his teaching did not, like that of the other sophists, end in a barren knowledge, but that it led immediately into life, it fitted men for domestic and civil duties. He did not push to its logical consequences his doctrine respecting human knowledge and truth, which must have extinguished all virtue and morality,¹ replacing them with the concern of the individual for what is good and useful for himself alone; but he followed in his ethics the current ideas of virtue and piety. Now it is by discourse that men are influenced, and the prizes of life are gained, and, for securing proficiency in this, men looked pre-eminently to the sophists (*Protag.* 312 d). Discourse was therefore with Protagoras a prime object of attention. He taught ὀρθόπεια, i.e. he distinguished the grammatical genders, tenses, and kinds ('question,' 'answer,' 'command,' 'wish') of sentence. Thus he became the founder of Grammar, and the jests of Aristophanes in the *Clouds* (*Nub.* 659 ff.) evince the striking impression which he thus produced. From these grammatical studies, his pupils advanced to the art of oratory, Protagoras setting forth the same subject from opposite sides, teaching them to discover grounds of probability for the improbable (τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν *Arist. Rhet.* ii. 24, p. 1402 Bk.), developing their dexterity in the treatment of general questions, and furnishing as models for their imitation his own treatment of general propositions.

A keen and active intellect, engaging powers of speech, self-confidence, and a sagacious estimate of the desires and needs of the men of his day, won for him everywhere large numbers of pupils; and the deep and abiding effects which his teaching had left upon the thought and the moral views of men could not be denied. For this reason Plato devoted two dialogues to the statement and refutation of his doctrines — in the *Theaetetus* attacking his theory of knowledge, in the *Protagoras* his doctrine of virtue.

¹ Peipers *die Erkenntnisstheorie Platos*, p. 44 f.

2. SCENERY OF THE DIALOGUE.

With the finished art of the dramatist, and with the sparkling humor of the comic poet, Plato describes for us, in the most fresh and picturesque way, the house of Callias, where the conversation takes place.

One of the ancient priestly families of nobility in Athens was that of the Κήρυκες, who carried back their origin to Triptolemus. The honors of the sacred herald and of the torch-bearer at the Eleusinian mysteries were hereditary with them. The function of the Daduchia, the tie of public hospitality with Lacedaemon, and boundless wealth, established their renown, and a succession of generals and ambassadors increased their fame.¹ To this family belonged Callias and Hipponicus: Hipponicus, a frugal, quiet man, who, as general-in-chief, had gained the victory at Tanagra (in the summer of 426 B.C.), had died a short time before the representation of the Κόλακες of Eupolis (spring of 421 B.C.).² He left, as heir to his wealth, Callias, who gave himself up to all sensual pleasures as unrestrainedly as he devoted himself passionately to the sophists and their fascinating occupation. When these visited Athens, they found a welcome at his house, and those who wished to associate with them and listen to their discourses gathered there freely. Eupolis included Protagoras and other sophists, as he portrayed in his *Flatterers* the practices in the house of Callias, the weak vanity of the host, and the swarm of venal parasites devouring his wealth.

This house of Callias we enter with Socrates early in the morning, and find, in the porticos at either end of the court, and in one of the adjoining rooms, Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus, each surrounded by his disciples, and already actively engaged in teaching: Protagoras is walking, Hippias answers from a high seat the questions propounded to him, the pupils of Prodicus are gathered about his bed. Of the sophistic leaders, we miss Gorgias alone, probably because Plato regarded his activity as so significant and

¹ Meineke, *Com. Gr.* i., pp. 131 ff.; Petersen, *Hist. Gentium Att.* pp. 37 ff.

² Athen. v. 218 b.

peculiar that he preferred to treat his method in a separate work, rather than to give him here a subordinate position.

Around the sophists are gathered, besides Socrates and Callias, an array of persons who, at that time or soon after, were prominent in literary or public life. All belong to the most cultured circles of Athens: Xanthippus and Paralus, (the sons of Pericles and half-brothers of Callias,) Eryximachus the physician, Agathon the later poet; Alcibiades, between boyhood and manhood, here eighteen or nineteen years old; Critias, who later became one of the Thirty; Phaedrus, Pausanias, Andron, Plato's uncle Charmides, Philippides, two by name of Adimantus, — all citizens of Athens; and Antimoerus of Menda, who himself had already gained reputation as a sophist. Around these, who almost all appear in other dialogues as zealous adherents of the new doctrines, are grouped many other citizens and foreigners. Although we cannot assert that an actual occurrence lies at the foundation of the Platonic dialogue, yet it is certain that similar gatherings and conversations had frequently occurred in the house of Callias, and that, to the mind of contemporaries, there was no improbability in the introduction of any one of those named. The impression made by the lavish, pretentious, noisy behavior in Callias's house, is deepened by the contrast of the simplicity and quietness with which the domestic life of Socrates meets us in the preliminary conversation with Hippocrates, — a symbol of simple truth contrasted with the delusive glare of external display.

3. TIME IN WHICH THE SCENE IS LAID.

In attempting to derive the date from allusions in the dialogue, we are involved in a contradiction, to which Athenaeus has already called attention.¹ On the one hand, Pericles and his sons, who died in 429 B.C., are referred to as still living in 315 a; 319 e; 328 c; on the other hand, the *Ἄγριοι* of Pherecrates is mentioned in 327 d as a play of the previous year, while, according to Athenaeus, it was brought out during the Lenaeon festival of 420 B.C.; again, 315 d certainly presupposes the death of Hipponicus, who

¹ Cf. v. 218 b; xi. 505 f.

yet cannot have died long before 421 B.C. But here, as in the other dialogues, we must distinguish between the events of primary and those of secondary importance. Only where occurrences form the ground of the picture, does Plato adhere to the history; incidental matters he freely adds, even with violence to historical truth, when they serve to give life or completeness, or afford an apt comparison or a witty allusion. Shakspeare and others in their tragedies take the same liberty.

The death of Pericles and of his sons were events so weighty in themselves, and so linked with the memory of the dreadful pestilence in the early part of the fatal war, that their impression must still have been most vivid in the minds of those for whom Plato wrote. This compels us to place the scene of the dialogue in 433 or 432 B.C.,¹ before the opening of the war, to which it contains not the slightest allusion. This date is sustained by the following points in the dialogue. Hippocrates says in 310e that he was a boy when Protagoras first visited Athens. Protagoras had left Athens in 443 B.C.; if we suppose Hippocrates to have been then thirteen or fourteen years old, he was now a young man of twenty-three or twenty-four, just as he appears in the dialogue. Again, the youthfulness of Socrates is referred to in 314b, 317c, 361e; this has no meaning, if we place the time of the dialogue later, but agrees fully with Grecian ideas, if he was (432 B.C.) thirty-six years old. Protagoras, then, is fifty-three (if we consider him as born in 485 B.C.), and can properly speak of his advanced age. Furthermore, Alcibiades is called in 309b ὑπηρέτης, and, his birth falling in about 451 B.C.,² his age at this time is nineteen. Agathon is called in 315d νέον ἔτι μεράκιον, and, the date of his birth being 448 or 447 B.C.,³ we find him here sixteen or fifteen years of age. The allusion to Phidias in 311c as still living, does not conflict with 432 B.C., since the assumption that he died in that year is erroneous.

¹ So Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, Steinhart, in their Introductions. J. S. Kroschel also agrees with this, *de temporibus rerum, quae in Platonis Protagora habentur, constituendis* (Erfurt,

1859), pp. 15 ff., and preface to his edition, pp. 30 ff.

² Vischer, *Alkib. und Lysander*, p. 52.

³ Ritschl, *de Agathonis Vita*, p. 17 (*Opusc. Philol.* i. 428).

As opposed to the agreement of these circumstances, the cursory allusion to the play of Pherecrates is wholly without weight. The difficulty is more serious, that Callias is introduced in 432 B.C. as already heir and master of the house, when Hipponicus died ten years later.¹ But here Plato preferred the ideal truth to historical precision; the house of Callias, by the usage of many years, and by the cutting wit of the Κόλακες of Eupolis, had become, in the minds of the Athenians, dedicated to the sophists as a rendezvous. Besides, people could scarcely remember, nor did they care, precisely when Callias became heir to the property of Hipponicus.

The vexation of the old porter in 314c, and the malicious remark in 315d that Callias had sophists in the treasury, instead of Hipponicus's treasures, simply force us to the view that Hipponicus had been dead for some time, and that the proceedings in the house of Callias were not altogether new. To the readers of the *Protagoras*, however, the remark above mentioned must have seemed the more apt, as the prodigal frivolity of Callias had doubtless, when Plato wrote the dialogue, already squandered the greater part of his paternal inheritance.

4. ANALYSIS OF THE DIALOGUE.

A. *Introduction to Socrates's Narrative, 309a to 310a.*

Socrates, in a public place, perhaps in a palaestra or a portico (a point not clearly indicated), is asked by an acquaintance whence he comes, and, on replying that he has just had an interview with Protagoras, is begged to recount it to those present. This he expresses himself as quite willing to do.

¹ To be sure, Schleiermacher, p. 220, Kroschel, (in the *Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen*, 1857, p. 562, and in the dissert. previously quoted, p. 21) have assumed that, when the dialogue took place, Hipponicus was not dead, but for some reason was absent. But this is opposed by 311a, and indeed by the whole style in which Callias and

Hipponicus are referred to. The conjecture of Kroschel, preface pp. 30, 32, that Hipponicus had given over to Callias his city residence, and himself dwelt in the Peiraeus, does not help the matter. See Zeller *über die Anachronismen in den Platon. Gesprächen* (*Abh. d. Berl. Ak. d. Wiss.* 1873), pp. 83 ff.

B. Recital of Socrates, 310 a to the end.

I. Introductory conversation with Hippocrates, 310 a-314 c.

Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus, a young Athenian of good family, fine abilities, high aspirations, pure and modest mind, and accustomed to visit Socrates daily, came to his house at the early dawn, with the request that he would introduce him to Protagoras. Socrates rose, and, until it became day, walked in the court with Hippocrates, seeking to ascertain just what he desired from Protagoras. It appears that Hippocrates does not know what he desires. He does not wish to become a sophist; the idea of oratorical power presents itself to him in rather an obscure way, but what object this is to gain, to what subject to devote itself, he confesses he has no idea. Socrates holds up to him the levity with which the youth throw themselves into the arms of the sophists, and proposes, in company with him, to ask Protagoras concerning the aim and contents of his teaching.

II. Interview with the sophists at Callias's house, 314 c to end.

a. Portrayal of the scene and introduction of the dialogue, 314 c-317 e.

Socrates and Hippocrates pass in through the porch, pausing, unnoticed by the others, to survey the scene. They then approach Protagoras; and Socrates, making known the wish of Hippocrates to become his pupil, asks Protagoras whether he prefers to set forth the nature of his art to themselves privately, or in the presence of the others. Protagoras is gratified with the opportunity of displaying himself, and declares that he has no hesitation in professing himself a sophist. All who are present gather about them, and the discussion between Socrates and Protagoras begins.

b. The question is set forth, 317 e-320 c.

Socrates repeating his question, What will Hippocrates gain from Protagoras, the latter first replies that he will become better, then, more particularly, that he will become a better citizen, able in the administration of domestic and civil affairs. Socrates replies that he had not supposed previously that this skill could be taught; because, in the first place, in public assemblies, upon matters which are deemed capable of being learned, the people allow those

only to speak who are proficient in these, while, upon matters which pertain to civil administration, they listen to all without distinction; and because, in the second place, the best and wisest men do nothing themselves to impart their virtue to their children, nor do they commit this training to others. He begs Protagoras to explain this.

c. Myth and discourse of Protagoras, 320 c–328 d.

Protagoras treats three points: first, the question why the Athenians allow all, without exception, to speak upon justice and civil virtue (*πολιτικὴ ἀρετή*); secondly, the fact that they nevertheless hold that this virtue can be taught; thirdly, the question why, notwithstanding all the pains which state and parents devote to the education of the youth, the sons of excellent fathers do not always turn out well.

To the first question he replies by a myth. The race of men was left destitute by Epimetheus, but received from Prometheus technical skill, without civil virtue. They were therefore unable to found a state, and were exposed in their isolation to destruction, until Zeus caused Hermes to endow them, without exception, with justice and mutual respect. Thus all have received and possess political virtue, and so all can speak concerning it.

The second point he proves by the fact that the Athenians never rebuke one who lacks merely natural gifts, while those who are destitute of virtue, they reprove, punish, and even banish.

Upon the third point, he reviews at length the course of education in Athens, and explains away the apparent miscarrying of the sons of excellent fathers, by the view that, because of a more limited capacity, notwithstanding all the pains spent upon them, they reach, in comparison with others who are more gifted, only an inferior degree of virtue; and, since all men must possess virtue, and there is thus no opportunity of comparison with such as have none, this inferior degree is mistaken for an entire lack of virtue.

d. First dialogue between Protagoras and Socrates, 328 d–333 d.

Socrates professes himself satisfied with the answer, only he does not know whether Protagoras distinguishes different virtues, or regards virtue as something indivisible. Protagoras replies that

justice, piety, temperance, wisdom, and courage are parts, and in fact — qualitatively, in their nature and working, — distinct parts of virtue. Contrary to this, however, Socrates brings him to admit, first, that since justice can be nothing impious, nor piety anything unjust, piety and justice must be nearly alike; secondly, that since folly is the opposite of wisdom and of temperance, while every concept can have one opposite only, temperance and wisdom are one and the same.

e. Intermezzo, 333 d–338 e.

Socrates takes up another line of reasoning, in order to show further that temperance and justice coincide; but Protagoras, who sees himself at a disadvantage in these discussions, withdraws in a long, irrelevant discourse upon the relativity of the useful. Socrates, saying that he does not understand long discourses, wishes to drop the debate; but those present urge its continuance: viz., Callias, Alcibiades, Critias, Prodicus, who introduces and distinguishes a collection of synonyms, and Hippias, who, in magniloquent complimentary speech, proposes to institute a contest and to appoint an arbiter. Socrates and Protagoras finally accede to the general request; but Socrates decidedly rejects Hippias's proposal, and will have only a simple dialogue with Protagoras.

f. Exposition of the poem of Simonides, 338 e–348 a.

Protagoras assumes the part of questioner, and, since the interpretation of the poets is an essential requisite of true culture, points out a contradiction in a poem composed by Simonides in honor of Scopas, — the poet himself saying that it is hard to become good, and then criticising the saying of Pittacus that it is hard to be noble. Socrates says in the first place, that many, to resolve this difficulty, would appeal to Hesiod, and there find the thought that virtue is difficult to gain, but easy to maintain. Protagoras declaring that this contradicts the general experience, Socrates next beguiles Prodicus into the explanation that Simonides, in quoting from Pittacus the word *χαλεπός*, *difficult*, took it in the sense of *κακός*, *bad*. But to this Socrates opposes the words of Simonides which immediately follow; and now, thirdly, he gives his own interpretation. It was (he says) the purpose of Simonides, in the en-

tire poem, to combat the wisdom of Pittacus, which was condensed, after the manner of the oldest philosophers, especially of the Lacedaemonians, who were the greatest philosophers. Simonides says, therefore, that for man to become good, whether for a shorter or a longer time, is difficult, but possible; while to be good permanently is not difficult, but impossible. Socrates is able also to find in the poet his own conviction, that virtue is the knowledge of the good, while vice is the lack of this knowledge, and that no man voluntarily does wrong. Hippias approves of this interpretation, but wishes to bring forward still another of his own. This is deferred by Alcibiades, and Socrates sets forth how little in general is gained by such exposition of poetry.

g. Second dialogue between Protagoras and Socrates, 348 b-360 e.

Although reluctant, Protagoras now consents once more to make replies, and Socrates resumes the former discussion. He asks Protagoras whether he still considers the five special virtues as the five distinct parts of the one virtue; but the latter now states it as his doctrine, that justice, temperance, wisdom, and piety closely resemble one another, while courage is wholly distinct. But Socrates shows that courage as a virtue is always admirable, but that to courage belongs daring, and daring without knowledge is folly, and thus disgraceful; consequently courage cannot exist without knowledge, and wisdom and courage coincide.

Protagoras will not admit this conclusion, since, besides the daring which arises from knowledge, courage requires a certain natural endowment. Socrates, therefore, without taking up this objection, goes farther back in tracing the argument. He shows that, since the agreeable and the good, the disagreeable and the evil, are in their nature the same, no one knowingly chooses the evil and avoids the good; but that, when this seems to occur, it is owing to ignorance of the true good and evil; and that, consequently, the correct choice of the good and the competent avoidance of the evil rest upon knowledge. Accordingly, courage and fear must have knowledge as their foundation; therefore courage and wisdom coincide.

h. Conclusion, 360 e ff.

Socrates wonders that the course of their investigation has brought them both to views the reverse of those with which they started: he, who previously doubted whether virtue could be taught, now argues that it is wisdom, in which case it of course can be taught; while, contrariwise, Protagoras, who at the outset professed to be a teacher of virtue, now places it at the farthest remove from knowledge, involving the necessary consequence that it cannot be taught. He desires, therefore, very much to discuss carefully once more with Protagoras the question as to the nature of virtue. Protagoras commends Socrates's zeal, and expresses himself as ready for this discussion at another time; now he is otherwise engaged.

5. THE ARTISTIC ELEMENT.¹

Dramatic Art. — In few dialogues is the dramatic form so skilfully maintained, without being overborne by the philosophical development, as in the *Protagoras*. By the changing scenes, the variety in the treatment of the theme, the intermezzo, the repeated participation of the others present, and by the abrupt conclusion, the picture of a scene from real life is vivaciously sustained.

Noticeable, too, is the number of vividly elaborated characters: Socrates, ever genial, ready for a contest, clear, and, in his intellectual superiority, toying, under the guise of modest deference, with the shallow conceit of his opponents. Hippocrates, of noble character, but yielding blindly to a vague zeal for knowledge. Protagoras, in the consciousness of his reputation, and with vain confidence in his wisdom and virtue, disdainful towards the other sophists, condescending towards Socrates; always intent on display (as exhibited in his desire to discourse before the other sophists, in the myth, and in the exegesis of Simonides), impatient of contradiction, nettled when worsted, and yet, without foresight, entering upon Socrates's train of thought, which, simple as it seemed, involved his certain discomfiture; with no appreciation of

¹ R. Schöne, *über Pl. Protagoras*, *Platos Protagoras aufzufassen?* Oldenburg, 1865. pp. 23 ff., 54 ff.; Meinardus, *Wie ist*

the decisive importance of the result to which the discussion with Socrates has led, but imagining, like a true sophist, that it has been only a common contest of words. Prodicus, sickly, hollow-voiced, his mind surcharged with synonymic wisdom, and, thus fettered, liable to the greatest misconceptions. Hippias, pretentious and imposing, seeing, without appreciation of truth, in the exposition of the poem of Simonides, a mere opportunity for the display of his art. Finally, the impetuous Alcibiades and the tranquil Critias.

Many slighter touches enhance the vividness of the whole: ἐπιψηλαφήσας 310c, since it was dark; Socrates noticing the blush of Hippocrates 312a, ἤδη γὰρ ὑπέφαινε τι ἡμέρας, their standing awhile before Callias's house, so that the porter takes them for sophists; their pausing in the porch, in order to survey and to be able to describe the scene within; the chorus about Protagoras, Hippias's high seat, Prodicus in bed, the words καὶ ἄμα εἰς τὸν Ἰππίαν ἀπέβλεψε (sc. Protagoras) 318e.

Here belong, too, the parody of Protagoras's description of the antiquity of sophistry, in Socrates's remarks upon the philosophy of the Lacedaemonians; the skill in the imitation of Protagoras's half-poetical tone, in the myth, and of his verbosity; in the imitation of Prodicus's pedantic rage for synonyms, and of the pomposity of Hippias's language.

Narration of the Dialogue. — Why does Plato here, as in many other dialogues,¹ bring the conversation before us, not directly, but indirectly in a narration, in this case by Socrates? Cicero refers to the form as inconvenient, *Tusc.* i. 8 sed quo commodius disputationes nostrae explicentur, sic eas exponam, quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur. We see, in Plato, Socrates's fondness for this form of treatment frequently go so far that in conversation he throws the development of some thought of his own into the form of another conversation, held, or supposed to be held, with others, and rehearsed by himself. Here apparently we must assume that Plato followed a peculiar habit of Socrates, and ascribe to this the recital of

¹ Cf. *Phaedo*, *Symp.*, *Theaet.*, *Parm.*, the dramatic form is used in *Crito*, *Charm.*, *Lys.*, *Rep.* On the other hand, *Gorg.*, *Crat.*, *Phaedr.*, and others.

entire dialogues. This is the allusion of the passage in *Theaet.* 143b ἐγραψάμην δὲ δὴ οὕτως τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη διηγούμενον, ὡς διηγείτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον οἷς ἔφη διαλεχθῆναι. By the interlocutory form of his writings, Plato aimed to avoid the appearance of theoretical coldness and exclusiveness, in his investigation of the highest concerns of men; and rather to connect this investigation, through Socrates, with daily experience, and thus to represent it as closely related to common life; he also sought, in the modest garb of social conversation, to bring his reasonings to general comprehension, and to commend them to general acceptance. Moreover, by this form of recital, he avoided the impression of arbitrary invention, gained the effect of real occurrence, and gave an obvious reason for the fact that the memory of such a conversation here retained details more accurately and fully, there recalled only the more weighty portions.¹

The Myth.—Plato not infrequently yielded to the poetic impulse within him, giving in myths symbolical glimpses of thoughts which seemed to lie beyond the realm of human knowledge, and the proof of which was as yet unattained by the philosopher; or, again, connecting through myths the results of speculation with the faith of the fathers. From these myths that of Protagoras is to be clearly distinguished. The sophists do not aim at truth and conviction; they will rather catch and control men's minds by the arts of persuasion. Anything which will please is sought. Knowing well the charm of the legend, the mythical poem, they make it their method to dazzle by the brilliant coloring of the myth. However agreeable the narrative of Protagoras sounds, it has little symbolical depth; its intended lesson, that all men have a share in virtue, is not conveyed by the character of the narrated events, but rests merely upon an arbitrary command, which is put into the mouth of Zeus.² When, however, Protagoras is made to express many thoughts in themselves true and admirable, as upon the contrast between man's intellectual pre-eminence and his physical helplessness, between mental resource and moral endowment, upon the nature and object of punishment, upon painstaking in

¹ Peipers, *die Erkenntnistheorie Platos*, pp. 689 f.

² Schleiermacher, p. 234. Grote, *Plato*, ii. 45 ff., takes another view.

education, this is not done with the object of introducing elements essential to the fundamental idea of the dialogue; it is done from the necessity of pointing out, in its main features, the inferior point of view adopted by Protagoras, a prominent and sensible man; a point of view not involving absolute falsehood, but for that very reason the more dangerous, because the errors are mixed with truth.

Some have supposed that Plato borrowed the substance of the myth, or derived hints of it, from some writing of Protagoras.¹ This would not agree with the purpose, everywhere manifest in this dialogue, to paint Protagoras, not as in actual appearance, but in ideal truth. We must therefore believe that, following a common custom of Protagoras and other sophists (*e.g.* Prodicus's *Hercules*), Plato himself invented the myth in the spirit and method of Protagoras. He adopts, with free changes, the tradition of the forming of men by Prometheus,² and the ideas which Aeschylus has wrought out in his *Prometheus* trilogy.³

THE POEM OF SIMONIDES.⁴

Next to myths, the sophists were fond of introducing the discussion of famous poems into their discourses, in order to give these zest; they took special pride, too, in showing their own acuteness in masterpieces of interpretation, and in pointing out contradictions or errors in the poets. Thus Plato, who had no idea of giving Protagoras the victory in a dialectic contest with Socrates, makes the sophist propose for discussion a poem, doubtless at that time famous, by Simonides, whose renown filled Athens and all Greece. Protagoras, amid general applause (339 d), points

¹ Zeller, *Philos. d. Gr.* i. 775 r. *Per contra*, Steinhart, i. 422, 499.

² Preller in *Philologus*, vii. 56 ff.

³ Schömann zu Aesch. *Prometheus*, pp. 51, 131.

⁴ See, besides the commentators on Plato, Lehrs, *de Aristarchi Studiis Hom.* pp. 47 f.; Schneidewin, *Simonidis Reliquiae*, pp. 20 ff.; K. F. Hermann, *Platon. Philosophie*, p. 623; Bernhardt, *Griech. Lit.* ii³. 700; Susemihl, *Genet.*

Entwickl. der Plat. Philos. i. 50 f.; Schöne, *über Pl. Protag.* pp. 37 ff.; Steinthal, *Geschichte d. Sprachwiss. b. d. Griechen u. Römern*, pp. 128 f.; Meinardus, *Wie ist Platos Protag. aufzufassen?* pp. 35 ff.; F. Blass, *Rhein. Mus.* xxvii. 326 ff.; Madvig, *Kleine Philol. Schriften*, pp. 412 ff.; Reber, *Platons Kritik eines Liedes des Simonides*, *Zeitsch. f. Gymnasialw.* xx. 422 ff.

out a contradiction in this poem. How entirely such discussions of poetic passages fail to bring out clear conceptions, Socrates sets forth vigorously. Why then does Plato here represent him as entering into such a discussion? In order to understand this, we must first ask, what was the true meaning of the poem of Simonides? and, secondly, is the exposition given by Socrates meant to be taken in earnest?

The portion of the poem which Plato gives is all that remains to us, and we cannot be entirely sure of the order of the parts; that, however, is probably the true order, which, partly following hints of Schleiermacher, G. Hermann proposed in the following metrical scheme:—

STROPHES.

/	υ	υ	—	υ	υ	—	υ	/	υ	—	/	υ	υ	υ						
x	/	υ	/	υ	υ	—	υ	—	x	υ	—	υ	υ	—	υ	—	υ	/	υ	—
υ	υ	/	υ	—	x	υ	/	υ	υ	—	υ	—	x	υ	/	υ	υ	—	υ	υ
x	υ	/	υ	—	x	υ	/	υ	υ	—										
x	/	υ	—	x	υ	/	υ	υ	—											
υ	/	—	υ	/	—															
x	υ	/	υ	υ	—	—	/	υ	υ	—	υ	—	υ							

EPODE.

υ	/	—	/	—																
υ	/	/	υ	υ	—															
x	υ	/	υ	υ	—	υ	—	x	υ	—	υ	υ	x	υ	/	υ	υ	—	υ	υ
/	υ	υ	—	υ	υ	—														
/	υ	υ	—	υ	υ	—	υ													
x	υ	/	υ	υ	—	υ	—	/	υ	—	—									
x	υ	/	υ	υ	—	υ	—	υ	/	υ	—	—								

Στροφή α'.

ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν,
 χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.

(Five verses are wanting.)

Ἄντιστρ. α'.

οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιπτάκειον νέμεται,
 καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον · χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.
 5 θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχει γέρας · ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,

ὄν ἀμάχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.
 πράξαις γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
 κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς, καὶ
 τοῦπιπλείστον ἄριστοι, τοὺς κε θεοὶ φιλέωσιν.

Ἐπώδὸς α'.

- 10 ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ
 ὅς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ἦ
 μηδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰδὼς γ' ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν, ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ.
 οὐ μιν ἐγὼ μωμήσομαι·
 οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ φιλόμωμος·
 15 τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων ἀπείρων γενέθλα.
 πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχροὰ μὴ μέμικται.

Στροφή β'.

- τοῦνεκεν οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατόν
 διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω
 πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυέδους ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός·
 20 ἐπὶ τ' ὕμνιν εὐρὼν ἀπαγγελέω.
 πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω,
 ἐκὼν ὅστις ἔρδη
 μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

Bergk (*Poetae lyrici Graeci*, 4th ed., or *Anthologia Lyrica*, 3d ed.) does not recognize an epode, but arranges the lines as follows:¹—

Στροφή α'.

ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι
 χαλεπὸν χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.

¹ Blass has followed the same order, only that he believes that of the first strophe only vv. 1, 2 remain, and of the second, vv. 1, 2 are lost; and that, with the exception of these five verses of the first, and two of the second, the entire poem in its four strophes is quoted by Plato. This view seems untenable. For, apart from the ex-

punging of vv. 10, 14, and the alteration of v. 11 (ὅς ἂν ἦ κακός) for the sake of adapting it to the strophic measure, there is the further objection that Socrates 346 c says that the words vv. 11 ff. are addressed to Pittacus, who, upon this view, is not named until afterwards. It would at least be said that the words *at the*

ὅς ἂν ἦ¹ κακὸς μὴδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰδὼς γ' ὄνασίπολιν δίκαν
 ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ · οὐδὲ μὴ μιν ἐγὼ
 5 μωμάσομαι · τῶν γὰρ ἀλιθίων
 ἀπείρων γενέθλα.
 πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχροῖα μὴ μέμικται.

Στροφή β'.

οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιπτάκειον
 νέμεται, καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον · χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν
 ἔμμεναι.
 10 θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας · ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
 ὃν ἀμάχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.
 πράξαις γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
 κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς (τι) ·
 καὶ τὸ πλείστον ἄριστοι, τοὺς θεοὶ φιλέωντι.

Στροφή γ'.

15 τοῦνεκεν οὔποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι
 δυνατὸν διζήμενος, κενεὰν ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,
 πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρνεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός.
 ἐπὶ τ' ὕμνιν εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω,
 πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω,
 20 ἐκὼν ὅστις ἔρδη
 μὴδὲν αἰσχρόν, ἀνάγκα δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

The poem could hardly have been an epinician ode, as there is not the slightest expression indicating this, while its entire contents are such as to be scarcely reconcilable with the victor's praise. It is rather a Scolion, a table-song, performed by a chorus at a feast of Scopas, like the Pindaric *Frag.* 99 ff. Bgk.²

very opening of the poem were also addressed to Pittacus. The discriminating remark of Schleiermacher also sustains the former order, viz. that when Socrates 346 d, after the words πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχροῖα μὴ μέμικται, continues καὶ οὐ ζητῶ κτέ., the sequence of vv. 17 ff. following v. 16 appears manifest. That τὰ ἐπιόντα

345 c has no bearing, is shown by 344 a. The words πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι κτέ. 344 a b make it improbable that the greater part of the poem is preserved.

¹ V. 3, 'emendavi δς ἂν ἦ κακός deleta negatione μή, quae facile ex sequentibus repeti potest.' Bergk.

² Blass, p. 332.

It embodies the thought that we should be mild in our judgment of men's deeds. To be always good is a prerogative of the gods. Man is often ensnared in guilt by overpowering fate; it is difficult for him, even for a moment, to show himself perfect. He must content himself with moderate attainments, if only he fall into no shameful deeds. Thus Polybius also understood the poem, xxix. 7 a (p. 1043 Bk.), ὥστε καὶ λίαν ἀληθὲς φαίνεσθαι τὸ ῥηθὲν ὑπὸ Σιμωνίδου "χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι." ἔχειν μὲν γὰρ ὄρμας εἰς τὰ καλὰ καὶ μέχρι τινὸς ἀντιποιήσασθαι τούτων εὐμαρές, ὁμαλίσαι δὲ καὶ κατὰ πᾶσαν περίστασιν ἐπίμονον γίγνεσθαι τῇ γνώμῃ, μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ δικαίου προὔργαιότερον τιθέμενον, δυσχερές.

Socrates has interpreted correctly most of the poem, bringing out with entire justice the antithesis of γενέσθαι and ἔμμεναι in Simonides, and the pregnant meaning which Simonides, himself misinterpreting, put into the ἔμμεναι of Pittacus, while the latter certainly intended his χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι as synonymous with ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι χαλεπόν. We can, however, by no means agree in all points with Plato's exegesis. The relation of the μὲν, the connecting of ἀλαθέως with χαλεπόν, the separation of ἐκῶν from ἔρδη, the taking of the words ἔμοιγε ἔξαρκεῖ κτέ. as in opposition to Pittacus, we must hold to be absolutely erroneous.

When now we consider that in the language of common life one might very easily speak of one as ἀλαθέως ἀγαθός, while, to the keenness of the Socratic thought, this must of course seem foolish (343 e); that, furthermore, by the separation of ἐκῶν from ἔρδη a thought is removed which ran counter to Socrates's most characteristic conviction, namely, that no one does wrong of his own free will; and that, on the contrary, by connecting ἐκῶν with ἐπαίνημι (346 a) a thought is gained which is in perfect harmony with the fine moral sense of Socrates; we are brought unavoidably to the conviction that Plato was not throughout entirely in earnest in his exposition. True, at this early stage of grammatical exegesis, as it was brought into activity by the sophists, errors, even on Plato's part, would be nothing strange. Still, Socrates wholly condemned the extreme use and abuse of the exposition of the poets by the sophists; and, while refuting the opinions and explanations of the latter, and replacing them with those more tenable, it is wholly

consistent with his view, that he does not aim everywhere to draw out the meaning of the poet, but exerts himself to discover in the poem his own ideas, or even skilfully to interpolate and superimpose them. In fact, Socrates believed that in such study of poetic passages, people always explained them according to their wish, and recognized in them their own views. To this endeavor to discover characteristic Socratic ideas, belongs noticeably the working out of the thought (345 b) that the loss of knowledge alone lies at the root of moral deterioration. Socrates now proceeds to explain the poem cited by Protagoras, in order to show how easily he, too, after the manner of the sophists, can support his views by such a method. With the very purpose of showing how such exposition adapts itself to every requirement, and how every man can foist his opinion into a poem which does not properly contain it, Socrates himself must, through skilful interpretation, find here striking ideas of his own. His explanation commands general assent; and thus, through the ethical principles discovered in the poem, he has gained important support in the question at issue between himself and Protagoras, and has shown himself superior to the latter with this weapon also of the sophistic art.

6. IDEA AND AIM OF THE DIALOGUE.¹

Expositors formerly gave it as the aim of the *Protagoras* to point out the method of the sophists as vicious and inadequate, which indeed is manifestly true in relation to the concept of virtue, — the subject which they were most wont to treat. Or, again, the task of the dialogue was regarded as a double one, to exhibit the ignorance of the sophists upon the very subject of their teaching, — namely, virtue, — and also the perversity of their method.

Recently, however, there has been an increasing tendency to ascribe to the dialogue, not merely this negative purpose, but, as

¹ Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, Steinhart, in their *Introductions*; Hermann, *Plat. Philos.* i. 457; Zeller, *Plat. Studien*, pp. 161 f., and *Zeitschr. f. Alt.* 1851, p. 249; Brandis *Gesch. d. Griech. Philos.* ii. 1, pp. 454 ff.; Susemihl,

Genet. Entwicklung der Plat. Philos. i. 57; Schöne, *über Pl. Protag.* pp. 58 ff.; Grote, *Plato*, ii. 29 ff., especially pp. 48, 51; Meinardus, *Wie ist Platons Protagoras aufzufassen?* Oldenburg, 1865.

a positive aim, the scientific treatment of virtue, which consists in tracing it back to knowledge, and in showing that it is a unit and can be taught; and this view of virtue proves its correctness by the exposure of the absurdities and contradictions of the opposed sophistic method.

Nevertheless, when we take into account the large portion devoted to the exposition of the sophistic method, showing how it is fitted to secure outward effect and applause, but does not strive for clear conceptions by rigorous and orderly thought; how it may dazzle the mind by intellectual glitter, but cannot produce calm conviction; we are forced to recognize the negative and polemical side as the predominant one. We are therefore brought to the recognition of the purpose of the dialogue as *the statement and refutation of the empty and perverted doctrine of virtue held by Protagoras, in both form and contents*. Naturally, much of the argument applies at the same time to the sophists in general.

The Greeks regarded virtue as incapable of being taught, as says Theognis, vs. 429 ff.,

φῦσαι καὶ θρέψαι ῥᾶον βροτόν, ἢ φρένας ἐσθλὰς
 ἐνθέμεν· οὐδεὶς πω τοῦτό γ' ἐπεφράσατο,
 ᾧ τις σῶφρον' ἔθηκε τὸν ἄφρονα κακὸν κακοῦ ἐσθλόν.
 ἀλλὰ διδάσκων
 οὐ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ' ἀγαθόν,

and it must have seemed so, since virtue appeared to rest only upon an obscure moral feeling. When now Protagoras and the sophists announced themselves as teachers of virtue, they did this either through conceit, believing they could teach and produce results by high-sounding and plausible exhortations; or through a confusion of thought, substituting for morality mental quickness and rhetorical skill, while making a show of teaching purity of soul. This had a most pernicious influence on the general morals. For this reason Socrates sought, and Plato in this dialogue seeks, to expose the hollowness and vanity, in both matter and form, of this sophistic teaching, which as yet always lay at the basis of the popular views. Obviously this can be accomplished only by contrasting with the doctrine thus attacked something positive, which the conflict shall bring out into increasing clearness. So it

happens that Socrates, starting from the common view of the nature of virtue, has at the outset denied that it can be taught, but at the end of the discussion, maintains, in opposition to Protagoras, that it can. For he has pointed out, in his discussion with Protagoras, another and a higher virtue, which rests upon knowledge, upon a clear apprehension of the good, and which, for the very reason that it rests upon this ground, must be a unit.

The dialogue closes with the hint that the inquiry is not yet concluded, but needs a more thorough investigation and a broader foundation. The points which seemed to Plato most to need further examination, were, probably, the determination of the true nature of knowledge (357b εἰσαυθὺς σκεψόμεθα), since the propriety of the co-ordination and interchange of the terms σοφία and ἐπιστήμη, while tacitly accepted, has not been demonstrated; again, the question wherein the nature of virtue itself is to be recognized; how the special virtues, justice, wisdom, temperance, courage, piety, are related to one another and to the one virtue; with what right, good and agreeable, evil and disagreeable, have been assumed as coextensive ideas.

7. TIME OF THE COMPOSITION.

The exact time at which Plato wrote this dialogue can be as little determined as can the dates of most of the others. But, observing the negative indications, we notice the admission of piety as a fifth virtue, in which Plato here follows Socrates, although later he allows only four special virtues. Furthermore, Plato here still recognizes with Socrates only philosophic virtue (μετ' ἐπιστήμης), while he afterwards admits also civic virtue (μετ' ἀληθοῦς δόξης) as valid in a certain way. We notice finally that he still brings forward the Socratic view of the simple coincidence of the concepts good and agreeable, while later he has defined and developed the concept of the good far more profoundly. We can therefore with certainty, so far as certainty is attainable respecting the time of the composition of Plato's dialogues, determine that the *Protagoras* is one of the earliest of the writings of Plato.

Bonitz has recently shown (*Hermes*, iii. 447 ff., and see on 321c) that Aristotle was acquainted with the dialogue.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ
ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.

(In the Introductory Conversation.)

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

(In the Narrated Dialogue.)

ΙΠΠΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

ΚΑΛΛΙΑΣ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

ΚΡΙΤΙΑΣ.

ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ.

ΠΡΟΔΙΚΟΣ.

ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ.

ΙΠΠΙΑΣ.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ.

St. p. 309.

I. ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. Πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνει; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὄραν; καὶ μὴν μοι καὶ πρῶν ἰδόντι καλὸς μὲν ἐφαίμετο ἀνὴρ ἔτι, ἀνὴρ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν εἰρήσθαι, καὶ
5 πώγωνος ἤδη ὑποπιμπλάμενος.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἶτα τί τοῦτο; οὐ σὺ μέντοι Ὀμήρου ἐπαι-
νέτης εἶ, ὃς ἔφη χαριεστάτην ἤβην εἶναι τοῦ ὑπηνήτου, ἣν
νῦν Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔχει;

³⁰⁹
^a I. 1. Cicero translated (Prisc. vi. 63), Quid tu? unde tandem appares, o Socrate? an id quidem non dubium est, quin ab Alcibiade?—φαίνει: make one's appearance (cf. 315 e) was used popularly in the sense of ἡκειν, παρῆναι. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 8. 1 πόθεν, ἔφη, Εὔθηρε, φαίνει;—δῆλα: sc. ἐστὶ, here used adj. (cf. 330 a); not the particle δηλαδή—

2. κυνηγεσίου: all languages apply the terms of the chase to the pursuit of love. Cf. Soph. 222 d τῆ τῶν ἐρώων τῶν θήρα τὸν νοῦν οὐπω προσέσχεσ, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24 Ἀλκιβιάδης δ' αὖ διὰ μὲν κάλλος ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν γυναικῶν θηρώμενος.—This subst. is without a preceding art., just as though the following attribute τοῦ . . . ὄραν were lacking. See H. 668 a.

3. καλὸς ἀνὴρ: pred., cf. 341 a. Others would read ἀνὴρ, as subj.; but this anticipates the following ἀνὴρ μέντοι. The youth in Athens, on the completion of his eighteenth year, became legally ἀνὴρ (ἐπειδὴ εἰς ἄνδρας

δοκιμασθεῖεν Isocr. vii. 37) by registration in the roll of the citizens of his deme.

4. ὡς . . . εἰρήσθαι: for the inf. abs. see G. 268; H. 956. Cf. 339 e.—The slight blemish should receive a bare allusion.—αὐτοῖς: in such connections is nearly equiv. to μόνοις. Cf. Parm. 137 a ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν, Xen. An. ii. 3. 7 αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνδράσι . . . ἢ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, Ar. Ach. 504 αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐσμεν, we are by ourselves. Cf. 320 a d, 337 c.

6. τί τοῦτο: sc. ἐστίν, cf. 310 d. An elliptical formula of daily life, nearly equiv. to τί τοῦτο διαφέρει; 331 c.—οὐ . . . μέντοι: the more common declaration, σὺ μέντοι ἐπαινέτης εἶ, you surely agree with, is expressed interr. with οὐ. Cf. Theaet. 163 e μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι; Phaedr. 229 b, οὐκ ἐνθένδε μέντοι ποθὲν λέγεται ὁ Βορέας τὴν Ὀρείθυιαν ἀρπάσαι; Charm. 159 b οὐ τῶν καλῶν μέντοι ἢ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ;

7. Cf. Hom. Ω 347 of Hermes, βῆ δ' ἰέναι κούρω αἰσυμνητῆρι (a princely

ΕΤ. Τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἢ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνει; καὶ πῶς
10 πρὸς σέ ὁ νεανίας διάκειται;

ΣΩ. Εὖ, ἔμοιγε ἔδοξεν, οὐχ ἤκιστα δὲ καὶ τῇ νῦν ἡμέρᾳ·
καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε, βοηθῶν ἐμοί· καὶ οὖν καὶ
ἄρτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι. ἄτοπον μέντοι τί σοι ἐθέλω
εἰπεῖν· παρόντος γὰρ ἐκείνου οὔτε προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν
15 ἐπελανθανόμην τε αὐτοῦ θαμά.

ΕΤ. Καὶ τί ἂν γεγονὸς εἴη περὶ σέ κακείνον τοσοῦ- c
τον πρᾶγμα; οὐ γὰρ δήπου τινὶ καλλίονι ἐνέτυχες ἄλλῳ
ἔν γε τῆδε τῇ πόλει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ πολὺ γε.

20 ΕΤ. Τί φήσ; ἀστῶ ἢ ξένω;

ΣΩ. Ξένω.

ΕΤ. Ποδαπῶ;

ΣΩ. Ἀβδηρίτη.

ΕΤ. Καὶ οὕτω καλὸς τις ὁ ξένος ἔδοξέ σοι εἶναι, ὥστε
25 τοῦ Κλεινίου υἱέος καλλίων σοι φανῆναι;

³⁰⁹
b youth) εἰκώς, | πρῶτον ὑπηνήτη, τοῦ
περ χαριστάτη ἦβη. So κ279. These
verses, from which the sculptors
afterwards derived the type of the
statues of Hermes, are here peculiarly
apt, since Alcibiades himself had
served as a model for such statues.
Cf. Clem. Al. *Protrept.* § 53, p. 47 P.
καὶ οἱ λιθοξόοι τοὺς Ἑρμᾶς Ἀθήνησι
πρὸς Ἀλκιβιάδην ἀπείκασον. — Since
the words are quoted from Homer,
the customary Attic art. (χαριστά-
την τὴν ἦβην) is wanting. — ὑπηνή-
του: that this even without πρῶτον
indicates the first bloom of youth,
is shown by Photius, *Lex.*, ὑπηνήτη·
ἀκμαίω· ἄρτι γενειῶντι, and Pollux ii.
10, ὑπηνήτης, ἐν ἡρι τῆς ὥρας, ἐν ἀκμῇ,
ἐν ἄνθει.

9. τί . . . νῦν: reverting to the origi-
nal question.

12. καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι: Socrates an- ³⁰⁹
swers the first question last, and in b
truth I have just, etc. See H. 1048, 2.
— ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε: cf. 336 b; 348 b.

14. παρόντος . . . θαμά: this ἀτοπόν
τι serves to excite the wonder of the
ἔταιρος and whets the curiosity of the
reader. — οὔτε, τε: for the correlation,
cf. 347 e, 361 e. See H. 1044 a.

18. ἐν τῆδε τῇ πόλει: i.e. in Athens. c
ἦδε ἢ πόλις (like ἐνθάδε, τῆδε) refers
to the city in or near which is the
speaker; ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει, relatively,
to the city previously mentioned; cf.
Gorg. 468 e.

19. πολὺ γε: sc. καλλίονι ἐνέτυχον.
γέ is freq. used in answers, strength-
ening the thought of the question,
and may often be rendered *yes*.

24. τις: sometimes, as here, adds
indefiniteness to the meaning of

ΣΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλει, ὦ μακάριε, τὸ σοφώτερον κάλλιον φαίνεσθαι;

ΕΤ. Ἄλλ' ἢ σοφῶ τιμι ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐντυχῶν πάρει;

30 ΣΩ. Σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν δήπου τῶν γε νῦν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ α σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας.

ΕΤ. Ἄ τί λέγεις; Πρωταγόρας ἐπιδεδήμηκεν;

ΣΩ. Τρίτην γε ἤδη ἡμέραν.

ΕΤ. Καὶ ἄρτι ἄρα ἐκείνῳ συγγεγονῶς ἤκεις;

35 ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε, πολλὰ καὶ εἰπὼν καὶ ἀκούσας. 310

ΕΤ. Τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν, εἰ μὴ σέ τι κωλύει, καθιζόμενος ἐνταυθί, ἐξαναστήσας τὸν παῖδα τουτονί;

309
c
adjs. and advs., thus enlarging and strengthening them, as the Lat. *quidam*. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* i. 3. 12 ὡς δεινὴν τινα λέγεις δύναμιν τοῦ φιλήματος εἶναι, *how dreadful indeed, etc.*, Thuc. i. 138. 3 (Θεμιστοκλῆς) διαφερόντως τι . . . ἄξιος θαυμάσαι, *in a remarkable degree, etc.*

26. πῶς οὐ μέλλει: *why should not?* This and τί οὐ μέλλει are common phrases with Plato.—τὸ σοφώτερον . . . φαίνεσθαι: the words have a proverbial sound (as e.g. Sappho said ὁ δὲ κάγαθος αὐτίκα καὶ κάλος ἔσσεται Frag. 101 Bgk.), the personal application being made only in the following σοφῶ and σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν. The new κάλλος is in a different realm from that of Alcibiades, σοφώτερον not necessarily implying that Alcibiades is in any true sense σοφός.

30. μὲν οὖν: *immo vero, nay rather.*

d 31. Πρωταγόρας: the delay in uttering the name intensifies its effect.

310
a 36. τί . . . οὐ διηγῆσω: cf. 317 d; *Symp.* 173 b τί οὖν, ἔφη, οὐ διηγῆσω μοι; *Phaedo* 86 d εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; The

surprise that the action has not already taken place contains an urgent exhortation to its performance (GMT. 19, N. 6), but εἰ μὴ σέ τι κωλύει here and ἵνα ἐπακούσωσιν 317 d, show that the expression has become a mere formula of exhortation. So the pres. in 310 e τί οὐ βαδίζομεν;

37. We may picture a scene like the one in *Charm.* 155 b. Socrates is invited by some friends (ἡμῖν, ἀκούετε) who are sitting in a palaestra or a 'lesche,' to take a seat and discourse to them. An Athenian would hardly walk abroad without at least one slave, while the wealthy had many, and those who owned none frequently attempted to conceal their poverty by hiring attendants. The manners of these slaves are described in [*Xen.*] *Rep. Ath.* i. 10 τῶν δούλων . . . πλείστη ἐστὶν Ἀθήνησιν ἀκολασία, καὶ οὔτε πατάξαι ἔξεστιν αὐτόθι, οὔτε ὑπεκστήσεται σοι (*give place to you*) ὁ δούλος, *Ag. Nub.* 7 οὐδὲ κολάσ' ἔξεστί μοι τοὺς οἰκέτας. Socrates evidently must secure his own seat.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ χάριν γε εἶσομαι, εἴαν
40 ἀκούητε.

ΕΠ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡμεῖς σοί, εἴαν λέγῃς.

ΣΩ. Διπλῆ γ' ἂν εἴῃ ἡ χάρις. ἄλλ' οὖν ἀκούετε.

II. Τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου, Ἴπποκράτης, ὁ Ἀπολλοδώρου υἱὸς Φάσωνος δὲ ἀδελφός, τὴν θύραν τῆ βακτηρία πάνυ σφόδρα ἔκρουε, ^b καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ ἀνέωξέ τις, εὐθύς εἶσω ἦειν ἐπειγόμενος, ^b καὶ τῆ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγρήγορας ἢ καθεύδεις; καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν φωνὴν γνοὺς αὐτοῦ, Ἴπποκράτης, ἔφην, οὗτος· μή τι νεώτερον ἀγγέλλεις; Οὐδέν γ', ἢ δ' ὅς, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθὰ γε. Εὖ ἂν λέγοις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἔστι

³¹⁰
^a 42. διπλῆ κτέ.: proverbial, cf. Soph. Ph. 1370 χούτω διπλῆν μὲν ἐξ ἐμοῦ κτήσει χάριν (you will gain double thanks), | διπλῆν δὲ πατρός.

II. 1. From this point to the end of the dialogue Socrates narrates the circumstances of his interview with Protagoras. — βαθέος ὄρθρου: cf. Crito, 43 a ὄρθρος βαθύς.

2. δὲ ἀδελφός: in such double specifications, the Greek regularly uses δέ, without μὲν in the former member. Cf. Xen. An. i. 7. 9 Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος παῖς, ἐμὸς δὲ ἀδελφός, Aesch. Pers. 150 μήτηρ βασιλέως, βασίλεια δ' ἐμή, Hdt. vii. 10 πατρὶ τῷ σῷ, ἀδελφεῷ δὲ ἐμῷ, Δαρείῳ, ἠγόρευον, Isae. ix. 23 ἐμὲ γὰρ υἱὸν ὄντα Θεοφράστου σαυτοῦ δὲ ἀδελφιδοῦν ἀποστειρεῖς ἃ μοι οἱ νόμοι ἔδωσαν.

^b 4. τὸς: Socrates, of course, had no special θυρωρός. Cf. 314 c. — εὐθύς κτέ.: he bursts in, without asking whether Socrates is awake, or decorously waiting to be announced.

6. Ἴπποκράτης οὗτος: not an address, since this would not be suited to

the situation; but Socrates, who only ³¹⁰ hears his approaching visitor, without ^b seeing him, remarks *That is Hippocrates*. Similarly Hipposthenidas in Plutarch *de genio Socr.* c. 18 χλίδων, ἔφη, νῆ τὸν Ἡρακλέα· φεῦ, μή τι χαλεπώτερον συμβέβηκε; Alcibiades in *Symp.* 213 b τουτὶ τί ἦν; Σωκράτης οὗτος; Shakspeare *Jul. Caes.* i. 3 'Casca, by your voice.'

7. νεώτερον: the comp. in the questions of the curious Athenians (τί νεώτερον;) is familiar. The conservative view, 'The new is rarely good,' often allowed νεώτερος and νέος to stand as euphemistic expressions for κακός. Compare the uses of νεωτερίζειν. Cf. Eur. *Med.* 37 δέδοικα δ' αὐτὴν μή τι βουλευσῆ νέον, Soph. *Ant.* 242, *Ph.* 784. As μή disclosed this sense in Socrates's question, Hippocrates hastened to allay his apprehension.

8. εὖ ἂν λέγοις: not positive, like *Apol.* 24 e εὖ λέγεις, but like our "That were well." Cf. Soph. *O. C.* 647 μέγ' ἂν λέγοις δώρημα τῆς ξυνουσίας.

δὲ τί, καὶ τοῦ ἔνεκα τηνικάδε ἀφίκου; Πρωταγόρας, ἔφη,
 10 ἦκει, στὰς παρ' ἐμοί. Πρώην, ἔφην ἐγώ· σὺ δὲ ἄρτι
 πέπυσαι; Νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, ἑσπέρας γε. καὶ ἅμα ^c
 ἐπιψηλαφήσας τοῦ σκίμποδος ἐκαθέζετο παρὰ τοὺς πόδας
 μου καὶ εἶπεν· Ἐσπέρας δῆτα, μάλα γε ὄψὲ ἀφικόμενος
 ἐξ Οἰνόης. ὁ γάρ τοι παῖς με ὁ Σάτυρος ἀπέδρα· καὶ
 15 δῆτα μέλλων σοι φράζειν, ὅτι διωξιόμεν αὐτόν, ὑπό τινος
 ἄλλου ἐπελαθόμεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἦλθον καὶ δεδειπνηκότες
 ἦμεν καὶ ἐμέλλομεν ἀναπαύεσθαι, τότε μοι ἀδελφὸς λέγει,

³¹⁰ 9. τηνικάδε: cf. l. 1, above.

^b 10. πρώην: here equiv. to τρίτην ἡμέραν, cf. 309 d. So, too, in the formula χθὲς καὶ πρώην. — Socrates's quiet manner is contrasted with the excitement of Hippocrates.

^c 11. νῆ τοὺς θεούς: as though he needed to apologize for not coming sooner. — ἑσπέρας: but not ἐχθὲς γ' ἑσπέρας, for the civil day with the Greeks was reckoned from sunset to sunset, cf. 313 b.

12. ἐπιψηλαφήσας: for it was dark. Cf. *Phaedo* 99 b ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ ἐν σκότει, *Ar. Pax* 691 ἐψηλαφῶμεν ἐν σκότῳ τὰ πράγματα. — σκίμποδος: the frame of the low bed upon which Socrates was still lying. Cf. Eust. on *Hom.* Π 612 τὸν παρ' Ἀττικοῖς σκίμποδα, εὐτελεῆ κλίνην καὶ χαμαλήν, πελάζουσαν τῇ γῆ, *Ar. Nub.* 709 ἐκ τοῦ σκίμποδος | δάκνουσί μ' ἐξέρποντες οἱ Κορίνθιοι.

13. ἑσπέρας δῆτα: yes, last evening. δῆτα is strengthened from δή, Hippocrates resuming after a pause.

14. Οἰνόης: one deme of this name lay N.W. from Athens upon Mt. Cithaeron near Eleutherae, another N.E. near Marathon. The former must here be meant, as by this route fugitive slaves sooner reached the limits of

Attica. — The frequent wars greatly ³¹⁰ facilitated the escape of discontented ^c slaves. — ὁ Σάτυρος: shows that Socrates knows the slave, as also μέλλων σοι φράζειν reveals the intimacy existing between Socrates and Hippocrates.

15. ὑπό . . . ἐπελαθόμεν: the freq. Attic usage of a neut. verb. const., like a pass., with ὑπό and the gen. of the cause. Cf. *Apol.* 17 a ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἔμαντοῦ ἐπελαθόμεν, *Xen. An.* v. 5. 9 ἀξιούμεν ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἀγαθὸν μὲν τι πάσχειν, κακὸν δὲ μηδέν, *Lys.* xii. 96, *Thuc.* iii. 96. 1 Ἡσίοδος ὁ ποιητῆς λέγεται ὑπὸ τῶν ταύτη ἀποθανεῖν. See H. 819 d. — ἦλθον: for ἐπανῆλθον. Plato and other Attic writers freq. prefer simple to compound verbs. Cf. 320 a γεγονέναι for διαγεγονέναι, 321 c ἔρχεται for ἐπέρχεται. — δεδειπνηκότες: among the Attic Greeks the three meals were termed ἀκράτισμα breakfast, ἄριστον lunch, δεῖπνον dinner; in Homer, ἄριστον, δεῖπνον, δόρπον. The δεῖπνον was perhaps unusually late on this occasion, because Hippocrates had been awaited; still, it was often taken after sunset, cf. *Lys.* i. 22 τούτῳ ἡλίου δεδουκότος ἰόντι ἐξ ἀγροῦ ἀπήντησα . . . ἐκέλευον συνδειπνεῖν.

ὅτι ἤκει Πρωταγόρας. καὶ ἔτι μὲν ἐνεχείρησα εὐθὺς παρὰ
 σὲ ἰέναι, ἔπειτὰ μοι λίαν πόρρω ἔδοξε τῶν νυκτῶν εἶναι. **d**
 20 ἐπειδὴ δὲ τάχιστα με ἐκ τοῦ κόπου ὁ ὕπνος ἀνῆκεν, εὐθὺς
 ἀναστάς, οὕτω δεῦρο ἐπορευόμην. καὶ ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων
 αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν πτοίησιν, Τί οὖν σοι, ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, τοῦτο; μῶν τί σε ἀδικεῖ Πρωταγόρας; καὶ ὃς γελά-
 σας, Νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι γε μόνος
 25 ἐστὶ σοφός, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐ ποιεῖ. Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἔφην
 ἐγώ, ἂν αὐτῷ διδῶς ἀργύριον καὶ πείθης ἐκείνον, ποιήσει
 καὶ σὲ σοφόν. Εἰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί, ἐν

³¹⁰
c 18. ἔτι μὲν . . . ἔπειτα: cf. Xen. An. vi. 2. 15 Ξενοφῶν δὲ ἔτι μὲν ἐπε-
 χείρησεν . . . ἐκπλεῦσαι, θυομένῳ δὲ αὐτῷ
 . . . ἐσήμηνεν ὁ θεὸς . . . συστρατεύεσθαι.
 Strictly, Xen. still wished to sail away,
 when, etc.; or, paratactically, Xen. still
 wished to sail away, but, etc.; i.e. at
 first Xen. wished to sail away, but then,
 etc. Hell. ii. 4. 11 οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Φυλῆς ἔτι
 μὲν ἐπεχείρησαν μὴ ἀνιέναι αὐτούς, ἐπεὶ
 δὲ μέγας ὁ κύκλος ὦν πολλῆς φυλακῆς ἐδό-
 κει δεῖσθαι κτέ. Elsewhere also ἔπειτα,
 like μέντοι, τοίνυν, ἀτάρ, and other
 adversative conjs., is correl. with μὲν.

d 19. νυκτῶν: the pl. is used in Attic
 with reference to the different parts
 of the night, horae nocturnae;
 so ἐκ νυκτῶν, μέσαι νύκτες. For the
 gen. after advs. of place, see G. 168;
 H. 757.

20. Cf. Hom. B 71 ἐμὲ δὲ γλυκὺς
 ὕπνος ἀνῆκεν, Moore 'Ere slumber's
 chain has bound me.' Weariness
 held Hippocrates as if in bonds (ἐκ).
 He means that he slept longer than
 he intended, or he would have come
 earlier.

21. οὕτω: Plato, more freq. than
 other writers, uses οὕτως (314c), ἔπειτα
 (319d), εἶτα (341e) after partics., in
 imitation of the conversational style.

22. ἀνδρείαν: here nearly equiv. to ³¹⁰
 προθυμίαν. Cf. Polit. 262 a προθυμότατα
 καὶ ἀνδρείοτατα. Socrates notices the
 eagerness and excitement of Hippo-
 crates, and pretends ignorance of the
 reason.

23. ἀδικεῖ: ἀδικεῖν is often equiv. to
 ἡδικηκέαι, ἄδικον εἶναι. The wrong
 continues in its effects, and so still
 exists. Similarly, νικᾶν be victor, ἡττᾶ-
 σθαι be vanquished, διώκειν be prosecutor,
 φεύγειν be an exile, ἦκειν have come,
 οἴχεσθαι have gone. Cf. 324 c. See
 G. 200 n. 3; H. 827.

26. αὐτῷ, ἐκείνον: both refer to
 the same person (Protagoras). Cf.
 Phaedo 111 b τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κρᾶσιν
 (temperature) ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὥστε
 ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι.—ἂν αὐτῷ . . .
 σοφόν: an ironical assurance, as
 though the payment of money were
 the sole condition needful. The re-
 ceiving of money by the sophists for
 their instruction seemed to the best
 minds to be mercenary, and unworthy
 of the free and cultured Athenian.
 Cf. 311 b d, 328 b, 349 a, Ar. Nub. 98
 οὔτοι διδάσκουσ', ἀργύριον ἦν τις διδῶ.

27. ἐν . . . εἴη: would that it de-
 pended on that. Cf. 319 c, 354 e, 356 d,
 357 a, 313 a with acc. and inf.

St. p. 310.

τούτῳ εἶη· ὡς οὐτ' ἂν τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιλίποισι οὐδὲν οὔτε
 τῶν φίλων. ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἤκω παρὰ σέ, ἵνα
 30 ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ διαλεχθῆς αὐτῷ. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἅμα μὲν καὶ νεώτε-
 ρός εἰμι, ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ ἑώρακα Πρωταγόραν πώποτε οὐδ'
 ἀκήκοα οὐδέν· ἔτι γὰρ παῖς ἦ, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδή-
 μησεν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες τὸν ἄνδρα ἐπαι-
 νοῦσι καὶ φασὶ σοφώτατον εἶναι λέγειν. ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδί-
 35 ζομεν παρ' αὐτόν, ἵνα ἔνδον καταλάβωμεν; καταλύει δ' 311
 ὡς ἐγὼ ἤκουσα, παρὰ Καλλία τῷ Ἴππονίκου· ἀλλ' ἴω-
 μεν. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Μήπω γ', ὦγαθέ· πρῶ γάρ ἐστιν.
 ἀλλὰ δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν καὶ περιούντες
 αὐτοῦ διατρίψωμεν, ἕως ἂν φῶς γένηται· εἶτα ἴωμεν. καὶ

³¹⁰
^e 28. ὡς: causal. Cf. 335 d. See GMT.
 81, n. 2. — ἐπιλίποισι: *suffer to be lack-*
ing, omit; commonly intrans. Cf.
Phil. 52 d τί ποτ' ἄρα, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 ἐρωτᾶς βουλόμενος; Μηδὲν ὦ Πρωταρχε
 ἐπιλείπειν ἐλέγχων ἠδονῆς τε καὶ ἐπι-
 στήμης, 26 b καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπι-
 λείπω λέγων. For the thought, cf.
 313 b.

29. τῶν φίλων: cf. 311 d καὶ τὰ
 τῶν φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες, 313 b,
Symp. 218 d καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἢ τῆς οὐσίας
 τῆς ἐμῆς δέοιο ἢ τῶν φίλων τῶν ἐμῶν.
 — To avoid τῶν τῶν φίλων (the gen.
 of τὰ τῶν φίλων) one art. is omitted.
 — αὐτὰ ταῦτα: *for this very purpose*.
 — Hippocrates never thinks of raising
 the preliminary question, whether it
 is best to place himself under the
 teaching of Protagoras, — little
 dreaming of the opinions of his
 friend Socrates.

32. ἀκήκοα οὐδέν: *sc. αὐτοῦ*, cf.
 313 b οὔτε διείλεξαι οὐδεπώποτε. He
 has never heard Protagoras discourse.
 — ἦ: cf. Porphyry on Hom. *E* 533
 τῶν δὲ Ἀττικῶν οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι μονο-

γράμματον αὐτὸ προεφέροντο, οἱ δὲ νεώ-
 310
^e τεροι σὺν τῷ ν.—τὸ πρότερον: the
 time is uncertain; perhaps B.C. 445.
 See *Introd.* § 1.

34. σοφώτατον λέγειν: like δεινό-
 τατος λέγειν.—τί οὐ βαδίζομεν: see
 on 310 a.

37. ὦγαθέ: is followed in the Mss. ³¹¹
^a by ἐκεῖσε ἴωμεν, but the Athenians
 used μήπω γε in replies, regularly
 omitting the repetition of the verb.
 Cf. *Soph. Phil.* 1410 στείχε προσκύσας
 χθόνα. | *HER.* μήπω γε, πρὶν ἂν τῶν ἡμε-
 τέρων | ἀίης μύθων, *Ar. Nub.* 195 ἀλλ'
 εἴσιθ' . . . | μήπω γε, μήπω γ', ἀλλ' ἐπι-
 μεινάντων, *Plato Phaedr.* 242 a καὶ γὰρ
 ἀπέρχομαι. *PHAEDR.* μήπω γε, ὦ
 Σώκρατες, πρὶν ἂν τὸ καῦμα παρέλθῃ,
Aesch. Prom. 630 ἄκουε δὴ. *CHO.* μήπω
 γε.

38. ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν: cf.
 1. 12, *Phaedo* 116 a ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνί-
 στατο εἰς οἴκημά τι ὡς λουσόμενος,
Xen. Symp. 9. 1 Ἀυτόλυκος δὲ ἐξανί-
 στατο εἰς περίπατον. The prep. and
 connection imply the motion, 'the
 going.'

40 γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας ἔνδον διατρίβει· ὥστε θάρρει, καταληψόμεθα αὐτόν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἔνδον.

III. Μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν περιῆμεν. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀποπειρώμενος τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους τῆς ῥώμης ^b διεσκόπουν αὐτὸν καὶ ἠρώτων, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Ἱπποκράτες, παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς ἰέναι, ἀργύ-
5 ριον τελῶν ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τίνα ἀφιζόμενος καὶ τίς γενησόμενος; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπενόεις

³¹¹
^a 40. θάρρει, καταληψόμεθα: cf. *Menex. fin.* θάρρει, οὐ κατερῶ, *Xen. Cyr.* vii. 3. 13 ἀλλὰ θάρρει, ἔφη, ὦ Κῦρε, οὐ μὴ σε κρύψω. — Protagoras's constant life within doors contrasts strongly with the habits of Socrates.

^b III. 2 ff. By way of preparing his young friend for the interview, Socrates wishes to awaken in his mind a question as to the real value of the costly instruction of Protagoras; a question which the vehement Hippocrates was in no mood to entertain. First, therefore, Socrates will elicit from him the vagueness of his quest; then, humbled by this discovery, Hippocrates is ready for the consideration of the main question. — ῥώμης: relates generally to physical strength, but here to strength of will, fixedness of purpose. Cf. *Polit.* 259 c πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς σύνεσιν καὶ ῥώμην.

3. διεσκόπουν καὶ ἠρώτων: combining both in one act. Cf. *Apol.* 21 c διασκοπῶν οὖν τούτον καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, 18 b ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ.

5. τελῶν: fut., cf. *τελοῦντες* 311 e. — παρὰ τίνα κτέ.: for a similar questioning, cf. *Gorg.* 447 c f.

6. Illustrations of a general question or of an abstract principle by particular examples, introduced by ὥσπερ ἂν, belong in such a marked way to

the peculiarities of the style of the Platonic Socrates, that one may reasonably see in them a practice of the actual Socrates. In these passages it is no rare thing to find several members with εἰ, inserted one into another, and 'anacolutha,' in which the ὥσπερ is forgotten. We have here a prot., εἰ . . . ἐκείνῳ, then the apod. consisting of εἰ . . . ἤρετο, . . . ἀπεκρίνω. — The Athenians generally classed together physicians, sculptors, painters, flute-players, and sophists, as men whose professions were mercenary and to be adopted only through necessity. — Cf. 312 b, *Gorg.* 512 d, *Luc. Somn.* 9 εἰ δὲ καὶ Φειδίας ἢ Πολύκλειτος γένοιο, τὴν μὲν τέχνην ἅπαντες ἐπαινέσονται, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ὅστις τῶν ἰδόντων, εἰ νοῦν ἔχοι, εὔξαιτ' ἂν σοι ὁμοῖος γενέσθαι· οἷος γὰρ ἂν ἦς, βάνασος καὶ χειρῶναξ καὶ ἀποχειροβίωτος νομισθήσῃ (you will be considered a mechanic and an artisan, living by manual toil). Cf. *Plutarch Pericles* 2 for nearly identical language: ἡ δ' αὐτουργία τῶν ταπεινῶν τῆς εἰς τὰ καλὰ ῥαθυμίας μάρτυρα τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀχρήστοις πόνον παρέχεται καθ' αὐτῆς· καὶ οὐδεὶς εὐφυῆς νέος ἢ τὸν ἐν Πίσῃ θεασάμενος Δία γενέσθαι Φειδίας ἐπεθύμησεν ἢ τὴν Ἥραν τὴν ἐν Ἄργει Πολύκλειτος, οὐδ' Ἀνακρέων ἢ Φιλῆμων ἢ Ἀρχίλοχος ἢ σθεῖς αὐτῶν τοῖς ποιήμασιν.

παρὰ τὸν σαυτοῦ ὁμώνυμον ἐλθὼν, Ἴπποκράτη τὸν Κῶον,
τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν, ἀργύριον τελεῖν ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ μισθὸν
ἐκείνῳ, εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο, Εἶπέ μοι, μέλλεις τελεῖν, ὦ Ἴπ-
10 πόκρατες, Ἴπποκράτει μισθὸν ὡς τίνι ὄντι; τί ἂν ἀπε- c
κρίνω; Εἶπον ἂν, ἔφη, ὅτι ὡς ἰατρῷ. Ὡς τίς γενησό-
μενος; Ὡς ἰατρός, ἔφη. Εἰ δὲ παρὰ Πολύκλειτον τὸν
Ἀργεῖον ἢ Φειδίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ἐπενόεις ἀφικόμενος
μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ τελεῖν ἐκείνοις, εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο,
15 Τελεῖν τοῦτο τὸ ἀργύριον ὡς τίνι ὄντι ἐν νῶ ἔχεις Πολυ-
κλείτῳ τε καὶ Φειδίᾳ; τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω; Εἶπον ἂν ὡς
ἀγαλματοποιοῖς. Ὡς τίς δὲ γενησόμενος αὐτός; Δῆλον
ὅτι ἀγαλματοποιός. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· παρὰ δὲ δὴ Πρωτα- d
γόραν νῦν ἀφικόμενοι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἀργύριον ἐκείνῳ
20 μισθὸν ἔτοιμοι ἐσόμεθα τελεῖν ὑπὲρ σοῦ, ἂν μὲν ἐξικνη-

³¹¹
^b 7. Hippocrates of Cos, the founder of the science of medicine, belonged to the family of the Asclepiadae, in which family the priesthood of Asclepius and the practice of medicine were hereditary. See also *Phaedr.* 270 c εἰ μὲν Ἴπποκράτει γε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πιθέσθαι.

c 10. ἀπεκρίνω: see on 313 a.

11. ὅτι: sc. μέλλω τελεῖν Ἴπποκράτει μισθόν.

12. Phidias, son of Charmides, the Athenian, whose creative art produced ideals of the gods, and Polycletus (cf. 328 c) of Argos, unequalled in the expression of human beauty, represent together the culmination of Greek plastic art. They were older contemporaries of Socrates.

13. τὸν Ἀθηναῖον: is added in contrast with Ἀργεῖον.

d 18. εἶεν: a particle related to εἶα, not to the opt. εἴη or εἶεν. It marks a conclusion and transition, and is much used by Plato.

20. ἂν μὲν: after εἰ μὲν or εἰάν the ³¹¹
principal sent. is freq. omitted when ^d
an antithesis with εἰ δέ follows. εὖ ἔχει, *it is well*, can generally be supplied, as Hom. A 135 f. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί | . . . | εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώωσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλωμαι. Cf. 325 d below. The connection sometimes calls for a more definite expression, as here, e.g. ταῦτα ἀναλίσκοντες. See on 328 b; cf. Xen. *Mem.* iii. 9. 11 καὶ (ἐπεδείκνυεν) τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἂν μὲν αὐτοὶ ἠγῶνται ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (sc. αὐτοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους)· εἰ δὲ μή, τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις πειθομένους, and he showed that all the rest, if they thought themselves capable of attending to a matter (attended to it themselves); otherwise, they trusted those who were capable. Xen. *An.* vii. 7. 15 εἰ μὲν σύ τι ἔχεις πρὸς ἡμᾶς λέγειν (sc. λέγε)· εἰ δὲ μή, ἡμεῖς πρὸς σὲ ἔχομεν. Even εἰάν μὲν may be followed by εἰ δέ. See GMT. 53, n. 1; 52, 1, n. 2; H. 904 a; 906 a.

ται τὰ ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ τούτοις πείθωμεν αὐτόν, —
 εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες. εἰ οὖν
 τις ἡμᾶς περὶ ταῦτα οὕτω σφόδρα σπουδάζοντας ἔροιτο,
 Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Ἰππόκρατες, ὡς τίνι ὄντι
 25 τῷ Πρωταγόρα ἐν νῶ ἔχετε χρήματα τελεῖν; τί ἂν αὐτῷ
 ἀποκριναίμεθα; τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρω- e
 ταγόρου ἀκούομεν, ὥσπερ περὶ Φειδίου ἀγαλματοποιὸν
 καὶ περὶ Ὀμήρου ποιητὴν; τί τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου
 ἀκούομεν; Σοφιστὴν δὴ τοι ὀνομάζουσί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 30 τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, ἔφη. Ὡς σοφιστῆ ἄρα ἐρχόμεθα τε-
 λούντες τὰ χρήματα; Μάλιστα. Εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτό τις σε
 προσέροιτο, Αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ ὡς τίς γενησόμενος ἔρχεται παρὰ
 τὸν Πρωταγόραν; καὶ ὃς εἶπεν ἐρυθριάσας — ἦδη γὰρ 312
 ὑπέφαινε τι ἡμέρας, ὥστε καταφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι —

³¹¹
 d 24. εἰπέ μοι: the imp. sing. is used before several vocs. when one person is prominently addressed. Cf. *Euthyd.* 283 b εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι.

e 26. ἄλλο: "as Phidias is termed sculptor, Homer poet, what other name do we hear similarly given to Protagoras?"

27. ἀγαλματοποιόν: sc. ὄνομα. With verbs of naming, the name itself is generally in appos. with ὄνομα, ἐπωνυμία, or some similar word; the latter subst. may, however, be omitted. Cf. 315 e, *Rep.* ii. 369 c ταύτη τῇ ξυνοικία ἐθέμεθα πόλιν ὄνομα, *Hdt.* vi. 63 Δημάρρητον αὐτῷ ὄνομα ἔθετο.

29. ὀνομάζουσι . . . εἶναι: cf. 325 a, *Lach.* 192 a ὃ ἐν πᾶσιν ὀνομάζεις ταχυτήτα εἶναι, *Phil.* 13 b τί ἐνδὸν πάσας ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι προσαγορεύεις; a freq. const. with verbs of naming or calling.

30. ἐρχόμεθα: more vivid than μέλλομεν, emphasizes the partic. Cf. 313 a, *Theaet.* 198 e, *Hdt.* i. 5 ἐγὼ δὲ

περὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἔρχομαι ἐρέων. The ³¹¹
 Eng. has the same idiom, 'we are going to pay,' i.e. 'we purpose to pay.' e

31 ff. εἰ προσέροιτο: sc. τί ἂν ἀποκριναίω; or τί ἂν φαίης; cf. *Crat.* 392 c εἴ τις ἔροιτό σε, πότερον οἶε ὀρθότερον καλεῖν τὰ ὀνόματα τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους ἢ τοὺς ἀφρονεστέρους; *HERM.* δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους φαίην ἂν suppose one should ask whether you think the wise or the unwise likely to give names the more correctly (what would you reply?), etc. — ἐρυθριάσας: syn-

312
 a chronous with εἶπεν. See G. 204, N. 2; H. 856 b. On the passage, cf. *Demetrius περὶ ἐρμηνείας* 218 in *Spengel Rhet. Gr.* iii. 309 ὅπερ δὴ ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἰπποκράτους, ἐρυθριάσας . . . γενέσθαι, ὅτι μὲν ἐναργέστατόν ἐστι, παντὶ δῆλον· ἢ δ' ἐνάργεια γέγονεν ἐκ τῆς φροντίδος τῆς περὶ τὸν λόγον καὶ τοῦ ἀπομνημονεῦσαι, ὅτι νύκτωρ πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰσῆλθεν ὁ Ἰπποκράτης. — ὑπέφαινε τι ἡμέρας: there was a glimmer of daylight.

35 Εἰ μὲν τι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔοικε, δῆλον ὅτι σοφιστῆς γε-
νησόμενος. Σὺ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύ-
νοιο εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; Νῆ τὸν
Δία, ᾧ Σώκρατες, εἶπερ γε ἂ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν.
'Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ᾧ Ἰππόκρατες, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις
40 σου τὴν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησιν ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλ' οἷα ἄ
περ ἢ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ κιθαριστοῦ
καὶ παιδοτρίβου; τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἐκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνη
ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς
τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν
45 μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοιαύτη μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου
μάθησις.

³¹²
^a 35. εἰ . . . τι ἔοικε: with indef. subj.;
a freq. turn with Plato in such rea-
sonings; cf. 330 b. — μὲν: admitting
with a blush the conclusion forced
by the argument, he intends making
some qualification with a δέ, but is
forestalled by Socrates. See on c,
l. 8, below.

37. εἰς . . . παρέχων: before the
Greeks. Cf. 349 a, Thuc. vi. 31. 4
ξυνέβη εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας ἐπίδειξιν
εἰκασθῆναι it came about that it looked
like a display before the other Greeks.
— σαυτόν: cf. 348 e.

39. "But then, since you do not
wish to become a sophist." Cf.
Euthyd. 290 e ἀλλ' ἄρα, ᾧ πρὸς Διός, μὴ
ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ ταῦτ' εἰπών; Apol.
25 a ἀλλ' ἄρα, ᾧ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν
τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέ-
ρους; — μὴ οὐ . . . ὑπολαμβάνεις: μὴ
indicates properly a depend. question
after an implied verb of fear or cau-
tion; οὐ is const. with τοιαύτην. (I
question) whether you do not mean that
. . . will be not of this sort, but, etc.;
i.e. doubtless you mean that, etc. See
H. 867; GMT. 46, N. 4 and N. 5 a.

Cf. Meno 89 c ἴσως νῆ Δία· ἀλλὰ μὴ ³¹²
τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὠμολογήσαμεν; ^a

41. γραμματιστοῦ κτέ.: cf. 325 d ff. ^b

42. ἐπὶ τέχνη: cf. 315 a; to practise
it as an art, to make it a profession.

43. ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ: for the sake of gen-
eral culture. Cf. Gorg. 485 a φιλοσο-
φίας μὲν ὅσον παιδείας χάριν καλὸν
μετέχειν.

44. τόν, τόν: generic arts. See
H. 659. — ἰδιώτην: here contrasted
with δημιουργός (one who pursues the
art, cf. 327 c), elsewhere with ποιητής,
ιατρός etc. Cf. 322 c, 327 c, 344 c, 345 a;
ιδιωτεύειν 327 a. — ἐλεύθερον: libera-
lis, superior in dignity to the money-
getting class. See on 311 b. — πάνυ
μὲν οὖν: emphatic form of assent.

45. It seems, then, that Hippocrates
does not know what he wishes to ob-
tain from Protagoras. The question
naturally follows, what a sophist is,
essentially; whether he has anything
of value to impart, and whether it
is a safe experiment to throw one-
self precipitately (cf. 313 b) under
his instruction, without previously as-
certaining its precise nature.

IV. Οἴσθα οὖν ὃ μέλλεις νῦν πράττειν, ἢ σε λανθάνει; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Τοῦ περί; Ὅτι μέλλεις τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν σαυτοῦ παρασχεῖν θεραπεῦσαι ἀνδρὶ, ὡς φής, σοφιστῆ· ὃ c
τι δέ ποτε ὃ σοφιστῆς ἔστι, θαυμάζοιμι ἂν εἰ οἴσθα.
5 καίτοι εἰ τοῦτ' ἀγνοεῖς, οὐδὲ ὅτω παραδίδως τὴν ψυχὴν οἴσθα, οὐτ' εἰ ἀγαθῶ οὐτ' εἰ κακῶ πράγματι. Οἶμαί γ', ἔφη, εἰδέναί. Λέγε δή, τί ἡγεί εἶναι τὸν σοφιστῆν; Ἐγὼ μέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὥσπερ τοῦνομα λέγει, τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἔξ-
10 ἐστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ ζωγράφων καὶ περὶ τεκτόνων, ὅτι οὔτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονες· ἀλλ' εἴ τις ἔροιτο a
ἡμᾶς, Τῶν τί σοφῶν εἰσιν οἱ ζωγράφοι ἐπιστήμονες; εἵπομεν ἂν πού αὐτῶ, ὅτι Τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τὴν τῶν εἰκόνων, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως. εἰ δέ τις ἐκεῖνο ἔροιτο
15 Ὅ δὲ σοφιστῆς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστί; τί ἂν ἀποκρινοίμεθα

³¹² b IV. 2. τοῦ [τίνος] περί: sc. λανθάνει με. — ὅτι μέλλεις κτέ.: ὅτι depends upon λανθάνει, but with θαυμάζοιμι ἂν the discourse abandons the depend. const.

c 3. θεραπεῦσαι: the care of the soul by sophist and philosopher is often compared to the physician's treatment of the body, cf. 357 e Πρωταγόρας ὁ δὲ φησὶν ἰατρὸς εἶναι (sc. τῆς ἀμαθίας).

6. πράγματι: the calling of the σοφιστῆς a thing has somewhat of mocking humor. Cf. Ar. Eccl. 441 γυναιῖκα δ' εἶναι πρᾶγμ' ἔφη νομβυστικὸν καὶ χρηματοποιόν (clever and money-making), Plato Gorg. 520 b μέμφεσθαι τοῦτω τῶ πράγματι (i.e. the people) δ' αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν. Still stronger are the expressions μέγα πρᾶγμα, μέγα χρήμα. Cf. Hdt. iii. 132 ἦν δὲ μέγιστον πρῆγμα Δημοκλήδης παρὰ βασιλεί, Dem. xxxv. 15 Λάκριτος, μέγα πρᾶγμα, Ἰσοκράτους μαθητῆς.

8. μέν: confirmative, in truth. Freq. used alone in questions and replies.

Hippocrates seems to speak with more confidence here than in a above. ³¹² c

9. In σοφιστῆς Hippocrates thinks he recognizes the stem ιστ-, ὃς τὰ σοφὰ ἐπ-ιστ-αται, as Crat. 406 b "Ἀρτεμις is explained as ἀρετῆς ἴστωρ, and 407 c "Ἐφαιστος as ὁ φάεος ἴστωρ.

12. τί: depends upon τῶν σοφῶν. d τὰ τί σοφὰ; i.e. the knowledge relating to what? in the next line the thought is completed, τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τὴν τῶν εἰκόνων that which relates to the portrayal of forms.

14. καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως: sc. εἵπομεν ἂν. So freq. with καὶ τᾶλλα a verb is to be supplied from the context, e.g. 319b καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτως sc. ποιοῦντας, Symp. 176a καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα sc. ποιήσαντας, Gorg. 509 c δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ (sc. βοήθειαν) καὶ τρίτην τὴν τοῦ τρίτου, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως (sc. ἔχειν).

15. ἐστί: sc. ἐπιστήμων from the previous context.

αὐτῷ; ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; Τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν; Ἴσως ἂν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανῶς γε· ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτι ἢ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῖν δέεται, 20 περὶ οὗτου ὁ σοφιστῆς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν· ὥσπερ ὁ κί- e
θαριστῆς δεινὸν δήπου ποιεῖ λέγειν περὶ οὐπὲρ καὶ ἐπι-
στήμονα, περὶ κιθαρίσεως· ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Εἶεν· ὁ δὲ δὴ
σοφιστῆς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι
περὶ οὐπὲρ καὶ ἐπίσταται; Εἰκός γε. Τί δὴ ἔστι τοῦτο,
25 περὶ οὗ αὐτός τε ἐπιστήμων ἔστιν ὁ σοφιστῆς καὶ τὸν
μαθητὴν ποιεῖ; Μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι λέγειν.

V. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον μετὰ τοῦτο· Τί οὖν; οἶσθα εἰς 313
οἶόν τινα κίνδυνον ἔρχει ὑποθήσων τὴν ψυχὴν; ἢ εἰ μὲν
τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν σε ἔδει τῷ, διακινδυνεύοντα ἢ χρη-

³¹²
d 16. ἐπιστάτης: here equiv. to ἐπι-
στήμων, as comes out clearly in *Crito*
47 b τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαῖοντι. — τί . . .
ἦ: equiv. to τί ἄλλο . . . ἦ.

17. At first Hippocrates replied
confidently (ἐγὼ μὲν κτέ.), now, with
less assurance, he yet gives a some-
what fitting answer (ἦ . . . λέγειν);
finally, however, he has no longer
any reply to urge. For οὐκέτι, cf.
321 d, *Phaedo* 100 d οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο
δυσχυρίζομαι.

e 20. περὶ οὗτου κτέ.: for a similar ex-
amination, cf. *Gorg.* 450 e ff.

24. περὶ οὐπὲρ: follows also ἐπί-
σταται, which here is equiv. to ἐπιστή-
μων ἔστιν.

³¹³
a V. 2. ἔρχει: cf. 311 e. — ἢ εἰ μὲν
κτέ.: the sent. εἰ μὲν . . ., πολλὰ ἂν
περισκέψω is in its thought subord.,
as a concessive (*while*), to the follow-
ing sent. ὁ δὲ κτέ., as is often the case
in sents. with μὲν. In such cases the
former member properly does not
belong to the main argument, but is

introduced to emphasize the latter by ³¹³
contrast. Cf. *Dem. de Cor.* 160 αἰ-
σχρόν ἐστιν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν τὰ ἔργα τῶν
ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν πόνων ὑπέμεινα, ὑμεῖς δὲ μηδὲ
τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν ἀνέξεσθε it is shame-
ful if (*while*) I bore the burden of the
toils in your behalf, but you will not
tolerate even the recital; where only
the latter fact is shameful. Rarely
the clause with μὲν is the main, and
that with δέ the subord. clause, cf.
Xen. Mem. i. 2. 9. Similar in Latin
are paratactic interr. clauses, as *Cic.*
Tusc. 5. 90 an Scythes Anachar-
sis potuit pro nihilo pecu-
niam ducere, nostrates philo-
sophi facere non poterunt.
This whole period, with its repeti-
tions, its pleasing, free, conversational
style, doubtless vividly recalled the
manner of Socrates.

3. διακινδυνεύοντα: const. here with
acc. and inf.; in *Thuc.* vii. 1, with
the simple inf. εἴτε διακινδυνεύσωσιν
ἐσπλεύσαι, as freq. κινδυνεύειν. — There

στὸν αὐτὸ γενέσθαι ἢ πονηρόν, πολλὰ ἂν περιεσκέψω,
 5 εἴτ' ἐπιτρεπτόν εἴτε οὐ, καὶ εἰς συμβουλήν τούς τε φίλους
 ἂν παρεκάλεις καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους, σκοπούμενος ἡμέρας
 συχνάς· ὃ δὲ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ σώματος ἡγεί, τὴν ψυχὴν,
 καὶ ἐν ᾧ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ σα ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττειν,
 χρηστοῦ ἢ πονηροῦ αὐτοῦ γενομένου, περὶ δὲ τούτου
 10 οὔτε τῷ πατρὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀδελφῷ ἐπεκοινώσω οὔτε ἡμῶν ^b
 τῶν ἐταίρων οὐδενί, εἴτ' ἐπιτρεπτόν εἴτε καὶ οὐ τῷ
 ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ ξένῳ τὴν σὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλ' ἐσπέρας
 ἀκούσας, ὡς φῆς, ὄρθριος ἦκων περὶ μὲν τούτου οὐδένα

³¹³
^a were no qualifications legally pre-
 scribed for physicians, and the patient
 in ancient times 'ran a considerable
 risk.' Cf. *Gorg.* 514 d; *Pliny N. H.*
 xxix. 1 discunt (medici) peri-
 culis nostris, et experimenta
 per mortes agunt.

4. περιεσκέψω, παρεκάλεις: the
 ideas of saying, answering, consider-
 ing, in such hypothetical sents., Plato
 very often puts into the aor. (cf. 311
 b c), prob. to indicate the momentary
 occurrence or beginning of the action.
 Cf. *Theaet.* 144 e εἰ νῶν ἐχόντοιν ἑκα-
 τέρου λύραν ἔφη αὐτὰς ἡρμόσθαι ὁμοίως
 (if each of us held a lyre, and he said
 they were tuned alike), πότερον εὐθὺς ἂν
 ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἄν, εἰ μουσι-
 κὸς ὢν λέγοι; See GMT. 49, 2, n. 5.

7. τὴν ψυχὴν: explanatory of ὃ κτέ.
 Cf. 339 a, 351 a, 354 c, *Rep.* ix. 583 e
 ὃ μεταξὺν ἄρα νῦν δὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἔφαμεν
 εἶναι, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή so then that
 which we termed the intermediate state,
 namely, rest, will be both pain and
 pleasure.

8. ἐν ᾧ: see on 310 d.

9. περὶ δὲ τούτου: cf. 325 b f. ἐφ'
 ᾧν δὲ . . . ταῦτα δ' ἄρα. So when two
 periods consisting of prot. and apod.

are united in a larger period by μὲν ³¹³
 . . . δέ, the μὲν and δέ of the protases ^a
 are freq. repeated in the apodoses.
 Cf. *Apol.* 28 d e.

11. εἴτε καὶ οὐ: in the second mem- ^b
 ber of a depend. alternative question
 (whether . . . or not) οὐ and μή are used
 indifferently; cf. l. 15 below; but in
 depend. nominal questions, distin-
 guishing between what is and what is
 not, μή is used when the verb is not
 repeated, otherwise either οὐ or μή.
 For examples of nominal questions,
 cf. 314 a (l. 47), *Xen. Mem.* iii. 6. 10.
 See G. 283, 1, n.; H. 1022 a. — τῷ . . .
 ξένῳ: when a subst. with the art.
 takes an attrib. modifier, a dem., esp.
 οὗτος, may be inserted after the modi-
 fier and before the noun. Cf. 338 a
 τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοῦτο εἶδος, *Dem.* vi. 21 αἰ
 πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους αὐταὶ λίαν ὀμίλῃαι,
Plato Phil. 50 b ἐν τῇ τοῦ βίου ξυμπάσῃ
 τραγωδίᾳ. From the point of view of
 the Athenians, ξένῳ places in a clearer
 light the inconsiderateness of Hip-
 pocrates, and here by its position it
 intensifies the reproach of Socrates.

13. ὄρθριος: temporal adj. for adv.
 Cf. *Thuc.* ii. 49. 4 διεφθείροντο οἱ πλεῖ-
 στοὶ ἐναταῖοι καὶ ἑβδομαῖοι ὑπὸ τοῦ
 ἐντὸς καύματος (on the ninth and the

λόγον οὐδὲ συμβουλήν ποιεῖ, εἴτε χρὴ ἐπιτρέπειν σαυτὸν
 15 αὐτῷ εἴτε μή, ἐτοῖμος δ' εἶ ἀναλίσκειν τά τε σαυτοῦ καὶ
 τὰ τῶν φίλων χρήματα, ὡς ἤδη διεγνωκῶς, ὅτι πάντως
 συνεστέον Πρωταγόρα, ὃν οὔτε γιννώσκεις, ὡς φῆς, οὔτε
 διείλεξαι οὐδεπώποτε, σοφιστήν δ' ὀνομάζεις, τὸν δὲ
 σοφιστήν, ὃ τί ποτε ἔστι, φαίνει ἀγνοῶν, ᾧ μέλλεις σαυ- c
 20 τὸν ἐπιτρέπειν; Καὶ ὅς ἀκούσας, Ἔοικεν, ἔφη, ᾧ
 Σώκρατες, ἐξ ᾧν σὺ λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν, ᾧ Ἰππόκρατες,
 ὁ σοφιστὴς τυγχάνει ᾧν ἔμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος τῶν
 ἀγωγίμων, ἀφ' ᾧν ψυχὴ τρέφεται; Φαίνεται γὰρ ἔμοι-

³¹³
 b seventh day), Hom. A 424, 472, 497,
 a 443, and very freq. See Seymour
Hom. Lang. and Verse § 38; G. 138,
 n. 7; H. 619.

16. ὡς ἤδη διεγνωκῶς: as though you
 had already fully decided.

17. συνεστέον: σύνειμι is used, like
 συγγίγνομαι, with the meaning am (or
 become) one's pupil. — ὃν κτέ.: cf. 310 e.

18. διείλεξαι: sc. αὐτῷ. Instead of
 the rel. repeated in a different case, a
 personal or dem. pron. is commonly
 used; or, as here, the pron. may be
 omitted altogether. See G. 156;
 H. 1005.

c 19. σοφιστήν: a case of 'prolepsis'
 or anticipation; in which, to give it
 greater emphasis, a subst. is trans-
 ferred from a depend. to the princi-
 pal clause, usually with change of
 case. Cf. 341 d οἶμαι Πρόδικον σοῦ
 δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι, εἰ οἶός τ' ἔσει κτέ.,
 Xen. Mem. i. 4. 13 τίνος γὰρ ἄλλου
 ζῶου ψυχὴ πρῶτα μὲν θεῶν ἤσθηται ὅτι
 εἰσί. See H. 878.

20. ἔοικεν: sc. ἐμὲ ἀγνοεῖν. Cf. Rep.
 i. 346 c ἦντινα ἄρα ὠφέλειαν κοινῇ ὠφε-
 λοῦνται πάντες οἱ δημιουργοί, δῆλον ὅτι
 κοινῇ τιμὴ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώμενοι (avail-
 ing themselves of some self-same thing)
 ἀπ' ἐκείνου ὠφελοῦνται. Ἔοικεν, ἔφη

(sc. αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι κτέ.). So in ³¹³
 many places, where εἰκεν forms the c
 answer.

22. ἔμπορος ἢ κάπηλος: wholesale
 or retail dealer. This comparison
 often appears in Plato (cf. Soph.
 223 d, 224 d, 231 d) and in later writ-
 ers. On the terms, see Rep. ii. 371 d
 ἢ οὐ καπήλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ὠνήν
 τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακονοῦντας ἰδρυμένους
 ἐν ἀγορᾷ (those engaged in buying and
 selling, sitting in the market-place), τοὺς
 δὲ πλανήτας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐμποροῦς;
 Soph. 223 d, Polit. 289 e. Becker
Charicles (Göll) ii. 183 ff. — τις: a
 sort of. See on 334 c.

23. ψυχὴ: the art. (not merely
 generic) may be omitted with ψυχὴ,
 σῶμα, and their parts. Before γὰρ in
 answers, yes or no may easily be sup-
 plied; we might render certainly. Cf.
 Soph. Phil. 755 δεινὸν γε τοῦπίσαγμα τοῦ
 νοσήματος (the burden of the disease)
 PHIL. δεινὸν γὰρ οὐδὲ ῥητόν, Plato Rep.
 vi. 502 c ξυμβαίνει γὰρ, ἔφη. Hip-
 pocrates was ready to purchase, at
 any price, what Protagoras brought.
 The comparison was therefore at
 once obvious to him; still, as he
 had before shown that he had no
 clear conception of what he could

γε τοιοῦτός τις· τρέφεται δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ψυχὴ τίνι;
 25 Μαθήμασι δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ ὅπως γε μή, ὦ ἑταῖρε,
 ὁ σοφιστῆς ἐπαινῶν ἅ πωλεῖ ἐξαπατήσει ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ
 οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος τροφήν, ὁ ἔμπορός τε καὶ κά-
 πηλος. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοί που ὦν ἄγουσιν ἀγωγίμων οὔτε d
 αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν ὅ τι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν περὶ τὸ σῶμα,
 30 ἐπαινοῦσι δὲ πάντα πωλοῦντες, οὔτε οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ'
 αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μή τις τύχη γυμναστικὸς ἢ ἰατρὸς ὦν. οὔτω
 δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ
 πωλοῦντες καὶ καπηλεύοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἐπαι-
 νοῦσι μὲν πάντα ἅ πωλοῦσι, τάχα δ' ἂν τινες, ὦ ἄριστε,
 35 καὶ τούτων ἀγνοοῖεν ὦν πωλοῦσιν ὅ τι χρηστὸν ἢ πονη-
 ρὸν πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν· ὡς δ' αὐτως καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ' e

³¹³
 c learn from Protagoras, he now makes
 the further confession of his igno-
 rance concerning the nature of this
 substance by which the soul is nour-
 ished. Socrates responds to his ques-
 tion with the intelligible but indefi-
 nite μαθήμασι, in order at once to
 add the warning against seeking the
 instruction of the sophists before he
 has ascertained precisely what μαθή-
 ματα are to be derived from them.
 The words ὅπως γε μή κτέ. cannot be
 separated from those which precede
 them, and must therefore be the utter-
 ance of Socrates, as must also μαθή-
 μασι δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

26. ἐξαπατήσει: the Mss. read ἐξαπα-
 τήση, but such exhortations and warn-
 ings with ὅπως and ὅπως μή take only
 the fut. See H. 886; Kr. Spr. 54, 8, 7.
 But see for oppos. view Kühn. 552, n. 6.

d 28. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι κτέ.: the ignorance
 of the trader is more fully set forth
 in *Gorg.* 517 d ff. τούτων γὰρ (sc.
 σιτίων, ποτῶν, ἱματίων κτέ.) ποριστικὸν
 εἶναι ἢ κάπηλον ὄντα ἢ ἔμπορον . . .

οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἐστὶν ὄντα τοιοῦτον ³¹³
 δόξαι καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν d
 εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδῶτι, ὅτι
 ἐστὶ τις παρὰ ταύτας τέχνη γυμναστική
 τε καὶ ἰατρική, ἢ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἐστὶ σώμα-
 τος θεραπεία. — ὦν . . . ἀγωγίμων: de-
 pend. on ὅ τι following.

29. περὶ τὸ σῶμα: with reference to
 the body. In such expressions the
 prep. with the acc. brings out the
 quality of the adj. more distinctly
 and independently than would a sim-
 ple gen., and is preferred by Plato,
 with whom however it becomes almost
 a mannerism. Cf. πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν
 below, *Gorg.* 517 e εἰδέναί ὅ τι τὸ χρη-
 στὸν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν σιτίων ἢ ποτῶν
 ἐστὶν εἰς ἀρετὴν σώματος.

33. ἀεὶ: often means in each case,
 every time. — ἐπαινοῦσι: as Protagoras
 afterwards does, cf. 318 a e, 328 b.

36. ὡς δ' αὐτως: after Homer less e
 freq. than ὡσαύτως δέ. Even when
 δέ intervenes, the ὡς is not accented,
 although it stands for οὕτως. — οἱ
 ὠνούμενοι: sc. ἀγνοοῖεν ἄν.

αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μή τις τύχη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν ἰατρικὸς ὢν.
 εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τούτων, τί χρηστὸν
 καὶ πονηρὸν, ἀσφαλές σοι ὠνεῖσθαι μαθήματα καὶ παρὰ
 40 Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὄτουοῦν· εἰ δὲ μή, ὄρα, ὦ
 μακάριε, μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβεύης τε καὶ κινδου- 314
 νεύης. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πολὺ μείζων κίνδυνος ἐν τῇ τῶν
 μαθημάτων ὠνῇ ἢ ἐν τῇ τῶν σιτίων. σιτία μὲν γὰρ καὶ
 ποτὰ πριάμενον παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου ἔξεστιν ἐν ἄλλοις
 45 ἀγγείοις ἀποφέρειν, καὶ πρὶν δέξασθαι αὐτὰ εἰς τὸ σῶμα
 πιόντα ἢ φαγόντα, καταθέμενον οἴκαδε ἔξεστι συμβου-
 λεύσασθαι, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἐπαῖοντα, ὅ τι τε ἔδε-
 στέον ἢ ποτέον καὶ ὅ τι μή, καὶ ὅπόσον καὶ ὅποτε·
 ὥστε ἐν τῇ ὠνῇ οὐ μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος. μαθήματα δὲ οὐκ
 50 ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ ἀπενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη, καταθέντα b
 τὴν τιμὴν, τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ

³¹³
 e 38. τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων: Plato rarely uses τυγχάνειν without a partic. Cf. *Phaedr.* 230 a εἴτε τι θηρίον τυγχάνω. Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον (more complex), *Rep.* ii. 369 b ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής since no one of us is self-sufficing, but each has many wants, *Tim.* 61 c τυγχάνει δὲ οὔτε ταῦτα οὔτ' ἐκεῖνα δυνατὰ ἰκανῶς λεχθῆναι.

³¹⁴
 a 41. τοῖς φιλτάτοις: these are, in *Legg.* i. 650 a, wife, sons, and daughters (ἐπιτρέποντα αὐτοῦ θυγατέρας τε καὶ υἱεῖς καὶ γυναῖκας, οὕτως ἐν τοῖς φιλτάτοις κινδυνεύσαντα imperilling one's dearest interests), here ἡ ψυχὴ, its well-being, i.e. virtue, wisdom; similarly *Gorg.* 513 a ὅπως μὴ σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις (at the loss of what is dearest) ἡ αἵρεσις ἡμῖν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει. — κυβεύης: the Greeks sometimes compared life to a game of chance; cf. *Rep.* x. 604 c; *Terent. Ad.* iv. 7. 21 ita vitast

hominum, quasi quom ludas ³¹⁴
 tesseris; and used κυβεύειν τινί, περὶ τινι of a frivolous and fool-hardy risk, like our 'stake upon the die.' Cf. the tragic verse in *Polyb.* ii. 63 δεῖ τὴν ταχίστην ἐκκυβεύειν τοῖς ὄλοις, *Polybius* in *Suidas*, s.v. κύβος, οἱ μὲν ἀλογιστίαν καὶ μανίαν ἔφασαν εἶναι τὸ παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ κυβεύειν τῷ βίῳ. — καὶ κινδυνεύης: literal and figurative expressions are sometimes combined, the literal expression following and explaining the former. Cf. 334 d σύντεμνέ μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας ποιεῖ, *Acta Apost.* xiv. 17 ἐμπιπλῶν τροφῆς καὶ εὐφροσύνης τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν.

44. ἄλλοις: i.e. other than the body.

45. ἀποφέρειν: sc. τὸν πριάμενον, the purchaser, from the preceding circumst. partic.

50. καταθέντα: cf. 328 c.

51. τὸ μάθημα . . . λαβόντα: corresponds to δέξασθαι εἰς τὸ σῶμα above, b

μαθόντα ἀπιέναι ἢ βεβλαμμένον ἢ ὠφελημένον. ταῦτα οὖν σκοπώμεθα καὶ μετὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἡμῶν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἔτι νέοι ὥστε τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα διελέσθαι. νῦν μέν-
 55 τοι, ὥσπερ ὠρμήσαμεν, ἴωμεν καὶ ἀκούσωμεν τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἔπειτα ἀκούσαντες καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνακοινωσώμεθα· καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνος Πρωταγόρας αὐτόθι ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἴππίας ὁ Ἡλείος· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Πρόδικον τὸν Κεῖον· καὶ ἄλλοι c
 πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοί.

VI. Δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἐπορευόμεθα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντες περί τινος λόγου διελεγόμεθα, ὃς ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐπέπεσεν· ἵν' οὖν μὴ ἀτελής γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ διαπερανάμενοι, οὕτως ἐσίοιμεν,
 5 στάντες ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ διελεγόμεθα, ἕως συνωμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι, ὁ θυρωρός, εὐνοῦχός τις,

³¹⁴ and καὶ μαθόντα το πιόντα ἢ φαγόντα, hence, on learning and so receiving into the soul.

54. νέοι ὥστε κτέ.: too young to determine. Yet not the degree of the quality but the quality itself is declared to be unsuited to the end, which is put in the inf., or inf. with ὥστε. Cf. *Menex.* 239 b ὁ χρόνος βραχὺς διηγήσασθαι, *Eur. Andr.* 80 γέρων ἐκεῖνος ὥστε σ' ὠφελεῖν παρών. See G. 261, 1; H 642. — Contrast the less modest expression of Protagoras 317 c.

56. ἀνακοινωσώμεθα: cf. 317 d.

c 58. οἶμαι δὲ . . . Κεῖον: sc. αὐτόθι εἶναι. Cf. 316 d ἤσθημαι, sc. προκαλύπτεισθαι, *Symp.* 176 a χαλεπῶς ἔχω ὑπὸ τοῦ χθὲς πότου, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλούς, *Apol.* 25 θ ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. The words are parenthetical.

VI. 1. δόξαν ταῦτα: after the analogy of δοκεῖ ταῦτα. Cf. *Xen. An.* iv. i. 13 δόξαν δὲ ταῦτα ἐκήρυξαν οὕτω ποιεῖν. Plural in *Andoc.* i. 81 δόξαντα δὲ

ὑμῖν ταῦτα εἴλεσθε ἀνδρας εἴκοσι, *Xen.* ³¹⁴ *Hell.* iii. 2. 19 δόξαντα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ περανθέντα τὰ στρατεύματα ἀπῆλθε. See G. 278, 2; H. 974 a. — ἐπειδὴ δὲ κτέ.: in order to represent the porter as behaving in a manner so characteristic, Plato makes the conversation come to an end before the house; as Socrates when alone, in *Symp.* 175 a concludes his meditations ἐν τοῖς προθύροις. Doubtless this was a familiar habit of Socrates.

2. προθύρῳ: for this porch, see *Becker Char.* ii. 132; *Hermann Griech. Privatalt.* § 19.

6. δοκεῖ μοι: so οἶμαι, οἶδα is sometimes inserted parenthetically without ὡς, ὅτι. Cf. *Menex.* 236 b ὅτε μοι δοκεῖ συνετίθει τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λόγον when, as I believe, she composed the funeral oration, *Thuc.* i. 3. 1 δοκεῖ δέ μοι, οὐδὲ τοῦνομα τοῦτο ξύμπασά πω εἶχεν, *Soph. O. C.* 1615 σκληρὰν μὲν, οἶδα, also 309 b, 323 d, 327 b. — ὁ θυρωρός: in the house of the wealthy there was

St. p. 314.

κατήκουεν ἡμῶν· κινδυνεύει δὲ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σο- d
φιστῶν ἄχθασθαι τοῖς φοιτῶσιν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν. ἐπειδὴ
γοῦν ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν, ἀνοίξας καὶ ἰδὼν ἡμᾶς, Ἔα,
10 ἔφη, σοφισταί τινες· οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ. Καὶ ἅμα ἀμφοῖν
τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν θύραν πάνυ προθύμως ὡς οἶός τ' ἦν
ἐπήραξεν. καὶ ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐκρούομεν. καὶ ὃς ἐγκεκλημέ-
νης τῆς θύρας ἀποκρινόμενος εἶπεν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἔφη,
οὐκ ἀκηκόατε, ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ; Ἄλλ' ὠγαθέ, ἔφην
15 ἐγώ, οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἤκομεν οὔτε σοφισταί ἐσμεν,
ἀλλὰ θάρρει· Πρωταγόραν γάρ τοι δεόμενοι ἰδεῖν ἤλθο- e
μεν. εἰσάγγειλον οὔν. Μόγισ οὔν ποτὲ ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος
ἀνέωξε τὴν θύραν.

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰσῆλθομεν, κατελάβομεν Πρωταγόραν
20 ἐν τῷ προστώῳ περιπατοῦντα, ἐξῆς δ' αὐτῷ συμπερι-

³¹⁴ always at that time a porter, whose
^c duty it was in his θυρωρεῖον to watch
all that passed in and out, to open
the door which was usually closed,
and to announce visitors (εἰσαγγέλλειν
or προσαγγέλλειν). Not infre-
quently these porters were surly (cf.
Philodem. περὶ κακιῶν § 9, προσαγγέλλειν
οὐ θέλοντες ἢ σκορακίζοντες ἢ τι
τοιούτου ἐπιλέγοντες), but here the re-
luctance of the faithful old eunuch
points to the senseless doings in the
house of his young master. Socrates,
to be sure, he might have known;
but this is another touch of Plato's,
to show that Socrates was a beginner
as yet.

^d 10. οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ: a customary an-
nouncement to unwelcome visitors. In
Cic. *de Senec.* 10, Cato remarks *nemo
adhuc convenire me voluit,
cui fuerim occupatus.* *Symp.*
212d, when a company of revellers
knocks at the door late at night, Aga-
tho bids his servants, *εἰ μὲν τις τῶν*

ἐπιτηδείων ἦ, καλεῖτε· εἰ δὲ μή, λέγετε, ³¹⁴
ὅτι οὐ πίνομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀναπαυόμεθα (have
^d gone to bed) ἤδη. — αὐτῷ: himself; so
slaves called their masters, pupils
their teachers, parasites their patrons.
Cf. Poll. iii. 74 Ἀριστοφάνης μέντοι
κατὰ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν συνήθειαν τὸν
δεσπότην αὐτὸν κέκληκεν, also the
αὐτὸς ἔφη, ipse dixit of the pupils
of Protagoras.

17. μόγισ κτέ.: with difficulty the
man was finally persuaded. Cf. *Theaet.*
160e τοῦτο μόγισ ποτὲ ἐγεννήσαμεν
Thuc. vii. 40 μόγισ ποτὲ ἀντανήγοντο,
also μόγισ πως 328d, *Apol.* 21b μόγισ
πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ ἐτραπόμην after
a long struggle I gave myself to an in-
vestigation, etc.

20. προστώῳ: a narrow passage
(θυρωρεῖον, θυρών, πυλών) led from the
house-door to the porticos (τὸ περί-
στυλον), which surrounded the court
on all four sides, and which, as they
lay before the different rooms, were
termed προστώα. As nothing is said

επάτουν ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα Καλλίας ὁ Ἴππονίκου
καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ ὁμομήτριος, Πάραλος ὁ Περικλέ-
ους, καὶ Χαρμίδης ὁ Γλαύκωνος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα ὁ 315
ἕτερος τῶν Περικλέους, Ξάνθιππος, καὶ Φιλιππίδης ὁ Φι-
25 λομήλου καὶ Ἀντίμοιρος ὁ Μενδαῖος, ὅσπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ μά-
λιστα τῶν Πρωταγόρου μαθητῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τέχνη μαυθάνει,
ὡς σοφιστῆς ἐσόμενος. τούτων δὲ ὅπισθεν οἱ ἠκολούθουν
ἐπακούοντες τῶν λεγομένων, τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο,
οὓς ἄγει ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι' ὧν
30 διεξέρχεται, κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ ὥσπερ Ὀρφεύς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ
τὴν φωνὴν ἔπονται κεκλημένοι· ἦσαν δὲ τινες καὶ τῶν b

³¹⁴
^e here of the right or left, Protagoras
is to be imagined as in the front and
Hippias in the rear portico. Socrates
and Hippocrates tarry a few moments
in the passage, where, themselves un-
noticed, they can survey the interior,
including an adjacent room in which
Prodicus is lying, cf. 315 d.

21. ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα: on one side,
cf. Thuc. vii. 37, ἡ γυμνητεία ἐκ
τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα προσήει τῷ τείχει (ad-
vanced to the wall from the opposite side),
Xen. An. v. 4. 10. This use of the
art. in such expressions is freq. with
the Attic writers; cf. Euthyd. 297 c, ἐκ
τοῦ ἐπ' ἀριστερά, Phaedo 112 b, εἰς τὸ
ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα Thuc. viii. 104, ἐν τῷ ἐπέ-
κεινα, id. i. 32; iv. 72 ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ.

22. Πάραλος: ἦν μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ
(Pericles) γυνὴ προσήκουσα μὲν κατὰ
γένος, συμφηκῆναι δ' Ἴππονίκῳ πρότε-
ρον, ἐξ οὗ Καλλίαν ἔτεκε τὸν πλούσιον·
ἔτεκε δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῷ Περικλεῖ Ξάνθιππον
καὶ Πάραλον. Plutarch Pericles 24.

³¹⁵
^a 23. Χαρμίδης: brother of Plato's
mother; see the dialogue which bears
his name.

24. The family of Philippides and
Philomelus of Lower Paeania can be
traced through many generations.

See Boeckh *Seewesen Urkunden*, pp. 24 ³¹⁵
and 252 f. ^a

25. Antimoerus owes his immor-
tality to this single passage. — Even
though the passage marks no clear
distinction between μαθηταί and ἐπή-
κοοι, evidently those who walk near-
est Protagoras are his more intimate
pupils.

26. ἐπὶ τέχνη: see on 312 b.

27. Const. οἱ δὲ ὅπισθεν τούτων ἠκο-
λούθουν.

29. Cf. 316 c; and regarding Gor-
gias, Prodicus, and Hippias, *Apol.*
19 e τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος ἰὼν εἰς ἐκάστην
τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἕξεστι τῶν
ἐαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν
βούλωνται (the young men, who may
associate freely with whomsoever of their
own citizens they desire), τούτους πεί-
θουσι τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας
σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ
χάριν προσειδέναι (paying them money
and giving them thanks besides).

30. κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ: Protagoras
charms through the form, not the
content, of his teaching. — οἱ δὲ
ἔπονται: while they follow, a free ex-
tension of the rel. clause οὓς ἄγει.
The correl. of μὲν l. 28 is δὲ l. 31.

ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χορῷ. τοῦτον τὸν χορὸν μάλιστα ἔγωγε
 ἰδὼν ἤσθην, ὡς καλῶς εὐλαβοῦντο μηδέποτε ἐμποδῶν ἐν
 τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναι Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ἀνα-
 35 στρέφοι καὶ οἱ μετ' ἐκείνου, εὖ πως καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ περι-
 εσχίζοντο οὔτοι οἱ ἐπήκοοι ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν, καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ
 περιούντες ἀεὶ εἰς τὸ ὄπισθεν καθίσταντο κάλλιστα.

VII. Τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα, ἔφη Ὅμηρος, Ἴππίαν
 τὸν Ἥλείον, καθήμενον ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀντικρὺ προστώῳ ἐν c
 θρόνῳ· περὶ αὐτὸν δ' ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ βάθρων Ἐρυξίμαχός

³¹⁵
 b 32. χορῷ: the tragic chorus, as it entered the theatre, was generally arranged in three rows (στοῖχοι, cf. στίχοι), each consisting of five choreutae, the middle choreut in the row nearest to the spectators being the Coryphaeus. Similarly, here Protagoras is in the middle of a row of seven, the others walking behind these.

33. Socrates ironically admires the skill shown in keeping out of Protagoras's way.

34. τῷ: const. with πρόσθεν Πρωταγόρου after ἐν. See G. 141, n. 3. f.; H. 666.

36. ἐπήκοοι: mere silent listeners.

37. εἰς . . . κάλλιστα: took their positions in the rear in the most graceful manner.

VII. 1. τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα: these familiar words, and also καὶ Τάνταλον εἰσεῖδον, would instantly, in the minds of Plato's contemporaries, shift the scene to Hades; for in the Homeric Νέκυια Odysseus recounts, with these words, that he saw in Hades, among other shades, those also of Hercules and Tantalus. Cf. Hom. λ 601 τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα βίην Ἡρακλείην, ib. 582 καὶ μὴν Τάνταλον εἰσεῖδον χαλέπ' ἄλγε' ἔχοντα. So then we

are in the realm of shades; Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus are famous names, — rather an outward form than a reality. The comparison to Tantalus is applied to Prodicus because of his sickly condition, in which he appeared χαλέπ' ἄλγε' ἔχων. To find, however, an allusion to Prodicus's greed or love of luxury, to see in Hippias a Hercules by reason of his combativeness, or to seek to find in the wise Protagoras a Sisyphus, would be frivolous, and would impair the humor of the comparison. Timon of Phlius had also parodied the Νέκυια, as have Schiller, and Goethe in the Xenia (332-414).

3. θρόνον, βάθρων: both words are c suggestive of a boys' school. θρόνος, the high armchair, was, at least in later times, the accustomed seat of the rhetorician or sophist. Cf. Plut. περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν, c. 12 ἀναστάντες γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ θρόνου καὶ ἀποθέμενοι τὰ βιβλία . . . μικροὶ φαίνονται (sc. οἱ σοφισταί). βάθρα are the school benches, cf. 325 e. — Eryximachus, an intelligent physician of reputation, appears also in Phaedr. 268 a and Symp. 176 b ff.; with regard to Phaedrus, see the dialogue which bears his name; these two are everywhere represented as inti-

τε ὁ Ἄκουμενοῦ καὶ Φαῖδρος ὁ Μυρρινούσιος καὶ Ἄνδρων
 5 ὁ Ἄνδροτίωνος καὶ τῶν ξένων πολῖται τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλ-
 λοι τινές. ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τῶν μετεώ-
 ρων ἀστρονομικὰ ἅττα διερωτᾶν τὸν Ἰππίαν, ὁ δ' ἐν
 θρόνῳ καθήμενος ἐκάστοις αὐτῶν διέκρινε καὶ διεξήει
 τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.

10 Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλόν γε εἰσεῖδον. ἐπεδήμει
 γὰρ ἄρα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος. ἦν δὲ ἐν οἰκήματί α
 τινι, ᾧ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ὡς ταμείῳ ἐχρήτο Ἰππόδικος, νῦν
 δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν καταλυόντων ὁ Καλλίας καὶ
 τοῦτο ἐκκενώσας ξένοις κατάλυσιν πεποίηκεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν
 15 Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο, ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κωδίοις τισὶ

³¹⁵
 c mate friends. Andron is mentioned
 also in *Gorg.* 487 c as eagerly occupied
 with philosophy; he was afterwards
 perhaps one of the Four Hundred;
 probably the orator Androtion, against
 whom Demosthenes spoke, was his
 son.

7. Cf. 318 e; *Hipp. Ma.* 285 b ἀ σὺ
 (Hippias) κάλλιστα ἐπίστασαι, τὰ περὶ
 τὰ ἄστρα τε καὶ τὰ οὐράνια πάθη. As-
 tronomy was devoted to the investi-
 gation of the motions, nature, and
 origin of the heavenly bodies, and
 the general constitution of the uni-
 verse, — ἡ φύσις.

8. διέκρινε: Hippias pronounced
 his verdicts, like the judge or the
 schoolmaster, from his high seat.
 Cf. *Rep.* i. 348 b καὶ ἤδη δικαστῶν τι-
 νῶν τῶν διακρινούντων δεησόμεθα.

d 11. ἄρα: refers to 314 b. So also
 ἐπεδήμει, although at the time when
 Socrates is relating his story, Prodicus
 is still there. They found Socrates's
 conjecture respecting him (*ibid.*) cor-
 rect. — οἰκήματι: any room or cham-
 ber. Cf. *Poll.* ix. 45 οἴκημα παρὰ τοῖς
 Ἀττικοῖς ἀπλῶς τὸ οἰκήσιμον · ὅ τε γὰρ

Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ἔφη 'ἦσαν δ' ³¹⁵
 . . . ἐχρήτο,' *Symp.* 217 d οὐδεὶς ἐν τῷ
 οἰκῆματι ἄλλος καθῆνυδεν ἢ ἡμεῖς. ^d

12. ὡς ταμείῳ: cf. *Thuc.* vii. 24
 ὡσπερ γὰρ ταμείῳ χρωμένων τῶν Ἀθη-
 ναίων τοῖς τεύχεσι. The changed con-
 tents of the store-room, and the ἐκκε-
 νώσας, taken with the vexation of the
 eunuch, complete the picture of the
 state of things in Callias's house.

15. κωδίοις: cf. *Poll.* v. 16 δέρμα
 τοῦ προβάτου κώδιον. Cold weather,
 sickness, and effeminacy, caused peo-
 ple to wrap themselves in all sorts of
 skins and coverings. Cf. the descrip-
 tion of the hopeful son, *Ar. Nub.* 10
 ἐν πέντε σισύραις ἐγκεκορδυλημένος
 wrapped up in five skins. Prodicus
 is represented as sickly, cf. 317 e,
Plut. εἰ πρεσβυτ. πολιτευτέον p. 791 e
 Πρόδικον τὸν σοφιστὴν ἢ φιλητᾶν τὸν
 ποιητὴν . . . νέους μὲν, ἰσχνούς δὲ καὶ
 νοσώδεις καὶ τὰ πολλὰ κλινοπετεῖς δι'
 ἀρρωστίαν ὄντας (*thin and sickly, and*
for the most part confined to the bed
by their ailments). — τισὶ . . . καὶ μάλα
πολλοῖς: τινὲς πολλοὶ and similar com-
binations are not uncommon. Cf. Ar.

καὶ στρώμασι καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς, ὡς ἐφαίνετο· παρεκά-
θηντο δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ ταῖς πλησίον κλίμαις Πausανίας τε ὁ
ἐκ Κεραμέων καὶ μετὰ Πausανίου νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον,
ὡς μὲν ἐγῶμαι, καλόν τε κάγαθὸν τὴν φύσιν, τὴν δ' οὖν e
20 ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός. ἔδοξα ἀκούσαι ὄνομα αὐτῷ εἶναι Ἀγά-
θωνα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ παιδικὰ Πausανίου τυγ-
χάνει ὦν. τοῦτ' ἦν τὸ μειράκιον, καὶ τῷ Ἀδειμάντῳ

³¹⁵
d Av. 1014 κεκίνηνται τινες πληγαὶ συχναί
very frequent blows are set agoing, Plato
Legg. iii. 678d παμπόλλαις τισίν (sc.
γενεαῖς), 682b ἐν πολλοῖς τισι χρόνοις.

17. Pausanias appears also in *Symp.*
176 a ff. as one of the more note-
worthy persons in the cultivated
Athenian society of that day; both
in the *Symp. l.c.*, 177 e, 193 b, and in
Xen. *Symp.* c. 8, is his love for Aga-
thon mentioned. Agathon, son of
Tisamenus, was rich and handsome,
and gained favor for his tragedies by
a Gorgian splendor of language; he
went later to the court of Archelaus
in Macedonia, where he died about
401 B.C. We are to think of him
here as about sixteen years old.

e 19. δ' οὖν: contrasts with a pre-
vious statement of conceded uncer-
tainty, one as to which there is no
doubt; but at any rate, sed certe.
Cf. Xen. *An.* i. 2. 12 and 22, 3. 5;
Plato *Apol.* 17 a, 34e εἴ μὲν θαρρα-
λέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μὴ, ἄλλος
λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν κτέ., whether
I can face death bravely or not is another
matter, but certainly in view of our repu-
tation I do not think it best, etc.

20. καλός: with μειράκιον, παιδικά,
etc., the natural gender prevails. Cf.
Lach. 180e τὰ γὰρ μειράκια τάδε πρὸς
ἀλλήλους οἴκοι διαλεγόμενοι θαμὰ ἐπι-
μέμνηνται Σωκράτους. — ἔδοξα: "if
I rightly remember." Cf. *Theaet.*

142c δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανά-
του ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ μεираκίῳ ὄντι for, I
believe, a little while before his own
death, he met him, while still a youth.

21. εἰ . . . τυγχάνει ὦν: if it should
be found that he is, etc.; an elliptical
prot., representing the object of won-
der not as a matter of fact, but as
more or less uncertain. Cf. 336c;
Thuc. i. 121. 5 δεινὸν ἂν εἴη, εἰ οἱ μὲν
ἐκείνων σύμμαχοι οὐκ ἀπεροῦσιν, ἡμεῖς
δὲ οὐκ ἄρα δαπανήσομεν if it should
prove that their allies will not weary of
paying, while we will not spend our
money. See GMT. 56; H. 926.

22. ἦν κτέ: there was this youth.
Cf. *Phaedo* 59b οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλό-
δωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ ὁ Κριτό-
βουλος καὶ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἔτι
Ἑρμογένης καὶ Ἀντισθένης. ἦν δὲ καὶ
Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ
ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων, where, be-
cause παρῆν precedes, ἦν signifies Cte-
sippus also was (sc. present) *Rep.* x.
615d ἐκεῖνόν τε κατείδομεν καὶ ἄλλους
σχεδόν τι αὐτῶν τοὺς πλείστους τυράν-
νους· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἰδιῶται τινὲς τῶν μεγάλα
ἡμαρτηκότων, we saw him and others of
whom the most were tyrants; and there
were also (to be seen) some private
persons who had committed great crimes,
Symp. 173b Ἀριστόδημος ἦν τις (in
reply to τίς σοι διηγεῖτο;), 180c εἶναι.
Adimantus was not an unusual name
in Athens. Of those here mentioned

ἀμφοτέρω, ὃ τε Κήπιδος καὶ ὁ Λευκολοφίδου, καὶ ἄλλοι τι-
 νὲς ἐφαίνοντο. περὶ δὲ ὧν διελέγοντο οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἔγωγε
 25 μαθεῖν ἔξωθεν, καίπερ λιπαρῶς ἔχων ἀκούειν τοῦ Προδί-
 κου — πάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος, —
 ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς φωνῆς βόμβος τις ἐν τῷ οἴ- 316
 κήματι γιγνόμενος ἀσαφῆ ἐποίει τὰ λεγόμενα.

VIII. Καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἄρτι εἰσεληλύθειμεν, κατόπιν δὲ
 ἡμῶν ἐπεισῆλθον Ἀλκιβιάδης θ' ὁ καλός, ὡς φῆς σὺ καὶ
 ἐγὼ πείθομαι, καὶ Κριτίας ὁ Καλλαίσχρου.

Ἡμεῖς οὖν ὡς εἰσῆλθομεν, ἔτι σμίκρ' ἄττα διατρί-
 5 ψαντες καὶ ταῦτα διαθεασάμενοι προσῆμεν πρὸς τὸν Πρω- b
 ταγόραν καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πρὸς σέ τοι ἦλθο-
 μεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Ἰπποκράτης οὗτος. Πότερον, ἔφη, μόνω
 βουλόμενοι διαλεχθῆναι ἢ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων; Ἡμῖν μὲν,
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἀκούσας δὲ οὐ ἔνεκα ἦλθομεν
 10 αὐτὸς σκέψαι. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστίν, ἔφη, οὐ ἔνεκα ἦκετε;
 Ἰπποκράτης ὅδε ἐστὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπιχωρίων, Ἀπολλοδώρου
 υἱός, οἰκίας μεγάλης τε καὶ εὐδαίμονος· αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν

³¹⁵
 e the son of Cepis is unknown; but the
 son of Leucolophides appears also in
Ar. Ran. 1513; he is the general who
 was charged with treachery in the
 affair of Aegos Potami. *Cf.* *Xen.*
Hell. ii. i. 32; *Lys.* xiv. 38. His
 property was confiscated; *C. I. Att.*
 I. 274, 275, 276.

25. ἔχων: ἔχειν with an adv. of con-
 dition is equiv. to εἶναι with an adj.

26. πάσσοφος: an epithet fre-
 quently applied ironically by Plato
 to the sophists. *Cf.* *Euthyd.* 271c
 πάνσοφοι ἀτεχνῶς (*Euthydemus* and
Dionysodorus). Used of the Eleatic
 and Heraclitic philosophers; *cf.*
Theaet. 181b, *Rep.* i. 331e σοφὸς γὰρ
 καὶ θεῖος ἀνὴρ (*sc.* *Simonides*).

VIII. 2. ὡς φῆς σὺ κτέ.: *cf.* *Symp.* ³¹⁶
 186e ὡς φασιν οἷδε οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ ἐγὼ a
 πείθομαι, 212b ταῦτα δὴ ἔφη μὲν Διο-
 τίμα, πέπεισμαι δ' ἐγώ.

3. Κριτίας: well known as the
 leader of the Thirty Tyrants. His
 father and Plato's maternal grand-
 father were brothers. He gave him-
 self diligently to the study of philos-
 ophy, and appears in several of Plato's
 dialogues.

6. τοί: indicates with emphasis b
 the person addressed; most freq. with
 prons. *Cf.* *Ar. Av.* 406 ἰὼ ἐποψ (*hoo-*
proe), σέ τοι καλῶ, *Plut.* 1100 σέ τοι
 λέγω, ὦ Καρίων, ἀνάμεινον. Here, in
 the presence of Callias and others,
 this directness is necessary.

φύσιν δοκεῖ ἐνάμιλλος εἶναι τοῖς ἡλικιώταις. ἐπιθυμεῖν
 δέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει. τοῦτο δὲ ^c
 15 οἷεται οἱ μάλιστα ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ συγγένοιτο. ταῦτ'
 οὖν ἤδη σὺ σκόπει, πότερον περὶ αὐτῶν μόνος οἷει δεῖν
 διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς μόνους ἢ μετ' ἄλλων. Ὁρθῶς, ἔφη,
 προμηθεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ. ξένον γὰρ ἄνδρα καὶ
 ἰόντα εἰς πόλεις μεγάλας, καὶ ἐν ταύταις πείθοντα τῶν
 20 νέων τοὺς βελτίστους ἀπολιπόντας τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συνου-
 σίας, καὶ οἰκείων καὶ ὀθνείων, καὶ πρεσβυτέρων καὶ νεω-
 τέρων, ἑαυτῷ συνεῖναι ὡς βελτίους ἐσομένους διὰ τὴν
 ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίαν, χρὴ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὸν ταῦτα πράττοντα. ^d

³¹⁶
^b 13. ἐνάμιλλος εἶναι: cope with, am a match for one. Cf. *Rep.* iv. 433 d ἐνάμιλλον ἄρα πρὸς ἀρετὴν πόλεως τῇ τε σοφίᾳ αὐτῆς καὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ τοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις then that each individual in the state should do his own work contributes as much toward the excellence of a city as its wisdom, temperance, and courage.

^c 15. ἂν: always stands with the aor. inf. after verbs signifying to hope, expect, promise, suppose, and the like, when the governing verb does not make the reference to the fut. unmistakable. Cf. 318 a, 348 d, 353 b. See GMT. 22, 2, n. 3; 41, 3.

16 μόνος: is const. with οἷει, being attracted into agreement with the subj. of the latter, while, according to the sense, we should expect μόνον agreeing with the subj. acc. of διαλέγεσθαι. So regularly in οἶομαι δεῖν, χρῆναι and similar expressions, the const. is unaffected by the impers. inf. Cf. *Isocr.* ix. 30 οὐχ ἠγήσατο δεῖν χωρίον ὀχυρὸν καταλαβὼν περιδεῖν, *Dem.* xxi. 17 αὐτὸς διδάσκειν ἔτεο δεῖν τὸν χορόν. See G. 138, n. 8; H. 944; 940.

17. Protagoras always displays his ³¹⁶
 art in long and ornate discourses, aiming ^c
 at thoughts which are striking rather than true. He does this here, in what he boastfully says of the antiquity of the sophistical art. The support for his statement he finds in the fact that all whom he quotes were eminent in the wisdom of practical life, which he maintains to be the essence of his own art. Socrates afterwards shows (cf. 342a ff.) that this method of grouping may be made very convenient. The supposed προμήθεια of Socrates serves perfectly the end of enabling Protagoras to declare his own fearlessness and to eulogize his profession. In fact, however, when he had offered to Socrates the decision as to the presence of others at the colloquy, Socrates had disclaimed any preference.

19. See on 315 a.

21. οἰκείων . . . νεωτέρων: note the ὁμοιοτέλευτα.

23. τὸν ταῦτα πράττοντα: emphati- ^d
 cally sums up the preceding accs., as does freq. οὗτος alone. The clause is equiv. to χρὴ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τοῦτον, but has more rhetorical dignity.

οὐ γὰρ σμικροὶ περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι τε γίνονται καὶ ἄλλαι
 25 δυσμένειαί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί. ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέ-
 χνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους
 αὐτὴν τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθὲς
 αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι τοὺς μὲν
 οἰον Ὅμηρόν τε καὶ Ἑσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς
 30 δὲ αὖτε τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμωδίας, τοὺς ἀμφί τε Ὀρφέα
 καὶ Μουσαῖον. ἐνίους δέ τινας ἤσθημαι καὶ γυμναστικὴν,
 οἰον Ἴκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος καὶ ὁ νῦν ἔτι ὢν οὐδενὸς
 ἤπτων σοφιστῆς Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον
 Μεγαρεύς. μουσικὴν δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμέτερος πρό-

³¹⁶
 d 24. ἄλλαι δυσμένειαί: *moreover en-*
mities. So freq. a new class is in-
 troduced by ἄλλος. Cf. *Apol.* 36 b
στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλ-
λων ἀρχῶν, where see Stallbaum, *Gorg.*
 519 c *τούς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ*
ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες (*and re-*
turning no thanks either), *Phaedr.* 232 b.
 See G. 142, 2, n. 3; H. 705.

28. ποιεῖσθαι . . . προκαλύπτεσθαι:
 in a clause with ὅτι the impf. would
 have been used. The pres. inf. and
 partic. belong also to the impf. See
 GMT. 15, 3; 16, 2; H. 853 a; 856 a.

29. οἰον: attracted to the case of
 the antec.; see G. 153, n. 5; H. 1002.
 — Σιμωνίδην: Protagoras's preference
 for Simonides appears thus early.
 Cf. 339 a ff.

30. The names of Orpheus and
 Musaeus were connected with vari-
 ous solemn rites and prophetic say-
 ings; after the collection and arrange-
 ment of their poems by Onomacritus,
 the poets were often mentioned to-
 gether.

32. Ἴκκος: cf. Paus. vi. 10. 2 Ἴκ-
 κος δὲ ὁ Νικολαΐδα Ταραντῖνος τὸν τε
 Ὀλυμπιακὸν στέφανον ἔσχεν ἐπὶ πεντά-

θλω καὶ ὕστερον γυμναστῆς ἄριστος λέ-
 γεται τῶν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι. Accord-
 ing to Steph. Byz., s. v. Τάρας, he was
 victorious, Ol. 77, 472 B.C. So *Legg.*
 viii. 840 a he is extolled ὡς διὰ φιλο-
 νικίαν καὶ τέχνην καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦ σω-
 φρονεῖν ἀνδρεῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κεκτημένος
because of his zeal for the games and
skill in them, and of possessing in his
soul courage combined with temperance.
 — οὐδενὸς ἤπτων: see on 324 d.

33. Herodicus was a teacher of
 gymnastics and medicine. His own
 debility led him to devise a strict regi-
 men, which prolonged his life to old
 age, although he was always sickly.
 Cf. *Rep.* iii. 406 a, Aristot. *Rhet.* i. 5.
 10, Plut. *de sera* ix. He was prob-
 born in Megara, and afterwards be-
 came a citizen of Selymbria on the
 Propontis. Σηλυμβριανοί is the form
 found in the Attic inscriptions of the
 fifth century, but Σαλύβριαν in an
 Attic epitaph from the beginning of
 the fourth century B.C. (Kumanudes
 ἐπιγραφαὶ ἐπιτύμβιοι No. 15.).

34. Agathocles is mentioned also in
Lach. 180 d, and Pythocles had in-
 structed Pericles in music (acc. to

35 σχημα ἐποιήσατο, μέγας ὢν σοφιστής, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ
 Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί. οὗτοι πάντες, ὥσπερ λέγω, φο-
 βηθέντες τὸν φθόνον ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετά-
 σμασιν ἐχρήσαντο. ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις ἅπασι κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι 317
 οὐ ξυμφέρομαι· ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὐ τι διαπράξασθαι
 40 ὃ ἐβουλήθησαν· οὐ γὰρ λαθεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυ-
 ναμένους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττειν, ὧν περ ἔνεκα ταῦτ'
 ἐστὶ τὰ προσχήματα, ἐπεὶ οἷ γε πολλοὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν

³¹⁶
^c Aristotle in Plutarch *Pericles* 4). Of the musician Damon, also Pericles's friend, Plutarch says similarly *ibid.* ἄκρος ὢν σοφιστής οὐκ ἔλαθε τῇ λύρᾳ παρακαλύμματι χρώμενος *it was no secret that he was a consummate sophist, and used the lyre as a pretext.*

³¹⁷
^h 38. κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι: *in this matter at least; cf. ἐκὼν εἶναι, τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶναι, τὸ νῦν εἶναι, — also without the art., Polit. 300 c τὰ παρὰ τῶν εἰδότην εἰς δύναμιν εἶναι (so far as possible) γεγραμμένα, Isae. II. 32 ὠμόσαμεν εὖ ποιεῖν ἀλλήλους κατὰ δύναμιν εἶναι.* The inf., as an acc. of specification, indicates the sphere within which the declaration finds its place. See G. 268; H. 956 a.

39. οὐ τι: very freq. in Plato (and in Homer) as a strengthened οὐ, *by no means.*

40. οὐ γὰρ λαθεῖν, κτέ.: λαθεῖν, even after γὰρ, depends upon ἡγοῦμαι. For (I think) they do not escape the detection of those in authority. Cf. 351 a, *Crat.* 417 c ταύτη μοι δοκεῖ ἐπιφημίσαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν λυσιτελοῦν· τὸ γὰρ τῆς φορᾶς λύον τὸ τέλος λυσιτελοῦν καλέσαι *herein, it seems to me, one happily terms the good λυσιτελοῦν, — for that which sets free the end of motion one calls λυσιτελοῦν, Rep.* v. 479 b τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἐστίασεσιν ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν ἔοικε· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτερίζειν *they are like the riddles at feasts; for these also have a double*

sense, *Lys.* xxix. 5 ἡγοῦμαι δὲ Φιλοκρά-
 τει δύο εἶναι ἀπολογίας· προσήκειν γὰρ
 κτέ. This is regarded as assimilation
 in GMT. 92, 2, n. 3; H. 947. — τοὺς
 δυναμένους πράττειν: *those who can
 act, and not merely consider and dis-
 cuss; i.e. "those in authority."* Cf.
 Thuc. viii. 72 πεντακισχίλιοί τε ὅτι
 εἶεν καὶ οὐ τετρακόσιοι μόνον οἱ πράσ-
 στοντες *that those administering the gov-
 ernment were, etc., Isocr.* iv. 188 τοὺς
 μὲν πράττειν δυναμένους πειρᾶσθαι (χρῆ)
 διαλλάττειν (τὰς πόλεις), v. 13 δεῖ ποι-
 ῆσασθαι τινα προστάτην τῶν καὶ λέγειν
 καὶ πράττειν δυναμένων καὶ δόξαν με-
 γάλην ἐχόντων, *Dem. de Cor.* 45 αἱ δὲ
 πόλεις ἐνόσουν τῶν μὲν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύ-
 εσθαι καὶ πράττειν δωροδοκούντων, τῶν
 δ' ἰδιωτῶν καὶ πολλῶν τὰ μὲν οὐ προορω-
 μένων κτέ. *but the cities were diseased,
 since, on the one hand, those engaged
 in public life and service were venal;
 while, on the other hand, those in pri-
 vate life and the masses, failed to fore-
 see, etc.*

41. ὧν περ: *i.e. τῶν δυναμένων
 πράττειν.*

42. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: is used when the speaker, in order to express something very concisely, makes use of a term which taken strictly is too strong, as here οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται, hence equiv. to nearly, almost. Very freq. in Plato. See G. 268; H. 956.

οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται, ἀλλ' ἄττ' ἂν οὗτοι διαγγέλλωσι, ταῦτα ὑμνοῦσιν. τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρά-
 45 ναι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ εἶναι, πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρή-
 ματος, καὶ πολὺ δυσμενεστέρους παρέχεσθαι ἀνάγκη τοὺς ^b
 ἀνθρώπους· ἡγοῦνται γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις
 καὶ πανοῦργον εἶναι. ἐγὼ οὖν τούτων τὴν ἐναντίαν ἄπα-
 σαν ὁδὸν ἐλήλυθα, καὶ ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστὴς εἶναι καὶ
 50 παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ εὐλάβειαν ταύτην οἶμαι βελτίω
 ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξαρνον εἶναι· καὶ
 ἄλλας πρὸς ταύτη ἔσκεμμαι, ὥστε, σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, μηδὲν

³¹⁷
^a 43. οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται: for the thought, cf. *Crito* 48 c τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινύντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἂν, εἰ οἱοί τ' ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῶ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν these selfish considerations are characteristic of those who recklessly kill and would bring to life again if they could, these unreasoning common people. — οὗτοι: i.e. οἱ πράττειν δυνάμενοι. — διαγγέλλωσι: proclaim, issue as an order.

44. ὑμνοῦσιν: have in one's mouth, take up in chorus, cf. 343 b. — τό: const. with both δύνασθαι and εἶναι. — We expect shows great folly, etc.

45. καταφανῆ εἶναι: getting caught. — καὶ (even) τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος: emphatically repeats with anacoluthon the thought already contained in ἀποδιδράσκοντα, — as this denotes (since the failure is declared at the outset), only the attempt to escape. Cf. *Menex.* 244 e ἐκ ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, ἣν προθύμως ἀπώλλυ which he eagerly sought to ruin.

^b 46. παρέχεσθαι: sc. τὸ ἐπιχειρήμα.

48. ἄπασαν: strengthens ἐναντίαν, i.e. directly the opposite way. Cf. *Thuc.* vi. 21 ἐς ἄλλοτρίαν πᾶσαν ἀπαρτήσαντες removing to a land completely foreign, vi. 37. 3 ἐν πάσῃ πολεμῖα (entirely hostile) Σικελία. — The gen. τούτων does

not stand for τῆς τούτων, but depends ³¹⁷
^b upon ἐγὼ ἐλήλυθα τὴν ἐναντίαν ὁδόν, in the sense of "in contrast with them," i.e. "I, in contrast with these, have taken directly the opposite course." With πᾶς, ἄπας thus used, the art. is lacking.

52. ἄλλας: sc. εὐλαβείας other precautions. Protagoras reflects with satisfaction that in other respects also his methods are of such a sort that he has no occasion for apprehension. — σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν: deprecates any ill consequences of a boastful expression, to say it with the favor of the gods; like our 'thank God' with reference to the past, cf. *Theaet.* 151 b καὶ, ξὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς τοπάζω (*I can judge pretty accurately*); and 'by God's help,' with reference to the future, cf. *Eur. Med.* 625 ἴσως γὰρ, ξὺν θεῷ δ' εἰρήσεται, | γαμεῖς τοιοῦτον ὥστε σ' ἀρνεῖσθαι γάμον for perhaps — with leave of heaven be it said — you will contract such a marriage as you will be fain to disown. — ὥστε . . . πάσχειν: "there is nothing to be feared from the multitude because οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται, but as οἱ δυνάμενοι πράττειν cannot be eluded, it is safer not to attempt this, therefore I avoid the danger." Contrast

δεινὸν πάσχειν διὰ τὸ ὁμολογεῖν σοφιστῆς εἶναι. καίτοι c
πολλά γε ἔτη ἤδη εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ξύμ-
55 παντα πολλά μοί ἐστιν· οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ πάντων ἂν ὑμῶν
καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἴην. ὥστε πολὺ μοι ἡδιστόν ἐστιν,
εἴ τι βούλεσθε περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ἐναντίον τῶν ἔνδον
ὄντων τὸν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι. Καὶ ἐγὼ — ὑπώπτεισα γὰρ
βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τῷ τε Προδίκῳ καὶ τῷ Ἰππία ἐνδείξασθαι
60 καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι, ὅτι ἐρασταὶ αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένοι εἴμεν
— Τί οὖν, ἔφην ἐγὼ, οὐ καὶ Πρόδικον καὶ Ἰππίαν ἐκαλέ- d
σαμεν καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτῶν, ἵνα ἐπακούσωσιν ἡμῶν; Πάνυ
μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Βούλεσθε οὖν, ὁ Καλλίας
ἔφη, συνέδριον κατασκευάσωμεν, ἵνα καθιζόμενοι διαλέ-

³¹⁷
b the attitude of Socrates, *Crito* 48 a
οὐκ ἄρα πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον, τί
ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ὁ
ἐπαίων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ
εἶς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ
πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

c 54. ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ: ἐν τινι εἶναι, *be engaged in anything*. Cf. *Meno* 91 e οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν (Protagoras) ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγυὲς καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα, τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα, *Rep.* vii. 531 b ταῦτ' οὖν γὰρ ποιοῦσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἀστρονομίᾳ, *Soph. O. T.* 562 τότε οὖν ὁ μάντις οὗτος ἦν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ; — τὰ ξύμπαντα: *the years of his entire life*, contrasted with those spent in studies. Cf. *Hdt.* v. 120 πεσόντων δὲ τῶν πάντων πολλῶν μάλιστα Μιλήσιοι ἐπλήγησαν, *but while many fell from all the forces engaged, the Milesians suffered most severely*. See *Introd.* p. 2.

55. οὐδενὸς κτέ.: in a confirmation of what has preceded, the *asyndeton* is common. See G. 153, n. 4; H. 1003 a for inverted assimilation. Similar *pleonasm* in *Dem.* xx. 3 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐφ' ὅτου τοῦτο οὐ πεπόνθατε τῶν πάντων.

56. ὥστε: *i.e.* "the former great ³¹⁷
sophists failed in attempting to cover c
this their real employment; I choose the safer course of avowing it as my own, and therefore strongly prefer to answer your question, not in private, but in the presence of the other sophists and their friends." The elaborate prelude is followed by a short strain; and Socrates failed to catch the sequence (ὑπώπτεισα γὰρ κτέ.).

57. ἀπάντων: *const.* with τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων.

58. καὶ ἐγὼ κτέ.: cf. 335 a, *Euthyd.* 302 a καὶ γὰρ — ἤδη γὰρ ὅτι κτέ.

59. ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι: *i.e.* ἐνδείξάμενον καλλωπίσασθαι, see on 333 d.

61. οὐ . . . ἐκαλέσαμεν: see on 310 a. d

63. βούλεσθε . . . κατασκευάσωμεν: for the 'deliberative' subjv. see G. 256; H. 866, 3.

64. συνέδριον: a word of much dignity. — καθιζόμενοι διαλέγησθε: *i.e.* καθίσησθε καὶ διαλέγησθε. Cf. *Phaedr.* 228 e ἀλλὰ ποῦ δὴ βούλει καθιζόμενοι ἀναγνώμεν;

65 γησθε; Ἐδόκει χρῆναι. ἄσμενοι δὲ πάντες ἡμεῖς, ὡς ἀκου-
 σόμενοι ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀντιλαβόμενοι τῶν βά-
 θρων καὶ τῶν κλιῶν κατεσκευάζομεν παρὰ τῷ Ἰππία·
 ἐκεῖ γὰρ προϋπήρχε τὰ βάθρα. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Καλλίας τε ^e
 καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἠκέτην ἄγοντε τὸν Πρόδικον, ἀναστήσαν-
 70 τες ἐκ τῆς κλίνης, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τοῦ Προδίκου.

IX. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες συνεκαθεζόμεθα, ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Νῦν
 δὴ ἄν, ἔφη, λέγοις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἶδε πάρισι,
 περὶ ὧν ὀλίγον πρότερον μνείαν ἐποιούῃ πρὸς ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ
 τοῦ νεανίσκου. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Ἡ αὐτῇ μοι ἀρχή
 5 ἐστίν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἣ περ ἄρτι, περὶ ὧν ἀφικόμην. Ἰπ- 318
 ποκράτης γὰρ ὄδε τυγχάνει ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὧν τῆς σῆς συν-
 ουσίας· ὅ τι οὖν αὐτῷ ἀποβήσεται, εἴαν σοι συνῆ, ἠδέως
 ἄν φησι πυθέσθαι. τοσοῦτος ὁ γε ἡμέτερος λόγος. Ὑπο-
 λαβὼν οὖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας εἶπεν· ὦ νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοίνυν
 10 σοι, εἴαν ἐμοὶ συνῆς, ἣ ἂν ἡμέρα ἐμοὶ συγγένη, ἀπιέναι
 οἴκαδε βελτίονι γεγονότι, καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταῦτὰ ταῦτα,
 καὶ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι. Καὶ

³¹⁷
^d 66. καὶ αὐτοί: the plan so pleased
 all, that they did not, as Callias would
 naturally have preferred, wait for the
 servants to arrange matters, but pro-
 ceeded to do this themselves. When
 Callias sees that this is in progress,
 he goes, as becomes the host, into the
 adjacent room, to assist Prodicus to
 come and join the party.

^e 69. ἠκέτην . . . ἀναστήσαντες: cf.
Euthyd. 273 a εἰσελθόντες δὲ περιεπα-
 τείτην, ^d ἐγελασάτην οὖν ἄμφω, βλέ-
 ψαντες εἰς ἀλλήλους. So often in
 Plato. Also *Ar. Plut.* 429 οὐ γὰρ δει-
 νότατα δεδράκατον ζητοῦντες κτέ.

IX. 2. ἂν λέγοις: for the potential
 opt. used in a mild command, see G.
 226, 2, N. 1; H. 872 d. Here there is

a polite invitation. Cf. *Soph. Phil.* ³¹⁷
 674 χωροῖς ἂν εἴσω, *El.* 637 κλύοις
 ἂν ἤδη, Φοῖβε προστατήριε.

4f. Socrates does not mention
 again the family of Hippocrates, and
 the specific expectation of the latter
 in resorting to Protagoras (ἐλλόγιμος
 γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει).

9. ὦ νεανίσκε: the formal address ³¹⁸
 prepares the mind for an important
 statement. — ἔσται: an apod. having
 for its prots. εἴαν . . . συνῆς, ἣ ἂν . . .
 συγγένη, (εἴαν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ συγγένη,) (εἴαν
 ἐκάστης ἡμέρας συγγένη). The subjs.
 of ἔσται are ἀπιέναι, the same verb im-
 plied in ταῦτὰ ταῦτα, and ἐπιδιδόναι.

11. γεγονότι: contains the leading
 idea.

ἐγὼ ἀκούσας εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν θαν- b
 μαστὸν λέγεις, ἀλλ' εἰκός, ἐπεὶ κὰν σύ, καίπερ τηλικούτος
 15 ὢν καὶ οὕτω σοφός, εἴ τις σε διδάξειεν ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις
 ἐπιστάμενος, βελτίων ἂν γένοιο. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλ'
 ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτίκα μεταβαλὼν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν Ἴπποκρά-
 τῆς ὅδε ἐπιθυμήσειε τῆς συνουσίας τούτου τοῦ νεανίσκου
 τοῦ νῦν νεωστὶ ἐπιδημοῦντος, Ζευξίππου τοῦ Ἡρακλεώ-
 20 του, καὶ ἀφικόμενος παρ' αὐτόν, ὥσπερ παρὰ σὲ νῦν,
 ἀκούσειεν αὐτοῦ ταῦτά ταῦτα, ἃ περ σοῦ, ὅτι ἐκάστης c
 ἡμέρας ξυνὼν αὐτῷ βελτίων ἔσται καὶ ἐπιδώσει, εἰ αὐτὸν
 ἐπανέροιτο Τί δὴ φῆς με βελτίω ἔσεσθαι καὶ εἰς τί ἐπι-
 δώσειν; εἶποι ἂν αὐτῷ ὁ Ζεύξιππος, ὅτι πρὸς γραφικὴν·
 25 κὰν εἰ Ὀρθαγόρα τῷ Θηβαίῳ συγγενόμενος, ἀκούσας ἐκεί-
 νου ταῦτά ταῦτα, ἃ περ σοῦ, ἐπανέροιτο αὐτὸν εἰς ὃ τι

³¹⁸
 b 13. μὲν: we expect δέ with a re-
 quest for a *specific* reply; but the
 form changes l. 22 ff.

14. κὰν σύ . . . ἂν γένοιο: καί and
 ὥσπερ before εἰ freq. draw to them-
 selves the ἂν of the apod., which is
 usually repeated after the verb or
 some other important word of the
 apod. The first ἂν shows the condi-
 tional character of the coming sen-
 tence; the last, esp. when several words
 have intervened, is felt to be needful as
 a resumption as well as to give empha-
 sis. Cf. *Menex.* 236 d ὥστε κὰν ὀλίγου,
 εἰ με κελεύεις ὀρχήσασθαι, χαρισαίμην
 ἂν so that, if you should bid me dance,
 I would almost gratify you, *Gorg.* 447 d,
Apol. 31 a. See G. 212, 3; H. 864.

16. μὴ οὕτως: do not answer so! Cf.
 331 c μὴ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, *Meno* 74 d ἀλλὰ
 μὴ μοι οὕτως, *Ar. Vesp.* 1179 μὴ μοί γε
 μύθους, *Dem. iv.* 19 μὴ μοι μύριους μηδὲ
 δισμύριους ξένους. Supply ποίει, λέγε.

17. αὐτίκα: to begin with, for exam-
 ple. Cf. 359 e, *Rep.* i. 340 d ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα

ιατρὸν καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἑξαμαρτάνοντα (*mak-*³¹⁸
ing mistakes) περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας; *Lach.*^b
 195 b.

19. Nothing is known of a painter
 Zeuxippus. Yet our passage shows
 that he had attracted attention. But
 since Zeuxis also was from Heraclea
 (probably the one in lower Italy) and
 Plato mentions him, *Gorg.* 453 c (cf.
Xen. Mem. i. 4. 3; *Oec.* 10. 1; *Symp.* 4.
 63), there is much to favor the con-
 jecture that he is here meant. Ζευξίς was
 originally only a pet form for Ζεύξιπ-
 πος, as Herodianus (*Etym. M.* 85, 50)
 cites Ἀμφίς for Ἀμφιάραος from Aes-
 chylus, and Ἴφίς for Ἴφιγένεια (*Lyc-*
ophr. 329). See Fick *d. Griech. Per-*
sonennamen, pp. xxviii. and 32.

24. εἶποι ἂν: an apod. following c
 the three prots. εἰ ἐπιθυμήσειε, (εἰ)
 ἀκούσειεν, εἰ ἐπανέροιτο.

25. Orthagoras was, according to
 Aristoxenus, Epaminondas's teacher
 upon the flute. Thebes was famous
 for its flute-players.

βελτίων καθ' ἡμέραν ἔσται συγγιγνόμενος ἐκείνω, εἴποι
 ἄν, ὅτι εἰς αὐλησιν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ σὺ εἶπέ τῷ νεανίσκῳ
 καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ τούτου ἐρωτῶντι, Ἴπποκράτης ὅδε Πρωτα- d
 30 γόρα συγγενόμενος, ἧ ἂν αὐτῷ ἡμέρα συγγένηται, βελτίων
 ἄπεισι γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμερῶν ἐκάστης οὕτως
 ἐπιδώσει, — εἰς τί, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ περὶ τοῦ; Καὶ ὁ
 Πρωταγόρας ἐμοῦ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας, Σὺ τε καλῶς ἐρωτᾶς, ἔφη,
 ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς καλῶς ἐρωτῶσι χαίρω ἀποκρι-
 35 νόμενος. Ἴπποκράτης γὰρ παρ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος οὐ πείσε-
 ται, ἅ περ ἂν ἔπαθεν ἄλλῳ τῷ συγγενόμενος τῶν σοφιστῶν.
 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους· τὰς γὰρ τέχνας e
 αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκοντας πάλιν αὐτῶν ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν
 εἰς τέχνας, λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν
 40 καὶ μουσικὴν διδάσκοντες — καὶ ἅμα εἰς τὸν Ἰππίαν ἀπέ-

318 d 32. εἰς τί, καὶ περὶ τοῦ: with peculiar, almost comical emphasis, the proper subject of the question is placed at its close. The opening words, repeated with humorous earnestness from Protagoras himself, appear thus, in spite of their fair sound, really empty of meaning.

34. χαίρω ἀποκρινόμενος: *I enjoy answering.* For the pred. partic. see GMT. 112, 1; H. 983.

e 37. τὰς τέχνας κτέ.: the branches pursued in the boys' schools, γραμματική, λογιστική, κιθαριστική, — thus about the same thought as ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγέντας (cf. 326 c).

38. ἄκοντας, ἄγοντες: note the paronomasia.

39. λογισμούς κτέ.: here Protagoras refers unfavorably to those who teach these specialties as not being sophists in the best sense (λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους above); while, according to 316 d, such specialists have ever been true sophists; but the different purpose of the

two arguments is obvious. The circle 318 e of the studies belonging to a complete education was enlarged just at this time; to γραμματική were added arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music; but as Callicles in *Gorg.* 485 a advises the pursuit of philosophy only ὅσον παιδείας χάριν, so the sophists warned against all that diverted from practical life, all mere theory. So Isocr. xv. 268 διατρίψαι μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς παιδείας ταύτας χρόνον τινὰ συμβουλεύσαιμ' ἂν τοῖς νεωτέροις, μὴ μέντοι περιδεῖν τὴν φύσιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατασκελετευθεῖσαν (not however to suffer their constitution to be impaired) ἐπὶ τούτοις. δεῖν δὲ (ἡγοῦμαι) τοὺς προύργου τι ποιεῖν βουλομένους (those wishing to make some real progress) καὶ τῶν λόγων τοὺς ματαίους καὶ τῶν πράξεων τὰς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸν βίον φερούσας ἀναιρεῖν ἐξ ἀπασῶν τῶν διατριβῶν (to put away from their whole life vain words, and deeds which bring no profit).

40. Ἰππίαν: cf. 315 c.

St. p. 318.

βλεψε· — παρὰ δ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὐ περὶ
 ἄλλου του ἢ περὶ οὗ ἦκει. τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία
 περὶ τε τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν
 διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως
 45 δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. Ἄρ', ἔφη 319
 ἐγώ, ἔπομαί σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πο-
 λιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς
 πολίτας. Αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 τὸ ἐπάγγελμα, ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.

X. Ἡ καλόν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτησαι, εἴ περ
 κέκτησαι· οὐ γάρ τι ἄλλο πρὸς γε σὲ εἰρήσεται ἢ ἅ περ
 νοῶ. ἐγὼ γὰρ τοῦτο, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὐκ ὤμην διδακτὸν
 εἶναι, σοὶ δὲ λέγοντι οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως ἀπιστῶ. ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὸ b
 5 ἡγοῦμαι οὐ διδακτὸν εἶναι μηδ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρα-

318 e 42. The sophists professed to teach
 ἀρετή (cf. παρὰ τούτους τοὺς ὑπισχνου-
 μένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι *Meno*
 91 b), but this virtue was only an ex-
 ternal prudence in private and public
 affairs, cf. ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἣ οἱ ἀνθρω-
 ποι τὰς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καλῶς
 διοικοῦσι καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὐτῶν θε-
 ραπεύουσι, καὶ πολίτας καὶ ξένους ὑπο-
 δέξασθαι τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαι ἐπίστανται
Meno 91 a.

319 a 47. ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας: not to be
 taken as pred. of ἄνδρας, but the
 three words together form the pred.
 of an obj. to be supplied (αὐτούς,
 "those who come to you"). Expan-
 sions with ἀνήρ seldom have an adj.
 added. Cf. *Thuc.* i. 74 ἄνδρα στρα-
 τηγὸν ξυνετώτατον (*most sagacious*),
Ar. Eq. 1304 ἄνδρα μοχθηρὸν (*worth-*
less) πολίτην, *Aeschin.* III. 197 ἄνδρῃ
 συνηγόρῳ δικαίῳ καὶ σώφρονι.

X. 2 f. γάρ, γάρ: the former in-
 troduces the reason for the expres-
 sion of the doubt εἴ περ κέκτησαι,

the latter for the existence of the 319
 a doubt.

4. ὅπως ἀπιστῶ: it is quite in b
 Socrates's style for him to say that he
 does not know what he ought to be-
 lieve. He had thought that virtue
 could not be imparted by instruction,
 but now he does not venture to doubt
 the authority of Protagoras, who holds
 that it can; cf. 320 b. ἂν, which the
 Mss. have after ὅπως, cannot stand
 with the subjv. of deliberation, cf.
Phaedo 107 a οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ἔτι ὅπη
 ἀπιστῶ.

5. οὐ, μηδέ: usually ἡγοῦμαι (cf.
 328 e), λέγω and similar verbs take
 with the inf. the objective neg. οὐ,
 more rarely μή, which places the ne-
 gation in the thought of the subject.
 Both are used together also, *Soph.*
Phil. 1058 ἐγὼ θ', ὅς οἶμαι σοῦ κάκιον
 οὐδὲν ἂν | τούτων κρατύνειν, μηδ' ἐπι-
 θύνειν χερί and I (am present), who
 think that I could be as good a master
 of this bow, and guide it as well as you.

σκευαστὸν ἀνθρώποις, δίκαιός εἰμι εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἀθη-
ναίους, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες, φημὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι.
ὁρῶ οὖν, ὅταν συλλεγῶμεν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπειδὰν μὲν
περὶ οἰκοδομίας τι δέη πράξαι τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους
10 μεταπεμπομένους συμβούλους περὶ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων,
ὅταν δὲ περὶ ναυπηγίας, τοὺς ναυπηγούς· καὶ τὰλλα πάντα c
οὕτως, ὅσα ἡγοῦνται μαθητά τε καὶ διδακτὰ εἶναι. εἰάν
δέ τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρῇ αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύειν, ὃν ἐκεῖνοι μὴ
οἶονται δημιουργὸν εἶναι, κἂν πάνυ καλὸς ᾗ καὶ πλούσιος
15 καὶ τῶν γενναίων, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλὰ
καταγελῶσι καὶ θορυβοῦσιν, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὸς ἀποστῇ ὁ
ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν καταθορυβηθείς, ἢ οἱ τοξόται αὐτὸν ἀφελ-

³¹⁹
b Cf. *Rep.* iii. 407 c οὐκοῦν φῶμεν καὶ
Ἀσκληπιδὸν οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ οἶε-
σθαι δεῖν, *Phaedo* 101 b, *Isocr.* xv. 60.

6. δίκαιος: includes both the right
and the duty; cf. 351 e.—We have
here the pers. const., where the less
freq. impers. const. might have been
used, δίκαιόν ἐστι with the acc. and
inf.; the latter corresponds to the
Eng. idiom. See H. 944 a.—ἐγὼ . . .
εἶναι: shows why the Athenians can
be cited in proof; the clause giving
the reason with γὰρ comes first, as
often in Greek. See on 347 a, and
compare a freq. use of ἀλλὰ γάρ. See
H. 1050, 4.—*Hippias* 337 d calls
Athens τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτα-
νεῖον τῆς σοφίας. And in fact it was
only the recognition of her real su-
periority, with which recognition Soc-
rates, ironically enough, expresses his
agreement, if the Greeks yielded to
Athens the pre-eminence in all culture,
art, and science. Cf. *Hdt.* i. 60. ἐν
Ἀθηναίοισι τοῖσι πρώτοισι λεγομένοισι
εἶναι Ἑλλήνων σοφίην, *Thuc.* ii. 41
λέγω (says Pericles) τὴν πᾶσαν πόλιν
τῆς Ἑλλάδος παιδεύειν εἶναι.

9. πράξαι περὶ: take action with re- 319
gard to is used thus by Xen., cf. *Hell.* b
vi. 3. 3 ἐπραττε περὶ εἰρήνης, vi. 4. 25,
vii. 4. 2, *An.* vii. 2. 12.

10. μεταπεμπομένους: mid., sc. as
subj. τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, as shown by
ἡγοῦνται and αὐτοῖς following.—τῶν
οἰκοδομημάτων: we should have ex-
pected οἰκοδομήσεως, cf. *Gorg.* 455 b.

11. καὶ τὰλλα πάντα οὕτως: sc. c
ποιούντας. See on 312 d.

17. At that time the Prytanes had
the conduct of the general assemblies,
exercising their function through the
ἐπιστάτης of the day. It was his duty,
in case any speaker behaved unbe-
comingly, to have the police if neces-
sary remove him (ἐλκεῖν) from the
bema, and put him out of the assem-
bly, (αἶρειν, ἐξαίρειν), cf. *Poll.* viii. 131.
These policemen, slaves of the state,
were called from their weapons τοξό-
ται, and from the nationality of the
most of them Σκύθαι. Boeckh, *Staatsh.*
i. 291 f. Cf. *Ar. Eq.* 665 κᾶθ' εἰλ-
κον αὐτὸν οἱ πρυτάνεις χοῖ τοξόται the
Prytanes and the police began to drag
him out, *Eccl.* 258 ἐκεῖνο μόνον ἄσκε-

κύσωσιν ἢ ἐξαίρωνται κελεύοντων τῶν πρυτάνεων. περὶ
 μὲν οὖν ὧν οἴονται ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι, οὕτω διαπράττονται.
 20 ἐπειδὴν δέ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως δέη βου- d
 λεύσασθαι, συμβουλεύει αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τούτων
 ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεὺς σκυτοτόμος, ἔμπο-
 ρος ναύκληρος, πλούσιος πένης, γενναῖος ἀγεννῆς, καὶ τού-
 τοις οὐδεὶς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει ὥσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι
 25 οὐδαμόθεν μαθῶν, οὐδὲ ὄντος διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ,
 ἔπειτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ· δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι οὐχ ἡγούνται
 διδακτὸν εἶναι. μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως οὕτως

³¹⁹
 c πτον, ἢν σ' οἱ τοξόται ἔλκωσιν, ὅτι δράσεις.
 ἡμεῖς δέ γ', ἢν αἴρωσ', ἔαν κελεύσομεν
*that alone is unconsidered, if the police
 try to drag you away, what you will do.
 But we, if they take you up, will bid them
 let you alone. Ach. 54 such a scene is
 described. The mid. (ἐξαίρωνται) oc-
 curs only here.*

18. Const. ταῦτα, περὶ ὧν οἴονται ἐν
 τέχνῃ εἶναι, οὕτω διαπράττονται. Things
 before termed ὅσα μαθητὰ καὶ διδακτά
 are now designated as those περὶ ὧν
 ἐν τέχνῃ ἐστίν, see on 310 d. — Soc-
 rates reasons thus: "when the Athe-
 nians believe a matter to turn upon
 professional knowledge, they allow
 only professional men to speak upon
 it; but on matters connected with the
 civil administration they listen to all
 without distinction; this ἀρετή there-
 fore, which relates to civil administra-
 tion, in the view of Athenians is not
 a matter of art, and so cannot be
 learned." Cf. 322 d e.

d 20. Socrates says, with reference
 to 318 e, διοίκησις τῶν τῆς πόλεως.
 This form is entirely correct, since
 διοίκησις τῆς πόλεως and such general
 expressions, like διοίκησις, freq. stand
 without the art. Cf. *Polit.* 296 e τὸν
 ὄρον ὀρθῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως the princi-

ple of the correct management of the state, ³¹⁹
Rep. x. 606 e πρὸς διοίκησιν τῶν ἀνθρω- d
πίνων πραγμάτων.

22. ὁμοίως, ὁμοίως: note the energy
 of the anaphora with μὲν, δέ. — χαλ-
 κεὺς, σκυτοτόμος: cf. 324 c.

23 f. τούτοις, μαθῶν, ἐπιχειρεῖ: such
 transitions to the sing. are not infreq.
 with Plato. Cf. 324 a, 334 c. Here
 the reversion is natural

24. τοῦτο: i.e. ὅτι ἐπιχειρεῖ.

26. ἔπειτα: after a partic., marks
 the contrast between it and the fol-
 lowing pred. Cf. 358 b, *Apol.* 20 c
 οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων
 περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα το-
 σαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν for
*it cannot be that while you (as you
 say) have not been exceeding the limits
 observed by other men, in spite of this,
 so great talk and commotion has arisen
 about you, Soph. Ant. 496 μισῶ χῶταν
 ἐν κακοῖσί τις | ἀλούς, ἔπειτα τοῦτο καλ-
 λύνειν θέλη I hate it, when one, taken
 in evil deeds, then desires to gloss these
 over.*

27. μὴ ὅτι, ἀλλά: advances to a
 stronger statement; "not to speak
 of the city, even, etc." Cf. *Apol.* 40 d
 οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν
 μέγαν βασιλέα ἂν εὐρεῖν κτέ. *I think that,*

ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ ἡμῶν οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι
 ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἷοί τινος τοῦ
 τῶν ἰσχυρῶν Περικλῆς, ὁ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἄλλοις παρα-
 30 διδόναι· ἐπεὶ οὐκ εἶχετο τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ,
 τούτους ἂ μὲν διδασκὰ καλῶς καὶ εὖ ἐπαίδευσεν,
 ἂ δὲ αὐτὸς σοφός ἐστιν, οὔτε αὐτὸς παιδεύει οὔτε τῶ 320
 ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ περιούριον γινέμενται ὡσπερ
 ἄφετοι, εἴαν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσι τῇ ἀρετῇ. εἰ δὲ
 35 βούλει, Κλεινίαν, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου τουτουὶ νεώτερον ἀδελ-
 φόν, ἐπιτροπεύων ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ, Περικλῆς, δεδιὼς
 περὶ αὐτοῦ μὴ διαφθαρῆ δὴ ὑπὸ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ἀποσπά-
 σας ἀπὸ τούτου, καταθέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρονος ἐπαίδευσεν·

St. p. 319.

³¹⁹
 d not to say a private individual, even the great king would find, etc. The expression is elliptical, see H. 1035.

e 31. In many places Socrates in Plato laments that the great men of Athens have not trained their sons to wisdom and virtue; in *Meno* 93 d ff. besides Pericles, he adduces Themistocles, Aristides, and Thucydides the son of Melesias. Both sons of Pericles died young of the plague; that Xanthippus was a worthless fellow is said by Plutarch, *Pericles* 36. Cf. 328 c. — εἶχετο: with gen., be in close connection with, pertain to a thing. διδασκάλων cf. 324 d, *Meno* 94 b ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται, *Theaet.* 145 a καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται.

³²⁰
 a 33. νέμονται: many temples had herds of cattle belonging to them, which roamed at will over the sacred fields. Cf. Plutarch *Lucull.* c. 24 βόες ἱεραὶ νέμονται Περσίας Ἀρτέμιδος· χρωῦνται δὲ ταῖς βουσί πρὸς θυσίαν μόνον, ἄλλως δὲ πλάζονται κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἄφετοι, *Arrian An.* vii. 20. 4 νέμεσθαί τε τὴν νῆσον αἰεὶ τε ἀγρίαις καὶ ἐλάφοις καὶ ταύτας ἀνεῖσθαι (let range) ἀφέτους τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι, *Periplus Ponti Eux.* 22 καὶ

τῶν ἱερέων τὰ μὲν καταθύειν, τὰ δὲ ³²⁰
 ἀφιέναι τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ. Hence ἄφετον ^a
 νέμεσθαι means range at will without oversight. Cf. Plato *Rep.* vi. 498 c τότε ἤδη ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν.

36. Clinias, the father of Alcibiades and Clinias, fell at Coronea 447 B.C. The guardianship of these sons was assumed by Ariphton and Pericles, whose mother Agariste was first cousin to Megacles, the father of Clinias's widow, Dinomache (cf. *Plut. Alc.* 1). The sons probably lived, however, with their mother Dinomache in their father's house. Pericles directed the separation on Alcibiades's coming of age, in 433 B.C.

37. δῆ: indicates (with a good-natured thrust at Alcibiades who was present) that the apprehension of Pericles was quite natural and reasonable.

38. καταθέμενος: deposit, place in one's keeping. Cf. 314 a, *Legg.* xi. 913 c ἀ μὴ κατέθου; μὴ ἀνέλη, *Thuc.* i. 115. 3 Ἀθηναῖοι δμήρους ἔλαβον καὶ κατέθεντο ἐς Λῆμνον.—ἐν Ἀρίφρονος: for the ellipsis, see on 326 c.

St. p. 320.

καὶ πρὶν ἕξ μῆνας γεγονέναι ἀπέδωκε τούτῳ οὐκ ἔχων ὅ
 40 τι χρήσαιτο αὐτῷ. καὶ ἄλλους σοι παμπόλλους ἔχω λέγειν, b
 οἳ αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες οὐδένα πώποτε βελτίῳ ἐποίησαν
 οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων οὔτε τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρω-
 ταγόρα, εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων οὐχ ἠγοῦμαι διδακτὸν εἶναι
 ἀρετὴν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σοῦ ἀκούω ταῦτα λέγοντος, κάμπτομαι
 45 καὶ οἶμαί τί σε λέγειν διὰ τὸ ἠγεῖσθαί σε πολλῶν μὲν
 ἔμπειρον γεγονέναι, πολλὰ δὲ μεμαθηκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτὸν
 ἐξηυρηκέναι. εἰ οὖν ἔχεις ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξαι, ὡς
 διδακτὸν ἐστὶν ἢ ἀρετὴ, μὴ φθονήσης, ἀλλ' ἐπίδειξον. c
 Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ φθονήσω. ἀλλὰ πότερον
 50 ὑμῖν, ὡς πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις, μῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω

³²⁰ 39. καί: paratactic. "Although
^a Pericles had separated Clinias from
 Alcibiades, yet he soon gave him back
 to him." καί is often thus used. Cf.
 Soph. O. T. 413 σὺ καὶ δέδορκας, κοῦ
 βλέπεις ἢ εἰ κακοῦ (i.e. although you
 have sight, you see not in what evil you
 are involved). — γεγονέναι: of time,
 elapse. Cf. Rep. x. 616 b ἐπειδὴ δὲ
 τοῖς ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι (meadow) ἐκάστοις
 ἑπτὰ ἡμέραι γένοιτο, Phaedo 108 c ἕως
 ἂν δὴ τινες χρόνοι γένωνται. — ἀπέδωκε
 τούτῳ: sc. Pericles to Alcibiades.
 For the prominent thought is the
 failure (ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τούτου) of Peri-
 cles to carry out the education of
 Clinias.

b 40. χρήσαιτο: opt. of indir. disc.
 derived from the deliberative subjv.
 Cf. 321 c. See G. 244; H. 932, 2.

44. κάμπτομαι: am led to waver. Cf.
 Lach. 192 e εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ὦν μὴ κάμ-
 πτοῖτο ἀλλὰ καρτεροῖ, Rep. vi. 494 e εἰ
 δ' οὖν εἰς αἰσθάνηται τέ πη καὶ κάμ-
 πτηται καὶ ἔλκεται πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν but
 suppose, further, one has some perception
 of the truth, and is led to waver and is
 drawn towards philosophy.

46. Socrates distinguishes between
 three sources of knowledge: "Protag-
 oras has had much experience, has
 learned much from others, and has
 thought out much for himself."

48. διδακτὸν . . . ἀρετὴ: this is the
 proposition to be proved, and we nat-
 urally expect at the outset a defini-
 tion of ἀρετὴ. — μὴ φθονήσης: po-
 litely urges the request. Cf. Gorg.
 489 a μὴ φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο.

50. μῦθον ἢ λόγῳ: Protagoras gives
 both story and argument. He first,
 after the manner of the sophists, tells
 a story, drawn in part from the popu-
 lar myths concerning Prometheus and
 aboriginal man, and embellished by
 his free invention; a method, as he is
 aware, much more acceptable to the
 people than dry disquisition; and from
 this myth he draws various conclu-
 sions. Then, after 324 d (οὐκέτι μῦθον,
 ἀλλὰ λόγον), he develops an argument
 which he contrasts as real (λόγος)
 with the fictitious (μῦθος). With simi-
 lar contrast, Socrates says in Phaedo
 61 b ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι ποι-
 εῖν μύθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους (fictions, not

ἢ λόγῳ διεξελθῶν; Πολλοὶ οὖν αὐτῷ ὑπέλαβον τῶν παρακαθημένων, ὁποτέρως βούλοιτο, οὕτω διεξιέναι. Δοκεῖ τοῖνυν μοι, ἔφη, χαριέστερον εἶναι μῦθον ὑμῖν λέγειν.

XI. Ἦν γάρ ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, θνητὰ δὲ γένη οὐκ ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τούτοις χρόνος ἦλθεν εἶμαρ-
 μένος γενέσεως, τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ
 πυρὸς μίξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆ κεράννυται.
 5 ἐπειδὴ δ' ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἔμελλον, προσέταξαν Προμηθεὶ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεὶ κοσμησαί τε καὶ νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἐκάστοις ὡς πρέπει. Προμηθεὰ δὲ παραιτεῖται Ἐπιμηθεὺς

³²⁰ realities), *Gorg.* 523 a ἄκουε δὴ μάλα
 C καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἠγήσει μῦθον, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον.

51. διεξελθῶν: we should expect διεξερχόμενος, but cf. *Theaet.* 167 d ἀμφισβήτει, λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθῶν *dispute it, traversing it in an argument.*

53. χαριέστερον: an element of value, provided the argument be not impaired.

XI. 1. In the first part of the discourse, the myth, Plato represents Protagoras as imitating the tone of old legends, as indeed he may very likely have done in similar narratives. This appears in the whole tone of the recital, the simple construction, the selection of words and phrases peculiar to poetry (γῆς ἔνδον, ἄοπλον φύσιν, σμικρότητι ἡμπισχε, πτηνὸν φυγήν, αἰστωθείη, ἀλληλοφθοριῶν, σχόμενος, πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοί, φιλίας συναγωγοί, νόσον πόλεως κτέ.), and the freq. omission of the art. (esp. with ἄνθρωπος). The very beginning was common in legends. Cf. Stasinus *Cypr.* Frag. 1 ἦν ὅτε μυρία φῦλα, Critias in Sext. *Empir.* ix. 54 ἦν χρόνος, ὅτε ἦν, Theocr. vii. 1 ἦς χρόνος, ἀνικ' ἐγῶν.

3. ἔνδον: with the gen. survives in
 prose only in the old-fashioned Anti-
 phon v. 45 ἔνδον ὦν αὐτοῦ καὶ μὴ πεφο-
 βημένος. — Parmenides held that fire and earth were the original elements of the sensible world; Empedocles first inserted between these as elements, air and water, which combine with fire and earth. That men originally sprang from the earth was the ancient belief of many peoples, and upon this belief rest the Greek autochthonic myths (Preller's *Gr. Mythol.* i.³ 63). To this Plato attaches also the myth in *Polit.* 272 a e.

4. τῶν: the art. before rel. clauses is freq. in Plato. Cf. *Rep.* vi. 510 a τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ ξυνέστηκε the reflections in water, and in whatever bodies are solid, smooth, and polished, *Phaedo* 75 b ὁρέγεται τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον *aspires to that which is equal* (i.e. abstract equality).

7. παραιτεῖται: beg as a favor, cf. *Apol.* 27 a ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρητησάμην, *Critias* 106 c ταῦτόν καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ τοῦτο παραιτοῦμαι. Instead of the acc. of the thing, here the inf. νεῖμαι is used. Otherwise below, 358 a.

αὐτὸς νεῖμαι· ^{gen} Νείμαντος δ' ἐμοῦ, ἔφη, ἐπίσκειψαι. καὶ
οὔτω πείσας νέμει. νέμων δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἰσχὺν ἄνευ τάχους e
10 προσῆπτε, τὰ δ' ἀσθενέστερα τάχει ἐκόσμει· τὰ δὲ ὤπλιζε,
τοῖς δ' ἄοπλον διδοὺς φύσιν ἄλλην τιν' αὐτοῖς ἐμηχανᾶτο
δύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν. ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σμικρότητι ἤμπι-
σχε, πτηνὸν φυγὴν ἢ κατάγειον οἴκησιν ἔνεμεν· ἃ δὲ ἠῦξε
μεγέθει, τῷδε αὐτῷ αὐτὰ ἔσφριζε· καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως ἐπαν- 321
15 ἰσῶν ἔνεμε. ταῦτα δὲ ἐμηχανᾶτο εὐλάβειαν ἔχων μή τι
γένος ἀιστωθείη. ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀλληλοφθοριῶν διαφυ-
γὰς ἐπήρκεσε, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ Διὸς ὥρας εὐμάρειαν ἐμηχα-
νᾶτο ἀμφιεννὺς αὐτὰ πυκναῖς τε θριξὶ καὶ στερεοῖς δέρμα-
σιν, ἱκανοῖς μὲν ἀμῦναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα,
20 καὶ εἰς εὐνάς ἰοῦσιν ὅπως ὑπάρχουσι τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα στρω-
μνὴ οἰκεία τε καὶ αὐτοφυῆς ἐκάστῳ, καὶ ὑποδῶν τὰ μὲν b
ὄπλαῖς, τὰ δὲ δέρμασι στερεοῖς καὶ ἀναίμοις. τούντεῦ-
θεν τροφὰς ἄλλοις ἄλλας ἐξεπόριζε, τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γῆς βο-
τάνην, ἄλλοις δὲ δένδρων καρπούς, τοῖς δὲ ῥίζας· ἔστι
25 δ' οἷς ἔδωκεν εἶναι τροφήν ζώων ἄλλων βοράν. καὶ τοῖς
μὲν ὀλιγογονίαν προσῆψε, τοῖς δ' ἀναλισκομένοις ὑπὸ
τούτων πολυγονίαν, σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζων. ἅτε δὴ
οὖν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὢν ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν κατ-
αναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις, λοιπὸν δ' ἀκόσμητον ἔτι αὐτῷ c
30 ἦν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἠπόρει ὅ τι χρήσαιτο. ἀπο-

³²¹ 14. τῷδε: for τούτῳ is another touch
^a of poetic and archaic expression, in
addition to those mentioned above
(see on l. 1). Still others are the
dat. θριξί with ἀμφιεννύς, instead of
the acc. (cf. *Symp.* 219 b), αὐτοῖς ἐμη-
χανᾶτο after τοῖς δ', and αὐτὰ ἔσφριζε
after ἃ δέ. See G. 164; H. 724.

19 f. The purpose of clothing the
animals with τρίχες and στερεὰ δέρματα
is given in changing construction,

first ἱκανοῖς and δυνατοῖς, then καὶ ὅπως ³²¹
ὑπάρχουσι. ^a

24. ἔστι δ' οἷς: cf. 346 e ἔστιν οὖς. b
In the nom., however, according to
prevalent Attic use, 342 e εἰσὶν οἷ. See
G. 152, n. 2; H. 998.

27. σωτηρίαν: safety, continuance.

28. οὐ πάνυ τι: 'litotes,' not very
wise, i.e. very unwise. So often οὐ
πάνυ τι, οὐ μάλα, οὐ σφόδρα, like οὐχ
ἠκιστα etc.

ροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκεψόμενος τὴν
 νομὴν, καὶ ὄρα τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζῶα ἐμμελῶς πάντων ἔχον-
 τα, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον γυμνόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ
 ἄστρωτον καὶ ἄοπλον. ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰμαρμένη ἡμέρα
 35 παρῆν, ἐν ἣ ἔδει καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐξιέναι ἐκ γῆς εἰς φῶς.
 ἀπορία οὖν σχόμενος ὁ Προμηθεύς, ἦντινα σωτηρίαν τῷ
 ἀνθρώπῳ εὔροι, κλέπτει Ἑφαιίστου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς τὴν ἐν-
 τεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί, — ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἦν ἄνευ πυρὸς **d**
 αὐτὴν κτητὴν τῷ ἢ χρησίμην γενέσθαι —, καὶ οὕτω δὴ
 40 δωρεῖται ἀνθρώπῳ. τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν

³²¹
^c 31. ἔρχεται: freq. with the dat. of
 interest, in the poets; cf. Aesch. *Prom.*
 358 ἀλλ' ἦλθεν αὐτῷ Ζηνὸς ἄγρυπνον
 βέλος (*sleepless bolt*), also in Plato
Rep. x. 596 **e** καλῶς καὶ εἰς δέον ἔρχει
 τῷ λόγῳ, Xen. *Symp.* 2. 1 ἔρχεται αὐτοῖς
 ἐπὶ κῶμον (*revel*) Συρακόσιός τις ἄνθρω-
 πος.

32. ἐμμελῶς ἔχοντα: with the gen.,
 like the common ὡς, πῶς, καλῶς ἔχειν.
 Somewhat different is *Gorg.* 501 **c**
 ἀσκέπτως ἔχων (equiv. to ἀμελῶν) τοῦ
 ἀμείνονος *without consideration of the*
better, *Phaedo* 108 **a** ἐπιθυμητικῶς (*de-*
sirous) τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα. On ἐμμε-
 λῶς cf. 339 **c**. For the intrans. use of
 ἔχειν and some other verbs, see G. 195,
 n. 2; H. 810.

33. Cf. Lucretius v. 223: tum
 porro puer nudus humi jacet,
 infans, indigus omni vitali
 auxilio, Aristotle *περὶ ζῴων μορίων*
iv. 10, p. 687 **a** 23 ἀλλ' οἱ λέγοντες ὡς
συνέστηκεν οὐ καλῶς (is not well put to-
gether) ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ χεῖριστα τῶν
ζῴων (ἀνυπόδητόν τε γὰρ αὐτὸν εἶναι
φασὶ καὶ γυμνὸν καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντα ὄπλον
πρὸς τὴν ἀλκὴν) οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν, —
 words which show that Protagoras
 uttered here a thought often ex-

pressed, and also that Aristotle was ³²¹
 acquainted with Plato's *Protagoras*. ^c
 See on 352 **c**.

36. σχόμενος: this aor. is often
 used in an intrans. or passive sense,
involved in, possessed by. Cf. Hom.
λ 279 **φ** ἄχειῖ σχομένη *involved in her*
woes, Plato *Soph.* 250 **d** πάσῃ συνεσχό-
 μεθα ἀπορία, *Phaedr.* 244 **e** τῷ ὀρθῶς μα-
 νέντι τε (*to the one truly mad*), καὶ
 κατασχομένῳ (τῇ μανίᾳ), Isocr. xix. 11
 φθόβῃ σχόμενον.

37. Somewhat differently *Polit.* 274 **c**
 ὄθεν δὴ τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα παρὰ θεῶν
 δῶρα (*gifts from the gods*) ἡμῖν δεδώρη-
 ται πῦρ μὲν παρὰ Προμηθέως, τέχναι δὲ
 παρ' Ἑφαιίστου καὶ τῆς συντέχνου.

38. According also to the sacred **d**
 legend of the Greeks, fire was the
 source and teacher of every art. Cf.
 Aesch. *Prom.* 109 ff. *ναρθηκοπλήρωτον*
δὲ θηρῶμαι πυρὸς | πηγὴν κλοπαίαν (and
I discover the secret source of fire filling
the hollow of the reed), ἡ διδάσκαλος τέχ-
νης | πάσης βροτοῖς πέφηνε καὶ μέγας πό-
ρος. Protagoras places the ἐντεχνος
 σοφία, which provides for the necessi-
 ties of the physical life, in contrast
 with the πολιτικὴ, which is the ground
 of the social life and of all culture.

St. p. 321.

ἄνθρωπος ταύτῃ ἔσχε, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχεν· ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ Δίῃ, τῷ δὲ Προμηθεῖ εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τὴν τοῦ Διὸς οἴκησιν οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν· πρὸς δὲ καὶ αἱ Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν· εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς
 45 Ἀθηναῶν καὶ Ἐφαιστου οἴκημα τὸ κοινόν, ἐν ᾧ ἐφιλο-
 τεχνεῖτην, λαθὼν εἰσέρχεται, καὶ κλέψας τὴν τε ἔμπυρον
 τέχνην τὴν τοῦ Ἐφαιστου καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τῆς Ἀθηναῶν
 δίδωσιν ἀνθρώπῳ. καὶ ἐκ τούτου εὐπορία μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ
 τοῦ βίου γίγνεται, Προμηθεῖα δὲ ὕστερον, ἣ περ λέγεται,³²²
 50 κλοπῆς δίκη μετήλθεν.

XII. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν ζῶν μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισε καὶ ἐπεχείρει βωμούς τε ἰδρύεσθαι καὶ ἀγάλματα θεῶν· ἔπειτα φωνὴν καὶ ὀνόματα ταχὺ διηρθρώσατο τῇ τέχνῃ,

³²¹
 d 41. ἔσχε, εἶχεν: *obtained, had*; for the inceptive use of the aor., see G. 200, n. 5 b; H. 841.

42. Protagoras represents Olympus as resembling a city of the Greek heroic age; the ruler occupies the citadel, the people the lower city.

43. οὐκέτι: he could *no longer* go forward, and enter the citadel itself.

44. φυλακαί: prob. Βία and Κράτος are meant, whom Hesiod *Theog.* 385 ff. calls the inseparable attendants of Zeus, and whom Aeschylus (*Prometheus ad init.*) introduces as his ever-compliant beadles.

e 45. Hephaestus and Athena were closely associated in the Attic belief; see the legend of Erichthonius, the feasts Χαλκεῖα and Ἀπατούρια, and the Ἀθηναία Ἐφαιστία recently established by inscriptions. Preller's *Gr. Mythol.* i. 146 f.

³²²
 a 50. κλοπῆς δίκη: technical term from the Attic criminal process; a

prosecution for theft pursued Prometheus. ³²²
 a

XII. 1. θείας . . . μοίρας: *received a share in divinity*. — πρῶτον, ἔπειτα: indicate, not temporal sequence, but the different points of view, from which the imparting of that which belonged to the gods worked advantageously to men.

2. μόνον: neut. adj., identifies ὁ ἄνθρωπος as one of τὰ ζῷα. — ἐνόμισε: inceptive aor., *took up the belief in the gods*.

4. ἔπειτα: correlative with μὲν. — διηρθρώσατο: the technical term for articulation; *articulated* speech and thus formed words. Language therefore, acc. to Protagoras, did not arise at the beginning with man, but he immediately fashioned it, from the sounds derived from nature, through the skill bestowed upon him by Prometheus (*cf. Symp.* 191 a τὰ στήθη διήρθρου sc. ὁ Ἀπόλλων).

5 καὶ οἰκήσεις καὶ ἐσθῆτας καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ στρωμνὰς καὶ
 τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς ἡὔρετο. οὕτω δὲ παρεσκευασμένοι
 κατ' ἀρχὰς ἄνθρωποι ᾤκουν σποράδην, πόλεις δὲ οὐκ
 ἦσαν. ἀπώλλυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχῆ **b**
 αὐτῶν ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι, καὶ ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη αὐ-
 10 τοῖς πρὸς μὲν τροφήν ἰκανὴ βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν
 τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδεής· πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὐπω
 εἶχον, ἧς μέρος πολεμική. ἐζήτουν δὲ ἀθροίζεσθαι καὶ
 σώζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις. ὅτ' οὖν ἀθροισθεῖεν, ἡδί-
 15 πάλιν σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο. Ζεὺς οὖν δείσας περὶ **c**
 τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, μὴ ἀπόλοιτο πᾶν, Ἑρμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα
 εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην, ἵν' εἶεν πόλεων κόσμοι
 τε καὶ δεσμοί, φιλίας συναγωγοί. ἐρωτᾷ οὖν Ἑρμῆς
 Δία, τίνα οὖν τρόπον δοίη δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώποις.
 20 Πότερον ὡς αἱ τέχναι νενέμηνται, οὕτω καὶ ταύτας νείμω;
 νενέμηνται δὲ ᾧδε· εἷς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἰκανὸς

³²² **b** 8. πανταχῆ: *in every respect*.

9. ἀσθενέστεροι: pred. nom. See G. 136, n. 3; H. 958, 940.

11. θηρίων: subjective gen. Cf. Xen. An. ii. 5. 7 τὸν γὰρ θεῶν πόλεμον οὐκ οἶδα ἀπὸ ποίου ἂν τάχους φεύγων τις ἀποφύγοι, Thuc. i. 24. 4 οἱ Ἐπιδάμνιοι πέμπουσιν δεόμενοι τὸν τῶν βαρβάρων πόλεμον καταλῦσαι (to put an end to the war waged by the barbarians).

c 17. αἰδῶ, δίκην: often represented as the protecting spirits and the underlying conditions of all social and civilized life, "reverence for divine and human law." Cf. Tyrt. xii. 39 f. (= Theogn. 937 f.) γηράσκων ἀστοῖσι μεταπρέπει (*growing old, he is distinguished among the citizens*), οὐδέ τις αὐτὸν | βλάπτειν (*deprive him of*) οὐτ' αἰδοῦς οὐτε δίκης ἐθέλει, Theogn. 291 f. αἰδῶς

μὲν γὰρ ὄλωλεν, ἀναιδείη δὲ καὶ ὕβρις ³²² **c** (shamelessness and insolence) | νικήσασα δίκην γῆν κατὰ πᾶσαν ἔχει, Hes. Ἔργα 192 δίκη δ' ἐν χερσὶ καὶ αἰδῶς οὐκ ἔσται, and similarly *ib.* 200 αἰδῶς καὶ νέμεσις.

18. δεσμοί: cf. Tim. 31c δεσμὸν γὰρ ἐν μέσφ' δεῖ τινα ἀμφοῖν ξυναγωγὸν γίνεσθαι *for there must be some bond between them uniting them both*. The words are perhaps borrowed from some poet. The paronomasia κόσμοι, δεσμοί is noticeable.

19. οὖν: in a dependent question, cf. Symp. 219d ὥστε οὐθ' ὕπως οὖν ὀργιζοίμην εἶχον *so neither therefore could I be angry with him*. So ἄρα Phaedr. 228d δείξας γε πρῶτον τί ἄρα ἐν τῇ ἀριστερᾷ ἔχεις. — For a similar sudden transition to dir. disc., cf. 320d, 325d, 338b.

ιδιώταις, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί. καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ οὕτω θῶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω ; Ἐπὶ πάντας, ἔφη ὁ Ζεὺς, καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων· οὐ γὰρ α
25 ἂν γένοιτο πόλεις, εἰ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιεν ὥσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν. καὶ νόμον γε θὲς παρ' ἐμοῦ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως.

Οὕτω δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἷ τε ἄλλοι
30 καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ἢ λόγος ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, ὀλίγοις οἴονται μετεῖναι συμβουλῆς, καὶ εἰάν τις ἐκτὸς ὧν τῶν ὀλίγων συμβουλεύῃ, e οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φῆς· εἰκότως, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι· ὅταν δὲ εἰς συμβουλήν πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς ἴωσιν, ἢν δεῖ διὰ 323
35 δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἰέναι καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως ἅπαντος

³²² 22. καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί: is loosely appended; sc. πολλοῖς ἱκανοὶ ιδιώταις. We should have expected καὶ εἰς ἕκαστος τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν ὡσαύτως. Cf. 328 c.

d 24. This is the culmination of the myth, which was to show that virtue can be taught (see on 320 c); while it really only asserts that all men possess virtue, and this with an important saving qualification (line 26). If virtue is purely a gift, and is so vitally important, there is no reason why Zeus should not have bestowed it upon all, instead of leaving exceptions who were to be destroyed as pests. If virtue is not a gift, the myth proves (asserts) nothing whatever. The importance to Protagoras, however, of the exception, is that it leaves room for the argument upon responsibility and punishment (323 c f.).

27. νόσον: used only poetically of persons. Cf. Aesch. Prom. 1068 f. τοὺς προδότας γὰρ μισεῖν ἔμαθον, | κοῦκ

ἔστι νόσος, | τῆσδ' ἦντιν' ἀπέπτυσσα (de-³²² test) μάλλον. More frequent thus is pestis. d

30. Ἀθηναῖοι: pl. proper names of peoples generally take the art., but may omit it. This omission here is easier because of the οἷ τε ἄλλοι, cf. 324 c. — ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς: "a matter involving the builder's art"; cf. 319 b.

31. μετεῖναι συμβουλῆς: have a right to give counsel.

34. πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς: objective gen. ³²³ after συμβουλήν, "a matter involving political science." — ἦν: sc. ἀρετήν, subj. of ἰέναι. a

35. ἰέναι διὰ: take one's way through a thing, "follow the path of," "act in the sphere of"; used by Plato in many connections. Others use similarly χωρεῖν, πορεύεσθαι, ἔρχεσθαι διὰ. Cf. Xen. An. iii. 2. 8 εἰ μὲν οὖν βουλευόμεθα πάλιν αὐτοῖς διὰ φιλίας ἰέναι, . . . καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν διὰ παντὸς πολέμου αὐτοῖς ἰέναι. — σωφροσύνης: must here

ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται, ὡς παντὶ προσῆκον ταύτης γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις. αὕτη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου αἰτία.

¶ Ἴνα δὲ μὴ οἷη ἀπατᾶσθαι, ὡς τῷ ὄντι ἡγοῦνται
 40 πάντες ἄνθρωποι πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, τόδε αὖ λαβὲ τεκμήριον. Ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, εἴαν τις φῆ ἀγαθὸς ἀυλητῆς εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλην ἡντιοῦν τέχνην, ἣν μὴ ἐστίν, ἢ καταγελῶσιν ἢ χαλεπαίνουσι, καὶ οἱ οἰκείοι προσ-
 45 ἰόντες νουθετοῦσιν ὡς μαινόμενον· ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ, εἴαν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν, ὅτι ἄδικός ἐστιν, εἴαν οὗτος αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτοῦ τᾶληθῆ λέγει ἐναντίον πολλῶν, ὃ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἡγοῦντο εἶναι, τᾶληθῆ λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μανίαν, καὶ φασὶ πάντας δεῖν φάναι
 50 εἶναι δικαίους, εἴαν τε ᾧσιν εἴαν τε μή, ἢ μαίνεσθαι τὸν

³²³
 a have the sense of αἰδῶς. — εἰκότως . . . ἀνέχονται: the emphasis is on both the adv. and the verb (cf. 322 e). "In view of the facts contained in the myth (οὕτω δὴ, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα), the Athenians, and with good reason, listen to every man," — i.e. they believe every man to possess virtue; a conclusion which Protagoras goes on to confirm.

37. ἢ: sc. ἀναγκαῖον ὄν from προσῆκον, cf. *Phaedr.* 245 d τοῦτο δὲ (i.e. the self-moving) οὐτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι οὐτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στήναι (else the whole heaven and all created things must collapse and come to a standstill) where ἀναγκαῖον is supplied from δυνατόν. Conversely, *Rep.* vi. 490 a ἦν (sc. ἀλήθειαν) διώκειν αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ πάντη ἔδει, ἢ ἀλαζόνι (an impostor) ὄντι μηδαμῇ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς (sc. δυνατὸν ἦν). For ἢ, otherwise,

or else (alioquin), see 323 b bis, 325 a etc. — εἶναι: exist. Cf. 327 a. ³²³
 a

39. ὡς: apparently might depend upon ἀπατᾶσθαι, equiv. to μετ' ἀπάτης πείθεσθαι, cf. *Crat.* 413 d ἴσως γὰρ ἂν σε καὶ τὰ ἐπίλοιπα ἐξαπατήσαιμι, ὡς οὐκ ἀκηκοὼς λέγω, and so often. But here τῷ ὄντι shows that ὡς depends rather upon the following τόδε . . . τεκμήριον. Cf. 324 c.

42. ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις: cf. 319 c.

48. ἐκεῖ: i.e. ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς. b — ἡγοῦντο: a general truth, but impf. as referred to a previous illustration or observation. Cf. *Crito* 47 d διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δίκαιῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο.

49. ἐνταῦθα μανίαν: sc. ἡγοῦνται. Thus the universality of virtue is proved by the fact that men will not tolerate the truthful confession of its lack.

μὴ προσποιούμενον δικαιοσύνην· ὡς ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα
 ὄντιν' οὐχὶ ἀμωσγέπως μετέχειν αὐτῆς ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν c
 ἀνθρώποις.

XIII. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντ' ἀνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται περὶ
 ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς σύμβουλον διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι παντὶ μετ-
 εἶναι αὐτῆς, ταῦτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φύσει ἡγοῦν-
 ται εἶναι οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ
 5 ἐξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι ᾧ ἂν παραγίγνηται, τοῦτό
 σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι. ὅσα γὰρ ἡγοῦνται
 ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἀνθρώποι φύσει ἢ τύχῃ, οὐδεὶς θυ- a
 μοῦται οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει, οὐδὲ κολάζει τοὺς
 ταῦτα ἔχοντας, ἵνα μὴ τοιοῦτοι ᾦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐλεοῦσιν. οἷον
 10 τοὺς αἰσχροὺς ἢ σμικροὺς ἢ ἀσθενεῖς τίς οὕτως ἀνόητος
 ὥστε τι τούτων ἐπιχειρεῖν ποιεῖν; ταῦτα μὲν γάρ, οἶμαι,
 ἴσασιν ὅτι φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται,
 τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰναντία τούτοις· ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ
 ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς οἴονται γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώ-

³²³ 51. δικαιοσύνην: cf. Thuc. i. 137. 4
 b ἦν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο, Aeschin. ii.
 166 τὴν φήμην ἦν προσεποιήσω. Every-
 where else Plato uses the inf. after
 προσποιεῖσθαι. — ὡς: sometimes fol-
 lowed by the simple adj. absolutely,
 while usually ὄν is added; cf. Rep. v.
 449 c ὡς ἄρα παντὶ δῆλον, Gorg. 495 c
 ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης
 (on the ground that courage differs from
 knowledge) δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγε; — οὐδένα
 ὄντινα: see on 317 c.

c XIII. 1. According to rhetorical
 principles, the part which has been
 proved is brought to a separate close,
 here and 324 c, and what remains to
 be proved is stated; finally 328 c the
 whole is brought to a regular con-
 clusion. Protagoras was himself a
 teacher of rhetoric.

3. οὐ φύσει κτέ.: but cf. ἐπὶ πάντας ³²³
 νείμω 322 c. It is now necessary to
 show that virtue is not an original
 possession of all.

4. ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου: equiv. to
 τύχῃ below.

6. μετὰ τοῦτο: freq. in Plato; in
 the next place, when one point is fin-
 ished and another is to be taken up.
 Cf. 355 a τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο as subst.,
 the next point. Now follows the
 second division of the speech of
 Protagoras.

10. αἰσχροὺς ἢ σμικροὺς: the d
 Greeks regarded beauty and stature
 as qualities which were never sepa-
 rated. — For the acc. of the person
 after ποιεῖν τι, see G. 165; H. 725, a.

13. τὰ . . . τούτοις: follows ταῦτα
 epexegetically.

15 ποῖς, εἴαν τις ταῦτα μὴ ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ τὰναντία τούτων | κακά, e
 ἐπὶ τούτοις που οἷ τε θυμοὶ γίνονται καὶ αἱ κολάσεις
 καὶ αἱ νουθετήσεις. ὧν ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἀσε-
 βεια καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρε- 324
 τῆς. ἔνθα δὴ πᾶς παντὶ θυμοῦται καὶ νουθετεῖ, δῆλον
 20 ὅτι ὡς ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως κτητῆς οὔσης. εἰ
 γὰρ ἐθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν, ὦ Σώκράτες, τοὺς ἀδι-
 κοῦντας τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτό σε διδάξει, ὅτι οἷ γε ἄν-
 θρωποὶ ἡγοῦνται παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι ἀρετῆν. οὐδεὶς
 γὰρ κολάζει τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων
 25 καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα, ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὥσπερ θηρίον b
 ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται· ὁ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολά-
 ζειν οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἔνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται
 — οὐ γὰρ ἂν τό γε πραχθὲν ἀγένητον θείῃ — ἀλλὰ τοῦ

³²³ 17. ἀσεβεία: cf. 322 a. Since men
 e worshipped the gods before receiv-
 ing ἀρετὴ πολιτικὴ, Protagoras be-
 gins here to enlarge his definition of
 virtue, cf. 325 a, 329 c, 330 a.

³²⁴ 19. δῆλον ὅτι: this expression, as
 a well as οἷδ' ὅτι, is often added to a
 clause or inserted in it with the force
 of an adv., *evidently, certainly*. See
 H. 1049, 1 a.

22. δύναται: *signifies*; cf. *Crat.*
 429 d ἄρα ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν
 οὐκ ἔστιν, ἄρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος;
Euthyd. 286 c τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λό-
 γος. — αὐτό σε διδάξει: *the matter it-*
self will teach you. αὐτό is not to be
 referred to κολάζειν. Cf. the standing
 formulae αὐτὸ δείξει (*Hipp. Ma.* 288 b
 εἰ δ' ἐπιχειρήσας ἔσται καταγέλαστος,
 αὐτὸ δείξει), αὐτὸ δηλώσει (329 b, *Critias*
 108 c τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οἷόν ἐστιν, αὐτό σοι
 τάχα δηλώσει), and passages like *Soph.*
Frag. 352 ταχὺ δ' αὐτὸ δείξει τοῦργον,
 ὡς ἐγώ, σαφῶς. — οἷ γε ἄνθρωποι: not
 necessarily all men, but all excepting

the class referred to below, ὅστις μὴ ³²⁴
 ὥσπερ θηρίον κτέ. a

24. τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ὅτι ἠδίκησεν:
 for the change to the sing., see on
 319 d. — πρὸς τούτῳ ἔχων: *equiv. to*
τούτῳ προσέχων.

25. ὅστις . . . θηρίον: *antithetical* b
 with οἷ γε ἄνθρωποι above.

26. μετὰ λόγου: *with reason* (op-
 posed to ἀλογίστως), so that he gives
 to himself, and can give to others,
 account of what he does. Cf. *Tim.*
 28 a τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περι-
 ληπτόν (*to be received by the intelligence*
with reason), ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὄν (*being*
always the same), τὸ δ' αὖ δόξη μετ' αἰ-
 σθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν (*but the other,*
conceived by the opinion, with the help of
irrational sense), γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύ-
 μενον, *Phaedr.* 256 a ὁ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα
 μετ' αἰδοῦς καὶ λόγου ἀντιτείνει. See
 on 351 e.

28. οὐ γὰρ κτέ.: a thought widely
 current among the Greeks, from which
 Theognis has derived the ethical con-

μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὐθις ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος
 30 μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα. καὶ τοιαύτην
 διάνοιαν ἔχων διανοεῖται παιδευτὴν εἶναι ἀρετὴν· ἀπο-
 τροπῆς γοῦν ἔνεκα κολάζει. ταύτην οὖν τὴν δόξαν πάντες
 ἔχουσιν, ὅσοι περ τιμωροῦνται καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία. c
 τιμωροῦνται δὲ καὶ κολάζονται οἳ τε ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι
 35 οὓς ἂν οἴωνται ἀδικεῖν, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναῖοι, οἳ σοὶ
 πολῖται· ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ Ἀθηναῖοί εἰσι
 τῶν ἡγουμένων παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετὴν.
 Ὡς μὲν οὖν εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται οἳ σοὶ πολῖται καὶ χαλ-
 κέως καὶ σκυτοτόμου συμβουλευόντος τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ ὅτι
 40 διδακτὸν καὶ παρασκευαστὸν ἡγοῦνται ἀρετὴν, ἀποδέδει-
 κταί σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἰκανῶς, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. d

XIV. Ἔτι δὴ λοιπὴ ἀπορία ἐστίν, ἣν ἀπορεῖς περὶ τῶν

³²⁴
 b tent of his words 583 f. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν
 προβέβηκεν (*that which is past*) ἀμήχαν-
 νόν ἐστι γενέσθαι | ἀργά· τὰ δ' ἐξοπίσω,
 τῶν φυλακῆ μελέτω. Cf. Simon. Frag.
 69 τὸ γὰρ γεγενημένον οὐκέτ' ἄρεκτον
 (*unaccomplished*) ἔσται, Dem. III. 6
 τὰ μὲν δὴ τότε πραχθέντα οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως
 ἔχοι, Hor. Car. iii. 29. 45 ff.—τοῦ
 μέλλοντος: subst., cf. Parm. 137 a
 τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον.

29. ἵνα . . . κολασθέντα: the theory
 of prevention, which meets us also in
Gorg. 525 b and elsewhere in Plato,
 prevailed more and more in the time
 of the sophists as the ideas of the
 state and of law lost power and sa-
 credness. In former times the ideas
 of retribution and of the expiation of
 the violation of right and law, had
 been the foundation of criminal law;
 cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 313 δρᾶσαντι παθεῖν, |
 τριγέρων μῦθος τάδε φωνεῖ *the doer must*
suffer, thus says a most ancient adage.

c 34. τιμωροῦνται κτέ.: cf. Arist. *Rhet.*
 i. 10. 17 διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις·

ἢ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἔνεκά ³²⁴
 ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιούντος, ἵνα ^c
 ἀποπληρωθῇ (*be satisfied*). The rare
 pres. mid. of κολάζω occurs also Ar.
Vesp. 405 νῦν ἐκεῖνο τοῦξύθυμον, φ' κολα-
 ζόμεσθα, κέντρον ἐντέτατ' ὀξύ *now that*
choleric sting, with which we punish, is
sharp and ready for action; the aor.,
Menex. 240 d δεξάμενοι καὶ κολασάμενοι
 τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν, Xen. *An.* ii. 5. 13 ἂν
 κολάσαισθε, and the fut. is freq.

40. ἀποδέδεικται κτέ.: replying to
 Socrates's objection 319 b f., Protago-
 ras argues, "All men blame and pun-
 ish, not for natural defects, but for
 avoidable faults. But punishment
 can have reference (Protagoras as-
 serts) only to prevention, *i.e.* to the
 teaching of virtue; hence the Athe-
 nians and others (show that they)
 think virtue can be taught." This is
 in the place of showing ὡς διδακτὸν
 ἐστίν ἢ ἀρετῇ 320 c.

XIV. 1. ἀπορία: the art. is some- d
 times omitted when a rel. follows the

ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τί δήποτε οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ
 μὲν ἄλλα τοὺς αὐτῶν υἱεῖς διδάσκουσιν ἂ διδασκάλων
 ἔχεται καὶ σοφοὺς ποιοῦσιν, ἣν δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀρετὴν ἀγαθοὶ
 5 οὐδενὸς βελτίους ποιοῦσι. τούτου δὴ πέρι, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 οὐκέτι μῦθόν σοι ἐρῶ, ἀλλὰ λόγον. ὦδε γὰρ ἐννόησον.
 Πότερον ἔστι τι ἐν ἧ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐ ἀναγκαῖον πάντας
 τοὺς πολίτας μετέχειν, εἴ περ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι; ἐν τούτῳ
 γὰρ αὕτη λύεται ἡ ἀπορία, ἣν σὺ ἀπορεῖς, ἧ ἄλλοθι οὐ-
 10 δαμοῦ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἐν οὐ τεκτονικὴ
 οὐδὲ χαλκεία οὐδὲ κεραμεία, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφρο- 325
 σύνη καὶ τὸ ὄσιον εἶναι, καὶ συλλήβδην ἐν αὐτὸ προσα-
 γορεύω εἶναι, ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν· εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν οὐ δεῖ πάντας
 μετέχειν καὶ μετὰ τούτου πάντ' ἄνδρα, εἴαν τι καὶ ἄλλο

³²⁴
 d noun, since the needed definiteness is given by the rel. clause. Cf. *Charm.* 169 a ἀρ' ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ἣν δὴ ἡμεῖς σωφροσύνην φαμέν εἶναι, *Rep.* iii. 413 e φύλαξ αὐτοῦ ὧν ἀγαθὸς καὶ μουσικῆς ἧς ἐμάνθανεν, *Symp.* 197 e ὠδῆς μετέχοντα, ἣν ἄδει θέλγων joining in the song which he sings, charming, etc.— Here begins the third division of the speech.

4. ἔχεται: see on 319 e.—ἀγαθοί: sc. εἰσί.

5. οὐδενὸς βελτίους: lit. more excellent than no one, to excel no one. Cf. 335 a, *Aesch. Prom.* 1016 αὐθαδία γὰρ οὐδενὸς μείζον σθένει for self-will is utterly powerless, *Dem.* ii. 17 οὐδένων εἰσὶ βελτίους, xix. 208 ἐμοῦ οὐδενὸς μείζον φθειρομένου ἠττωνται when I speak more weakly than any other, they are discomfited. More freq. are the cases in which the comparative word has a neg. force, as in the use of ἐλάσσω, ἡσσω, ἐνδεέστερος, with a preceding οὐδενός. Cf. 316 e οὐδενὸς ἠττων, he is inferior to no one, *Eur.*

Bacch. 777 Διόνυσος ἡσσω οὐδενὸς θεῶν ἔφυ. ³²⁴
 d

6. οὐκέτι μῦθον: the second part of the discourse had already been for the most part disconnected from the myth; but Protagoras now calls attention to this, in order to strengthen the impression that he is giving a fundamental demonstration from the nature of the subject itself.

8. ἐν τούτῳ: "in the answer to this question."

10. The following period is a typical example of imitation of oral disc., which, in its efforts at clearness, allows itself all manner of repetitions, recapitulations, and little anacolutha.

12. καὶ συλλήβδην κτέ.: inserted with anacoluthon; see on 323 e. ³²⁵
 a

13. εἶναι: see on 311 e.

14. καὶ μετὰ τούτου: a dem. or pers. pron. is common in such cases, after a copulative or disjunctive conj., instead of a repeated rel.

15 βούληται μανθάνειν ἢ πράττειν, οὕτω πράττειν, ἄνευ δὲ
 τούτου μή, ἢ τὸν μὴ μετέχοντα καὶ διδάσκειν καὶ κολά-
 ζειν, καὶ παῖδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα, ἕως περ ἂν κολα-
 ζόμενος βελτίων γένηται, ὅς δ' ἂν μὴ ὑπακούῃ κολαζό-
 μενος καὶ διδασκόμενος, ὡς ἀνίατον ὄντα τοῦτον ἐκβάλλειν
 20 ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἢ ἀποκτείνειν· εἰ οὕτω μὲν ἔχει, οὕτω δ' ὅ
 αὐτοῦ πεφυκότος οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες εἰ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα διδά-
 σκονται τοὺς υἱεῖς, τοῦτο δὲ μή, σκέψαι ὡς θαυμασίως
 γίνονται οἱ ἀγαθοί. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ διδακτὸν αὐτὸ ἡγοῦνται
 καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία, ἀπεδείξαμεν· διδακτοῦ δὲ ὄντος
 25 καὶ θεραπευτοῦ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα τοὺς υἱεῖς διδάσκονται,
 ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἢ ζημία, εἰ μὴ ἐπίστωνται,
 ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἢ τε ζημία θάνατος αὐτῶν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ φυγαὶ

³²⁵
 a 15. οὕτω: resumes μετὰ τούτου
 above.

16. τὸν μὴ μετέχοντα: cf. 323 a,
 l. 40.—διδάσκειν κτέ.: depends on δεῖ
 above.

b 20. οὕτω πεφυκότος: resumes the
 foregoing prot. in order to add an-
 other, containing a contradiction, and
 then the more emphatically to draw
 the conclusion σκέψαι κτέ.

22. θαυμασίως γίνονται: we should
 have expected θαυμάσιοί εἰσιν or θαυ-
 μάσια πράττουσιν, still the reading can
 be sustained by expressions like that
 of Timotheus in Plut. Mor. 127 a ὡς
 οἱ παρὰ Πλάτωνι δειπνήσαντες καὶ εἰσαύ-
 ριον ἠδέως γίνονται, 686 b (Ath. x.
 419 d) τοὺς παρὰ Πλάτωνι δειπνήσαντας
 καὶ τῇ ὑστεραία καλῶς γίνεσθαι, Aris-
 tophon in Ath. xiii. 559 d κακὸς κακῶς
 γένοιθ' ὁ γήμας δεύτερος. It is prob.
 the language of common life. The
 meaning is then, *how strangely it fares*
with the good, what a strange course they
take. More freq. πεφυκέναι is thus con-
 strued with an adv.; e.g. Phaedo 60 b

(τὸ ἡδὺ) ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ ³²⁵
 λυπηρόν. b

24. διδακτοῦ . . . ὄντος: this is
 continued from διδακτόν of the pre-
 vious line, "if it can be taught,
 as I have shown that people be-
 lieve."

25. τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κτέ.: argument
 a *minore ad majus*.

26. ζημία: in this use commonly
 has the art., "the legally appointed
 penalty."

27. τέ: would be in its place, were
 the passage e.g. ἐφ' ὧν ἢ τε ζημία ἐστὶ
 θάνατος καὶ τῶν οἰκῶν ἀνατροπαὶ γίνον-
 ται. The sent., however, proceeds
 as though it began ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἢ ζημία
 θάνατός τε. Such transpositions of
 τέ within the connected group of
 words are not infreq.; cf. 336 c λόγον
 τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι, 338 b, l. 2,
 Rep. i. 348 b ἅμα αὐτοὶ τε δικασταὶ καὶ
 ῥήτορες ἐσόμεθα, Lach. 195 c τὸ ὑγιει-
 νὸν εἰπεῖν οἶόν τε καὶ νοσῶδες, Crito
 43 b ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ
 εἶναι.

μὴ μαθοῦσι μηδὲ θεραπευθεῖσιν εἰς ἀρετὴν, καὶ πρὸς τῷ c
 θανάτῳ χρημάτων τε δημεύσεις καί, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ξυλ-
 30 λήβδην τῶν οἴκων ἀνατροπαί, ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδά-
 σκονται οὐδ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν; Οἴεσθαί
 γε χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες. XV. Ἐκ παίδων σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι,
 μέχρι οὗ περ ἂν ζῶσι, καὶ διδάσκουσι καὶ νουθετοῦσιν.
 ἐπειδὰν θάπτον συνιῆ τις τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ τροφὸς καὶ
 μήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ πατήρ περὶ τούτου d
 5 διαμάχονται, ὅπως βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς, παρ' ἕκαστον
 καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι, ὅτι
 τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον, καὶ τόδε μὲν καλόν, τόδε
 δὲ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τόδε μὲν ὄσιον, τόδε δὲ ἀνόσιον, καὶ τὰ
 μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποίει. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐκῶν πείθηται,
 10 — εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς περ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτό-
 μενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα

³²⁵
 c 28. μηδὲ . . . ἀρετὴν: added epexegetically, with anacoluthon after ἐφ' ὧν.

29. ξυλλήβδην: is unexpected after ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, but cf. *Apol.* 22 b ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον. — The destruction of one's house, the extinction of one's family, stood for the greatest possible disaster.

30. δ' ἄρα: see on 313 a, l. 2. Cf. *Crito* 46 d ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο κτέ.; 50 e ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον (while towards your father it was certainly not right for you), πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐξέσται σοι κτέ.

31. οἴεσθαί γε χρή: an expression freq. in Plato in reply to a question raised by the speaker himself or a bystander. What follows is added

'asyndetically,' because it confirms οἴεσθαι χρή by a surprising fact. ³²⁵
 c

XV. 1. On the following classical passage upon the training of the youth, see Becker *Char.* ii. 19 ff., Hermann *Griech. Alt.* iii. § 33 ff., Guhl and Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, §§ 50, 51.

3. ἐπειδὰν θάπτον κτέ.: during the first years, nurse and mother; later, pedagogue and father. — θάπτον: is rare after ἐπεὶ and similar particles; more freq. is τάχιστα. In Plato, besides this place, θάπτον is found thus only in *Alc.* I. 105 a εἰ μὲν θάπτον.

6 ff. So Demea admonishes his son, d Terent. *Ad.* iii. 3. 63: Hoc facito. — Hoc fugito. — Hoc laudi est. — Hoc vitio datur.

9. πείθηται κτέ.: see on 311 d, l. 20.

11. καὶ πληγαῖς: cf. Menand. *Sent.* 422 ὁ μὴ δαρὲς ἄνθρωπος οὐ παιδεύεται.

St. p. 325.

εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐντέλλονται ἐπι-
 μελεῖσθαι εὐκοσμίας τῶν παίδων ἢ γραμμάτων τε καὶ
 κιθαρίσεως. οἱ δὲ διδάσκαλοι τούτων τε ἐπιμελοῦνται, e
 15 καὶ ἐπειδὴν αὐτὰ γράμματα μάθωσι καὶ μέλλωσι συνήσειν
 τὰ γεγραμμένα, ὥσπερ τότε τὴν φωνήν, παρατιθέασιν
 αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν
 ποιήματα καὶ ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλὰ
 μὲν νουθητήσεις ἔνεισι, πολλὰ δὲ διέξοδοι καὶ ἔπαινοι 326
 20 καὶ ἐγκώμια παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἵνα ὁ παῖς ζηλῶν
 μιμῆται καὶ ὀρέγηται τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι. οἳ τ' αὐτὰ κι-
 θαρισταὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα· σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμελοῦνται
 καὶ ὅπως ἂν οἱ νέοι μηδὲν κακουργῶσι· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις,

³²⁵
 d 12. εἰς διδασκάλων: see on 326 c,
 1. 37.

13. With the *γραμματιστής* the boys learned τὰ γράμματα, i.e. to read and write, then with the *κιθαριστής* they learned to sing, and generally to play the lyre.

e 14. τούτων: i.e. εὐκοσμίας. So freq. the neut. pl. of dem. prons. is used for the sing., as τάδε, ταῦτα, θάτερα, as is also freq. the case with pred. adjs. Cf. 327 b, 353 a διὰ ταῦτα, *Crito* 52 a ἐφιέντων (permit) ἡμῶν δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ, *Thuc.* iv. 1 ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοὺς Λοκροὺς ἀμύνεσθαι. See H. 635.

16. τότε: previously; cf. c above, *Gorg.* 488 c οἷόν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὡς κτέ. So often.

17. βάρων: see on 315 c.—ποιητῶν: Homer before all others. In *Xen. Symp.* 3. 5 Niceratus says ὁ πατήρ ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενοίμην, ἠνάγκασέ με πάντα τὰ Ὀμήρου ἔπη μαθεῖν. Prominently after Homer come Hesiod, Theognis, Phocylides; καὶ γὰρ τούτους φασὶ μὲν ἀρίστους

γεγενῆσθαι συμβούλους τῷ βίῳ τῷ τῶν ³²⁵
 ἀνθρώπων *Isocr.* ii. 43. In part the teachers dictated passages merely, which were to be committed to memory; cf. *Euthyd.* 276 c ὁπότε ἀποστοματίζοι (dictated) ὑμῖν ὁ γραμματιστής, πότεροι ἐμάνθανον τῶν παίδων τὰ ἀποστοματιζόμενα; e

18. ἀναγκάζουσιν: cf. *Arist. Pol.* viii. 4 οὐ γὰρ παίζουσι μανθάνοντες (οἱ νέοι)· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἢ μάθησις.

19. διέξοδοι: attractive tales, descriptions. In 361 d, detailed exposition, course of argument.—ἔπαινοι: more general than ἐγκώμια. ³²⁶
 a

22. ἕτερα τοιαῦτα: sc. ποιούσιν, see on 312 d. For the thought, see *Ar. Nub.* 964 εἶτα βαδίζειν (sc. ἔδει) ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς εὐτάκτως εἰς κιθαριστοῦ | τοὺς κωμήτας γυμνοὺς ἀθρόους then those of the same district had to go in good order through the streets, in a body and wearing only the chiton, to the school of the harp-player.

23. ἂν: gives a shade of contingency in final clauses. Cf. *Gorg.* 481 a μηχανητέον ὅπως ἂν διαφύγη καὶ μὴ δῶ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός.

ἐπειδὴν κιθαρίζειν μάθωσιν, ἄλλων αὖ ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν
 25 ποιήματα διδάσκουσι, μελοποιῶν, εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα
 ἐντείνοντες, καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς τε καὶ τὰς ἄρμονίας ἀναγ- b
 κάζουσιν οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παίδων, ἵνα ἡμε-
 ρώτεροί τε ᾧσι, καὶ εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστώτεροι
 γιγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι ᾧσιν εἰς τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν.
 30 πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρ-
 μοστίας δεῖται. ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις εἰς παιδοτρίβου
 πέμπουσιν, ἵνα τὰ σώματα βέλτιον ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ
 διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ οὔσῃ, καὶ μὴ ἀναγκάζονται ἀποδειλιᾶν c
 διὰ τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ
 35 ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πράξεσιν. καὶ ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ μάλιστα
 δυνάμενοι μάλιστα· μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται οἱ πλουσιώτατοι·
 καὶ οἱ τούτων υἱεῖς, πρωαίτατα εἰς διδασκάλων τῆς ἡλι-
 κίας ἀρξάμενοι φοιτᾶν, ὀψιαίτατα ἀπαλλάττονται. Ἐπει-
 δὴν δὲ ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγῶσιν, ἡ πόλις αὖ τούς τε
 40 νόμους ἀναγκάζει μαθάνειν καὶ κατὰ τούτους ζῆν, ἵνα d
 μὴ αὐτοὶ ἐφ' αὐτῶν εἰκῇ πράττωσιν, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ
 οἱ γραμματισταὶ τοῖς μήπω δεινοῖς γράφειν τῶν παίδων

³²⁶ 24. ἄλλων: see on 316 d, l. 24.

^a 25. μελοποιῶν: viz. the Aeolic and Doric lyric poets, the dithyrambic poets Cecidas, Lamprocles, Lasos, Cydias and others, besides the choral songs of the tragedians.

b 26. ἐντείνοντες: used of putting prose into metrical form, or adapting verses to musical rhythm and melody. Cf. *Phaedo* 60 d ἐντείνοντας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον.

27. ἵνα κτέ.: the Greeks ascribed to music the highest influence in moral culture. Cf. *Rep.* iii. 401 d κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή (musical training is most controlling) ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅ τε

ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἄρμονία καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ³²⁶ b (most mightily) ἀπτεται αὐτῆς.

31. παιδοτρίβου: the teacher of gymnastics, who trained the youth in a παλαίστρα fitted up by himself or allowed him by the state.

34. πονηρίαν: depravity, wretched c condition.

39. ἐκ διδασκάλων: the subst. depending on ἐκ is omitted; cf. ἐν Ἀρίφρονος (320 a), the freq. εἰς διδασκάλων (325 d), εἰς παιδοτρίβου (326 b), and ἐν κιθαριστοῦ μεμαθηκέναι (*Theaet.* 206 a), *Ar. Plut.* 84 ἐκ Πατροκλέους ἔρχομαι, *Lysistr.* 701 τὴν ἐταίραν ἐκάλεσ' ἐκ τῶν γειτόνων.

41. ἐφ' αὐτῶν εἰκῇ: cf. 320 a, 323 c. d

ὑπογράψαντες γραμμάς τῇ γραφίδι, οὕτω τὸ γραμματεῖον
 διδύασι καὶ ἀναγκάζουσι γράφειν κατὰ τὴν ὑφήγησιν τῶν
 45 γραμμῶν, ὥς δὲ καὶ ἡ πόλις νόμους ὑπογράψασα, ἀγα-
 θῶν καὶ παλαιῶν νομοθετῶν εὐρήματα, κατὰ τούτους
 ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, ὅς δ' ἂν ἐκτὸς βαίνη
 τούτων, κολάζει· καὶ ὄνομα τῇ κολάσει ταύτη καὶ παρ' e
 ὑμῖν καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ, ὡς εὐθυνούσης τῆς δίκης,
 50 εὐθῦναι. τοσαύτης οὖν τῆς ἐπιμελείας οὔσης περὶ ἀρετῆς
 ἰδία καὶ δημοσία θαυμάζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀπορεῖς,
 εἰ διδακτὸν ἔστω ἀρετή; Ἄλλ' οὐ χρὴ θαυμάζειν, ἀλλὰ
 πολὺ μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ διδακτὸν.

XVI. Διὰ τί οὖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων πολλοὶ υἱεῖς φαῦλοι

³²⁶
 d 43. ὑπογράψαντες γραμμάς: cf. Seneca *Epistol.* 94 § 51 *digiti puerorum tenentur et aliena manu per literarum simulacra ducuntur*, and Quintil. i. 1. 27 *cum vero jam ductus sequi coeperit (sc. puer) non inutile erit literas tabellae quam optime insculpi ut per illos velut sulcos ducatur stilus* (cf. v. 14. 31). The passages just quoted have led to the impression that Plato also refers to letters to be traced over by the boy. But *γραμμή* does not mean *letter*, and we must therefore understand *the lines* within which the boys must keep their letters. The comparison is thus the more forcible. In *Theaet.* 172 e, Plato calls the ἀντρωμοσία α ὑπογραφή, ἧς ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον.

45. ὥς: rare in prose, cf. 338 a ὡς οὖν ποιήσετε, *Rep.* vii. 530 d *κινδυνεύει, ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὡς πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὦτα παγήναι, it is probable that as the eyes are appointed for astronomy, so the ears for harmonious motions.*—The slight mingling of syntactic and paratactic con-

nection, seen in ὡς δέ after ὡσπερ, is ³²⁶
 very common in Plato, e.g. 328 a, cf. d
 also ὅμως δέ after εἰ 353 d.

50. εὐθῦναι: to these every official e
 in Athens was subjected on the expiration of his term of office (Hermann *Staatsalt.* § 154. Schömann *gr. Alterth.* i. 432³); although they apply only to ἄρχειν, Protagoras mentions them on account of the analogy between them and the punishments of children, cf. 325 d. Compare his doctrine of punishment, 324 a f.

52. ἐστίν: but it does not follow from Protagoras's long argument that virtue is a thing which can be taught, but simply that it is so regarded. See on 324 c, 325 b. Moreover, the virtue taught in the Athenian schools was not at all that which was taught by Protagoras, so that the value of the former training would not prove the value of his.

53. πολὺ μᾶλλον: i.e. χρῆν θαυμάζειν, εἰ μὴ διδακτὸν ἦν.

XVI. 1. Cf. Hom. β 276 f. *παῦροι γάρ τοι παῖδες ὁμοῖοι πατρὶ πέλονται, οἱ πλεονές κακίους, παῦροι δέ τε πατρὸς ἀρείους.*

γίνονται ; τοῦτο αὖ μάθε· οὐδὲν γὰρ θαυμαστόν, εἴ περ
 ἀληθῆ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι τούτου τοῦ
 πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα ³²⁷
 5 δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν. Εἰ γὰρ δὴ ὃ λέγω οὕτως ἔχει — ἔχει δὲ
 μάλιστα πάντων οὕτως —, ἐνθυμήθητι ἄλλο τῶν ἐπιτη-
 δευμάτων ὁτιοῦν καὶ μαθημάτων προελόμενος. εἰ μὴ
 οἷόν τ' ἦν πόλιν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πάντες ἀυληταὶ ἦμεν, ὁποῖός
 τις ἐδύνατο ἕκαστος, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ πᾶς
 10 πάντα καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς ἀυλοῦν-
 τα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθόνηι τούτου, ὥσπερ νῦν τῶν δικαίων καὶ
 τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς φθονεῖ οὐδ' ἀποκρύπτεται ὥσπερ ^b
 τῶν ἄλλων τεχνημάτων — λυσιτελεῖ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν ἢ
 ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή· διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς παντὶ
 15 προθύμως λέγει καὶ διδάσκει τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ νόμιμα·
 — εἰ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἐν ἀυλήσει πᾶσαν προθυμίαν καὶ
 ἀφθονίαν εἶχομεν ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν, οἶει ἄν τι, ἔφη,
 μᾶλλον, ὧ Σώκρατες, τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀυλητῶν ἀγαθοὺς ἀυλη-
 τὰς τοὺς υἱεῖς γίγνεσθαι ἢ τῶν φαύλων ; οἶμαι μὲν οὐ,
 20 ἀλλὰ ὅτου ἔτυχεν ὁ υἱὸς εὐφυέστατος γενόμενος εἰς ἀυλη-

326

^e 3. ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν : cf. 324 e.

327

^a

5. ἰδιωτεύειν : equiv. to μηδὲν ἐπαίειν (327c), μὴ μετέχειν (325a), the opposite of δημιουργὸν εἶναί τινος. Cf. 312 b.

7. εἰ μὴ κτέ. : cf. 323 a.

8. ὁποῖός τις ἐδύνατο : sc. εἶναι, impf. by assimilation ; cf. *Gorg.* 506 b ἠδέως ἂν Καλλικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμεν, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν. See GMT. 66, 3 ; G. 239, 2 ; H. 919 b.

10. καὶ ἐπέπληττε : does not influence the construction, on account of the predominance of the idea of διδάσκειν, hence we read not τῷ ἀυλοῦντι, but the acc. depending on ἐδίδασκε. Cf. *Phaedo* 94 d τὰ μὲν ἀπει-

λοῦσα τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, ³²⁷
Gorg. 460 d μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν ^a
 μηδὲ ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι we should not lay it to the charge of the instructor, nor banish him, but rather the wrong-doer. So οὐδ' ἀποκρύπτεται below is outweighed by φθονεῖ. Cf. 335 e, l. 53.

11. ἐφθόνηι τούτου : cf. *Menex.* 238 a τούτου δὲ τοῦ καρποῦ οὐκ ἐφθόνησεν (sc. γῆ).

17. ἔφη : serves to remind the ^b reader that Socrates is rehearsing the argument of another ; cf. 310 a. Moreover the 'hyperbaton' gives emphasis to the words τι μᾶλλον. See H. 1062.

20. ὅτου ἔτυχεν : see on ὁποῖός τις ἐδύνατο above.

σιν, οὗτος ἂν ἐλλόγιμος ηὐξήθη, ὅτου δὲ ἀφυής, ἀκλεής · c
καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἀγαθοῦ ἀληθοῦ φαῦλος ἂν ἀπέβη, πολ-
λάκις δ' ἂν φαύλου ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οὖν ἀληταί γ' ἂν
πάντες ἦσαν ἱκανοὶ ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ μηδὲν ἀλή-
25 σεως ἐπαίοντας. οὕτως ᾧ κὰν νῦν, ὅστις σοι ἀδικώ-
τατος φαίνεται ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις
τεθραμμένων, δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ δημιουργὸν τούτου d
τοῦ πράγματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους,
οἷς μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶ μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε νόμοι μηδὲ
30 ἀνάγκη μηδεμία διὰ παντὸς ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμε-
λεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' εἴεν ἄγριοί τινες, οἷους πέρυσσι Φερέκράτης

³²⁷
c 21. ἐλλόγιμος: 'proleptic'; cf. *Rep.*
iv. 425 a ἐννόμους τε καὶ σπουδαίους ἐξ
αὐτῶν ἀνδρας αὐξάνεσθαι, viii. 565 c
ἓνα τινὰ ἀεὶ δῆμος εἴωθε τρέφειν τε καὶ
αὔξειν μέγαν, *Meno* 93 d τὸν υἱὸν ἱππέα
ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθόν. So freq. — ἀκλεής:
sc. ἐγένετο from ηὐξήθη.

23. ἀλλ' οὖν: but however that might
be; stronger than δ' οὖν, and often
followed by γέ. This is used when
previous statements are for the mo-
ment left in abeyance, while that
which follows is unquestionably cer-
tain. Cf. *Apol.* 34 e ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμέ-
νον γέ ἐστι τὸ Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τινὲ
τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, *Gorg.* 496 d ἀλλ'
οὖν τό γε πεινήν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν (rainful).

24. τοὺς: is not repeated, since ἰδιώ-
τας and μηδὲν ἐπαίοντας relate to the
same individuals. Cf. *Dem.* XIX. 87
(δεῖ) τὸν αἴτιον καὶ παρασκευάσαντα τὴν
ἐξουσίαν ταύτην ἐκείνῳ μισεῖν καὶ τιμω-
ρεῖσθαι you ought to hate and to punish
the one who is responsible, and who se-
cured this power to that one.

25. "As, in the supposed case, there
would be good and bad flute players,
and yet all would be flute players, so
now all are upright and virtuous; but

because some are more so, those who ³²⁷
have less virtue seem to have none. c
Still, that these last are also really
virtuous, would be clear, if they were
compared with absolute savages." So
Protagoras wishes to *prove* his view
respecting those who are regarded as
unjust and vicious, through what
would be indisputably true in the
supposed case. This lies in ᾧ κὰν
νῦν (also now, in the present case), where
the question is not of flute playing,
but of virtue. οἷου καὶ νῦν, the read-
ing of the Mss., would be not a proof
but merely an *exhortation*.

26. καὶ ἀνθρώποις: since, acc. to
Protagoras, men must possess virtue,
evidently civil and social life, legal
institutions and human society, are
allied conceptions, and ἐν νόμοις and
ἀνθρώποις can be connected as synony-
mous. He has already in mind, too,
the contrast between ἀνθρωποι and the
ἄγριοι about to be cited.

27. αὐτόν: not *himself*, but merely d
referring back to ὅστις.

29. μηδέ: nor, in general.

31. ἀλλ' εἴεν: belongs to the rel.
clause beginning with οἷς, which it

ὁ ποιητῆς ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ. ἦ σφόδρα ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις γενόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χορῷ μισάνθρωποι, ἀγαπήσαις ἄν, εἰ ἐντύχοις Εὐρυβάτῳ καὶ 35 Φρυνώνδῃ, καὶ ἀνολοφύραι' ἄν ποθῶν τὴν τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπων πονηρίαν. νῦν δὲ τρυφᾶς, ὧ Σώκρατες, διότι

³²⁷
d follows in free const. — Pherecrates, one of the masters of the old comedy, had in the year 421–420 B.C. (cf. Ath. v. 218 d ἐδιδάχθησαν δὲ οἱ Ἄγριοι ἐπ' Ἀριστίωνος ἄρχοντος) brought out a comedy, the Ἄγριοι, to the contents of which the surviving fragments (Meineke *Frag. Com. Gr.* I. 79 f., II. 254 ff., Kock *Com. Att. Frag.* I. 146) give almost no clue. Our passage would seem to imply that certain misanthropists (like Timon), who had fled from Athens into a wilderness, had encountered absolutely lawless and savage men, like the Cyclopes of the *Odyssey*, namely the Ἄγριοι, who formed the Chorus. These savages by their rudeness had taught them to prefer an association with even the worst types of common humanity, with Eurybatus and Phrynondas. — πέρυσι: see *Introd.* p. 6.

32. ὁ ποιητῆς: an Athenian speaker would hardly have added this qualification to an Athenian name. — ἐδίδαξεν: the technical term for the training of the actors and the chorus by the poet, then in general for the bringing out of the play. — ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ: means strictly only *at the Lenaean*. This was a temple and sacred precinct of Dionysus south of the Acropolis, in and near which were observed the solemnities of the Lenaea, which for this reason were called Διονύσια τὰ ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ in distinction from Διονύσια τὰ ἐν ἄστει, the Great Dionysia (C. I. Att. II. 741 A, a l. 10,

b l. 4, d l. 9 from the years 333–330 B.C.). Between this and the citadel lay the Theatre of Athens, where all tragedies and comedies, on both festivals, were brought out. Consequently the formula ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ cannot designate those brought out *at the Lenaean festival*. Protagoras, however, uses the expression ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ in the wider sense: *such as Pherecrates put upon the stage*, as contrasted with the class of men which Socrates encountered in real life. — ἐν γενόμενος: *coming among*. γίγνεσθαι and εἶναι are often used with advs. of place.

33. The Ἄγριοι must have formed the Chorus, and ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις refers to them; the μισάνθρωποι then were different persons, and in the words ἀγαπήσαις ἄν, ὥσπερ οἱ κτέ., Protagoras likens Socrates's condition, if he should ever meet beings like those Ἄγριοι, to that of the μισάνθρωποι in meeting the Chorus. We must therefore from the preceding context supply γενόμενοι with ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χορῷ, even though this is a little difficult.

34. Eurybatus was a thief notorious for his cunning, or an Ephesian who had betrayed Croesus to Cyrus; Phrynondas, an Athenian, infamous by reason of his trickery and baseness. Both had become proverbial representatives of all wickedness. Cf. Ephorus in Harpocr. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τοὺς πονηροὺς Εὐρυβάτους καλεῖσθαι, Suid. s.v. Φρυνώνδας: ἐκ τούτου τοὺς πονηροὺς Φρυνώνδας καλοῦσιν.

St. p. 327.

πάντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν ἀρετῆς, καθ' ὅσον δύνανται ἕκα-
 στος, καὶ οὐδεὶς σοι φαίνεται εἶναι· ὥσπερ ἄν, εἰ ζητοῖς
 τίς διδάσκαλος τοῦ ἐλληνίζειν, οὐδ' ἂν εἷς φανεῖη, οὐδέ 328
 40 γ' ἄν, οἶμαι, εἰ ζητοῖς τίς ἂν ἡμῖν διδάξειε τοὺς τῶν
 χειροτεχνῶν υἱεῖς αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν τέχνην, ἣν δὴ παρὰ
 τοῦ πατρὸς μεμαθήκασι, καθ' ὅσον οἴός τ' ἦν ὁ πατὴρ
 καὶ οἱ τοῦ πατρὸς φίλοι ὄντες ὁμότεχνοι, τούτους ἔτι τίς
 ἂν διδάξειεν, οὐ ρᾶδιον οἶμαι εἶναι, ὧ Σώκρατες, τούτων
 45 διδάσκαλον φανῆναι, τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων παντάπασι ρᾶδιον,
 οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων. ἀλλὰ κἂν b
 εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστι τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι εἰς
 ἀρετὴν, ἀγαπητόν. ὧν δὴ ἐγὼ οἶμαι εἷς εἶναι, καὶ δια-
φερόντως ἂν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ὀνήσαι τινα πρὸς

327 e 38. καί: *and so*, paratactic for ὥστε. Cf. Aesch. Theb. 647 κατάξω δ' ἄνδρα τόνδε, καὶ πόλιν | ἔξει, Thuc. i. 99 χρήματα ἐτάξαντο, καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἠῤῥετο τὸ ναυτικὸν κτέ.—ὥσπερ κτέ.: marks neither an antithesis to the preceding, nor a step in advance, but only an illustration.—ἄν: see on 318 b.

328 a 39. οὐδ' εἷς: more emphatic than οὐδεὶς, cf. 335 d, 343 d. These particles are freq. separated by preps.

42. οἴος τ' ἦν: sc. διδάσκειν from μεμαθήκασι.

44. οὐ ρᾶδιον: anacoluthon, as though οὐδέ γ' ἄν had not preceded. The anacoluthon is caused by the repetition in τούτους ἔτι τίς ἂν διδάξειεν.

45. τῶν ἀπείρων: those unskilled in a particular art. For these it is easy to find a teacher, while for the skilled it is difficult. By this example Protagoras gains a step in the development of his argument; unobserved, it forms the transition to his claim that

there are nevertheless special teachers 328 a in virtue.

46. οὕτω δέ: after ὥσπερ, see on b 326 d. That ὥσπερ referred back, and not to a following οὕτως, is forgotten, as often happens. Sc. οὐ ρᾶδιον διδάσκαλον φανῆναι.—κἂν: properly an opt. εἴη should follow, but κἂν εἰ became so much a formula that ἂν sometimes was not regarded in the const. Cf. Meno 72 c κἂν εἰ πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπαὶ εἰσιν (αἱ ἀρεταί), ἐν γέ τι εἶδος ταύτων ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν, Symp. 185 a κἂν εἴ τις ἐξαπατηθείη, καλὴ ἢ ἀπάτη.

47. ὀλίγον, διαφέρει: are to be taken together.—προβιβάσαι: for the inf., cf. Gorg. 517 b μεταβιβάσειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκεῖνοι in regard to correcting the desires and not indulging them, these men in no wise excelled those others.

49. ὀνήσαι: cf. Rep. x. 600 d εἰ περ οἴός τ' ἦν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὀνινάναι ἀνθρώπους.

50 τὸ καλὸν καγαθὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἀξίως τοῦ μισθοῦ ὃν
 πράττομαι, καὶ ἔτι πλείονος, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖν τῷ
 μαθόντι. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ
 μισθοῦ τοιοῦτον πεποίημαι. ἐπειδὴν γάρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ
 μάθη, εἴαν μὲν βούληται, ὃ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον, εἴαν
 55 δὲ μή, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν, ὁμόσας, ὅσου ἂν φῆ ἀξία εἶναι c
 τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν.

Τοιοῦτόν σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ καὶ μῦθον καὶ
 λόγον εἶρηκα, ὡς διδακτὸν ἀρετὴ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι οὕτως
 ἠγοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων
 60 φαύλους υἱεῖς γίνεσθαι καὶ τῶν φαύλων ἀγαθοῦς, ἐπεὶ
 καὶ οἱ Πολυκλείτου υἱεῖς, Παράλου καὶ Ξανθίππου τοῦδε
 ἠλικιωῦται, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα εἰσί, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλων
 δημιουργῶν. τῶνδε δὲ οὐπω ἀξίον τοῦτο κατηγορεῖν. ἔτι d
 γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰσὶν ἐλπίδες· νέοι γάρ.

XVII. Πρωταγόρας μὲν τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐπιδειξά-

328 50. μισθοῦ: cf. 349 a. Arist. *Ethic.*

b N. ix. 1, p. 1164 a 25. ὕπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν ὅσου δοκεῖ ἀξία ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον. He sought thus to avoid the censure cast upon the sophists because they took money for their instruction.

53. γάρ: expegetical, equiv. to *namely*.

54. βούληται: for the apod., sc. κατέθηκεν (gnomic aor.). See on 311 d.

c 55. ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν: the Greeks, when an oath was to be peculiarly solemn, were wont to take it at some sacred place, as an altar (Andoc. 1. 126 λαβόμενος τοῦ βωμοῦ ὤμοσεν).

61. The sons of Polycletus are wholly unknown. Obviously, however, they with their father are thought of as well known at Athens.

63. τῶνδε: points to the sons of Pericles then present. Protagoras speaks in defence of his pupils, although compelled to admit the truth of what Socrates has said concerning them in 319 e. — Protagoras began his discourse with the commendation of his own teaching, having previously, before Socrates and Hippocrates, extolled the profession of the sophists; he closes it with a justification of his course in receiving compensation, and a complimentary allusion to his pupils. Grote (Plato II. 45 f.) considers this discourse one of the best parts of the Platonic writings, as an exposition of the growth and propagation of 'common sense' among a community.

XVII. 1. ἐπιδειξάμενος: Socrates humorously refers to Protagoras's speech as made for display, cf. 347 b.

μενος ἀπεπαύσατο τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπὶ μὲν πολλὸν χρό-
 νον κεκηλημένος ἔτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔβλεπον ὡς ἐροῦντά τι,
 ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκούειν· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ἠσθόμην, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι πε-
 5 παυμένος εἶη, μόγισ πως ἑμαυτὸν ὡσπερὶ συναγείρας
 εἶπον, βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Ἴπποκράτη· ὦ παῖ Ἀπολλοδώ-
 ρου, ὡς χάριν σοι ἔχω ὅτι προὔτρεψάς με ὧδε ἀφικέσθαι·
 πολλοῦ γὰρ ποιῶμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἀ ἀκήκοα Πρωταγόρου. e
 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἠγούμην οὐκ εἶναι
 10 ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν, ἧ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται·
 νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι. πλὴν σμικρὸν τί μοι ἐμποδῶν, ὃ δῆ-
 λον ὅτι Πρωταγόρας ῥαδίως ἐπεκδιδάξει, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ
 πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεδίδαξε. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν τις περὶ αὐτῶν
 τούτων συγγένοιτο ὄψουν τῶν δημηγόρων, τάχ' ἂν καὶ 329
 15 τούτου τοιούτους λόγους ἀκούσειεν, ἢ Περικλέους ἢ ἄλλου
 τινὸς τῶν ἱκανῶν εἰπεῖν· εἰ δὲ ἐπανέροιτό τινά τι, ὡσπερ

³²⁸
 d 2. ἐπὶ μὲν πολλὸν χρόνον: const. with ἔτι ἔβλεπον. Cf. 345 c, Legg. i. 646 c ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἡμέρας.

3. ὡς ἐροῦντά τι: Protagoras might have added further remarks quite as relevant as those with which he actually concluded.

4. τῷ ὄντι: in reality; for this dat. of manner, see H. 779 b.

6. ὦ παῖ Ἀπολλοδώρου: cf. 335 d. An address of this kind always has something solemn and formal.

7. ὧδε: hither; cf. Photius *lex. s.v.* καὶ Πλάτων που κέχρηται ἀντὶ τοῦ δεῦρο καὶ ἐνθάδε. Elsewhere it is found with this meaning only in the poets or late authors.

e 8. πολλοῦ ποιῶμαι: usually περὶ πολλοῦ (cf. *Crato* 48 e) or πρὸ πολλοῦ (cf. *Isocr.* v. 14). See G. 178; H. 746 a.

11. σμικρὸν τι: note the irony of Socrates. The little point proves forthwith to be a central point in the in-

vestigation. — δῆλον ὅτι: see on 324 a, ³²⁸ l. 19. e

12. τὰ πολλά: a touch of sarcasm at the long speech of Protagoras.

13 ff. "A popular orator could also deliver a discourse like that of Protagoras, but, after that, in defending himself, and in entering into the exposition of single points when questioned, he would be as powerless as a book, and would on the slightest question deliver immediately another long discourse, as a brazen pot when struck keeps up a long reverberation."

16. εἰπεῖν: frequent in similar con- ³²⁹ nections for λέγειν. Cf. *Gorg.* 456 c a ἀλλ' αἰρεθῆναι ἂν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατὸν (the man of ability in speaking), εἰ βούλοιο. — ὡσπερ βιβλία κτέ.: "They can only make speeches, they cannot defend a position" (ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, i.e. διαλέγεσθαι *Crat.* 390 c). Cf. *Phaedr.* 275 d δεινὸν γὰρ που τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφή,

βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέ-
σθαι, ἀλλ' ἐάν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπερωτήσῃ τι τῶν ῥη-
θέντων ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἤχηί καὶ
20 ἀποτείνει, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιλάβηται τις, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὕτω
σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. Πρω-
ταγόρας δὲ ὅδε ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς
εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὸ δηλοῖ, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρί- b
νασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἐρόμενος περιμεῖναί τε καὶ ἀποδέ-
25 ξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἃ ὀλίγοις ἐστὶ παρεσκευασμένα.
νῦν οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, σμικροῦ τινὸς ἐνδεής εἰμι πάντ'
ἔχειν, εἴ μοι ἀποκρίναιο τόδε. τὴν ἀρετὴν φῆς διδακτὸν

³²⁹
a καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅμοιον ζωγραφία (*the art of painting*). καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἔστηκε μὲν ὡς ζῶντα, ἐὰν δ' ἀνέρη τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγαῖ. ταῦτ' οὖν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι· δόξαις μὲν ἂν ὡς τι φρονούντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δέ τι ἔρη τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἐν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταῦτ' ἀεὶ. Cf. also below, 336 b f., 347 e ff.

20. ἀποτείνει: freq. intrans. as here. Cf. *Gorg.* 458 b καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν. More often with τὸν λόγον, μακροὺς λόγους and the like. Cf. 335 c, 336 c, 361 a. — καὶ οὕτω: we should expect οὕτω καί, but thus also *Rep.* i. 354 b ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι τοῦ αἰεὶ παραφερομένου ἀπογεύονται ἀρπάζοντες (*but just as epicures hurriedly taste of every dish successively placed before them*), καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ οὕτω ὀρμηῆσαι (*to have hastened on*), ix. 585 a ὥσπερ πρὸς μέλαν φαιδὸν ἀποσκοποῦντες, πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην ἀφορῶντες ἀπατῶνται *as though regarding gray as white in comparison with black, so regarding the absence of pain as pleasure in comparison with pain, they are deceived.*

21. δόλιχον: (from δολιχός) *the long course.* "They reply in a speech of endless length." The δολιχος was

the severest of all the foot-races; in ³²⁹
a it the length of the stadium was traversed twelve times, at least, and perhaps twenty or even twenty-four times. The Spartan Ladas, victorious in this race, fell dead at the goal. Cf. 335 e τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τφ. Phocion uses a similar figure (cf. *Plutarch Phoc.* 23) καλῶς πρὸς τὸ στάδιον (παρεσκευᾶσθαι δοκοῦσιν), τὸν δὲ δόλιχον τοῦ πολέμου φοβοῦμαι, so also the comic poet Epichrates (*Meineke Com. Gr.* iii. 366) ἐπεὶ δὲ δόλιχον τοῖς ἔτεσιν ἤδη τρέχει.

23. ὡς αὐτὸ δηλοῖ: see on 324 a. b

25. ἄ: refers to ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κτέ.

26. σμικροῦ κτέ.: cf. *Euthyphro* 13 a ἀλλὰ σμικροῦ τινος ἔτι ἐνδεής εἰμι. The inf. πάντ' ἔχειν depends upon ἐνδεής εἰμι, cf. *Crat.* 432 d ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει ὅσου ἐνδέουσιν αἱ εἰκόνας (*how far the images fall short*) ταῦτ' ἔχειν ἐκείνοισιν ὦν εἰκόνας εἰσίν; *Lys.* 204 e πολλοῦ δεῖς τὸ εἶδος ἀγνοεῖν τοῦ παιδός. Since, however, here the sense is that of πάντ' ἂν ἔχοιμι, the corresponding cond. form εἴ μοι ἀποκρίναιο τόδε follows.

27. φῆς: implies assertion, not argument; as does the following πειθοίμην ἂν.

εἶναι, καὶ ἐγώ, εἴ περ ἄλλω τῷ ἀνθρώπων, πειθοίμην
 ἂν καὶ σοί. ὁ δ' ἐθαύμασά σου λέγοντος, τοῦτό μοι ἐν c
 30 τῇ ψυχῇ ἀποπλήρωσον. ἔλεγες γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς τὴν δι-
 καιοσύνην καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ πέμψειε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ
 αὐτὸν πολλαχοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ἢ δικαιο-
 σύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὡς
 ἐν τι εἴη συλλήβδην, ἀρετή. ταῦτ' οὖν αὐτὰ δῖελθέ μοι
 35 ἀκριβῶς τῷ λόγῳ, πότερον ἐν^ο μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, μό-
 ρια δὲ αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὀσιό-
 της, ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἅ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πάντα ὀνόματα d
 τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος. τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἔτι ἐπιποθῶ.

XVIII. Ἀλλὰ ράδιον τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρί-
 νασθαι, ὅτι ἐνὸς ὄντος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, μόριά ἐστὶν ἅ ἐρω-
 τᾶς. Πότερον, ἔφην, ὥσπερ προσώπου τὰ μόρια μόριά
 ἐστὶ, στόμα τε καὶ ῥίς καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα, ἢ ὥσπερ

³²⁹ 28. εἴ περ ἄλλω τῷ: cf. 352 c, b
Phaedo 67 b ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ πον
 ἄλλοι (i.e. *if anywhere*), κτήσασθαι
 τοῦτο, 63 c εὖ ἴστε, ὅτι, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο
 τῶν τοιούτων, δυσχυρισαίμην (*affirm*
confidently) ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. So almost
 always. Very rarely has εἴπερ a verb
 of its own, as *Meno* 98 b ἀλλ' εἴπερ
 τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι, ὀλίγα δ' ἂν
 φαίην, ἐν δ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην
 ἂν ὦν οἶδα (*this, at any rate, I would*
put down as one of the things that I
know).

c 29. ὁ δ' ἐθαύμασα κτέ.: cf. *Apol.*
 17 a μάλιστα δ' αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα.

30. τὴν δικαιοσύνην, αἰδῶ: cf.
 322 c δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ.

32. πολλαχοῦ: cf. 323 a e, 325 a.
 —If the different virtues form to-
 gether only one and the same, viz.
 virtue, this fails to harmonize (αὐτὸν)
 with the representation that Zeus
 sent to men σωφροσύνη and αἰδῶς as

two different virtues. — ἡ δικαιοσύνη ³²⁹
 κτέ.: placed emphatically before ὡς,
 cf. *Thuc.* iii. 5 οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν
 πρέσβεις ὡς οὐδὲν ἦλθον πράξαντες, ἐς
 πόλεμον καθίσταντο οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι.

35. The following argument upon
 the unity of the virtues is intended
 mainly to show that Protagoras has
 maintained their diversity, without
 having clearly thought out the
 matter. Socrates's request looks
 towards the definition, which would
 naturally have been given at the out-
 set; see on 320 b.

38. ἐνὸς ὄντος: repeated from d
 above.

XVIII. 3. Socrates asks whether
 the particular virtues differ qualita-
 tively or quantitatively; in their
 nature, or only in the degree and
 amount of the virtue contained in
 them. — πότερον: sc. ταῦτα μόριά
 ἐστὶν.

5 τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέ-
ρων καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλ' ἢ μεγέθει καὶ σμικρότητι ; Ἐκεί-
ως μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου
μόρια ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πρόσωπον. Πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' e
ἐγώ, καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τούτων τῶν τῆς
10 ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο, ἢ ἀνάγκη, εἴαν
πέρ τις ἐν λάβῃ, ἅπαντ' ἔχειν ; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ πολ-
λοὶ ἀνδρείοί εἰσιν, ἀδικοὶ δέ, καὶ δίκαιοι αὖ, σοφοὶ δὲ
οὔ. Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔφην
ἐγώ, σοφία τε καὶ ἀνδρεία ; Πάντων μάλιστα δήπου, ἔφη .
15 καὶ μέγιστόν γε ἢ σοφία τῶν μορίων. Ἐκαστον δὲ αὖ- 330
τῶν ἐστίν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ; Ναί. Ἡ καὶ
δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἰδίαν ἔχει, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώ-
που ; οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμὸς οἶον τὰ ὦτα, οὐδ' ἢ δύναμις
αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτή· οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν οἶον τὸ ἕτε-
20 ρον οὔτε κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα. ἄρ' οὖν
οὔτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἕτερον οἶον

³²⁹
d 5. διαφέρει: with anacoluthon; we should have expected ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια (sc. μόριά ἐστι τοῦ χρυσοῦ), οὐδὲν διαφέροντα κτέ.

7. φαίνεται: sc. πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχειν.

e 9. καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσιν κτέ.: "in addition to the fact of their difference, do men also possess them singly?"

10. ἄλλο: since men possess the object in its entirety, the acc. is used as a sort of cognate acc. Cf. 355 c, *Apol.* 36 b οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων, *Tim.* 59 b καὶ γῆς μόριον ὀλίγον καὶ λεπτὸν μετασχόν.

14. σοφία, ἀνδρεία: these complete the list of the five cardinal virtues discussed in this dialogue.

16. ἄλλο: we should have expected ³³⁰
τὸ μὲν ἄλλο. Cf. *Phil.* 56 d πῆ ποτὲ a
διορισάμενος οὖν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην θείη τις ἂν ἀριθμητικὴν how would you distinguish between the one and the other arithmetic? So often ὁ δέ without a preceding ὁ μὲν (*G.* 143, n. 2). Cf. 331 a, 334 a, 343 e, 355 e, *Theaet.* 181 d δύο δὲ λέγω τούτω εἶδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφορὰν I say now that there are these two kinds of motion, change, and motion in place, *Symp.* 207 d οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ ὅμως ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ νέος ἀεὶ γιγνόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύς for he never retains the same substance, while yet called the same man, but in part he is ever becoming new, and in part he is suffering loss.

17. δύναμιν: force, efficiency, then nature, peculiar quality.

St. p. 330.

τὸ ἕτερον, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ; ἡ δὴλα δὴ
 ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, εἴ περ τῷ παραδείγματί γε ἔοικεν ; Ἄλλ' ^b
 οὕτως, ἔφη. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶ τῶν τῆς
 25 ἀρετῆς μορίων ἄλλ' οἷον ἐπιστήμη, οὐδ' οἷον δικαιο-
 σύνη, οὐδ' οἷον ἀνδρεία, οὐδ' οἷον σωφροσύνη, οὐδ' οἷον
 ὀσιότης ; Οὐκ ἔφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, κοινῇ σκεψώ-
 μεθα ποῖόν τι αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἕκαστον. πρῶτον μὲν τὸ
 τοιόνδε· ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμα τί ἐστὶν ἡ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα ;
 30 ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ· τί δὲ σοί ; Καμοί, ἔφη. Τί οὖν ; εἴ ^c
 τις ἔροιτο ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρα-
 τες, εἶπετον δὴ μοι, τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ ὠνομάσατε
 ἄρτι, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δίκαιόν ἐστὶν ἡ ἄδι-
 κον ; ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμην ὅτι δίκαιον· σὺ δὲ
 35 τί' ἂν ψῆφον θείῳ ; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην ; Τὴν αὐ-
 τήν, ἔφη. Ἔστιν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἡ δικαιοσύνη οἷον δί-
 καιον εἶναι ; Φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε, ἀποκρινόμενος τῷ ἐρωτῶντι. ^d
 οὐκοῦν καὶ σύ ; Ναί, ἔφη. Εἴ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς
 ἔροιτο, Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὀσιότητά τινά φατε εἶναι ; φαίμεν ἂν,
 40 ὡς ἐγὼμαι. Ναί, ἡ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν φατὲ καὶ τοῦτο
 πρᾶγμα τί εἶναι ; φαίμεν ἂν. ἡ οὔ ; Καὶ τοῦτο συνέφη.

³³⁰
^b 27. οὐκ ἔφη: *he said no.* Certain verbs, beyond a mere negation, have their meaning at times precisely reversed by οὐ. *e.g.* οὐ φημι, *negot deny*; οὐχ ὑπισχνούμαι, *refuse*; οὐκ ἀξιῶ, *regard as unworthy*; οὐκ ἐῶ, *veto, forbid*.

29. πρᾶγμα τί ἢ κτέ.: the Platonic Socrates often begins his examinations thus. *Cf.* 330 d, 332 a, 358 d.

^c 31. ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες: out of respect for Protagoras, Socrates naturally reverses the order of persons in the common address, *cf.* 311 d, 316 a. This order is found also in 353 a.

33. αὐτὸ τοῦτο: *in itself*; justice ³³⁰
 in the abstract, as distinguished from ^c
 the concrete objects which possess the quality. "Justice in itself must be just." *Cf.* τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα below, and 360 e, l. 3.

36. ἔστιν ἄρα κτέ.: is a further question of the supposed interlocutor.

37. φαίην: equiv. to συμφαίην, a ^d
 frequent usage, *cf.* 332 a.

40, 42. οὐκοῦν, πότερον: these are also words of the supposed questioner. But there is an ellipsis of εἴ δὲ ἐπανεῖροιτο, which would show this, and of which ἀγανακτήσασαι' ἂν forms the apod.

Πότερον δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα φατε τοιοῦτον πεφυ-
 κέναι οἷον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ οἷον ὄσιον; ἀγανακτήσασιν ἂν
 ἔγωγ', ἔφην, τῷ ἐρωτήματι, καὶ εἶποιμ' ἂν Εὐφήμει,
 45 ὦ ἄνθρωπε· σχολῇ μέντ' ἄν τι ἄλλο ὄσιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴ
 γε ἢ ὀσιότης ὄσιον ἔσται. τί δὲ σύ; οὐχ οὕτως ἂν ἀπο- e
 κρίναιο; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

XIX. Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτ' εἶποι ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς, Πῶς οὖν
 ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐλέγετε; ἄρ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμῶν κατήκουσα;
 ἐδόξατέ μοι φάναι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως
 ἔχοντα πρὸς ἀλλήλα, ὡς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν οἷον
 5 τὸ ἕτερον· εἶποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὀρθῶς
 ἤκουσας, ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ οἶει εἰπεῖν τοῦτο, παρήκουσας.
 Πρωταγόρας γὰρ ὅδε ταῦτα ἀπεκρίνατο, ἐγὼ δὲ ἠρώτων. 331
 εἰ οὖν εἶποι, Ἀληθῆ ὅδε λέγει, ὦ Πρωταγόρα; σὺ φῆς
 οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον μόριον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς;
 10 σὸς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστί; τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκρίναιο; Ἀνάγ-
 κη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁμολογεῖν. Τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα,
 ἀποκρινοῦμεθα αὐτῷ ταῦτα ὁμολογήσαντες, εἰ ἡμᾶς
 ἐπανερίηται, Οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὀσιότης οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι
 πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὄσιον, ἀλλ' οἷον μὴ ὄσιον,
 15 ἢ δ' ὀσιότης οἷον μὴ δίκαιον ἀλλ' ἀδικον ἄρα, τὸ δὲ

330 XIX. 4. ὡς: is seldom used thus
 e with the inf., while οἶος is often so
 used, cf. 330 c d, 331 a, ὄσον 334 c.
 — οὐκ εἶναι: the difference is con-
 ceived as a fact. μή would have in-
 dicated rather dependence in thought.

331 14. πρᾶγμα: connected with δίκαι-
 a ον. Const. ὀσιότης οὐ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν,
 οἷον εἶναι δίκαιον πρᾶγμα.

15. τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον: sc. ἢ δικαιοσύνη.
 The whole sent. might have closed
 with οἷον ὄσιον, but in order to bring
 out more strongly the absurdity of the
 result, if the parts of virtue are un-

like, Socrates adds ἀλλ' οἷον μὴ ὄσιον. 331
 This then leads him to add further, a
 respecting ὀσιότης, the description
 οἷον μὴ δίκαιον. But this negative μὴ
 δίκαιον naturally calls out the yet
 stronger positive expression ἀλλ' ἀδι-
 κον ἄρα. When now Socrates has added
 this for ὀσιότης, it occurs to him to com-
 plete the matter by making just such
 a statement regarding that which
 has been predicated of δικαιοσύνη, and
 he adds τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον, as though fol-
 lowing ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀδικον, cf. 330 a.
 There is here also an imitation of easy

St. p. 331.

ἀνόσιον; τί αὐτῷ ἀποκρινόμεθα; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς b
 ὑπὲρ γε ἑμαυτοῦ φαίην ἂν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὄσιον
 εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀσιότητα δίκαιον· καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ δέ, εἴ με
 ἐώης, ταῦτ' ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρinoίμην, ὅτι ἦτοι ταυτόν γέ
 20 ἔστι δικαιοσύνης ὀσιότητι ἢ ὅ τι ὁμοιότατον, καὶ μάλιστα
 πάντων ἢ τε δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὀσιότης καὶ ἢ ὀσιότης οἷον
 δικαιοσύνη. ἀλλ' ὄρα, εἰ διακωλύεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἢ
 καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτως. Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες, οὕτως ἀπλοῦν εἶναι, ὥστε συγχωρῆσαι τὴν τε c
 25 δικαιοσύνην ὄσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀσιότητα δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ
 τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο δια-
 φέρει; ἔφη· εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἔστω ἡμῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνη
 ὄσιον καὶ ὀσιότης δίκαιον. Μή μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐδὲν
 γὰρ δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἐλέγ-
 30 χεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ. τὸ δ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ τοῦτο

³³¹
 a conversational style.—To treat μὴ ὄσιον and ἀνόσιον, μὴ δίκαιον and ἄδικον, as identical, is not, to be sure, strictly logical, since ὄσιον and μὴ ὄσιον, δίκαιον and μὴ δίκαιον are contradictories, ὄσιον and ἀνόσιον, δίκαιον and ἄδικον, contraries. Infants and idiots are neither the one nor the other. But as soon as, in the case of a person, one can speak of the quality *just*, *pious*, to be *not just* and *unjust* is the same thing. The defect in the argument, however, probably occasions the words ἢ ὅ τι ὁμοιότατον below.

b 18. καί: *also*. It does not belong with δέ.

20. δικαιοσύνης: rare, here prob. owing to conjunction with ὀσιότης, cf. *Gorg.* 508 a. This ending is a favorite one with Plato; see *Lehrs's Arist.* p. 257³.—At first only the likeness of the two concepts is declared. Then,

in order to emphasize this statement, the assertion follows that there is no such likeness between either of these concepts and any other.

24. ἀπλοῦν: *absolutely true*, without c exception.—συγχωρῆσαι: *sc. μέ* from the preceding μοί.

28. μή μοι: see on 318 b.

29. τό: for the neut. art. with a clause, see G. 141, n. 7.—εἰ βούλει: Socrates often rejects concessions made merely from courtesy, mere conditional assent, because he has to do with truth, with genuine persuasion, not with a momentary exhibition of his own skill and acuteness. He who will find the truth must take into the contest himself and his real belief; cf. 333 c.

30. τοῦτο κτέ.: *I use this expression 'you and me.'* τοῦτο does not refer to what follows (by 'you and me' I mean this).

³³¹
b

λέγω, οἰόμενος οὕτω τὸν λόγον βέλτιστ' ἂν ἐλέγχεσθαι,
 εἴ τις τὸ εἶ ἀφέλοι αὐτοῦ. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἢ δ' ὅς, προσ- d
 εοικέ τι δικαιοσύνη ὀσιότητι· καὶ γὰρ ὅτιοῦν ὄτωοῦν
 ἀμῆ γέ πη προσέοικε. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι ἔστιν
 35 ὅπη προσέοικε, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ μαλακῷ, καὶ τὰλλα
 ἂ δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι ἀλλήλοις. καὶ ἂ τότε ἔφαμεν
 ἄλλην δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἶον τὸ ἕτε-
 ρον, τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια, ἀμῆ γέ πη προσέοικε καὶ
 ἔστι τὸ ἕτερον οἶον τὸ ἕτερον· ὥστε τούτω γε τῷ τρόπῳ
 40 κἂν ταῦτα ἐλέγχοις, εἰ βούλοιο, ὡς ἅπαντά ἐστιν ὁμοῖα
 ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ ὁμοῖόν τι ἔχοντα ὁμοῖα δίκαιον e
 καλεῖν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια, κἂν πάνυ
 σμικρὸν ἔχη. Καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν, Ἡ
 γὰρ οὕτω σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ὀσιον πρὸς ἀλληλα ἔχει,
 45 ὥστε ὁμοῖόν τι σμικρὸν ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη,
 οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὖ ὡς σύ μοι δοκεῖς οἶεσθαι.
 Ἄλλὰ μήν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δυσχερῶς δοκεῖς μοι ἔχειν 332
 πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο μὲν εἰσώμεν, τόδε δὲ ἄλλο ὦν ἔλεγες
 ἐπισκεψώμεθα.

XX. Ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; Ἔφη. Τούτω τῷ πράγματι
 οὐ πᾶν τούναντίον ἐστὶν ἢ σοφία; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

331 34. ἔστιν ὅπη: *in a certain way.*

d In these adv. expressions the verbal force of ἔστιν has ceased to be felt.

40. ταῦτα: *viz. τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια.* But to say this, would be senseless.

e 42. κἂν πάνυ κτέ.: *i.e.* "this likeness or unlikeness cannot, when but a minimum, yet give its name to the objects."

46. οὐ μέντοι οὐδέ: a freq. doubling of negs. *Cf. Xen. An. i. 8. 20 καὶ οὐδὲν μέντοι οὐδὲ τούτον παθεῖν ἔφασαν, οὐδ' ἄλλος δὲ ἔπαθεν οὐδεὶς οὐδέν.* See G. 283, 9; H. 1030. — Protagoras

having thus renounced his own position and rejected that of Socrates, has effectually blocked the argument. 331 e

XX. 1. ἔφη: see on 330 d. — The proof that σοφία and σωφροσύνη must coincide, because they are both the contrary of the concept ἀφροσύνη, rests simply on the indefiniteness of the concept ἀφροσύνη. It must be admitted that Plato was entirely conscious of this, but intentionally lets Socrates confuse and vanquish the sophists with their own weapons. See on 329 c. 332 a

Πότερον δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἄνθρωποι ὀρθῶς τε καὶ ὠφέ-
 λίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες, b
 5 ἢ τούναντίον; Σωφρονεῖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν σωφροσύνη σω-
 φρονοῦσιν; Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν οἱ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντες
 ἀφρόνως πράττουσι καὶ οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν οὕτω πράττον-
 τες; Συνδοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. Τούναντίον ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἀφρό-
 νως πράττειν τῷ σωφρόνως; Ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἀφρό-
 10 νως πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνη πράττεται, τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως
 σωφροσύνη; Ὁμολόγει. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τι ἰσχύι πράττεται,
 ἰσχυρῶς πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἀσθενεία, ἀσθενῶς; Ἐδόκει. c
 Καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ βραδυ-
 τήτος, βραδέως; Ἐφη. Καὶ εἴ τι δὴ ὡσαύτως πράττε-
 15 ται, ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἐναντίως, ὑπὸ
 τοῦ ἐναντίου; Συνέφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔστι τι κα-
 λόν; Συνεχώρει. Τούτῳ ἔστι τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ αἰ-
 σχρόν; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Τί δέ; ἔστι τι ἀγαθόν; Ἐστίν. Τού-
 τῳ ἔστι τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ κακόν; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Τί δέ;
 20 ἔστι τι ὀξύ ἐν φωνῇ; Ἐφη. Τούτῳ μὴ ἔστι τι ἐναντίον
 ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρύν; Οὐκ ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐνὶ d
 ἐκάστα τῶν ἐναντίων ἐν μόνον ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ
 πολλά; Συνωμολόγει. Ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναλογισώμεθα
 τὰ ὠμολογημένα ἡμῖν. ὠμολογήκαμεν ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναν-
 25 τίον εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μή; Ὁμολογήκαμεν. Τὸ δὲ ἐναν-
 τίως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἐναντίων πράττεσθαι; Ἐφη. Ὁμο-
 λογήκαμεν δὲ ἐναντίως πράττεσθαι ὃ ἂν ἀφρόνως πράτ-
 τηται τῷ σωφρόνως πραττομένῳ; Ἐφη. Τὸ δὲ σωφρόνως e

³³² 4. οὕτω πράττοντες: in acting thus; b not a mere repetition of ὅταν πράττωσιν. Cf. ὅτι ἀδικεῖ 333 b.

5. ἢ τούναντίον: i.e. ἀφρόνως πράττειν.

c 20. ὀξύ: high in tone.

23. ἀναλογισώμεθα: think over ³³² again, recapitulate. Cf. Rep. x. 618 c d ἀναλογιζόμενον πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ ρηθέντα. The more common word for the thought with Plato is ἀνομολογεῖσθαι.

πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνως
 30 ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; Συνεχώρει. Οὐκοῦν εἴ περ ἐναντίως
 πράττεται, ὑπὸ ἐναντίου πράττοιτ' ἄν; Ναί. Πράττεται
 δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; Ναί.
 Ἐναντίως; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων ὄντων; Ναί.
 Ἐναντίον ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνη; Φαίνεται. Μέ-
 35 μνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν ἀφρο-
 σύνη σοφία ἐναντίον εἶναι; Συνωμολόγει. Ἐν δὲ ἐνὶ μό-
 νον ἐναντίον εἶναι; Φημί. Πότερον οὖν, ὧ Πρωταγόρα,
 λύσωμεν τῶν λόγων; τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι ἢ 333
 ἐκεῖνον ἐν ᾧ ἐλέγετο ἕτερον εἶναι σωφροσύνης σοφία,
 40 μόριον δὲ ἐκάτερον ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ
 ἀνόμοια καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ
 προσώπου μόρια; πότερον οὖν δὴ λύσωμεν; οὔτοι γὰρ οἱ
 λόγοι ἀμφοτέροι οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς λέγονται· οὐ γὰρ
 45 συνάδουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις. πῶς γὰρ ἂν
 συνάδοιεν, εἴ πέρ γε ἀνάγκη ἐνὶ μὲν ἐν μόνον ἐναντίον
 εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μή, τῇ δὲ ἀφροσύνη, ἐνὶ ὄντι, σοφία ἐναν- b

³³²
 e 33. ἐναντίως; πάνυ γε: repeats, but with emphasis, what has already been said.

36. Cf. 332 a.

³³³
 a 38. τό: const. with the following clause. Cf. τὸ εἰ βούλει 331 c, l. 29. Similarly τό is used with the inf. as epexegetis of subst. Cf. *Phaedo* 92 a ἐάνπερ μείνη ἡδε ἢ οἴησις, τὸ ἀρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι ξύνθετον πρᾶγμα, 94 b εἰ ὀρθὴ ἢ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι.

40. πρὸς τῷ εἶναι: besides being. Cf. *Phaedr.* 252 a πρὸς γὰρ τῷ σέβεσθαι ἰατρὸν εὔρηκε μόνον τῶν μεγίστων πόνων for besides his worship, he has found the only physician to heal his sharpest pangs, 270 a ὃ καὶ Περικλῆς πρὸς τῷ εὐφύης εἶναι ἐκτήσατο.

41. ἀνόμοια: pred., sc. ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

43. μουσικῶς: the comparison of 333
 a conflicting statements with discordant tones, and the reverse, is not uncommon. Cf. *Phaedo*, 92 c οὗτος οὖν σοὶ ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς ξυνάσεται; καὶ μὴν πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ξυνφθῶ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἀρμονίας (and certainly, if any doctrine should be harmonious, that should be which relates to harmony), *Lach.* 188 d.

45. ἐνὶ: to this ἀφροσύνη corresponds in the following words; to ἐν, the noms. σοφία and σωφροσύνη, which are not ἐν, but πλείω. Plato therefore must have written πλείω, not the πλείοσι of the Mss.

46. ὄντι: attracted from the fem. b by the neut. ἐνὶ. Cf. 354 c τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν. See H. 610.

τία καὶ σωφροσύνη αὐ φαίνεται ; ἦ γάρ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα ;
 ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ ἄλλως πως ; Ὁμολόγησε καὶ μάλ' ἀκόντως.
 Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἂν εἴη ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἢ σοφία ; τὸ δὲ πρό-
 50 τερον αὐ ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἢ ὀσιότης σχεδόν
 τι ταῦτόν ὄν. ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ ἀπο-
 κάμωμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διασκεψώμεθα. ἄρά τίς σοι
 δοκεῖ ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος σωφρονεῖν, ὅτι ἀδικεῖ ; Αἰσχυνοίμην c
 ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν, ἐπεὶ πολλοί
 55 γέ φασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Πότερον οὖν πρὸς ἐκείνους τὸν
 λόγον ποιήσωμαι, ἔφην, ἢ πρὸς σέ ; Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, πρὸς
 τοῦτον πρῶτον τὸν λόγον διαλέχθητι τὸν τῶν πολλῶν.
 Ἄλλ' οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει, ἐὰν μόνον σύ γε ἀποκρίνη, εἴτ'
 οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα εἶτε μή. τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγωγε μά-
 60 λιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρω-
 τῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι.

XXI. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπίζετο ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγό- d
 ρας · τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἠτιᾶτο δυσχερῆ εἶναι · ἔπειτα μέντοι
 συνεχώρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

³³³
 b 47. ἦ γάρ: *is it not so?* γάρ refers back to the preceding conclusion; and ἄλλως πως indicates that a general expression (like οὕτως ἔχει) is to be supplied. — καί: *and that, although.*

49. τὸ πρότερον: *cf.* 331 a b. The remarks of Protagoras 331 c-e do not merit notice by Socrates.

c 53. ὅτι: *in so far as.* Cf. 333 d ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν, *Parm.* 155 e τὸ ἐν — ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὐ ποτέ οὐσίας; *Symp.* 207 d δύναται δὲ ταύτη μόνον, τῇ γενέσει, ὅτι αἰεὶ καταλείπει ἕτερον νέον ἀντὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ and *this is possible only in this way, by generation, in so far as it always leaves behind a new in place of the old.*

54. ἔγωγε: with strong emphasis, ³³³
 ἐπεὶ . . . ἀνθρώπων being antithetic. — c
 ἐπεὶ: "although"; *cf.* 353 a.

57. τῶν πολλῶν: not *the majority*, but referring to the πολλοί above.

60. "It is unimportant who maintains a principle under consideration, provided the principle itself be scrutinized; still, in the scrutiny, the views of those who hold the principle are brought to the test."

XXI. 1. ἐκαλλωπίζετο: *pretended* d
to be cog. Cf. *Phaedr.* 236 d παῦσαι πρὸς με καλλωπιζόμενος · σχεδὸν γὰρ ἔχω δ' εἰπὼν ἀναγκάσω σε λέγειν. In 317 c above, the sense is *to plume himself.*

2. δυσχερῆ: *cf.* 332 a.

Ἰθι δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μοι ἀπόκριναι. 5
 5 κοῦσί τινές σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντες; Ἔστω, ἔφη. Τὸ
 δὲ σωφρονεῖν λέγεις εὖ φρονεῖν; Ἔφη. Τὸ δ' εὖ φρονεῖν
 εὖ βουλευέσθαι, ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν; Ἔστω, ἔφη. Πότερον,
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικοῦντες ἢ εἰ κακῶς; Εἰ
 εὖ. Λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἅττα εἶναι; Λέγω. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν
 10 δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, ἃ ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώ- 6
 ποῖς; Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔφη, κὰν μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
 ὠφέλιμα ἦ, ἔγωγε καλῶ ἀγαθὰ. Καί μοι ἐδόκει ὁ Πρω-
 ταγόρας ἤδη τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετά-
 χθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐώρων αὐτὸν οὐ-
 15 τως ἔχοντα, εὐλαβούμενος ἠρέμα ἠρόμην. Πότερον, ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἃ μὴδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὠφέλιμά 334
 ἐστὶν, ἢ ἃ μὴδὲ τὸ παράπαν ὠφέλιμα; καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
 σὺ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖς; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἶδ'

333
 d 5, 7. ἔστω: *be it so*; an attempt to make the unavoidable concession without assent.

7. ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν: (see on b, l. 53, above, ὅτι ἀδικεῖ) is here emphatically repeated, as is afterwards ἀδικοῦντες. Thus the attention is held to the question, with reference to the σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντα, whether a εὖ φρονεῖν and εὖ βουλευέσθαι can be thought of in the particular relation to the ἀδικεῖν, and not in relation to something else with which the ἀδικεῖν might accidentally be associated. By means of the proof that this is inconceivable, Socrates aims to reach the demonstration that σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη are one.

e 10. τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: naturally added after ὠφέλιμα, although the question under discussion can have reference only to men. But Protagoras seizes upon the words, and, carried away by

his irritation, proceeds to refer ὠφέ-333
 λιμα to things which can have neither 6
 σωφροσύνη nor ἀδικία, even at last to the human body, in distinction from the man himself.

13. ἀγωνιᾶν: prop. *am eager for a fight*; then, as feverish anxiety may be connected with this, generally *am excited, in inward disquiet*. Cf. Charm. 162 c καὶ ὁ Κριτίας δῆλος μὲν ἦν καὶ πάλαι ἀγωνιῶν καὶ φιλοτίμως πρὸς τε τὸν Χαρμίδην καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ἔχων, Lys. 210 e κατιδῶν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀγωνιῶντα καὶ τεθορυβημένον ὑπὸ τῶν λεγομένων. — παρατετάχθαι: prop. of soldiers, an army, in line ready for battle; here, like many such terms, transferred to the contest of words; *stand in fighting attitude*. Socrates observed more and more clearly (cf. 332 a), that Protagoras, vexed and excited, stood ready to break out (as he in fact afterwards does) with a refusal to give further answers.

St. p. 334.

ἂ ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀνωφελῆ ἐστὶ, καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτὰ καὶ
 20 φάρμακα καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τὰ δὲ γε ὠφέλιμα, τὰ δὲ ἀν-
 θρώποις μὲν οὐδέτερα, ἵπποις δέ, τὰ δὲ βουσί μόνον, τὰ
 δὲ κυσί· τὰ δὲ γε τούτων μὲν οὐδενί, δένδροις δέ· τὰ
 δὲ τοῦ δένδρου ταῖς μὲν ρίζαις ἀγαθά, ταῖς δὲ βλάσταις
 πονηρά, οἶον καὶ ἡ κόπρος πάντων τῶν φυτῶν ταῖς μὲν **b**
 25 ρίζαις ἀγαθὸν παραβαλλομένη, εἰ δ' ἐθέλοις ἐπὶ τοὺς
 πτόρθους καὶ τοὺς νέους κλῶνας ἐπιβάλλειν πάντ' ἀπόλ-
 λυσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοῖς μὲν φυτῶσι ἀπασίν ἐστι
 πάγκακον καὶ ταῖς θριξὶ πολεμιώτατον ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων
 ζώων πλὴν ταῖς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
 30 ἀρωγὸν καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι. οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἐστι
 τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ παντοδαπὸν, ὥστε καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μὲν
 ἔξωθεν τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῖς δ' **c**

334 **a** 19. ἀνθρώποις μὲν κτέ.: Protagoras here gives a long disquisition upon the relative nature of the useful which probably recalled actual discourses of his (see on 351 c), but he becomes confused in endeavoring to drag in much which should be kept separate. He has denied that the absolutely useless is good (οὐδαμῶς), but adds that he knows of much which is injurious to men, but beneficial to animals or plants. As he now begins with ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀνωφελῆ, it occurs to him that all things fall into three classes, the useful, the harmful and the neutral, so he adds to his first class τὰ δὲ γε ὠφέλιμα, τὰ δὲ οὐδέτερα. By adding, with the last, ἀνθρώποις μὲν, he returns to his opening thought, but continues only with ἵπποις δέ, failing to add the ὠφέλιμα, because it is so vividly in his mind as the object of his discourse. — ἀνωφελῆ: prop. *useless*, not infreq. *harmful*. Cf. *Rep.* viii. 560 d μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπιθυ-

μιῶν, of which it had before been said 334 **a** 559 a οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐνοῦσαι δρῶσιν, αἱ δὲ **a** καὶ τοῦναντίον.

22. οὐδενί: since species are spoken of, οὐδέσι might have been used (cf. *Euthyd.* 305 d), but whatever is denied of each individual must be denied also of the species. Cf. *Dem.* xix. 66 and 62.

27 f. τὸ ἔλαιον κτέ.: note the artistic **b** order, exciting surprise and expectation in the listeners. — Cf. *Theophr. de causis plant.* v. 15. 6 καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα (oleum, pix, adeps) φθείρει καὶ μάλιστα τὰ φυτὰ τὰ νέα = *Plin. N. H.* xvii. 234.

31. ἐνταῦθα: in this case, with man's body.

32. τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ: loosely added, **c** epexeg. of ἐνταῦθα. Regularly, when two dat. are connected, of the whole and of a part, the dat. of the whole precedes. Cf. 339 e, l. 44, *Rep.* iii. 407 b ἡ νοσοτροφία (diet in disease) τεκτονικῆ μὲν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις ἐμπόδιον τῆ

ἐντὸς ταῦτὸ τοῦτο κάκιστον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ ἰατροὶ πάντες ἀπαγορεύουσι τοῖς ἀσθενούσι μὴ χρῆσθαι ἐλαίῳ, 35 ἀλλ' ἢ ὅ τι σμικροτάτῳ ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέλλει ἔδεσθαι, ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβέσαι τὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς διὰ τῶν ῥινῶν γιγνομένην ἐν τοῖς σιτίοις τε καὶ ὄψοις.

XXII. Εἰπόντος οὖν ταῦτα αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες ἀνεθορύβησαν ὡς εὖ λέγοι. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμων τις ὢν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐάν τις μοι μακρὰ λέγη, ἐπιλανθάνομαι, περὶ οὗ ἂν ἦ ὁ λόγος. ὥσπερ 5 οὖν, εἰ ἐτύγχανον ὑπόκωφος ὢν, ὧν ἂν χρῆναι, εἴ περ ἔμελλές μοι διαλέξεσθαι, μείζον φθέγγεσθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, οὕτω καὶ νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ἐπιλήσμονι ἐνέτυχες, σύντεμνέ μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας ποίει, εἰ μέλλω σοι ἔπεσθαι. Πῶς οὖν κελεύεις με βραχέα ἀποκρίνεσθαι; ἢ βραχύτερά σοι, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνωμαι ἢ δεῖ; Μηδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ἄλλ' ὅσα δεῖ; ἔφη. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Πότερα οὖν ὅσα ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δεῖν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τοσαῦτά 10 σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἢ ὅσα σοί; Ἀκήκοα γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

³³⁴ προσέξει τοῦ νοῦ (the application of the mind)? *Lach.* 190 b τοῖς υἰέσιν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴ παραγενομένη ταῖς ψυχαῖς.

35. μέλλει: for the change of number from ἀσθενούσι, see on 319 d.

36. ὅσον μόνον: equiv. to τοσοῦτῳ μόνον ὥστε. Cf. *Theaet.* 145 a ἢ οὖν ζωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος; *THEAET.* οὐχ, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι. — Thus Protagoras's reply to the question *δοκοῦσί τινές σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντες*, ends somewhat wide of the mark, but gains the applause of the listeners. See on 328 d.

XXII. 2. ὡς: how. Cf. 315 b, l. 35, *Crito* 43 b πάλαι θανμάζω αισθανόμενος ὡς ἠδέως καθεύδεις.

3. ἐπιλήσμων τις: τις indicates that the object approximately corresponds to the word; here somewhat. See on 313 c, l. 22. See H. 702 a.

4. ἐπιλανθάνομαι: cf. 336 d. This, d which Socrates applies to himself, was true of the listeners. — περὶ οὗ ἂν κτέ.: whatever we are talking about, i.e. however weighty or trifling the topic may be. — ὥσπερ οὖν, εἰ κτέ.: cf. *Apol.* 17 d ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὢν, συνεγιγνώσκετε δήπου ἂν μοι (you would certainly indulge me) εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμη (in which I had been reared), καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν κτέ.

St. p. 334.

ὅτι σὺ οἴός τ' εἶ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι περὶ τῶν
 15 αὐτῶν καὶ μακρὰ λέγειν, εἴαν βούλη, οὕτως ὥστε τὸν λό-
 γον μηδέποτε ἐπιλιπεῖν, καὶ αὖ βραχέα οὕτως ὥστε μη-
 δένα σοῦ ἐν βραχυτέροις εἰπεῖν. εἰ οὖν μέλλεις ἐμοὶ 335
 διαλέξεσθαι, τῷ ἐτέρῳ χρῶ τρόπῳ πρὸς με, τῇ βραχυ-
 λογίᾳ. ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγὼ πολλοῖς ἤδη εἰς ἀγῶνα
 20 λόγων ἀφικόμην ἀνθρώποις, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο ἐποίουν ὃ σὺ
 κελεύεις, ὡς ὁ ἀντιλέγων ἐκέλευέ με διαλέγεσθαι, οὕτω
 διελεγόμην, οὐδενὸς ἂν βελτίων ἐφαινόμην οὐδ' ἂν ἐγέ-
 νετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν. Καὶ ἐγώ —
 ἔγνω γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἤρεσεν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεις
 25 ταῖς ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθελήσοι ἐκὼν εἶναι ἀπο- b
 κρινόμενος διαλέγεσθαι — ἠγησάμενος οὐκέτι ἐμὸν ἔρ-
 γον εἶναι παρεῖναι ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις, Ἄλλά τοι, ἔφη, ὦ
 Πρωταγόρα, οὐδ' ἐγὼ λιπαρῶς ἔχω παρὰ τὰ σοὶ δο-
 κοῦντα τὴν συνουσίαν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν σὺ

³³⁴ 14. καὶ αὐτὸς . . . διδάξαι: paren-
^e thetical.

15. μακρὰ λέγειν κτέ.: the sophists and rhetoricians boasted of their ability to speak on any subject as long or as briefly as one desired. Cf. 329 b, 335 b, *Phaedr.* 267 b *Τισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐάσομεν εὔδειν, οἳ συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἀπειρά μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνεῦρον (invented)?* *Gorg.* 449 c καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἐστὶν ὦν φημί, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν. Cf. *Anaximenes Rhet.* 22.

³³⁵ 19. ἀγῶνα: this conversation then
^B was not a search for truth, but a contest for victory. Cf. *Gorg.* 456 d.

21. ὡς . . . διελεγόμην: added, without a copula, as an explanatory appos., to τοῦτο ἐποίουν. Cf. *Rep.* ii. 359 c εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ, δόντες ἐξουσίαν ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν, *Meno* 71 b

καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, συμπένομαι τοῖς 335
 πολίταις (*I share the poverty of the citi- a*
 zens), τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, *Gorg.* 479 b
 κινδυνεύουσι τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν
 δίκην φεύγοντες, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθο-
 ρᾶν those who flee from justice, seem to
 do the same sort of thing, (they seem) to
 see its painful side. A freq. usage.

22. οὐδενὸς βελτίων: see on 324 d.

— ἐγένετο κτέ.: see on 327 d.

23. ὄνομα: cf. *Apol.* 38 c ὄνομα
 ἔχετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν
 πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, 20 c οὐ γὰρ σοῦ γε οὐδὲν
 τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομέ-
 νου τοσαύτη φήμη καὶ λόγος γέγονεν,
Xen. An. vii. 3. 19 παρὰ Σεύθῃ τὸ σὸν
 ὄνομα μέγιστόν ἐστι.

25. ἐκὼν εἶναι: see on 317 a. b

27. ἀλλά τοι: in immediate reply to the declaration of Protagoras above, hence also οὐδ' ἐγώ neither do I.

- 30 βούλη διαλέγεσθαι ὡς ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἔπεσθαι, τότε σοι
 διαλέξομαι. σὺ μὲν γάρ, ὡς λέγεται περὶ σοῦ, φῆς δὲ
 καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἐν μακρολογίᾳ καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίᾳ οἴός τ'
 εἶσινουσίας ποιεῖσθαι· σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ· ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ c
 ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἴός τ' εἶναι. ἀλλὰ
 35 σὲ ἐχρῆν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀμφοτέρα δυνάμενον, ἵνα
 συνουσία ἐγίγνετο· νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐθέλεις καὶ ἐμοί
 τις ἀσχολία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἴός τ' εἶην σοι παραμεῖναι
 ἀποτείνοντι μακροὺς λόγους — ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ποί με δεῖ —
 εἶμι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ' ἂν ἴσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἤκουον.
- 40 Καὶ ἅμα ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἀνιστάμην ὡς ἀπιών. καί μου
 ἀνισταμένου ἐπιλαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς χειρὸς τῆ δε- a
 ξιά, τῆ δ' ἀριστερᾷ ἀντελάβετο τοῦ τρίβωνος τουτουί,
 καὶ εἶπεν· Οὐκ ἀφήσομέν σε, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ
 ἐξέλθῃς, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἡμῖν ἔσονται οἱ διάλογοι. δέομαι
 45 οὖν σου παραμεῖναι ἡμῖν· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὸς ἡδίου
 ἀκούσαιμι ἢ σοῦ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρου διαλεγομένων. ἀλλὰ
 χάρισαι ἡμῖν πᾶσιν. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον — ἤδη δὲ ἀνειστήκη
 ὡς ἐξιών — ὦ παῖ Ἰππονίκου, ἀεὶ μὲν ἔγωγέ σου τὴν

³³⁵ 34. ἀδύνατος: with acc., cf. *Meno*
 94 b ἵνα δὲ μὴ ὀλίγους οἶη καὶ τοὺς
 φαυλοτάτους Ἀθηναίων ἀδυνάτους γεγο-
 νέναι τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα. — ἐπεὶ: see on
 333 c, l. 54.

35. ἵνα ἐγίγνετο: for secondary
 tense of indic. in a final clause, ex-
 pressing a purpose which cannot be
 fulfilled, see G. 216, 3; H. 884.

36. συνουσία: conversation; cf. 338 c.

38. ἀποτείνοντι: see on 329 a.

39. ἐπεὶ κτέ.: for, if I had time, I
 should be glad to listen to this also
 (ταῦτα equiv. to τοὺς μακροὺς λόγους).
 Socrates in Plato is never at a loss
 to cover his meaning, — in this case,
 aversion to the long discourses of the

sophists, — in terms of expression ³³⁵
 which are courteous yet perfectly c
 transparent.

42. τρίβωνος: see on 342 c. d

44. ὁμοίως ἔσονται: εἶναι as well as
 γίγνεσθαι may be modified by advs.
 See on 325 b, l. 22.

45. ὡς: causal; see on 310 e.

48 f. μὲν, ἀτάρ: cf. *Rep.* ii. 367 e
 ἀεὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος
 καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἠγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν
 καὶ τότε πάνυ γε ἠσθην, *Xen. Hell.* v.
 4. 17. — φιλοσοφίαν: here, as freq.,
 desire for knowledge, intellectual aspira-
 tion; cf. *Rep.* ii. 376 b τό γε φιλομαθὲς
 καὶ φιλόσοφον ταῦτόν; *Lys.* 213 d ἐκεί-
 νου ἠσθεις τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ.

φιλοσοφίαν ἀγαμαι, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ, ὥστε ^c
 50 βουλοίμην ἂν χαρίζεσθαι σοι, εἴ μου δυνατὰ δέοιο. νῦν
 δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δέοιό μου Κρίσωνι τῷ Ἰμεραίῳ
 ἔπεσθαι, ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῶ ἢ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων
 διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι. εἴπομι ἂν σοι ὅτι πολὺ σοῦ ³³⁶
 μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐμαυτοῦ δέομαι θέουσι τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖν,
 55 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι, ἀλλ' εἴ τι δέει θεάσασθαι ἐν τῷ
 αὐτῷ ἐμέ τε καὶ Κρίσωνα θέοντας, τούτου δέου συγκαθ-
 εῖναι· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι ταχὺ θεῖν, οὗτος δὲ δύ-
 νηται βραδέως. εἰ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖς ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταγόρου
 ἀκούειν, τούτου δέου, ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτόν μοι ἀπεκρίνατο,
 60 διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, οὕτω καὶ νῦν
 ἀποκρίνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῶν διαλό- ^b
 γων; χωρὶς γὰρ ἔγωγ' ὄμην εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναί τε ἀλλήλοις
 διαλεγομένους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν. Ἄλλ' ὄρα's, ἔφη, ὦ

³³⁵ 51. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ: see on 311 b. —
^c Crison had conquered in the Olympic
 races, Ol. 83, 84 and 85 (448, 444,
 440 B.C.), cf. Diod. xii. 5. 23, 29. In
 Legg. viii. 840 a his temperance is
 praised.

52. ἔπεσθαι: keep up with. — δολι-
 χοδρόμων: see on 329 a. — ἡμεροδρό-
 μων: couriers, like Phidippides in Nep.
 Milt. c. 4 and Hdt. vi. 105. Heme-
 rodromos (says Livy xxxi. 24) vo-
 cant Graeci, ingens die uno
 cursu emetientes spatium.

³³⁶ 53. διαθεῖν: cf. Theaet. 148c εἰ διαθέων
^a τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἠττήθης if
 in a race you had been beaten by a man
 full grown and very swift. διαθεῖν τε καὶ
 is inserted διὰ μέσου (see on 327a), and
 τῶ depends upon ἔπεσθαι. In many
 compounds διὰ expresses a race.

55. ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ: see H. 1050, 4, d.

56. συγκαθεῖναι: intr., as are many
 compounds of ἰέναι. Cf. 338 a, l. 21,

Theaet. 168 b ἔλεφ τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεῖς ³³⁶
 ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψει in a spirit genial and ^a
 sincerely accommodating, you will search,
 Rep. viii. 563 a οἱ δὲ γέροντες συγκα-
 θείντες τοῖς νέοις εὐτραπέλιαι τε καὶ
 χαριεντισμοῦ ἐμπίπλυνται.

62. χωρὶς εἶναι: is different in na- ^b
 ture or kind. Cf. Soph. O. C. 808 χωρὶς
 τό τ' εἰπεῖν πολλὰ καὶ τὰ καίρια to say
 much and to speak fittingly are different
 things, Euthyd. 289 d δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ
 περὶ λόγους χωρὶς ἢ τοῦ ποιεῖν τέχνη
 καὶ ἢ τοῦ χρῆσθαι evidently, as regards
 speeches, the art of making them differs
 from the art of using them. So also
 δίχα.

63. δημηγορεῖν: harangue, with more
 regard for the impression than for the
 treatment of the subject. — ὄρα's: eith-
 er with or without ὡς or ὅτι, stands
 freq. at the beginning of clauses, like
 our you see, i.e. you see for yourself.
 Cf. Xen. Hier. i. 16 ἀλλ' ὄρα's· ἐκεῖνός

Σώκρατες· δίκαια δοκεῖ λέγειν Πρωταγόρας ἀξιῶν αὐτῷ τε
65 ἐξεῖναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως βούλεται καὶ σοὶ ὅπως ἂν αὐ
σὺ βούλη.

XXIII. Ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις,
ἔφη, ὦ Καλλία· Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅδε ὁμολογεῖ μὴ μετεῖ-
ναί οἱ μακρολογίας καὶ παραχωρεῖ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦ δὲ δια-
λέγεσθαι οἷός τ' εἶναι καὶ ἐπίστασθαι λόγον τε δοῦναι c
5 καὶ δέξασθαι θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἴ τῳ ἀνθρώπων παραχω-
ρεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ Πρωταγόρας ὁμολογεῖ φαυλότερος
εἶναι Σωκράτους διαλεχθῆναι, ἐξαρκεῖ Σωκράτει· εἰ δὲ ἀν-
τιποιεῖται, διαλεγέσθω ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ
ἐφ' ἐκάστη ἐρωτήσῃ μακρὸν λόγον ἀποτείνων ἐκκρούων
10 τοὺς λόγους καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀπο-
μηκύνων ἕως ἂν ἐπιλάθωνται περὶ ὅτου τὸ ἐρώτημα ἦν d
οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀκουόντων, ἐπεὶ Σωκράτη γε ἐγὼ ἐγγυῶμαι
μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει καὶ φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶ-

³³⁶
b γε οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πείσαις ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα ὡς
κτέ., Ar. Pax 331 ἀλλ' ὄρατ', οὕτω πέπαι-
σθε; Plato Crat. 432c ὄρα's οὖν ὅτι ἄλλην
χρῆ εἰκόνοσ ὀρθότητα (principle of cor-
rectness) ζητεῖν. Different is the interr.
ὄρα's do you see? Cf. Apol. 24 d ὄρα's, ὦ
Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγαῶσ καὶ οὐκ ἔχεισ εἰπεῖν;

XXIII. 1. Ἀλκιβιάδης: cf. 309 b.

3. τοῦ: const. with εἶναι.

c 4. τέ: see on 325 b.

5. εἰ . . . παραχωρεῖ: cf. 315 e εἰ
τυγχάνει ὄν.

7. ἀντιποιεῖται: sc. τοῦ κρείστων εἶναι
διαλεχθῆναι.

8. μὴ: and not οὐ, because const.
with an imv. (equiv. to μηδὲ ἀποτει-
νέτω); but οὐκ ἐθέλων, because ἐκκρούων
. . . λόγον gives the reasons for the
ἀποτείνειν, as they actually exist.

9. ἐκκρούων: lit. strike out a weapon
or a ball from one's hand, thrust one

out of the way; then, put to one side, ³³⁶
frustrate, always with the idea of vio-
lence. Here ἐκκρούων τοὺς λόγους
c means "frustrating the purpose," "de-
feating the result of the discussion."
Cf. Arist. Eth. N. iii. 15 κὰν μεγάλαι καὶ
σφροδραὶ ὦσι (αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι), καὶ τὸν λο-
γισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν, Dem. xl. 43 ἵνα
ἀποδαιτηθέντα μου λύσασ ἐξ ἀρχῆσ με
συκοφαντῆ καὶ τῆχ δίκην ταύτην ἐκ-
κρούη.

13. οὐχ ὅτι: i.e. οὐ λέγω ὅτι. I do d
not speak of the fact that; or, in sense,
although. Freq. in Plato. See on 319d.
— Nothing can ruffle Socrates's cour-
tesy, but Plato puts into the mouth
of the impetuous Alcibiades a plain
and vigorous statement of what is
already in the reader's mind. Prob.
Alcibiades was an exception to the
οἱ παρόντες ἀνεθορύβησαν 334 c.

ναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ἐπιεικέστερα Σωκράτης λέγειν·
15 χρῆ γὰρ ἕκαστον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι.

Μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, Κριτίας ἦν ὁ
εἰπών· ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Ἴππία, Καλλίας μὲν δοκεῖ μοι
μάλα πρὸς Πρωταγόρου εἶναι, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ αἰεὶ φιλό-
νειακός ἐστι πρὸς ὃ ἂν ὀρμήσῃ. ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ συμ- e
20 φιλονεικεῖν οὔτε Σωκράτει οὔτε Πρωταγόρα, ἀλλὰ κοινῇ
ἀμφοτέρων δεῖσθαι μὴ μεταξὺ διαλύσαι τὴν ξυνουσίαν.

Εἰπόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα ὁ Πρόδικος, Καλῶς μοι, 337
ἔφη, δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Κριτία· χρῆ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τοιοῖσδε
λόγοις παραγιγνομένους κοινούς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τοῖν
25 διαλεγόμενοι ἀκροατάς, ἴσους δὲ μή. ἔστι γὰρ οὐ ταύ-
τόν· κοινῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων, μὴ ἴσον
δὲ νεῖμαι ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν σοφωτέρῳ πλεον, τῷ δὲ
ἀμαθεστέρῳ ἔλαττον. ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Πρωταγόρα
τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς συγχωρεῖν καὶ ἀλλήλοις περὶ b
30 τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητεῖν μὲν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μή· ἀμφισβητοῦσι
μὲν γὰρ καὶ δι' εὐνοίαν οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσι δὲ
οἱ διάφοροί τε καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις. καὶ οὕτως ἂν καλ-

336 e 19. πρὸς: *on the side of.*

337 a 24. κοινούς κτέ.: Prodicus gave much attention to the matter of synonyms, ὀρθότης τῶν ὀνομάτων, as he termed it, and his lecture upon the subject cost fifty drachmas. Cf. *Crat.* 384 b; Spengel *συναγωγή τεχνῶν* pp. 46-59. Since he attached too great value to this art, as it seems, and was always introducing such distinctions, he here, as 340 a, 358 a d, encounters the raillery of Socrates. For the sake of making a good hit, Plato perhaps goes beyond the reality in his description. *κοινός* and *ἴσος* were habitually joined with ἀκροατής. Cf. *Dem. de Cor.* 7 παρασχῶν

ἑαυτὸν ἴσον καὶ κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἀκροα- 337
τήν, xxix. 1 ἂν περ ἴσοι καὶ κοινοὶ γέ- a
νησθε ἡμῶν ἀκροαταί, xv. 29 τῶν μὲν γὰρ
ιδίῳ δικαίων οἱ νόμοι κοινὴν τὴν μετου-
σίαν ἔδοσαν καὶ ἴσην καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενέσι
καὶ τοῖς ἰσχυροῖς. Prodicus's remark
takes up the *κοινῇ* used by Critias.

28. ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτός κτέ.: cf. *Prisc.* viii. 35 Cicero in *Protagora*: nunc a vobis, o Protagora et Socrates, postulo, ut de isto concedatis alter alteri et inter vos de hujusmodi rebus controversemini, non concertetis.

31. δι' εὐνοίαν: *with the best of feel-* b
ing.

λίστη ἡμῖν ἢ συνουσία γίγνοιτο · ὑμεῖς τε γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες
 μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ
 35 οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε — εὐδοκιμεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔστι παρὰ ταῖς
 ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἄνευ ἀπάτης, ἐπαινεῖσθαι δὲ ἐν
 λόγῳ πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων —, ἡμεῖς τ' αὖ ^c
 οἱ ἀκούοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως εὐφραينوίμεθα, οὐχ' ἡδοί-
 μεθα · εὐφραίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι μανθάνοντά τι καὶ
 40 φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἡδεσθαι δὲ
 ἐσθίοντά τι ἢ ἄλλο ἡδὺ πάσχοντα αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι.

XXIV. Ταῦτα οὖν εἰπόντος τοῦ Προδίκου πολλοὶ πάνυ
 τῶν παρόντων ἀπεδέξαντο. μετὰ δὲ τὸν Πρόδικον Ἰππίας
 ὁ σοφὸς εἶπεν, ὦ ἄνδρες ἔφη, οἱ παρόντες, ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ
 ἡμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας ἅπαντας εἶναι,
 5 φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ · τὸ γὰρ ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενές ^d

³³⁷
^b 34. ἐν ἡμῖν: *before us as judges*. See on 355 d; *cf. Gorg.* 464 d εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρόν.

^c 37. πολλάκις: *const.* with ψευδομένων.

38. εὐφραينوίμεθα: *cf. Arist. Top.* ii. 6. ὁ Πρόδικος διηρεῖτο τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς χαρὰν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην, but the distinctions themselves are not specified, and the statement is not sustained by the passage from Prodicus in *Xen. Mem.* ii. 1. 24 τί ἂν κεχαρισμένον ἢ σιτίον ἢ ποτὸν εὖροις, ἢ τί ἂν ἰδὼν ἢ τί ἀκούσας τερφθείης, ἢ τίνων ὀσφραϊνόμενος ἢ ἀπτόμενος ἡσθείης, τίσι δὲ παιδικοῖς ὀμιλῶν μάλιστ' ἂν εὐφρανθείης.

40 f. αὐτῇ, αὐτῷ: *in sense nearly equiv. to μόνη and μόνῳ*. See on 309 a.

XXIV. 4. συγγενεῖς: it was the cardinal point of the sophistic ethics, that positive laws are arbitrary restrictions, imposed upon men by powerful individuals or by the ma-

jority, with the purpose simply of ³³⁷ putting them down, and of restraining ^c the natural rights of the individual, *i.e.* those things which he desires and regards as his rights. That Hippias also taught this is shown by *Xen. Mem.* iv. 4. 14 ff. Plato therefore, in order here to characterize him, makes him express this principle.

5. ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ: *cf. Gorg.* 510 b ^d φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἕκάστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, ὕπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὁμοῖος τῷ ὁμοίῳ, *Symp.* 195 b ὁ γὰρ παλαιὸς λόγος εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ὁμοῖον ὁμοίῳ ἀεὶ πελάζει, *Lys.* 214 b οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς τῶν σοφωτάτων συγγράμμασιν ἐντετύχηκας ταῦτα αὐτὰ λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὸ ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ φίλον εἶναι; εἰσὶ δὲ πού οὗτοι οἱ περὶ φύσεως (nature) τε καὶ τοῦ ὅλου (the universe) διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες, a description referring directly to Empedocles, but applying equally well to Hippias.

ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ
 τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται. ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχροὺς τὴν μὲν φύσιν
 τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων,
 καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος
 10 εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως
 εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε, μηδὲν τού-
 του τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἄξιον ἀποφύνασθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τοὺς
 φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρεσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἐγὼ e
 μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ συμβουλεύω, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ
 15 Σώκρατες, συμβῆναι ὑμᾶς ὥσπερ ὑπὸ δαιτητῶν ἡμῶν

³³⁷
 d 6. νόμος: the sophists often ap-
 pealed, in support of their view of
 right, to a passage of Pindar (*Frag.*
inc. 151 Boeckh, 169 Bgk.) νόμος ὁ
 πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανά-
 των ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτη
 χειρὶ (does, and makes just, that which is
 most violent, with supreme hand), under-
 standing by this the law of nature.
Cf. Gorg. 484 b, 488 b. — πολλὰ κτέ.:
 often forces unnatural connections, i.e. of
 ordinary and superior natures in the
 state.

10. πρυτανεῖον: was originally prob-
 ably in most Greek cities the public
 building devoted to the Prytanis, the
 highest official, where was also the
 sanctuary of the Ἑστία, the sacred
 state-hearth, so that it formed the
 heart and centre of the city. Athens
 therefore is called here and by Theo-
 pompus (*Athen.* vi. 254 b) τὸ πρυτα-
 νεῖον τῆς Ἑλλάδος, in the same sense
 in which a Pythian oracle (*Ael. V. H.*
iv. 6) called her τὴν κοινὴν ἐστίαν τῆς
 Ἑλλάδος, Pindar (*Frag.* 54) Ἑλλάδος
 ἔρεισμα, Thucydides (*Anth.* vii. 45) Ἑλ-
 λάδος Ἑλλάς, others τὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος
 μουσεῖον. — The solemn, pompous, and
 at the same time flattering style of

Hippias's words is doubtless true to ³³⁷
 the life. d

15. Hippias compares himself and e
 the rest of the company to arbitra-
 tors, umpires, freely chosen by the
 contending parties. It is the office of
 these umpires to persuade both par-
 ties (here, Socrates and Protagoras)
 to moderate their demands and to
 unite upon some intermediate course.
 συμβαίνειν and συμβιβάζειν are here
 the technical expressions (*cf. Thuc.*
ii. 29 ξυνεβίβασε δὲ καὶ τὸν Περδίκκην
 τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις). ὑπὸ is used because
 συμβῆναι has a pass. sense. See H.
 820. — The peculiar transposition
 of the words, for ὑφ' ἡμῶν ὥσπερ ὑπὸ
 δαιτητῶν, is very freq. in Plato in
 such comparisons. *Cf. Rep.* iii. 414 e
 δεῖ ὡς περὶ μητρὸς καὶ τροφῶν τῆς χώρας
 ἐν ἧ εἰσι βουλευέσθαι, vii. 520 e ὡς ἐπ'
 ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν ἕκαστος εἰσι τὸ ἄρχειν
 (will take office), viii. 545 e ὡς πρὸς παῖ-
 das ἡμᾶς παιζούσας (*viz.* τὰς Μούσας),
Theaet. 170a ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς
 ἐν ἑκάστοις ἄρχοντας look up to their com-
 manders in such peril as to gods. — As
 συμβῆναι in this sense almost always
 stands absolutely, εἰς τὸ μέσον is most
 simply connected with συμβιβάζοντων.

συμβιβαζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ μήτε σὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς 338
 τοῦτο εἶδος τῶν διαλόγων ζητεῖν τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λίαν,
 εἰ μὴ ἤδὺ Πρωταγόρα, ἀλλ' ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς
 ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι καὶ εὐσχημονέ-
 20 στεροι ἡμῖν φαίνωνται, μήτ' αὖ Πρωταγόραν πάντα κά-
 λων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρία ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος
 τῶν λόγων, ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλὰ μέσον τι ἀμφοτέρους
 τεμεῖν. ὥς οὖν ποιήσετε, καὶ πείσεσθέ μοι ῥαβδοῦχον καὶ ἅ

³³⁸
^a 17. λίαν: belongs to ζητεῖν, and stands at the end of the clause because it is emphatic.

20. φαίνωνται: come into view, present themselves. Cf. *Euthyd.* 288c οἶμαι γάρ τι αὐτοῖν πάγκαλον φανεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴν ἄρξωνται σπουδάζειν for *I think some great beauty will appear in the two, when they begin to be in earnest*, 294a ὡς θαυμαστὸν λέγεις καὶ ἀγαθὸν μέγα πεφάνθαι. — As this refers only to Socrates's words, it cannot have ὑμῖν with the Mss. ἡμῖν is ethical dat. — πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα: (or σείειν, ἐφιέναι, κινεῖν, ἐκλύειν), like οὐρία ἐφιέναι and ἀποκρύπτειν γῆν, a nautical expression, "letting out all the ropes, that hold and stretch the sails, as long as possible," i.e. setting every sail. Then figuratively, cf. Schol. on Plato ii., p. 466 Bk. παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν πάσῃ προθυμῖα χρωμένων. Cf. *Eur. Med.* 278 ἐχθροὶ γὰρ ἐξιάσι πάντα δὴ κάλων, *Ag. Eq.* 756 νῦν δὴ σε πάντα δεῖ κάλων ἐξιέναι σεαυτοῦ, *Zenobius* v. 62.

21. οὐρία ἐφέντα: Ovid *Met.* xv. 176 (Pythagoras speaks), et quoniam magno feror aequare plenaque ventis | vela dedi. ἐφέντα is intr., see on 336 a. — πέλαγος: a freq. comparison. Cf. *Rep.* v. 453 d οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμῖν νευστέον (must swim) καὶ πειρατέον σφίζεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, *Symp.* 210 d ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλα-

γος τετραμμένος τοῦ καλοῦ, *Polit.* 273 d ³³⁸
 ἵνα μὴ χειμασθῆς (tempest-tossed) εἰς ^a
 τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἄπειρον ὄντα τόπον δὴ, *Cic. Tusc.* 4, 9 statimne nos vela facere, an quasi e porta egredientes paullulum remigare.

22. ἀποκρύψαντα: cause to disappear, lose from sight. Cf. *Thuc.* v. 65. 6 ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνοι ἀπέκρυψαν (sc. αὐτούς), *Luc. V. H.* ii. 38 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπέκρυψαμεν αὐτούς, *Verg. Aen.* iii. 291 protinus aërias Phaeacum abscondimus arces.

23. τεμεῖν: freq. of the way, course, ^b
 open, take, pursue (like Lat. secare).
 Cf. *Polit.* 262 b διὰ μέσων δὲ ἀσφαλέστερον ἵεναι τέμνοντας, *Legg.* vii. 803 e καθάπερ ὁδοὶ τέμνηται. — ὥς: equiv. to οὕτως, elsewhere in prose, only after ὥς, ὥσπερ (see on 326 d); yet this use is also found in *Thuc.* iii. 37 ὥς οὖν χρῆ καὶ ἡμᾶς ποιούντας παραινέειν. — The imperative force of the fut. ind. corresponds to the assumption and confidence of Hippias. — ῥαβδοῦχον: it was very appropriate for Hippias the *Elean* to multiply terms for the directors and judges of contests, and thus to embellish his discourse. The ῥαβδοῦχοι or ῥαβδοφόροι are seen on all vases in pictures of gymnastic contests. On ἐπιστάτης and βραβευτής cf. *Legg.* xii. 949 a καὶ γυμνικῶν τε καὶ ἵππικῶν ἄθλων

ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρύτανιν ἐλέσθαι, ὃς ὑμῖν φυλάξει τὸ μέ-
25 τριον μῆκος τῶν λόγων ἐκατέρου.

XXV. Ταῦτα ἤρεσε τοῖς παροῦσι, καὶ πάντες ἐπήνεσαν,
καὶ ἐμέ τε ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη ἀφήσειν καὶ ἐλέσθαι ἐδέ-
οντο ἐπιστάτην. εἶπον οὖν ἐγὼ ὅτι αἰσχροὺς εἶη βραβευ-
τὴν ἐλέσθαι τῶν λόγων. εἶτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ
5 αἰρεθεῖς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὸν χείρω τῶν βελτιόνων
ἐπιστατεῖν, εἶτε ὁμοῖος, οὐδ' οὕτως ὀρθῶς· ὁ γὰρ ὁμοῖος
ἡμῖν ὁμοῖα καὶ ποιήσει, ὥστε ἐκ περιττοῦ ἡρήσεται.
ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίονα ἡμῶν αἰρήσεσθε. τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ, ὡς c
ἐγῶμαι, ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν, ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφώ-
10 τερόν τινα ἐλέσθαι· εἰ δὲ αἰρήσεσθε μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω,
φήσετε δέ, αἰσχροὺς καὶ τοῦτο τῷδε γίγνεται, ὥσπερ φαύλω
ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστάτην αἰρεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδέν
μοι διαφέρει. ἀλλ' οὕτως ἐθέλω ποιῆσαι, ἵν', ὃ προθυ-
μείσθε, συνουσία τε καὶ διάλογοι ἡμῖν γίνωνται. εἰ μὴ
15 βούλεται Πρωταγόρας ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὗτος μὲν ἐρωτάτω, d
ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, καὶ ἅμα πειράσομαι αὐτῷ δεῖξαι
ὡς ἐγὼ φημι χρῆναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι·
ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅπως ἂν οὗτος βούληται

³³⁸
b ἐπιστάτας καὶ βραβέας. Finally πρύτανις,
an old word, *president*, was also doubt-
less the proper name of the one who
arranged the contests. These presi-
dents were selected either by those
who instituted the respective games,
or by the combatants themselves. In
Socrates's words which follow, these
methods of selection run into each
other.

XXV. 2. τέ: see on 325 b, l. 27.

7. ἡρήσεται: the fut. pf. with tem-
poral aug. is very rare.

c 8. ἀλλὰ δὴ: introduces objections
raised by others, like the Lat. at.
Cf. *Apol.* 37 c ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσο-

μαι; *Crito* 54 a ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα ³³⁸
βούλει ζῆν; c

9. ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν: sc. αἰρεῖσθαι βελ-
τίονα ἡμῶν, from which then naturally
ὥστε . . . ἐλέσθαι would result. In
other cases ὥστε at times immedi-
ately follows ἔστι, δυνατός, ἰκανός.
Cf. *Lys.* xx. 24 ὑμῖν δ' οὐκ ἦν, ὥστ'
εἰδέναί, Plato *Phaedr.* 269 d τὸ δύνα-
σθαι ὥστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι,
Polit. 295 a ἰκανὸς ὥστε διὰ βίου προσ-
τάττειν.

12. τό γ' ἐμόν: for my part, so far
as I am concerned. Frequent in Plato.
Cf. *Soph.* 237 b τὸ μὲν ἐμόν ὅπη βούλει
τίθεσο.

ἔρωτᾶν, πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ λόγον ὑποσχέτω ὁμοίως. εἰ
 20 οὖν μὴ δοκῆ πρόθυμος εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον
 ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ὑμεῖς κοινῇ δεησόμεθα αὐτοῦ
 ἅ περ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ, μὴ διαφθείρειν τὴν συνουσίαν. καὶ e
 οὐδὲν δεῖ τούτου ἔνεκα ἕνα ἐπιστάτην γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάν-
 τες κοινῇ ἐπιστατήσετε. Ἐδόκει πᾶσιν οὕτω ποιητέον
 25 εἶναι. καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελεν, ὅμως δὲ
 ἠναγκάσθη ὁμολογήσαι ἐρωτήσεων, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἱκανῶς ἐρω-
 τήσῃ, πάλιν δώσειν λόγον κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀποκρινόμενος.

XXVI. Ἦρξατο οὖν ἐρωτᾶν οὕτωςί πως. Ἠγοῦμαι,
 ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος
 εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν 339
 ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τ' εἶναι ξυνιέναι, ἅ τε ὀρθῶς πεποι-

³³⁸
 d 19. λόγον ὑποσχέτω: *render account, i.e. defend his position. Cf. Gorg.* 465 a τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον, Xen. Mem. iv. 4. Ὁ ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων καταγελαῖς (*for it is enough for you that you ridicule the others*) ἐρωτῶν μὲν καὶ ἐλέγχων πάντας, αὐτὸς δ' οὐδενὶ θέλων ὑπέχειν λόγον.

e 22. διαφθείρειν: *cf. 360 a, Symp.* 174 b ἵνα καὶ τὴν παροιμίαν διαφθείρωμεν μεταβάλλοντες *that we may spoil the proverb by changing it.*

24. ἐδόκει πᾶσιν: *they offered a facile acquiescence, cf. ταῦτα ἤρεσε κτέ. above.*

XXVI. 1. ἠγοῦμαι κτέ.: *the sophists were the first to make language the object of scientific examination and discussion. This was occasioned by, and in its turn promoted, the exegesis and criticism of the poets, who thus became the favorite theme of conversation in cultivated circles. This appears in Socrates's remarks*

in 347 c, and in the amusing scenes in ³³⁸
 Ar. Ran. 1099 ff. It was often, how-
 ever, the sole aim of the sophists, e
 through the pointing out of faults in form or contents, to exhibit their own superiority to these writers. Thus Protagoras censured the imv. in μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά, and the fem. form οὐλομένην (*cf. Arist. Poet.* 19, *Soph. El.* 14), and Hippias boasted his knowledge of the poets (*cf. 347 a, Cic. de Or.* iii. 127); see the dialogue *Hipp. Mi.* and *Introd.* p. 16 f. Isocrates says XII. 18 τινές μοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔλεγον ὡς ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ συγκαθεζόμενοι τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρες τῶν ἀγελαίων (*common sort of*) σοφιστῶν καὶ πάντα φασκόντων εἶδέναι διαλέγοντο περὶ τε τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν καὶ τῆς Ἡσιόδου καὶ τῆς Ὀμήρου ποιήσεως.

3. περὶ ἐπῶν: *this and also ὀρθῶς* ³³⁹
 were probably expressions character-
 istic of Protagoras, *cf. 342 a.* As to
 his ὀρθοέπεια, so called in *Phaedr.*
 267 c, see *Introd.* p. 4. a

5 ηται καὶ ἄ μή, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον
 λόγον δοῦναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ ἐρώτημα περὶ τοῦ
 αὐτοῦ μὲν περὶ οὗ περ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν δὴ διελεγόμεθα,
 περὶ ἀρετῆς, μετενηνεγμένον δὲ εἰς ποίησιν· τοσοῦτον
 μόνον διοίσει. λέγει γάρ που Σιμωνίδης πρὸς Σκόπαν,
 10 τὸν Κρέοντος υἱὸν τοῦ Θεπταλοῦ, ὅτι

* Ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, ἢ
 χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ
 ψόγου τετυγμένον.

³³⁹
^a 5. διελεῖν: *analyze, explain. Cf.*
 314 b διελέσθαι, *Hipp. Ma.* 285 c & σὺ
 ἀκριβέστατα ἐπίστασαι ἀνθρώπων διαιρεῖν,
 περὶ τε γραμμάτων δυνάμεως καὶ συλλα-
 βῶν, *Charm.* 163 d καὶ γὰρ Προδίκου
 μυρία τινὰ ἀκήκοα περὶ ὀνομάτων δια-
 ρούντος. But in 340 a, 341 c it is *dis-*
tinguish.

7. νῦν δὴ: ἀρτίως ἢ μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν,
Photius Lex. p. 305, 9, *cf.* *Poll.* i. 72,
 when used with an impf. (otherwise
 in 349 a). The contrast is marked,
 as here, by νῦν or νῦν δέ, *cf.* 340 b
 νῦν δὴ εἶπες . . . νῦν σκόπει, *Legg.* iii.
 683 e ἢ νῦν δὴ μὲν τούτοις περιτυχόντες
 τοῖς λόγοις οὕτω ταῦτ' ἐτίθεμεν, νῦν δ'
 ἐπιλελήσμεθα or *did we a little while ago,*
coming to these principles, lay them down
thus, and now have we forgotten them?
 the comic poet Magnes (*Meineke*
Com. Frag. ii. 10) εἶπέ μοι· νῦν δὴ μὲν
 ὤμνυς μὴ γεγονέναι, νῦν δὲ φῆς; After
 the interruption, the contrast of
 the earlier with the later (νῦν ἔσται)
 could not be expressed by νῦν διαλεγό-
 μεθα (the reading of the Mss.).

9. πρὸς Σκόπαν: "in a poem in
 honor of Scopas." The Scopadae, a
 princely family of Thessaly, allied
 with the Aleuadae, were dynasts in
 Crannon and Pharsalus. Of this
 family, Diactorides was among the

suitors for the daughter of Clisthenes ³³⁹
 in Sicyon (*Hdt.* vi. 127), and a Scopas, ^a
 according to Diogenes Laërtius, ii. 25,
 invited Socrates to his residence. Si-
 monides, as Gorgias at a later day,
 was often the guest of the Scopadae,
 and composed several poems in their
 honor. These included an epinician
 ode (in which he celebrated the Dio-
 scuri, *Cic. de Or.* ii. 86, *Quint.* xi. 2.
 11 ff.), the poem before us (whether
 an epinician ode or a scolion see
Introd. p. 19), and a threnos when a
 great part of the family perished, at
 a triumphal feast, by the fall of the
 roof of the banqueting hall (*Bergk*
Poet. Lyr. iii. 384⁴). To meet the ἀπο-
 ρία, the criticism of Protagoras, sev-
 eral answers are now ready; namely,
 the first attempted explanation by
 Socrates, the one by Prodicus, the
 second by Socrates, and the barely
 intended one by Hippias. See *Introd.*
 pp. 11 f.

12. τετράγωνον: *firm and unchange-* b
able, perfect. This meaning is derived
 from the use of the Pythagoreans,
 with whom the number four (τετρακ-
 τὺς) and the square were symbols
 of the permanent, perfect, divine. *Cf.*
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις (sc. τὸ
τετράγωνον) εἰκόνα φέρειν τῆς θείας

τοῦτο ἐπίστασαι τὸ ἄσμα, ἢ πᾶν σοι διεξέλθω; Καὶ ἐγὼ
 15 εἶπον ὅτι Οὐδὲν δεῖ· ἐπίσταμαί τε γὰρ καὶ πάνυ μοι
 τυγχάνει μεμεληκὸς τοῦ ἄσματος. Εὐ, ἔφη, λέγεις. πό-
 τερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἢ οὐ;
 Πάνυ, ἔφην ἐγώ, καλῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς. Δοκεῖ δέ σοι κα-
 λῶς πεποιῆσθαι, εἰ ἐναντία λέγει αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁ ποιητής;
 20 Οὐ καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ὅρα δὴ, ἔφη, βέλτιον. Ἄλλ', ὦ-
 γαθέ, ἔσκεμμαι ἰκανῶς. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι προϊόντος
 τοῦ ἄσματος λέγει πού·

Οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιπτάκειον νέμεται
 καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπὸν
 25 φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ τάδε λέγει κακείνα τὰ ἔμ-
 προσθεν; Οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ἔφη, ταῦτα

³³⁹
^b οὐσίας (the image of the divine nature)
 Proclus on Euclidis *Elem.* p. 48 G,
 Boeckh *Philolaus*, 155. When τετρά-
 γωνος occurs later in the sense of our
 passage, it is a play on the verse of
 Simonides. So Arist. *Rhet.* iii. 11 τὸν
 ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον
 μεταφορά· ἄμφω γὰρ τέλεια. Some-
 what differently Varro (Pliny *N. H.*
 34. 19) calls the figures (signa) of
 Polycletus quadrata, in contrast
 to those of Lysippus. Cf. in qua-
 drum redigere.

16. μεμεληκός: cf. *Soph.* 227 a τῇ
 τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρ-
 μακοποιίας οὐδὲν ἦττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον
 τυγχάνει μέλον the dialectical art con-
 cerns itself neither less nor more with the
 use of the sponge than with the taking of
 physic. — The usual impers. const. of
 μέλει is retained in the partic. with
 τυγχάνει.

18. δοκεῖ δέ σοι κτέ.: this then is
 the ἐρώτημα περὶ ἀρετῆς proposed
 above.

20. ὄρα: sc. εἰ δοκεῖ καλῶς τε καὶ
 ὀρθῶς πεποιῆσθαι. ³³⁹
 c

23. νέμεται: equiv. to νομίζεται.
 Cf. *Soph. O. T.* 1080 ἐγὼ δ' ἐμαντὸν
 παῖδα τῆς Τύχης νέμων, *Tr.* 483 εἴ τι
 τήνδ' ἀμαρτίαν νέμεις. Thus in prose
 form, οὐδ' ὑπ' ἐμοῦ νομίζεται τοῦτο παρὰ
 Πιπτακοῦ καίπερ σοφοῦ ὄντος ἀνδρὸς ἐμ-
 μελῶς (321 c) εἰρήσθαι· χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν
 ἔμμεναι. — According to Didymus, in
 the Schol. on Plato ii. 369 Bk., Pitta-
 cus, the ruler of Mytilene, uttered the
 famous saying, on hearing that Peri-
 ander, formerly mild and a friend
 of the people, had become cruel.
 With Solon's saying, χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά,
 which Plato frequently quotes, cf.
 Zenobius vi. 38. — Simonides was fond
 of quoting the expressions of others,
 as of Homer and Stesichorus, *Frag.*
 25 Schn., 53 Bgk.; of Homer, *Frag.* 60
 Schn., 85 Bgk.; of Hesiod, *Frag.* 32
 Schn., 58 Bgk., or of combating them,
 as he said of a thought of Cleobulus
 of Lindus (*Frag.* 10 Schn., 57 Bgk.)

ἐκείνοις ὁμολογεῖσθαι ; Φαίνεται ἔμοιγε. Καὶ ἅμα μέν-
 τοι ἐφοβούμην μή τι λέγοι. Ἄτάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοὶ οὐ **a**
 30 φαίνεται ; Πῶς γὰρ ἂν φαίνοιτο ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ
 ὁ ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρωθεν λέγων, ὅς γε τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτὸς
 ὑπέθετο χαλεπὸν εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἀληθείᾳ,
 ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθὼν ἐπε-
 λάθετο, καὶ Πιπτακὸν τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι χα-
 35 λεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, τοῦτον μέμφεταιί τε καὶ οὐ φη-
 σιν ἀποδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ λέγοντος ; καίτοι
 ὁπότε τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα αὐτῷ μέμφεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
 ἑαυτὸν μέμφεται, ὥστε ἦτοι τὸ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον οὐκ
 ὀρθῶς λέγει. Εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα πολλοῖς θόρυβον παρέσχε
 40 καὶ ἔπαινον τῶν ἀκούοντων. καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, **e**
 ὡσπερὲι ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ
 ἰλιγγίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθορυ-
 βησάντων· ἔπειτα, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρήσθαι τάλθηθῆ,

³³⁹
c μωροῦ φωτὸς ἅδε βουλά. So Pindar, P. iv. 277 and elsewhere, appealed to Homer.

28, 30. ὁμολογεῖσθαι, ὁμολογεῖν: of persons ὁμολογεῖν τινι, of things ὁμολογεῖσθαι τινι. Cf. Crat. 416 a καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογεῖται, Rep. v. 457 c τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖσθαι.

d 29. ἐφοβούμην . . . λέγοι: I was afraid there was something in what he said.

31. ὅς γε: qui quidem, cf. 348 e, l. 13. See H. 1037, 1.

32. ὑπέθετο: strictly, lay down a principle in order to reason from it, then in general maintain. Cf. 361 b ὑποθέμενος. Similarly 343 e ὑπειπόντα, and 359 a ὑποκειμένων.

33. εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθών: freq. of a road or an investigation; so προῖεναι. Cf. Legg. iii. 682 a εἰς δὴ τὸ πρόσθεν προέλθωμεν ἔτι τοῦ νῦν ἐπελθόντος ἡμῖν

μύθον, Symp. 174 d κελεύειν (Σωκράτη) ³³⁹
 προῖεναι εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν (forwards), **d**
 Gorg. 497 a καὶ πρόϊθι γε ἔτι εἰς τοῦμ-
 προσθεν, below, 357 d εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι
 ὁμολογήκατε, Soph. 258 c εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν
 ἔτι ζητήσαντες.

38. τὸ πρότερον: adv.

39. παρέσχε: called out.

41. ὡσπερὲι . . . πληγείς: a contest **e**
 of opinions is often compared to a
 boxing match, in which stunning
 blows would be received in the face.
 Cf. Euthyd. 303 a ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὡσπερ
 πληγείς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἐκέιμην ἄφωνος,
 Phil. 22 e ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν ἡδονή σοι
 πεπτωκέναι καθαπερὲι πληγείσα ὑπὸ τῶν
 νῦν δὴ λόγων.

42. ἰλιγγίασα: cf. Gorg. 486 b ἰλιγγι-
 γιῶης ἂν καὶ χασμῶ (gape) οὐκ ἔχω
 ὄ τι εἴποις, Lys. 216 c.

43. σέ: i.e. the ἔταιρος mentioned in
 the opening of the dialogue, cf. 309 a ff.

ἵνα μοι χρόνος ἐγγένηται τῇ σκέψει τί λέγοι ὁ ποιητής,
 45 τρέπομαι πρὸς τὸν Πρόδικον, καὶ καλέσας αὐτόν, ὦ Πρό-
 δικε, ἔφην ἐγὼ, σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης· δίκαιος εἶ
 βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνδρί. δοκῶ οὖν μοι ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σέ, 340
 ὥσπερ ἔφη Ὅμηρος τὸν Σκάμανδρον πολιορκούμενον ὑπὸ
 τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τὸν Σιμόεντα παρακαλεῖν, εἰπόντα·

50 φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ
 σχῶμεν.

ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σέ παρακαλῶ, μὴ ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας τὸν
 Σιμωνίδην ἐκπέρση. καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ δεῖται τὸ ὑπὲρ Σι-
 μωνίδου ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς, ἣ τὸ τε βούλε-
 55 σθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὐ ταῦτὸν ὄν, καὶ ἂ
 νῦν δὴ εἶπες πολλά τε καὶ καλά. καὶ νῦν σκόπει, εἴ σοι b
 συνδοκεῖ ὃ περ ἐμοί. οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐναντία λέγειν αὐ-
 τὸς αὐτῷ Σιμωνίδης. σὺ γάρ, ὦ Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι
 τὴν σὴν γνώμην· ταῦτόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι

³³⁹
 e 44. ἐγγένηται: cf. *Phaedo* 86 e
 χρόνου ἐγγενομένου. — λέγοι: opt. after
 a historical present. See G. 201 Rem.

³⁴⁰
 a 47. παρακαλεῖν: usually δοκῶ μοι
 (*I am resolved*) takes the inf. fut.
 (cf. *Theaet.* 183 d ἀλλά μοι δοκῶ οὐ
 πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ), but the pres. is also
 used (*Phaedr.* 230 e ἐγὼ μὲν μοι δοκῶ
 κατακεῖσθαι *I intend to lie down*, *Ar.*
Vesp. 177 ἀλλ' εἰσιῶν μοι τὸν ὄνον ἐξάγειν
 δοκῶ). So here παρακαλεῖν is to be
 taken as inf. pres. since the action
 referred to is close at hand. The
 appeal is repeated after the clause
 introduced by ὥσπερ.

50. Cf. Hom. Φ 307 (Σκάμανδρος) Σι-
 μόεντι δὲ κέκλετ' ἀύσας | 'φίλε κασίγ-
 νητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ | σχῶ-
 μεν, ἐπεὶ τάχα ἄστυ μέγα Πριάμοιο ἀνακ-
 τος | ἐκπέρσει.' Hence the unusual ex-
 pression τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἐκπέρση (cf.
Soph. Tr. 1104 τυφλῆς ὑπ' ἄτης ἐκπε-

πόρθηται τάλας, Lobeck on *Ilias* 1198) ³⁴⁰
 and the preceding πολιορκούμενον. ^a
 This latter word is used figuratively in
Rep. v. 453 a ἵνα μὴ ἔρημα τὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου
 λόγου πολιορκῆται *that the opposite view*
may not be besieged without defenders.

53. ὑπέρ: Socrates's correction of
 the view of Protagoras will be at
 once a defence of Simonides.

54. μουσικῆς: used at times by
 Plato of all intellectual effort and
 knowledge (cf. *Rep.* ii. 376 e μουσικῆς
 δ' εἰπὼν τίθης λόγους *but when you say*
this, do you include literature in music?),
 esp. poetry and philosophy (cf. *Phaedo*
 61 a ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὐσης μεγίστης
 μουσικῆς). Here, somewhat sarcasti-
 cally, it denotes the knowledge of
 synonyms, cf. 337 a ff.

55. διαιρεῖς: Socrates had often
 heard Prodicus's expositions, see on
 341 a, l. 15.

60 καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο; Ἄλλο νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος.
 Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρώτοις αὐτὸς ὁ Σιμωνί-
 δης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφήνατο, ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν
 ἀληθείᾳ γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν εἶη; Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ c
 Πρόδικος. Τὸν δέ γε Πιπτακόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέμφεται οὐχ
 65 ὡς οἶεται Πρωταγόρας ταῦτ' ἑαυτῷ λέγοντα, ἀλλ' ἄλλο.
 οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ὁ Πιπτακὸς ἔλεγε χαλεπὸν, γενέσθαι
 ἐσθλόν, ὡσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔμμεναι· ἔστι δὲ
 οὐ ταῦτόν, ὧ Πρωταγόρα, ὡς φησι Πρόδικος ὅδε, τὸ εἶ-
 ναι καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστι τὸ εἶναι τῷ
 70 γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντία λέγει ὁ Σιμωνίδης αὐτὸς αὐτῷ.
 καὶ ἴσως ἂν φαίη Πρόδικος ὅδε καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, καθ' d
 Ἡσιόδου, γενέσθαι μὲν ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν εἶναι· τῆς γὰρ
 ἀρετῆς ἔμπροσθεν τοὺς θεοὺς ἰδρῶτα θεῖναι· ὅταν δέ τις
 αὐτῆς εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, ῥηιδίην δῆπειτα πέλειν,
 75 χαλεπήν περ ἐοῦσαν, ἐκτῆσθαι.

XXVII. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἀκούσας ταῦτα ἐπήνεσέ
 με· ὁ δὲ Πρωταγόρας, Τὸ ἐπανόρθωμά σοι, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες,

³⁴⁰
c 66. Const., ὁ Πιπτακὸς τὸ χαλεπὸν οὐκ ἔλεγε τοῦτο, γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔμμεναι, sc. ἐσθλόν. The inf. is used with equal freq. with and without the art. after this use of τοῦτο. Cf. also *Gorg.* 489 d πάλαι τοπάζω τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον.

71. Socrates ascribes this view only to Prodicus and others, not to himself, as he already has in mind his own later exposition. There is at the same time an allusion here to Prodicus's 'Choice of Heracles' in connection with which Xenophon also, *Mem.* ii. 1.20, quotes the passage of Hesiod.

d 72. τῆς γὰρ κτέ.: cf. Hes. Ἔργα 287 ff. τὴν μὲν τοι κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν (in abundance) ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι | ῥηιδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει. | τῆς

δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν | ³⁴⁰
d ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὕρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτήν | καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὶ δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, | ῥηιδίη δῆπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα. The passage is cited also in *Rep.* ii. 364 c. Simonides himself had said (*Frag.* 32 Schn., 58 Bgk.) ἔστι τις λόγος τὰν ἀρετὰν ναίειν δυσάμβάτοις ἐπὶ πέτραις.

75. ἐκτῆσθαι: added by Plato (cf. 340 e) to explain ῥηιδίην. After vowels Plato uses κεκτῆσθαι, after consonants both ἐκτῆσθαι and κεκτῆσθαι.

XXVII. 2. ἐπανόρθωμα: Socrates is making a defence of Simonides against attack, not a correction of error. His reply however εἰμι . . . ἰατρός falls in with Protagoras's μείζον ἀμάρτημα κτέ. Cf. a above.

μείζον ἀμάρτημα ἔχει ἢ ὁ ἐπανορθοῖς. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον,
 Κακὸν ἄρα μοι εἵργασται, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ
 5 εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός· ἰώμενος μείζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ.
 Ἄλλ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη. Πῶς δὴ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Πολλὴ ἄν,
 ἔφη, ἀμαθία εἶη τοῦ ποιητοῦ, εἰ οὕτω φαῦλόν τί φησιν
 εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκτῆσθαι, ὃ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον,
 ὡς ἅπασιν δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Νῆ τὸν
 10 Δία, εἰς καιρὸν γε παρατετύχηκεν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
 Πρόδικος ὅδε. κινδυνεύει γάρ τοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἢ Προ-
 δίκου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι, ἥτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου 341
 ἀρξαμένη, ἢ καὶ ἔτι παλαιότερα. σὺ δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν
 ἔμπειρος ὢν ταύτης ἄπειρος εἶναι φαίνει, οὐχ ὥσπερ

340
 e 4. κακόν: subst. (without τι) as
Gorg. 518 e καὶ σὺ νῦν ὁμοιώτατον τούτῳ
 ἐργάζει, or in the exclamation of those
 initiated in the Orphic-Bacchic mys-
 teries (*Dem. de Cor.* 259), ἔφυγον κακόν,
 εἶδρον ἄμεινον, and in the common
 phrases, δεινὸν λέγεις (*Ar. Lysistr.*
 499), γελοῖον πάσχειν (*Rep.* vii. 536 b)
etc. — μοί: for the dat. of the agent,
 see G. 188, 3; H. 769.

5. ἰώμενος . . . ποιῶ: the expres-
 sion was proverbial, μὴ κακὸν κακῷ
 ἰάσασθαι. Cf. *Hdt.* iii. 53 μὴ τῷ κακῷ
 τὸ κακὸν ἰῶ, *Thuc.* v. 65 ἐπεβόησεν
 ὅτι διανοεῖται κακὸν κακῷ ἰᾶσθαι, *Soph.*
Aj. 362 μὴ κακὸν κακῷ διδοῦς | ἄκος
 πλέον τὸ πῆμα τῆς ἄτης τίθει *do not,*
adding ill as a remedy to ill, make the
woe of thy calamity the greater, the
 comic poet in *Plut. Mor.* 523 e τὸ φάρ-
 μακὸν σου τὴν νόσον μείζω ποιεῖ. The
 const. is an 'epexegetic asyndeton,' as
 in 339 e δίκαιος εἶ, 343 d ἀμφισβητοῦντα,
 343 e εἰπόντα . . . ἀποκρινόμενον, 348 a
 καταθεμένους ποιεῖσθαι.

6. πολλὴ ἄν ἀμαθία εἶη κτέ.: it
 seemed not to occur to Protagoras,

although believing ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέ- 340
 γιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι e
 (cf. 339 a), to consider the argument
 of the poem as a whole, or to refute
 Socrates by a critical examination
 and comparison of its parts. Nor
 again did he cite other passages from
 his favorite poet, to establish the
 doctrine of the latter respecting vir-
 tue. His method here is the same
 which he uses elsewhere, cf. 324 a
 αὐτό σε διδάξει and ὅστις μὴ ὥσπερ
 θηρίον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται, where,
 without any scientific treatment of
 the doctrine of punishment, he
 falls back upon 'common sense.'
 This mode of exegesis proved, as
 it has often done since, to be un-
 safe, when placed in the hands of
 an opponent.

12. θεία: cf. 315 e, l. 26. — πάλαι: 341
 a alludes ironically to Protagoras's
 claim that the sophist's art was of
 great antiquity, 316 d. Socrates says
 that Simonides, like Prodicus, had
 distinguished synonyms (γενέσθαι,
 ἔμμεναι).

15 ἐγὼ ἔμπειρος διὰ τὸ μαθητῆς εἶναι Προδίκου τουτουί.
καὶ νῦν μοι δοκεῖς οὐ μανθάνειν ὅτι καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν
τοῦτο ἴσως οὐχ οὕτω Σιμωνίδης ὑπελάμβανεν, ὥσπερ σὺ
ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ Πρόδικός με
οὔτοσὶ νουθετεῖ ἐκάστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἐγὼ ἢ σὲ ἢ ἄλ-
20 λον τινὰ λέγω ὅτι Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινός ἐστιν
ἀνὴρ, ἐρωτᾷ· εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τὰγαθὰ δεινὰ καλῶν. τὸ β
γὰρ δεινόν, φησί, κακόν ἐστιν· οὐδεὶς γοῦν λέγει ἐκάστοτε
δεινοῦ πλούτου οὐδὲ δεινῆς εἰρήνης οὐδὲ δεινῆς

³⁴¹
^a 15. ἔμπειρος: sc. εἰμί, for with οὐχ ὥσπερ (in the sense of *while*) the clause with ὥσπερ is always formed independently, preceded by simply οὐχ, while the pred. of the clause with οὐχ, (here ἔμπειρος εἶναι) is supplied from that with ὥσπερ. Cf. *Symp.* 179 e οὐχ (sc. ἐτίμησαν) ὥσπερ Ἀχιλλεῖα ἐτίμησαν καὶ εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψαν, 189 c οὐχ (sc. οὐδὲν ἂν ἐγίγνετο) ὥσπερ νῦν τούτων οὐδὲν γίγνεται περὶ αὐτόν *it would not be as now, when none of these things is done for him.* — Socrates calls himself a pupil of Prodicus also in *Crat.* 384 b, *Meno* 96 d, *Charm.* 163 d, always with special reference to the synonymic art, yet never without implied ridicule of the consequential pedantry with which Prodicus treated his doctrine. Here Socrates makes sport of him and his hobby, by first alluring him to the explanation of χαλεπὸν by κακόν, and then suggesting that Prodicus did this in jest and for the sake of testing Protagoras.

18. ὥσπερ: should have been followed by οὕτω καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν αὐτοὶ κεῖνοι κτέ., but this is postponed by the intervention at some length of the views of Prodicus upon δεινός. Here the clause ὅταν . . . λέγω, as though

its main verb (νουθετεῖ) had not already preceded, is followed by another principal verb (ἐρωτᾷ), and then, instead of the expected and postponed clause οὕτω καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν κτέ., the clause ἴσως οὐν κτέ. is added with anacoluthon. This intervention of a dependent clause between two main clauses is found also in Homer. Cf. also Plato *Theaet.* 172 d τοὺς λόγους ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κακεῖνοι *they follow out their reasonings at their leisure, just as we now have taken up a third point, one following naturally from another; so they, etc.*

20. σοφὸς καὶ δεινός: cf. *Theaet.* 154 d εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἡμεῖς, 173 b δεινοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται, *Ar. Ran.* 967. Θηραμένης; σοφός γ' ἀνὴρ καὶ δεινός. εἰς τὰ πάντα, and frequently thus. On account of its derivation, Prodicus will not allow the use of δεινός as a word of commendation (cf. colloquial parallels in Eng.); but his theory makes itself ridiculous in thus opposing the living language.

23. δεινοῦ πλούτου κτέ.: cf. *Euthyd.* b 303 a πυππάξ ὦ Ἡράκλεις καλοῦ λόγου, *Rep.* vi. 509 c Ἀπολλόν, δαιμονίας ὑπερ-

ὑγείας, ἀλλὰ δεινῆς νόσου καὶ δεινοῦ πολέμου
 25 καὶ δεινῆς πενίας, ὡς τοῦ δεινοῦ κακοῦ ὄντος. ἴσως
 οὖν καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν αὖ οἱ Κεῖοι καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης ἢ κα-
 κὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἢ ἄλλο τι ὃ σὺ οὐ μανθάνεις. ἐρώ-
 μεθα οὖν Πρόδικον· δίκαιον γὰρ τὴν Σιμωνίδου φωνὴν
 τοῦτον ἐρωτᾶν. τί ἔλεγεν, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸ χαλεπὸν Σι- c
 30 μωνίδης; Κακόν, ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ μέμφεται, ἦν
 δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸν Πιπτακὸν λέγοντα χαλεπὸν
 ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος
 ὅτι ἐστὶ κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι; Ἀλλὰ τί οἶει, ἔφη, λέγειν,
 ὦ Σώκρατες, Σιμωνίδην ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, καὶ ὀνειδίζειν τῷ
 35 Πιπτακῷ ὅτι τὰ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἠπίστατο ὀρθῶς διαιρεῖν
 ἅτε Λέσβιος ὢν καὶ ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρῳ τετραμμένος;
 Ἀκούεις δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, Προδίκου τοῦδε.
 ἔχεις τι πρὸς ταῦτα λέγειν; Καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Πολλοῦ d
 γε δεῖ, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Πρόδικε· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι
 40 καὶ Σιμωνίδης τὸ χαλεπὸν ἔλεγεν ὅπερ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι,
 οὐ τὸ κακόν, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μὴ ράδιον ἦ ἀλλὰ διὰ πολλῶν
 πραγμάτων γίγνηται. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἔφην, ὦ Πρω-
 ταγόρα, τοῦτο λέγειν Σιμωνίδην, καὶ Πρόδικόν γε τόνδε

³⁴¹ βολῆς. For the gen. of exclam., see
^b G. 173, 3; H. 761.

28. φωνήν: *dialect*; so below, l. 36
 ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρῳ, and 346 d, l. 61. Cf.
Phaedo 62 a Ἴπτω Ζεύς, ἔφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ
 φωνῇ εἰπών (Cebes was a Boeotian).

^c 35. διαιρεῖν: this was just Prodi-
 cus's art. Cf. 340 a.

36. βαρβάρῳ: the Aeolic dialect
 might, in the time of Socrates and
 Plato, sound so strange to the Athe-
 nians, as to be termed, from an exclu-
 sive pride in the Attic literary style,
 βάρβαρος. Cf. Eust. on the *Il.*, p. 279.
 36 ἐκωμωδοῦντο (were ridiculed) δέ,
 φασίν, οἱ Ἐρετριεῖς ὡς πολλῶ τῶ ῥ ἐν

ταῖς ὀμιλίαις χρώμενοι. διὸ καὶ αὐτοί, ³⁴¹
 καθὰ καὶ Ἡλεῖοι, βαρβαρόφωνοι ἐκα- c
 λοῦντο, ὡς ἐν ῥητορικῶ εὔρηται λεξικῶ.
 In the *Cratylus*, words and forms of
 the Aeolic and Doric dialects are
 often called *ξενικά*, e.g. 401 b. This
 judgment might without improba-
 bility be ascribed to Prodicus, who
 naturally spoke Attic, and to Simoni-
 des, whose language varied little from
 the Attic.

39. ἐγὼ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κτέ.: here again d
 Protagoras leaves it for Socrates to
 refute this interpretation by citing
 other words from the poem. See
 below.

εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ παίζειν καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι, εἰ
 45 οἷός τ' ἔσει τῷ σαυτοῦ λόγῳ βοηθεῖν· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε Σιμωνί- e
 νίδης οὐ λέγει τὸ χαλεπὸν κακόν, μέγα τεκμήριόν ἐστίν
 εὐθὺς τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ῥῆμα· λέγει γὰρ ὅτι

θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας.

οὐ δήπου τοῦτό γε λέγων, κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, εἶτα
 50 τὸν θεόν φησι μόνον τοῦτο ἂν ἔχειν καὶ τῷ θεῷ τοῦτο
 γέρας ἀπένειμε μόνῳ· ἀκόλαστον γὰρ ἂν τινα λέγοι Σι-
 μωνίδην Πρόδικος καὶ οὐδαμῶς Κεῖον. ἀλλ' ἅ μοι δο-
 κεῖ διανοεῖσθαι Σιμωνίδης ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ᾄσματι, ἐθέλω
 σοι εἰπεῖν, εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μου πείραν ὅπως ἔχω, ὃ σὺ 342
 55 λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἐπῶν· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, σοῦ ἀκούσομαι.
 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρωταγόρας ἀκούσας μου ταῦτα λέγοντος, Εἰ

³⁴¹
 d 44. σοῦ: for the prolepsis, see on 313 b, l. 19. — δοκεῖν: redundant, as though οἶμαι had not preceded, although it depends upon the latter. Cf. *Soph.* 225 d δοκῶ μὴν τό γε ἀμελὲς τῶν οἰκείων (the neglect of one's own affairs) γιγνόμενον καλεῖσθαι κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμὴν οὐχ ἕτερον ἀδολεσχοῦ (nothing else than garrulity); in *Parm.* 165 c the expression ταῦτ' οὐ φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι depends upon the preceding δόξει, *Xen. Hell.* vii. 4. 35 ἐνόμιζον τῷ θεῷ οἶεσθαι μᾶλλον ἂν οὕτω χαρίζεσθαι they thought they would thus the rather please the god.

e 49. οὐ δήπου: belongs to the whole following sent. with its internal contradiction emphasized by εἶτα. — εἶτα: see on 319 d, l. 26. The thought of Socrates is, that Simonides cannot first say that it is evil to be good, and then characterize this as a prerogative solely of the gods. Here it is immaterial whether Simonides gives his own thought or only quotes Pittacus.

50. τοῦτο γέρας: 344 c reads θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτο ἔχοι τὸ γέρας, but in the passage before us γέρας is pred. Cf. *Symp.* 179 c εὐαριθμήτοις δὴ τισιν ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοί, *Apol.* 18 a δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, *Ar. Eccl.* 658 καγὼ ταύτην γνώμην ἐθέμην.

52. Κεῖον: the people of Ceos were renowned for the vigor and purity of their morals (*Brönsted Reisen in Griechenland*, i. 63 ff., *Bursian, Geog. v. Griech.* ii. 469 f.). In *Legg.* i. 638 b, the subjection of the Ceians by the Athenians is cited as an illustration of the fact that victory and virtue often lie with opposite camps.

54. εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν κτέ.: Socrates ³⁴²
 a now delivers a discourse of considerable length; but the subject excludes the brevity of question and answer, and moreover he does this with the assent of Protagoras and upon the urgent request of the others (ἐκελευέτην πάνυ). — ὃ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο: cf. 338 e as you suggest. Similarly *Gorg.* 514 e τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο.

σὺ βούλει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὁ δὲ Πρόδικός τε καὶ ὁ Ἴππίας ἐκελευέτην πάνυ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

XXVIII. Ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἃ γέ μοι δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ ἄσματος τούτου, πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διεξελθεῖν. Φιλοσοφία γάρ ἐστι παλαιοτάτη τε καὶ πλείστη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν Κρήτῃ τε καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, καὶ σοφισταὶ πλείστοι ^b γῆς ἐκεῖ εἰσίν. ἀλλ' ἐξαρνοῦνται καὶ σχηματίζονται ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ κατάδηλοι ὦσιν ὅτι σοφία τῶν Ἑλλήνων περίεισιν, ὥσπερ οὖς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε τοὺς σοφιστάς, ἀλλὰ δοκῶσι τῷ μάχεσθαι καὶ ἀνδρεία περιεῖναι, ἡγούμενοι, εἰ γνωσθεῖεν ὅτι περίεισι, πάντας τοῦτο ἀσκή- ⁵ σειν, τὴν σοφίαν. νῦν δὲ ἀποκρυψάμενοι ἐκείνο ἐξηπα- ¹⁰

³⁴² 57. Prodicus and Hippias unite in ^a strongly urging Socrates, perhaps because they hope he will humble their rival.

XXVIII. 2. The reflections of the seven wise men upon government and morals, and their efforts to regulate these, were expressed in sententious proverbs. This tendency to put their thoughts into pithy, striking sentences was a characteristic also of the vigorous Spartans. (Plut. Ἀποφθέγματα λακωνικά ii. 208 b ff.). Socrates makes use of this, by a keen stroke of wit, to surpass the paradoxical description of Protagoras (316 d), — to which he had already given a thrust (341 a), — by one still more paradoxical, in describing Crete and Lacedaemon, which were in fact strangers to all learning, as the most ancient seats of philosophy. This is also a hit at the imitators of the Spartans.

^b 5. γῆς: Sauppe construes this with ἐκεῖ, citing ὑποῦ γῆς *Rep.* iii. 403 e, γῆς οὐδαμοῦ ix. 592 a, οὐ γῆς *Menex.* 235 c,

and declaring that to connect it with πλείστοι is against the *usus loquendi*. ³⁴² Still, this latter const. seems a very ^b natural sequence and climax to πλείστη τῶν Ἑλλήνων, and is maintained by Stallbaum, Kroschel, and Deuschle, and given in *Kr. Spr.* 47, 28, 7, where this passage is cited. — σχηματίζονται: cf. *Soph.* 268 a ὡς ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα, ἀ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὡς εἰδὼς ἐσχημάτισται (*he has pretended to know*), *Tim. Lex.* σχηματιζόμενος· προσποιοῦμενος ἢ συνταττόμενος.

7. τοὺς σοφιστάς: for the incorporation and assimilation of the antec., see G. 154; H. 995. (The article in such cases is more commonly dropped.) Cf. 359 d ἐν οἷς σύ ἔλεγες τοῖς λόγοις, *Phaedo* 66 e τότε ἡμῖν ἔσται οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν φρονήσεως, *Rep.* iii. 402 c οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὖς φαμεν ἡμῖν παιδευτέον εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας *neither we, nor the guardians whom we say we have to educate.*

10. ἐξηπατήκασι: a humorous reference to Protagoras's description in 316 d e, 317 a.

St. p. 342.

τήκασι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι λακωνίζοντας, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὦτά
 τε κατάγνυνται μιμούμενοι αὐτούς, καὶ ἱμάντας περιει- c
 λίπτονται καὶ φιλογυμναστοῦσιν καὶ βραχείας ἀναβολὰς
 φοροῦσιν, ὡς δὴ τούτοις κρατοῦντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς
 15 Λακεδαιμονίους· οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπειδὰν βούλων-
 ται ἀνέδην τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῖς συγγενέσθαι σοφισταῖς καὶ
 ἤδη ἄχθονται λάθρα ξυγγιγνόμενοι, ξενηλασίας ποιούμε-
 νοι τῶν τε λακωνιζόντων τούτων καὶ ἐάν τις ἄλλος ξένος
 ὦν ἐπιδημήσῃ, συγγίγνονται τοῖς σοφισταῖς λαυθάνοντες
 20 τοὺς ξένους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐδένα ἐῶσι τῶν νέων εἰς τὰς ἄλ-

³⁴²
 b 11. Many Athenians, who hated the
 democracy and bewailed the decay of
 morals, hoped to improve matters by
 an imitation of Spartan ways, and, as
 usually happens, copied them only ex-
 ternally. They made themselves con-
 spicuous by stern looks, a mustache,
 a staff and short cloak, and engaged
 in gymnastics to such an excess, that,
 contrary to the law of Sparta, they
 zealously practised boxing. Cf. Ar.
 Av. 1281 ἐλακωνομάνουσαν ἅπαντες ἄνθρω-
 ποι τότε, ἐκόμων, ἐπεινῶν, ἐρρύπων ἐσω-
 κράτων all men then had a Laconomania;
 they wore their hair long, went hungry and
 dirty, acted like Socrates, Dem. LIV. 34
 οἱ μὲθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ἐσκυθρωπάκασιν καὶ
 λακωνίζουσιν φασὶ καὶ τρίβωνας ἔχουσι καὶ
 ἀπλᾶς ὑποδέδενται who during the day
 look gloomy and say they live in the
 Spartan style, wear short cloaks and
 single-soled shoes, Plut. Phoc. 10 ἦν
 δέ τις Ἀρχιβιάδης ἐπικαλούμενος Λακω-
 νιστής, πώγωνά τε καθειμένος ὑπερφυῆ
 μεγέθει (wearing a beard of monstrous
 size) καὶ τρίβωνα φορῶν ἀεὶ καὶ σκυθρω-
 πάζων. The same fashion prevailed
 also, as it seems (ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι), in
 other cities.

c 12. ὦτα κατάγνυνται: the ears of
 the boxers bore the marks of the fists

covered with thongs (caestus), cf. ³⁴²
Gorg. 515 e τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγόντων (sc.
 τῶν Λακωνιστῶν). Hence the name ὠτο-
 κάταξις a boxer with ears battered by the
 caestus, which Bekk. *Anecd.* 116, 32 and
 Poll. ii. 83 quote from Aristophanes.

13. ἀναβολάς: the Spartans wore,
 without any chiton, a very short cloak
 of coarse stuff, often threadbare (τρί-
 βων); the Cynics also adopted this
 from Socrates, and it became later
 the usual philosophic dress. From its
 being thrown about the shoulders, in
 which manner of wearing it an artis-
 tic effect was sought (cf. ἐπιδέξια ἀνα-
 βάλλεσθαι *Theaet.* 175 e), the cloak
 was called ἀναβολή.

14. ὡς κρατοῦντας: for the acc.
 abs., see G. 278, 2, n; H. 974. — ὡς δὴ:
 scilicet.

17. ξενηλασίας: Pericles says in
Thuc. i. 144 ἦν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ξενη-
 λασίας μὴ ποιῶσι μήτε ἡμῶν μήτε τῶν
 ἡμετέρων συμμάχων. Schömann: *Gr.*
Alt. i. 291³ f.

20. οὐδένα ἐῶσι: cf. Aristotle (in
Harpocr. p. 166, 12 Ddf.) οὐκ ἐξεῖναι
 φησιν ἀποδημεῖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις,
 ὅπως μὴ ἐθίζωνται ἄλλων νόμων εἶναι
 φίλοι. Laws of this kind are laid
 down also for the ideal state in *Legg.*

λας πόλεις ἐξιέναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ Κρήτες, ἵνα μὴ ἀπομαν- d
 θάνωσιν ἅ αὐτοὶ διδάσκουσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς
 πόλεσιν οὐ μόνον ἄνδρες ἐπὶ παιδεύσει μέγα φρονοῦντες,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες. Γνωῖτε δ' ἄν, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ
 25 λέγω καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ λόγους
 ἄριστα πεπαιδευνται, ὧδε. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλει τις Λακεδαι-
 μονίων τῷ φαυλοτάτῳ συγγενέσθαι, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς
 λόγοις εὐρήσει αὐτὸν φαῦλόν τινα φαινόμενον, ἔπειτα, e
 ὅπου ἂν τύχη τῶν λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλε ῥῆμα ἄξιον λόγου
 30 βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοντιστής, ὥστε
 φαίνεσθαι τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον παιδὸς μηδὲν βελτίω.
 Τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ καὶ τῶν νῦν εἰσὶν οἱ κατανενοήκασι καὶ
 τῶν πάλαι, ὅτι τὸ λακωνίζειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ φιλοσο-
 φεῖν ἢ φιλογυμναστεῖν, εἰδότες ὅτι τοιαῦτα οἷόν τ' εἶναι

³⁴²
^d xii. 950 d f. — This is the only passage
 which states the same fact regarding
 Crete, but the agreement of Spartan
 and Cretan customs is well known.

22. ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσι: *i.e.* in
 Lacedaemon and the Cretan cities.

24. γυναῖκες: training and custom
 made the women in Sparta more
 nearly equal to the men than else-
 where, and their crisp, spirited say-
 ings also were quoted; as of the
 mother who handed her son his
 shield, with the words τέκνον ἢ τὰν ἢ
 ἐπὶ τὰς, *cf.* Plut. ii. 240 b ff., Λακωνῶν
 ἀποφθέγματα.

26. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλει κτέ.: *cf.* 324 a, l. 20.

27. τὰ μὲν πολλὰ: K. F. Hermann
 reads τὰ μὲν πρῶτα, but not at first
 simply, but in general, the conversa-
 tion of the Spartan is plain and un-
 pretending, and only occasionally
 does his keenness dart forth.

^e 29. ὅπου . . . λεγομένων: "wherever
 in the conversation it may chance,"

³⁴²
^e *i.e.* "at some unexpected point in the
 conversation." — ἐνέβαλε: the aor.
 here expresses the action as occurring
 suddenly and all at once. *Cf.* Rep. x.
 609 a οὐκοῦν ὅταν τί τι τούτων προσγέ-
 νηται, πονηρόν τε ποιῆι ᾧ προσεγένετο,
 καὶ τελευτῶν ὅλον διέλυσε καὶ ἀπώλεσε
whenever therefore one of these infects
anything, it makes the thing infected evil,
and finally wholly destroys it, Symp.
 188 b (Ἔρως) διαφθείρει τε πολλὰ καὶ
 ἠδίκησεν. For the gnomic aor., see
 G. 205, 2; H. 840. — The comparing
 of words to darts is not infrequent,
cf. Symp. 219 b ἐγὼ ταῦτα εἰπὼν, καὶ
 ἀφελὶς ὥσπερ βέλη, τετρῶσθαι αὐτὸν ᾤμην,
 Hor. Sat. i. 4. 79 unde petitum
 hoc in me jacis?

30. συνεστραμμένον: (opp. to λελυ-
 μένον) twisted together, like a bow-
 string, where a slight distension gives
 great force, *concise, pithy. Cf. con-*
torta oratio, compressione
rerum brevis (Cic. Brut. 29).

St. p. 342.

35 ῥήματα φθέγγεσθαι τελέως πεπαιδευμένου ἐστὶν ἀνθρώ-
 που. τούτων ἦν καὶ Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος καὶ Πιπτακὸς ³⁴³
 ὁ Μυτιληναῖος καὶ Βίας ὁ Πριηνεὺς καὶ Σόλων ὁ ἡμέ-
 τερος καὶ Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος καὶ Μύσων ὁ Χηνεὺς,
 καὶ ἔβδομος ἐν τούτοις ἐλέγετο ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος Χίλων.
 40 οὗτοι πάντες ζηλωταὶ καὶ ἐρασταὶ καὶ μαθηταὶ ἦσαν
 τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων παιδείας καὶ καταμάθοι ἂν τις αὐ-
 τῶν τὴν σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὔσαν ῥήματα βραχέα ἀξιωμα-
 νόμνευτα ἐκάστω εἰρημένα· ἃ οὗτοι καὶ κοινῇ ξυνελθόν-
 τες ἀπαρχὴν τῆς σοφίας ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι εἰς τὸν ^b
 45 νεῶν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, γράψαντες ταῦτα ἃ δὴ πάντες
 ὑμνοῦσι, Γνωθὶ σαυτόν καὶ Μηδὲν ἄγαν.

Τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; Ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἦν

³⁴³ 38. The memory of Myson early
^a became obscure, and Plato alone
 numbers him with the seven, al-
 though Hipponax (*Frag.* 45 Bgk.) said
 καὶ Μύσων, δὲν ὠπόλλων ἀνεῖπεν ἀνδρῶν
 σωφρονέστατον πάντων. It was not
 certainly known whether he was a
 native of Etis in Crete, or Chenae on
 Mt. Oeta, or Chen in Laconia. That
 Plato did not regard him as a Lace-
 daemonian, but as a Malian from
 Chenae, is clear from the following
 Λακεδαιμόνιος.

42. τοιαύτην: defined by ῥήματα...
 εἰρημένα.

^b 44. ἀνέθεσαν κτέ.: upon pillars of
 the pronaos of the Delphic temple
 were engraved sayings (Paus. x. 24. 1)
 ascribed by Grecian legend to the
 seven Sages, and the same spirit per-
 vaded the teaching of Apollo and the
 wisdom of the Seven (Zeller *Philoso-
 phie der Griechen* i. 82 f.). According
 to Plutarch *Mor.* 385 f, five of them
 dedicated to Apollo an E (*i.e.* εἰ, *thou*
art). Diodorus (ix. 9, Ddf.) relates of

Chilon, καθάπερ ἀπαρχὰς ποιούμενος τῷ ³⁴³
 θεῷ τῆς ἰδίας συνέσεως ἐπέγραψεν ἐπὶ τινα ^b
 κίονα τρία ταῦτα· 'γνωθὶ σεαυτόν,' καὶ 'μη-
 δὲν ἄγαν,' καὶ τρίτον 'ἐγγύα, πᾶρα δ' ἅτα.'

46. ὑμνοῦσι: see on 317 a.

47. τοῦ δὴ... λέγω; Plato likes to
 enliven his discourse by such ques-
 tions. Cf. *Gorg.* 457 e for this same
 phrase; *Meno* 97 e πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω
 ταῦτα; *Phaedr.* 235 c πόθεν δὴ τεκμαι-
 ρόμενος λέγω; *Symp.* 178 d λέγω δὲ δὴ
 τί τοῦτο; *Apol.* 40 b τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι
 ὑπολαμβάνω. So frequently in Demos-
 thenes. — ὅτι: not *because*, but "in or-
 der to show *that*." — ὁ τρόπος τῆς φι-
 λοσοφίας: these words form together
 a single conception, upon which τῶν
 παλαιῶν, emphasized by its position,
 depends. Similarly 345 a ἡ τῆς θερα-
 πείας μάθησις. On the other hand,
Rep. i. 329 b ἐνιοὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν οἰ-
 κείων προπηλακίσεις (*contumelious treat-
 ment*) τοῦ γήρως ὀδύρονται, the words
 τὰς προπηλακίσεις τοῦ γήρως are to be
 connected, and τῶν οἰκείων depends
 upon them.

τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, βραχυλογία τις Λακωνική.
καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ ἰδίᾳ περιεφέρετο τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα
50 ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν, τὸ χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν
ἔμμεναι. ὁ οὖν Σιμωνίδης, ἅτε φιλότιμος ὢν ἐπὶ σο- c
φία, ἔγνω ὅτι εἰ καθέλοι τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα, ὥσπερ εὐδοκι-
μοῦντα ἀθλητήν, καὶ περιγένοιτο αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς εὐδοκιμή-
σει ἐν τοῖς τότε ἀνθρώποις. εἰς τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ
55 τούτου ἕνεκα, τούτῳ ἐπιβουλεύων κολουῦσαι αὐτό, ἅπαν
τὸ ἄσμα πεποίηκεν, ὥς μοι φαίνεται.

XXIX. Ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ ἅπαντες, εἰ ἄρα
ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω. Εὐθύς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ ἄσματος μανι-
κὸν ἂν φανείη, εἰ βουλόμενος λέγειν ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν d
γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, ἔπειτα ἐνέβαλε τὸ μέν. τοῦτο γὰρ
5 οὐδὲ πρὸς ἓνα λόγον φαίνεται ἐμβεβλήσθαι, εἰ μὴ τις
ὑπολάβῃ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ ῥῆμα ὥσπερ ἐρίζοντα

³⁴³ 49. ἰδίᾳ: *in particular*.

^b 51. ἅτε φιλότιμος ὢν: this, as well
^c as ὥσπερ . . . ἀθλήτην below, contains
a hit at Protagoras. Cf. 335 a.

52. καθέλοι: cf. 344 c. So Theocri-
tus xxii. 115 says of Polydeuces, who
has vanquished Amycus in a boxing
match, πῶς δ' ἄρ δὴ Διὸς υἱὸς ἀδηφάγον
(gluttonous) ἄνδρα καθεῖλεν;

(55. τούτῳ: some take as depend-
ing upon ἐπιβουλεύων, anticipating
κολοῦσαι αὐτό, but it is dat. of
means, "through the making of the
poem." — ἐπιβουλείων: with the inf.
means endeavor stealthily, plan to do
a thing unobserved. Cf. Symp. 203 b
ἢ Πενία ἐπιβουλεύουσα παιδίον ποιήσα-
σθαι, Rep. viii. 566 b βιαίῳ δὴ θανάτῳ
ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἀποκτινύναι λάθρα (τὸν
τύραννον). — κολουῦσαι: often has some-
thing exalted as its obj., cf. Hdt. vii.
10. ὃ φιλέει γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα
κολοῦειν. — Protagoras, professing to

adhere to the ethical question raised ³⁴³
by Socrates, while merely changing ^c
its mode of treatment, has raised a
wholly different one (cf. 339 a b).
What Socrates thinks of the value of a
discussion of the poets, he indicates be-
low (cf. 347 e). Now, therefore, meet-
ing Protagoras on his own ground, and
assuming that in the examination of
Simonides's poem a discussion of vir-
tue is the real end, he purposes to find
the true doctrine in the poem; and, as
the first step, discovers in it a polemic
aim. If this is contrary to the view
of Protagoras, the latter has full op-
portunity to refute it (see on 347 a).

XXIX. 5. οὐδὲ . . . λόγον: wholly d
without reason, with no purpose what-
ever. See on 328 a, 351 e. Cf. 344 a.
— Simonides inserted μέν, which al-
ways involves an antithesis, which is
found here, acc. to Socrates, between
γενέσθαι and ἔμμεναι.

λέγειν τὸν Σιμωνίδην, λέγοντος τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ ὅτι Χαλε-
 πὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ἀμφισβητοῦντα εἰπεῖν ὅτι Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ
 γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ὧ Πιπτακέ,
 10 ὡς ἀληθῶς, — οὐκ ἀληθεία ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λέ- e
 γει τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἄρα ὄντων τινῶν τῶν μὲν ὡς ἀλη-
 θῶς ἀγαθῶν, τῶν δὲ ἀγαθῶν μὲν, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθῶς·
 εὔηθες γὰρ τοῦτό γε φανείη ἂν καὶ οὐ Σιμωνίδου· ἀλλ'
 ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἄσματι τὸ ἀλαθέως, οὐ-
 15 τωσί πως ὑπειπόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεῖ-
 μεν αὐτὸν λέγοντα τὸν Πιπτακὸν καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀπο-
 κρινόμενον, εἰπόντα ὦ ἄνθρωποι, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμ-

³⁴³
 d 7. λέγοντος τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ κτέ.:
 exegetical of πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ
 κτέ.; hence the asyndeton. See on
 340 e.

9. γενέσθαι μὲν: should strictly
 have been followed by εἶναι δέ or δια-
 μένειν δέ (cf. 344 b, 345 c), but it is
 followed in 344 a only by οὐ γὰρ εἶναι
 κτέ. with anacoluthon.

e 11. τὴν ἀλήθειαν: i.e. the word
 ἀληθῶς or ἀλήθεια. In Greek, as in
 Latin, words which are referred to
 merely as words, often conform to the
 const. of the sentence. Cf. 341 a περὶ
 τοῦ δεινοῦ, and the freq. τὸ χαλεπόν.

13. This style of exegesis should
 commend itself to Protagoras, for Soc-
 rates has borrowed it from him. See
 on 340 e. "To be sure, the position
 of the words would naturally lead one
 to construe ἀλαθέως with ἀγαθόν, but
 this distinction of two kinds of ἀγαθός
 would indicate a false view, and there-
 fore be unworthy of Simonides." To
 make Simonides say, therefore, what
 it is manifest to Socrates that he
 should say, is readily accomplished
 by the convenient change which fol-
 lows. The argument is ironical.

14. ὑπερβατόν: occurs here for the ³⁴³
 first time in the familiar grammatical e
 sense. It is found also in Anaxim.
Rhet. 30 (p. 60, 24 Sp.) (σαφῶς δηλώ-
 σομεν) ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἐὰν μὴ ὑπερ-
 βατῶς αὐτὰ τιθῶμεν, ἀλλ' αἰετὰ ἐχόμενα
 ἐξῆς τάττωμεν, [Longin.] περὶ ὑψους,
 chap. 22 τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς ιδέας καὶ τὰ ὑπερ-
 βατὰ θετέον· ἔστι δὲ λέξεων ἢ νοήσεων
 ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀκολουθίαν κεκινημένη τάξις
 (an arrangement varying from the regu-
 lar order). Here, however, ὑπερβατόν
 is an adj., and θεῖναι is consider, assume,
 as θεῖμεν following.

15. ὑπειπόντα: premise as a starting-
 point, see on 339 d. Cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 54 f.
 φέρε νυν κατέιπω τοῖς θεαταῖς τὸν λόγον,
 ὀλίγ' ἄτθ' ὑπειπὼν πρῶτον αὐτοῖσιν ταδί
 come now, let me declare the argument
 to the audience, first promising to them
 some few matters as follows, Dem.
de Cor. 60 τούτων ὑφέξω λόγον, τοσοῦ-
 τον ὑπειπὼν, xxiii. 53 γέγραφεν, οὐδὲν
 ὑπειπὼν, ὅπως ἂν τις ἀποκτείνῃ, τὴν
 τιμωρίαν he has proposed private ven-
 geance, without promising under what
 circumstances one may kill justifiably.

17. εἰπόντα: repeats λέγοντα above,
 without τὸν μὲν. See on 330 a.

μεναι, τὸν δὲ ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι ὦ Πιπτακέ, οὐκ ἀληθῆ
λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν ἐστὶν ἄνδρα ἀγα- 344
20 θόν, χερσί τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου
τετυγμένον, χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως. οὕτω φαίνεται πρὸς λό-
γον τὸ μὲν ἐμβεβλημένον καὶ τὸ ἀλαθέως ὀρθῶς ἐπ'
ἐσχάτῳ κείμενον. καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα πάντα τούτῳ μαρ-
τυρεῖ, ὅτι οὕτως εἴρηται. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ περὶ
25 ἐκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ ἄσματι εἰρημένων ἀποδείξαι ὡς εἶ
πεποιήται· πάνυ γὰρ χαριέντως καὶ μεμελημένως ἔχει· b
ἀλλὰ μακρὸν ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ οὕτω διελθεῖν. ἀλλὰ τὸν
τύπον αὐτοῦ τὸν ὅλον διεξέλθωμεν καὶ τὴν βούλησιν,
ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔλεγχός ἐστι τοῦ Πιπτακείου ῥήματος
30 διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ἄσματος.

XXX. Λέγει γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὀλίγα διελθών, ὡς ἂν εἰ
λέγοι λόγον, ὅτι Γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν ἀλα-
θέως, οἷόν τε μέντοι ἐπὶ γε χρόνον τινά· γενόμενον δὲ
διαμένειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἔξει καὶ εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν, ὡς

344
a 19. μὲν: so placed after the pre-
ceding εἶναι that the force of μὲν, in
which it originated, still rings in it.
Cf. 361 e τῶν μὲν τηλικούτων.

21. πρὸς λόγον: with reason, co-
ordinate with ὀρθῶς. See on 351 e,
l. 25.

b 28. τύπον: form, general plan, freq.
contrasted with exact description. Cf.
Rep. iii. 414 a ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκρι-
βείας, εἰρησθαι to speak generally, without
aiming at exactness, Phil. 61 a τὸ τοί-
νον ἀγαθὸν ἦτοι σαφῶς, ἢ καὶ τινα τύπον
αὐτοῦ ληπτέον then we must apprehend
the good clearly, or at least get some gen-
eral idea of it.

29. ἔλεγχος: pred., the subj. being
ἡ βούλησις.

XXX. 1. λέγει γάρ: refers to the

words already quoted 339 c οὐδέ μοι 344
ἐμμελέως . . . ἔμμεναι, for after these b
came immediately, acc. to 341 e, θεὸς
ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας, and then,
evidently, the words ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι
κτέ. Consequently ὀλίγα διελθών can
refer only to the lost lines which
stood between the opening words
ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν . . . τετυγμένον and the
words οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως. Protagoras
refers to the same lines, when he says
in 339 d ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ
πρόσθεν προελθών. — ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοι λό-
γον: in order to make clear that which
the poet has said, it is converted into
periodic prose. For the same pur-
pose, after using the words ὀλίγα
διελθών, Socrates starts anew with
the opening of the poem.

5 σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Πιπτακέ, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, c
 ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτο ἔχοι τὸ γέρας,
 ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
 ὃν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.
 τίνα οὖν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθαιρεῖ ἐν πλοίου ἀρχῇ;
 10 δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸν ἰδιώτην· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἰδιώτης αἰεὶ καθή-
 ρηται. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐ τὸν κείμενόν τις ἂν καταβάλοι, ἀλλὰ
 τὸν μὲν ἐστῶτά ποτε καταβάλοι ἂν τις ὥστε κείμενον
 ποιῆσαι, τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὔ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν εὐμήχανον d
 ὄντα ποτὲ ἀμήχανος ἂν συμφορὰ καθέλοι, τὸν δὲ αἰεὶ
 15 ἀμήχανον ὄντα οὔ· καὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην μέγας χειμῶν ἐπι-
 πεσὼν ἀμήχανον ἂν ποιήσῃ, καὶ γεωργὸν χαλεπὴ ὥρα
 ἐπελθοῦσα ἀμήχανον ἂν θείῃ, καὶ ἰατρὸν ταῦτά ταῦτα.
 τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλῷ ἐγχωρεῖ κακῷ γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ
 παρ' ἄλλου ποιητοῦ μαρτυρεῖται τοῦ εἰπόντος

³⁴⁴ 5. ὦ Πιπτακέ: shows that dir. disc. follows ὅτι.

7. μὴ οὐ... ἔμμεναι: for the double neg. after οὐκ ἔστι, see G. 263, 1, n.; H. 1034. See on 352 d. — Socrates for the present passes unnoticed the use of ἔμμεναι instead of γενέσθαι, a distinction which Simonides had not at all in mind. The true thought of the poet, Socrates gives in e below.

8. καθέλη: cf. 343 c.

9. One is tempted to ascribe ἐν πλοίου ἀρχῇ to Simonides, but cf. in 344 e the introduction of εἰς γράμματα as an illustrative example, without οἶον or other indication that it is Socrates's illustration.

10. ἰδιώτην: on the doctrine that the change to a condition presupposes the opposite condition, assumed in this argument of Socrates, cf. *Phaedo* 70 e ἀναγκαῖον ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ

αὐτῷ ἐναντίου it is necessary that whatever ³⁴⁴ thing has an opposite be generated from ^c no other source than from that opposite.

12. ποτέ: to be connected with καταβάλοι, and then with καθέλοι. Cf. 345 a f.

13. τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὔ: repeats for d emphasis what had already been said before ἀλλά. Cf. *Parm.* 155 d ἐπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἐν (since the one partakes of time), ἀρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ (the past) μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα (the future) καὶ τοῦ νῦν, εἴ περ χρόνου μετέχει; *Gorg.* 521 d οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον.

17 ταῦτά ταῦτα: in this same way. Cf. *Meno* 90 d, ταῦτ' οὗτο *Symp.* 178 e and frequently.

18. γενέσθαι: see on c above. Cf. also e and 345 a b below.

19. ἄλλου ποιητοῦ: *Xen. Mem.* i. 2. 20 quotes the verse without naming

20 αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε
δ' ἐσθλός.

τῷ δὲ κακῷ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη. ^e
ὥστε τὸν μὲν εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐπειδὰν
ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη, οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμε-
25 ναι. σὺ δὲ φῆς, ὦ Πιπτακέ, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.
τὸ δ' ἔστι γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν, δυνατὸν δέ, ἔμμεναι δὲ
ἀδύνατον.

πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς.

30 τίς οὖν εἰς γράμματα ἀγαθὴν πράξις ἐστι, καὶ τίς ἄνδρα ³⁴⁵
ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ εἰς γράμματα; δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τούτων μάθη-
σις. τίς δὲ εὐπραγία ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν ποιεῖ; δῆλον ὅτι
ἡ τῶν καμνόντων τῆς θεραπείας μάθησις. κακὸς δὲ

³⁴⁴
^d the author. Perhaps it was an elegiac poet; in any case the poem had a gnomic character. Sophocles knew the verse, since, in *Ant.* 365, he makes the Chorus say, σοφὸν τι τὸ μηχανόεν | τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ' ἔχων | ποτὲ μὲν κακόν, ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἐσθλὸν ἔρπει one having inventive skill in a remarkable degree, beyond what one would expect, now falls into disaster, again attains to prosperity. See Bergk *Poet. Lyr.* iii. 735⁴.

^e 23. σοφόν, ἀγαθόν: in this whole exegesis Socrates keeps in view his main argument. Here, as developing εὐμήχανον, σοφόν is inserted as the characteristic mark of true excellence, and ἀγαθόν in order to emphasize the contrast with the predicate.

26. τὸ δέ: strictly in relation to this however, then in fact however, whereas. Very frequent in Plato. Cf. *Apol.* 23 α οἴονται γὰρ με αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν. τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι.

28. πράξας: "according as any man has done good or bad deeds, is he

reckoned a good or a bad man." An ³⁴⁴
uninterrupted *being* is not required as ^e
the basis of the judgment. Socrates, however, going beyond the meaning of the poet, applies the word to the inward condition, εὖ πράττει one fares well, κακῶς πράττει one fares ill, and thus is able to push the inquiry as to the cause of this good or ill condition.—μὲν: does not fit into the metrical scheme (see *Introd.* p. 18), but Attic usage allows its insertion here by Socrates in order to bring out the thought more clearly.

29. εἰ: sc. ἔπραξε.

31. ἡ...μάθησις: see on 343 b, l. 47. ³⁴⁵
Here Socrates finds his doctrine, that ^a
virtue is knowledge.

33. κακὸς δὲ κακῶς: (sc. πράξας). Socrates follows the sense, repeating the words of the poet in order to explain them. So he says also τὸ γέρας 344 c, while Simonides (341 e) has γέρας, and ἐξαρκεῖ ἄν 346 d for ἐξαρκεῖ ὅς ἄν 346 c.

κακῶς. τίς οὖν ἂν κακὸς ἰατρὸς γένοιτο ; δῆλον ὅτι ᾧ
 35 πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχει ἰατρῶ εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀγαθῶ ἰατρῶ.
 οὗτος γὰρ ἂν καὶ κακὸς γένοιτο, ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ ἰατρικῆς
 ἰδιῶται οὐκ ἂν ποτε γενοίμεθα κακῶς πράξαντες οὔτε
 ἰατροὶ οὔτε τέκτονες οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅστις b
 δὲ μὴ ἰατρὸς ἂν γένοιτο κακῶς πράξας, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ
 40 κακὸς ἰατρός. οὕτω καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ γένοιτ' ἂν
 ποτε καὶ κακὸς ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ πόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νό-
 σου ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου τινὸς περιπτώματος· αὕτη γὰρ μόνη
 ἐστὶ κακὴ πράξις, ἐπιστήμης στερηθῆναι· ὁ δὲ κακὸς
 ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο κακός· ἔστι γὰρ αἰεί· ἀλλ' εἰ
 45 μέλλει κακὸς γενέσθαι, δεῖ αὐτὸν πρότερον ἀγαθὸν γενέ-
 σθαι. ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ἄσματος πρὸς τοῦτο τείνει,
 ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε, διατελοῦντα c
 ἀγαθόν, γενέσθαι δὲ ἀγαθὸν οἷόν τε, καὶ κακόν γε τὸν
 αὐτὸν τοῦτον· ἐπὶ πλείστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοί εἰσιν
 50 οὓς οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.

³⁴⁵ 37. κακῶς πράξαντες: not attrib.
 a of ἰατροί, which would require πράτ-
 τοντες, and ὅστις γὰρ instead of ὅστις
 δέ following, but circumstantial par-
 tic. of means with ἂν γενοίμεθα.

b 39. ἂν: keeps in view the fact that
 the prot. ὅστις μὴ γένοιτο has just been
 reached as an apod. The first state-
 ment is ἡμεῖς, κακῶς πράξαντες, οὐκ ἂν
 ἰατροὶ γενοίμεθα. Then, starting again
 with this result, and selecting a single
 case, we have ὅστις (equiv. to εἴ τις) μὴ
 ἰατρὸς ἂν γένοιτο κτέ. See GMT. 63, 2.

42. αὕτη γὰρ κτέ.: the causes of
 the deterioration which are here men-
 tioned are all of such a sort that loss
 of knowledge is occasioned by them.
 See on 344 e, l. 23.

c 47. διατελοῦντα: is sometimes joined
 with an adj. without ὄν (Isocr. II. 4,

Isae. VIII. 44, not so elsewhere in ³⁴⁵
 Plato). Here, however, after εἶναι c
 ἀγαθόν, the ἀγαθόν is simply repeated,
 in order to add the further limitation
 διατελοῦντα (that is, permanently good).
 Hence ὄντα would be out of place.

49. ἐπὶ πλείστον: contrasted with
 διατελοῦντα means for the longest time.
 Cf. Thuc. I. 2. 2 τὴν γοῦν Ἀττικὴν ἐκ
 τοῦ ἐπὶ πλείστον (from the remotest
 period) ἀνθρωποὶ ἔκουν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεί,
 VI. 54. 5 καὶ ἐπετήδευσαν ἐπὶ πλείστον
 δὴ τύραννοι οὗτοι ἀρετὴν and these for
 the longest time as (i.e. longer than any
 other) tyrants practised virtue. So
 frequently in Thucydides ἐπὶ πολὺ is
 long. Cf. 328 d above. — That the
 words belong to the poet is evident
 from the loose connection with the
 preceding context and the abandon-

XXXI. Ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα πρὸς τὸν Πιπτακὸν εἴρηται,
καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα γε τοῦ ἄσματος ἔτι μᾶλλον δηλοῖ. φησὶ
γάρ·

Τοῦνεκεν οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν
5 διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν
αἰῶνος βαλέω,

πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν
αἰνύμεθα χθονός·

ἐπὶ δὴ μιν εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω,
10 φησὶν· οὕτω σφόδρα καὶ δι' ὅλου τοῦ ἄσματος ἐπεξέρ- d
χεται τῷ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ ῥήματι.

πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω
ἐκὼν ὅστις ἔρδη

μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

³⁴⁵
c ing. of the dependent form. — καί:
connects ἐπὶ πλείστον and ἀριστοί.

XXXI. 2. δηλοῖ: sc. πρὸς τὸν Πιπ-
τακὸν εἰρημένον. δηλώω is often const.
like δηλός εἰμι, taking the nom. of the
partic. This case is similar, the par-
tic. being supplied. Cf. Soph. Ant. 20
δηλοῖς γὰρ τι καλχαίνουσ' ἔπος for you
are evidently distressed at something, *ib.*
242 δηλοῖς δ' ὡς τι σημανῶν νέον you
plainly have some ill news to tell, Eur.
Med. 548 δείξω σοφὸς γεγώς, Isocr. xv.
5 ἐδήλωσαν δ' οὕτω διακείμενοι. See G.
280; H. 981.

5. κενεάν: belongs by prolepsis to
μοῖραν αἰῶνος (like μοῖραν βίου Soph.
Ant. 896, the allotted portion of life).
— ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα βαλέω: set upon
the vain hope. Cf. Soph. Tr. 940 ὡς
νιν ματαίως αἰτία βάλοι κακῇ that with-
out ground he had laid a grievous charge
upon her, Pind. P. ii. 35 εὐναὶ δὲ παρά-
τροποι ἐς κακότατ' ἀθρόαν| ἔβαλον lawless
unions plunge men into a sea of troubles.

7. πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον: in appos.

with τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατόν. Similar ³⁴⁵
is the thought of Phaedra's nurse, Eur. ^c
Hipp. 471 f. ἀλλ' εἰ τὰ πλείω χρηστὰ
τῶν κακῶν ἔχεις, | ἄνθρωπος οὐσα κάρτα
γ' εἴ πράξειας ἄν but if you have more
things good than bad, mortal as you are,
you surely must be well off. What fol-
lows is like Hom. Z 142 εἰ δέ τις ἐσσι
βροτῶν, οἳ ἀρούρης καρπὸν ἔδουσιν, Hor.
Od. ii. 14. 10 quicumque terrae
munere vescimur.

9. ἐπὶ δὲ μιν εὐρῶν: (i.e. ἐφευρῶν
δὴ μιν) added humorously. Cf. 346 d.

10. φησὶν: repeats the preceding d
φησὶ γάρ. — ἐπεξέρχεται . . . ῥήματι:
persequitur et quasi hostiliter
aggreditur. (Kroschel.)

12. ἐπαίνημι: see on 346 d.

13. The omission of ἄν with ὅστις
and the subjv. is an old usage often
followed by the poets. For the sing.
referring to a pl. antec., cf. τούτους
ὅς ἄν below, also ὅς ἄν τούτων e. See
G. 151, n. 2, b; H. 609 a.

14. ἀνάγκη . . . μάχονται: prover-

15 καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰρημένον. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτος ἦν Σιμωνίδης, ὥστε τούτους φάναι ἐπαινεῖν, ὅς ἂν ἐκὼν μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῆ, ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἱ ἐκόντες κακὰ ποιούσιν. ἐγὼ γὰρ σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡγείται οὐδένα ἀνθρώ-
 20 πων ἐκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ αἰσχροῦ τε καὶ κακὰ ἐκόντα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχροῦ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιῶντες ἄκοντες ποιούσι. καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης οὐχ ὅς ἂν μὴ κακὰ ποιῆ ἐκὼν, τούτων φησὶν ἐπαινέτης εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγει τοῦτο τὸ
 25 ἐκὼν. ἡγείτο γὰρ ἄνδρα καλὸν καγαθὸν πολλάκις αὐτὸν ἐπαναγκάζειν φίλον τινὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπαινέτην, οἷον
 ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβῆναι μητέρα ἢ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον

³⁴⁵
 d bial. Cf. *Legg.* vii. 818 b ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ὁ τὸν θεὸν πρῶτον παροϊμασάμενος εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας εἰπεῖν (*but it is likely that he who at first made the proverb about God had this in mind when he said*), ὡς οὐδὲ θεὸς ἀνάγκη μήποτε φανῆ μαχόμενος, *Aesch. Prom.* 515 τίς οὖν ἀνάγκης ἐστὶν οἰακοστρόφος (*guide*)? *PROM.* Μοῖραι τρίμορφοι μνήμονές τ' Ἐρινύες. *CHO.* τούτων ἄρα Ζεὺς ἐστὶν ἀσθενέστερος; *PROM.* οὐκ οὖν ἂν ἐκφύγοι γε τὴν πεπρωμένην (*the appointed fate*), cf. *Gorg.* 512 e.

15. This argument also is obviously ironical. ἀνάγκη above is clearly intended as the antithesis of ἐκὼν, and the poet really expresses thus the thought which Socrates combats. See on 343 e, 344 e.

18. σχεδόν τι: pretty nearly; here a courteous softening of the assertion. "I am pretty sure." Cf. *Charm.* 164 d σχεδόν γάρ τι ἔγωγε αὐτὸ τοῦτό φημι εἶναι σωφροσύνην, τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν. See on 348 c, l. 55.

e 20. ἐκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν: this also

(cf. 345 b) is a peculiarly Socratic ³⁴⁵ thought, founded upon the principle ^e that all morality rests upon knowledge. Cf. 352 d, 358 e, *Gorg.* 509 e ἡνίκα ὠμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικούντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν.

22. καὶ δὴ καί: after a general statement lays marked stress on the special case which follows it. Cf. 348 e, *Apol.* 18 a. See H. 1042 c.

26. οἷον: as, for example. For the ³⁴⁶ inf. συμβῆναι following the rel. in indir. ^a disc., see GMT. 92, 2, n. 3; H. 947.

27. μητέρα: from Homer down (*ι 367 μήτηρ ἠδὲ πατήρ ἠδ' ἄλλοι πάντες ἑταῖροι*), in such enumerations μήτηρ commonly stands first.—ἀλλόκοτον: strange, perverse, unnatural. Cf. *Rep.* vi. 487 d τοὺς μὲν πλείστους καὶ πάνυ ἀλλοκότους γιγνομένους, ἵνα μὴ παμπονήρους εἴπωμεν the most of them become very strange beings, not to call them utter rogues, *Phryn. Bekk. Anecd.* 15. 3 κυρίως μὲν οὖν οἱ τὸν νοῦν βεβλαμμένοι καὶ ἔμπληκτοι ἀλλόκοτοι καλοῦνται.

ἡ πατρίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. τοὺς μὲν οὖν πονη-
 ρούς, ὅταν τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτοῖς συμβῆ, ὥσπερ ἀσμένους ὄραν
 30 καὶ ψέγοντας ἐπιδεικνύναι καὶ κατηγορεῖν τὴν πονηρίαν
 τῶν γονέων ἢ πατρίδος, ἵνα αὐτοῖς ἀμελοῦσιν αὐτῶν μὴ
 ἐγκαλῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι μηδ' ὄνειδίζωσιν ὅτι ἀμελοῦσιν,
 ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον ψέγειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔχθρας ἐκουσίους **b**
 πρὸς ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις προστίθεσθαι· τοὺς δ' ἀγαθοὺς
 35 ἐπικρύπτεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἀναγκάζεσθαι, καὶ ἂν τι
 ὀργισθῶσι τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἢ πατρίδι ἀδικηθέντες, αὐτοὺς
 ἑαυτοὺς παραμυθεῖσθαι καὶ διαλλάττεσθαι προσαναγκά-
 ζοντας ἑαυτοὺς φιλεῖν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν. πολλάκις
 δέ, οἶμαι, καὶ Σιμωνίδης ἠγήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ τύραννον
 40 ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπαινέσαι καὶ ἐγκωμιάσαι οὐχ
 ἐκῶν, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τῷ Πιπτακῷ **c**
 λέγει ὅτι Ἐγώ, ὦ Πιπτακέ, οὐ διὰ ταῦτά σε ψέγω ὅτι
 εἰμὶ φιλόσοφος· ἐπεὶ

³⁴⁶ 29. ὄραν: depends upon ἠγεῖτο.

^a 31. ἀμελοῦσιν: (accuse them) of neglecting. Pred. partic. after ἐγκαλῶσιν, of the class *verba sentiendi et declarandi*.

b 33. μᾶλλον: sc. ἢ κατ' ἀξίαν.

34. ἐπικρύπτεσθαι, ἐπαινεῖν: although these verbs balance ἐπιδεικνύναι, κατηγορεῖν above, the former, ἐπικρύπτεσθαι, has for its obj. τὴν πονηρίαν, the latter, τοὺς γονέας ἢ τὴν πατρίδα.

37. παραμυθεῖσθαι: soothe. It depends, not upon ἀναγκάζεσθαι, but upon ἠγεῖτο, hence προσαναγκάζοντας is added. Cf. ἐπαινέσαι below. In meaning, it is like *alloqui* (cf. Hor. *Ep.* 13. 18 *deformis aegrimoniae dulcibus alloquiis*). It also has the meanings *encourage, console*. Cf. *Menex.* 247 **c** πατέρας καὶ μη-

τέρας ἀεὶ χρὴ παραμυθεῖσθαι ὡς βῆστα ³⁴⁶
 φέρειν τὴν ξυμφορὰν. **b**

39. ἠγήσατο: some have taken this in the sense of *think fit or needful* (formerly with the mistaken idea that *δεῖν* was omitted), as *Phil.* 59 **a** εἶτε καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἠγεῖται τις ζητεῖν. This, however, would require the pres. inf.; the aor. inf. after ἠγεῖσθαι and kindred verbs can denote only past time. Simonides therefore reflected on what he had already done. Yet the words of *Pind.* *I.* ii. 6 ἅ Μοῖσα γὰρ οὐ φιλοκερδῆς πῶ τότ' ἦν οὐδ' ἐργάτις were generally understood as directed against Simonides for using his art to win money; this was his ἀνάγκη. Cf. Schneidewin *Simon.* p. xxiv. f.

41. ἀναγκαζόμενος: e.g. by a large **c** reward, as was the case also with the sophists. — ταῦτα: see on 310 **e**.

45 ἔμοιγ' ἔξαρκεῖ ὅς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ἦ
 μηδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος,
 εἰδὼς γ' ὄνησίπολιν δίκαν, ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ.
 οὗ μιν ἐγὼ μωμήσομαι.
 οὐ γὰρ φιλόμωμός εἰμι.
 τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων ἀπείρων γενέθλα,
 50 ὥστ' εἴ τις χαίρει ψέγων, ἐμπλησθείη ἂν ἐκείνους μεμφό-
 μενος.

πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχροῖα μὴ μέμικται.
 οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἔλεγε, πάντα τοι λευκά, οἷς δ
 μέλανα μὴ μέμικται· γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἶη πολλαχῆ· ἀλλ'
 55 ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ μέσα ἀποδέχεται ὥστε μὴ ψέγειν. καὶ
 οὐ ζητῶ, ἔφη, πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς
 ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός· ἐπὶ δὴ μιν εὐ-
 ρὼν ἀπαγγελέω. ὥστε τούτου γ' ἔνεκα οὐδένα ἐπαι-
 νέσομαι· ἀλλὰ μοι ἔξαρκεῖ, ἂν ἦ μέσος καὶ μηδὲν κακὸν
 60 ποιῆ, ὡς ἐγὼ πάντας φιλέω καὶ ἐπαίνημι — καὶ

³⁴⁶
^c 45. ἀπάλαμνος: base, wanton. Cf. Theogn. 281 δειλῶ γὰρ τ' ἀπάλαμνα βροτῶ πάρα πόλλ' ἀνελέσθαι | παρ ποδός, ἠγεῖσθαί θ' ὡς καλὰ πάντα τιθεῖ it is in the power of wretched mortal to commit many lawless deeds, and to imagine that he directs all successfully, Pind. O. ii. 57 ὅτι θανόντων μὲν ἐνθάδ' αὐτίκ' ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες | ποινὰς ἔτισαν of the dead, lawless souls suffer at once here on earth their penalties.

46. ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ: a sound man. This is a pred. after ὅς ἂν ἦ and sums up the preceding preds. Cf. Simonides, Frag. 50 Schn., 37 Bgk. καλὸν πρόσωπον.

49. ἀπείρων: equiv. to ἄπειρος, ἀπερῆσιος.

52. "Everything, even that which is ordinary, is good, provided only there is nothing base, shameful, con-

nected with it." — τέ: epic use of the particle subjoined to relatives. See ³⁴⁶
^c G. 151. n. 4; H. 1041.

56. πανάμωμον κτέ.: the repetition δ of the following passage, already once treated, suggests that in the order of the poem it may belong here, and have been anticipated above.

58. τούτου γ' ἔνεκα: if it comes to this. Cf. Phaedo 85 b ἀλλὰ τούτου γ' ἔνεκα λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι ἂν βούλησθε, Rep. i. 337 d ἀλλ' ἔνεκα ἀργυρίου λέγε, Polit. 304 a πείρας μὲν τοίνυν ἔνεκα (if, then, the attempt is what is wanted) φανερός ἐσται. — "If I must first find an absolutely blameless man, I shall be able to praise no one."

60. ἐπαίνημι: verba vulgo contracta apud Lesbios semper fere verborum in $\bar{\mu}$ flexi-

τῇ φωνῇ ἐνταῦθα κέχρηται τῇ τῶν Μυτιληναίων, ὡς πρὸς Πιπτακὸν λέγων τὸ πάντας δὲ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἢ ἐκῶν (ἐνταῦθα δεῖ ἐν τῷ ἐκῶν διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα), ὅστις ἔρδη μηδὲν αἰσχροῦν, ἄκων δ' ἔστιν οὐς ἐγὼ 65 ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ. σὲ οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέσως ἔλεγες ἐπιεικῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πιπτακέ, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἔψεγον· νῦν δὲ — 347 σφόδρα γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψευδόμενος δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, διὰ ταῦτά σε ἐγὼ ψέγω.

XXXII. Ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Πρωταγόρα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, Σιμωνίδης διανοούμενος πεποιηκέναι τοῦτο τὸ ᾄσμα.

Καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας, Εὐ μὲν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ σὺ περὶ τοῦ ᾄσματος διεληλυθέναι· ἔστι μέντοι, 5 ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἔχων, ὃν ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω, ἂν βούλησθε. Καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Ναί, ἔφη, ὦ Ἰππία, εἰσαυθίς γε· νῦν δὲ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, ἂ ὠμολογη-

³⁴⁶ ^d onem assumunt. Ahrens *Dial. Aeol.* p. 145. Still, Simonides was certainly not thinking of Pittacus in this; the Doric lyric poets as well used many of these forms.

61. τῇ φωνῇ: alluding to 341 c.
e 63. διαλαβεῖν: make a division, in the sense of punctuate; of the voice, pause. Isocrates, XII. 17 (διαροῦντες οὐκ ὀρθῶς) and Aristotle *Soph. El.* 4, p. 166, 25 Bk., say διαιρεῖν. In Arist. *Rhet.* iii. 5 διαστίζειν is so used.

³⁴⁷ ^a 66. Const. νῦν δέ σε ψέγω, σφόδρα γὰρ κτέ., but from Homer down (as with ἀλλὰ γάρ), between νῦν δέ and the statement introduced by it, there often intervenes the reason for the latter, the final statement usually following the intervening clause with anacoluthon. See on 319 b, l. 6. Cf. Hom. M 326 νῦν δ' — ἔμπης (notwithstanding) γὰρ κῆρες ἐφ' ἑστᾶσιν θανάτοιο — ἴομεν, Plato *Symp.* 180 c νῦν δέ —

οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν εἷς· μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνός (but ³⁴⁷ now, for he is not one; and since he is not one) ὀρθότερόν ἐστι πρότερον προρηθῆναι ὁποῖον (that it be determined beforehand which) δεῖ ἐπαινεῖν. ^a

XXXII. 1 f. Socrates having concluded, it would have been in place for Protagoras to take exception to his interpretation of the poem. Although a portion is lost, it seems clear that the poet is deprecating a too severe judgment of the prince whom he had eulogized, and consequently of himself in giving the eulogy. On the interpretation, see *Introd.* p. 20.

4. καὶ σὺ: anticipates ἐμοὶ following.

5. ἐπιδείξω κτέ.: Hippias then is concerned not to discover the true sense of the poem, which cannot be manifold, but to display his own wit in an ingenious exposition. b

6. ναί, εἰσαυθίς γε: cf. *Gorg.* 447c τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν εἰσαυθίς ποιησάσθω.

σάτην πρὸς ἀλλήλω Πρωταγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης, Πρωτα-
 γόρας μὲν εἶ ἔτι βούλεται ἐρωτᾶν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι Σω-
 10 κράτη, εἶ δὲ δὴ βούλεται Σωκράτει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐρωτᾶν
 τὸν ἕτερον. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον Ἐπιτρέπω μὲν ἔγωγε Πρω-
 ταγόρα ὁπότερον αὐτῷ ἡδιον· εἶ δὲ βούλεται, περὶ μὲν ^c
 ἀσμάτων τε καὶ ἐπῶν ἐάσωμεν, περὶ δὲ ὧν τὸ πρῶτον
 ἐγὼ σε ἠρώτησα, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἡδέως ἂν ἐπὶ τέλος
 15 ἔλθοιμι μετὰ σοῦ σκοπούμενος. καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι τὸ
 περὶ ποιήσεως διαλέγεσθαι ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τοῖς συμ-
 ποσίοις τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων. καὶ
 γὰρ οὗτοι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις δι' ἑαυτῶν συν-
 εἶναι ἐν τῷ πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν
 20 λόγων τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας, τιμίας ποιούσι τὰς ^d
 ἀυλητρίδας, πολλοῦ μισθούμενοι ἀλλοτρίαν φωνὴν τὴν
 τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων φωνῆς ἀλλήλοις σύνεισιν.
 ὅπου δὲ καλοὶ καγαθοὶ συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι εἰ-
 σίν, οὐκ ἂν ἴδοις οὔτ' ἀυλητρίδας οὔτε ὀρχηστρίδας οὔτε

³⁴⁷
^c 13. ἐάσωμεν: sc. σκοπεῖσθαι from
 the following σκοπούμενος. Cf. Alc. I.
 113d ἐάσαντες οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοποῦσιν
 ὁπότερα συνοίσει πράξασιν *passing over*
therefore the question concerning them,
they ask which course will prove profita-
ble if taken.—We expect σκοπώμεθα,
 but the expression is turned on ac-
 count of the change to dir. discourse.

16. συμποσίοις: this custom is fol-
 lowed in Xen. *Symp.* 2. 1 ἔρχεται τις
 αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ κῶμον (*revel*) Συρακόσιος ἄν-
 θρωπος, ἔχων τε ἀυλητρίδα ἀγαθὴν καὶ
 ὀρχηστρίδα (*dancing-girl*) τῶν τὰ θαύ-
 ματα δυναμένων ποιεῖν καὶ παῖδα πάνυ γε
 ὠραῖον καὶ πάνυ καλῶς κιθαρίζοντα καὶ
 ὀρχούμενον. These show their skill
 during the whole banquet. Plato,
 however, has the same view as the
 one here, when he says *Symp.* 176 e

εἰσηγοῦμαι τὴν μὲν ἄρτι εἰσελθοῦσαν ³⁴⁷
 ἀυλητρίδα χαίρειν ἔαν, ἀυλοῦσαν ἑαυτῆ, ^c
 ἢ ἂν βούληται ταῖς γυναιξὶ ταῖς ἔνδον,
 ἡμᾶς δὲ διὰ λόγων ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι τὸ
 τήμερον.

17. ἀγοραίων: cf. ἀγοραῖος νοῦς· ὁ πάνυ
 εὐτελής καὶ συρφετώδης (*vulgar*) οὐδὲ
 πεφροντισμένος· οἱ γὰρ ἀγοραῖοι ἄνθρωποι
 ἀμαθεῖς καὶ ἀπαίδευτοι Bekk. *Anecd.*
 339. 10; Ar. *Eq.* 218 φωνὴ μιὰρά, γέ-
 γονας κακῶς, ἀγοραῖος εἶ.

20. ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας: is intended ^d
 to touch Protagoras in a tender spot.
 — τιμίας: like our *dear* opp. to cheap.
 Cf. *Euthyd.* 304 b τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον τίμιον,
 τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ εὐωνότατον, *Lys.* xxii. 22
 ἂν οὖν τούτων καταψηφίσθησθε, τὰ τε
 δίκαια ποιήσετε καὶ ἀξιώτερον (*cheaper*)
 τὸν σῖτον ἀνήσεσθε· εἰ δὲ μή, τιμιώ-
 τερον.

25 ψαλτρίας, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς ἱκανοὺς ὄντας συνεῖναι,
 ἄνευ τῶν λήρων τε καὶ παιδιῶν τούτων διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν
 φωνῆς, λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐν μέρει ἑαυτῶν ^e
 κοσμίως, κἂν πάνυ πολὺν οἶνον πίωσιν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ
 αἱ τοιαῖδε συνουσίαι, ἐὰν μὲν λάβωνται ἀνδρῶν, οἰοί
 30 περ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ φασιν εἶναι, οὐδὲν δέονται ἄλλο-
 τρίας φωνῆς οὐδὲ ποιητῶν, οὓς οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἷόν τ'
 ἐστὶ περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοί τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ
 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτά φασι τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν,
 οἱ δ' ἕτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι ὁ ἀδυνατοῦσιν
 35 ἐξελέγξαι· ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας συνουσίας ἐῶσι χαί-
 ρειν, αὐτοὶ δ' ἑαυτοῖς σύνεισι δι' ἑαυτῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ³⁴⁸
 λόγοις πείραν ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες καὶ διδόντες. τοὺς
 τοιούτους μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι μᾶλλον μιμείσθαι ἐμέ τε
 καὶ σέ, καταθεμένους τοὺς ποιητάς, αὐτοὺς δι' ἡμῶν
 40 αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς
 ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πείραν λαμβάνοντας. κἂν
 μὲν βούλη ἔτι ἐρωτᾶν, ἐτοῖμός εἰμί σοι παρέχειν ἀπο-

³⁴⁷
^d 25, 27. αὐτοῖς, ἑαυτῶν: the pl. of
^e the refl. is often used for the reciprocal
 pron., esp. when there is a contrast
 with *others*. See G. 146, n. 3; H. 686 b.

28. καὶ αἱ τοιαῖδε: returns from the
 comparison, which was introduced by
 καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι c.

29. μὲν: no δέ follows. Of the
 two contrasted kinds of feast sug-
 gested by the comparison, only the
 one here considered is emphasized by
 μὲν. Cf. 344 a, 349 d, 361 e. — λάβων-
 ται: the συνουσίαι are personified, as
Symp. 218 a οἱ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγοι νέου
 ψυχῆς μὴ ἀφυοῦς ὅταν λάβωνται *when*
the teachings of philosophy take hold of
a young and noble soul. Then, with
 anacoluthon, those present at the

συνουσίαι become the subj., ἀλλὰ ἐῶσι ³⁴⁷
 χαίρειν κτέ. ^e

30. φασίν: Socrates ironically re-
 minds them of Hippias's expression
 337 d, l. 8.

31 ff. See on 343 c, l. 55.

32. ἐπαγόμενοι: cite as authorities.
 Cf. *Hipp. Ma.* 289 b ἢ οὐ καὶ Ἡράκλει-
 τος ταῦτ' οὗτο λέγει, ὃν σὺ ἐπάγει;
Rep. ii. 364 c τούτοις δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς λόγοις
 μάρτυρας ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται. — αὐτούς:
 see on 325 a, l. 14.

39. καταθεμένους: putting aside. Cf. ³⁴⁸
Tim. 59 c τοὺς περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ κατα-
 τιθέμενος λόγους. ^e

42. παρέχειν: intrans. submit one's
 self, used thus esp. of the sick man
 who delivers himself into the hands of

κρινόμενος· ἔαν δὲ βούλη, σὺ ἐμοὶ παράσχεις, περὶ ὧν μεταξὺ ἐπαυσάμεθα διεξιόντες, τούτοις τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι.

45 Λέγοντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα οὐδὲν ὁ ἀπεσάφει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ὁπότερα ποιήσοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ἄλκιβιάδης πρὸς τὸν Καλλίαν βλέψας, ὦ Καλλία, δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, καὶ νῦν καλῶς Πρωταγόρας ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἐθέλων εἴτε δώσει λόγον εἴτε μὴ διασαφεῖν; ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ
50 δοκεῖ· ἀλλ' ἤτοι διαλεγέσθω ἢ εἰπέτω ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα τούτῳ μὲν ταῦτα συνειδῶμεν, Σωκράτης δὲ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαλέγεται ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις ἂν βούληται ἄλλῳ. Καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αἰσχυνθείς, ὥς γέ μοι ἔδοξε, τοῦ τε
55 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδόν τι τῶν παρόντων, μόγισ προὔτραπέτο εἰς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν ὡς ἀποκρινόμενος.

XXXIII. Εἶπον δὴ ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ οἴου διαλέγεσθαι μέ σοι ἄλλο τι βουλόμενον ἢ ἂ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ ἐκά-

³⁴⁸
a the physician. Cf. *Gorg.* 475 d ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς περὶ ἰατρῷ, παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, *Theaet.* 191 a τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς ναυτιῶντες πατεῖν τε καὶ χρῆσθαι ὅ τι ἂν βούληται like sea-sick passengers, we will submit ourselves to the argument, to trample on us and use us as it will. The refl. is added *Apol.* 33 b ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, *Phaedr.* 228 e ἐμαυτὸν σοι ἐμμελετᾶν (to practise on me) παρέχειν οὐ πάνυ δέδοκται. Cf. 312 c, l. 3, above.

43. βούλη: sc. παρέχειν, cf. 342 a ἔαν δὲ βούλη (ἐμὲ ἀκούειν), σοῦ ἀκούσομαι, *Phaedr.* 229 b καθίζεσθαι ἢ, ἂν βουλόμεθα, κατακλιθῆναι.

b 47. Cf. 336 b, l. 1.

51. συνειδῶμεν: τί τιμι share knowledge with another, then know a thing of

another. Cf. *Symp.* 193 e εἰ μὴ συνήδων Σωκράτει τε καὶ Ἀγάθωνι δεινοῖς οἴσι περὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά. ³⁴⁸
b

55. σχεδόν τι: limits the extent of c τῶν ἄλλων, which otherwise would be equiv. to τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. Cf. *Lach.* 199 c σχεδόν τι ἢ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων (ἐπιστήμη). See on 345 d, l. 18. — μόγισ: cf. 360 d, l. 67. — προὔτραπέτο: brought himself. Cf. *Hom. Z* 336 ἔθελον δ' ἄχει προτραπέσθαι (give myself up to grief), μ 381 ὁπότ' ἀψ ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἀπ' οὐρανόθεν προτραποίμη (turned back), *Thuc.* ii. 52. 2 ἐς ὀλιγορίας ἐτράποντο καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων they fell into the contempt of things sacred and profane, *Plat. Apol.* 21 b ἔπειτα ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην.

XXXIII. Socrates likes to preface critical discussions with an assurance

στοτε, ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ πάνυ λέγειν τι
τὸν Ὅμηρον τὸ

5 σὺν τε δὺ' ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ ὁ τοῦ ἐνόησεν.

εὐπορώτεροι γάρ πως ἅπαντές ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς
ἅπαν ἔργον καὶ λόγον καὶ διανόημα· μοῦνος δ' εἶ πέρ
τε νοήσῃ, αὐτίκα περιῶν ζητεῖ ὅτῳ ἐπιδείξεται καὶ
μεθ' ὅτου βεβαιώσεται, ἕως ἂν ἐντύχῃ. ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγὼ
10 ἔνεκα τούτου σοὶ ἡδέως διαλέγομαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ τινί,
ἡγούμενός σε βέλτιστ' ἂν ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν
ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν εἰκὸς σκοπεῖσθαι τὸν ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ δὴ e
καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς. τίνα γὰρ ἄλλον ἢ σέ; ὅς γε οὐ μόνον
αὐτὸς οἶει καλὸς καγαθὸς εἶναι, ὥσπερ τινὲς ἄλλοι αὐ-
15 τοὶ μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσίν, ἄλλους δὲ οὐ δύνανται ποιεῖν·

³⁴⁸
c of this kind, that he is concerned
only with the subject in hand. Cf.
Gorg. 457 e.

3. λέγειν τι: say something correctly,
be right. Here with πάνυ, "there is a
good deal in what Homer says." Cf.
320 b, 339 c.

d 5. Cf. Hom. κ 224 ff., where Dio-
medes says, when offering to go out as
a spy, σὺν τε δὺ' ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ ὁ
τοῦ ἐνόησεν | ὄππως κέρδος ἔη· μοῦνος δ'
εἶ πέρ τε νοήσῃ, | ἀλλὰ τέ οἱ βράσσων τε
νόος λεπτή δέ τε μῆτις, also *Symp.*
174 d, where Socrates refers to v. 224.
We should have expected σὺν τε δύο
ἐρχομένω πρὸ ὁ τοῦ ἐνόησαν, but, as
though ἔρχονται had preceded, καί
follows with a change of construction,
so that ἐρχομένω is left as nom. abs.
πρὸ ὁ τοῦ stands in transposed order
for ὁ πρὸ τοῦ equiv. τὸ ἕτερος πρὸ
ἑτέρου.

6. ἐσμέν: sc. οὕτως ἔχοντες (sc.
σύνδυο ἐρχομένω). Similar to this are
clauses like 350 b αἰσχροὺν μένταν εἶη,

and those in which we insert an ex-
planatory otherwise, as 355 d οὐ γὰρ ἂν
ἐξημάρτανεν.—The art. οἱ in the ex-
pression ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι is against
Plato's usage, but the insertion of
ἐσμέν makes οἱ ἄνθρωποι almost inde-
pendent of ἅπαντες.

8. ἐπιδείξεται, βεβαιώσεται: can,
not shall. Hence the subjv., the read-
ing of most of the Mss., cannot be
used. Cf. Eur. *Heracl.* 46 ζητοῦσ'
ὄπου γῆς πύργον οἰκιοῦμεθα, Dem. *de*
Cor. 16 οὐχ ἑτέρω ὅτῳ κακόν τι δώ-
σομεν ζητεῖν, Menander (*Meineke*
Com. Gr. iv. 240) οὐκ ἐκ πότων ζη-
τοῦμεν, ᾧ πιστεύσομεν τὰ τοῦ βίου.

11. ἡγούμενος: explains the pre-
paratory ἔνεκα τούτου. Cf. *Theaet.*
151 b ταῦτα ἔνεκα τούδε ἐμήκυνα, ὑπο-
τεύων σε ὠδίνειν τι κυοῦντα ἔνδον (sus-
pecting that you are in labor, great with
some conception), *Parm.* 126 a πάρειμί
γε ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δεησόμενος ὑμῶν.

12. καὶ δὴ καί: see on 345 e.

13. ὅς γε: see on 339 d.

σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶ καὶ ἄλλους οἴός τ' εἶ ποιεῖν
 ἀγαθούς, καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῶ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων
 ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σύ γ' ἀναφανδὸν
 σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας, σοφι- 349
 20 στήν ἐπονομάσας σεαυτόν, ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ
 ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνη-
 σθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐ σέ χρῆν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων
 σκέψιν καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως
 οὔ. καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνα, ἅπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἠρώτων
 25 περὶ τούτων, πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ μὲν ἀναμνη-
 σθῆναι παρὰ σοῦ, τὰ δὲ συνδιασκέψασθαι. ἦν δέ, ὡς b
 ἐγῶμαι, τὸ ἐρώτημα τόδε· σοφία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ αν-
 δρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης, πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε

³⁴⁸
 e 16. σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτός: free resump-
 tion of οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς κτέ. above.
 Socrates ironically uses οἶει . . . εἶναι,
 after the manner of Protagoras, as
 quite equivalent to εἶ. — ποιεῖν: cf.
 318 a, 319 a, 328 b.

17. πεπίστευκας: the perf. here has
 its true force, expressing the action as
 complete while still efficient in its re-
 sult; "you have such confidence in your-
 self." Cf. 2 Ep. ad Tim. i. 12 οἶδα γὰρ ᾧ
 πεπίστευκα, where however the verb has
 a stronger meaning. — ἄλλων: cf. 316 d.
 καὶ belongs to the whole sentence.

³⁴⁹
 a 19. σεαυτόν: (before ὑποκηρυξά-
 μενος) belongs to ἀπέφηνας. — ὑποκη-
 ρυξάμενος: lit. have proclaimed by the
 crier. Cf. Aeschin. III. 41 ἄλλοι δέ
 τινες ὑποκηρυξάμενοι τοὺς αὐτῶν οἰκέτας
 ἀφίεσαν ἀπελευθέρους let them go free.
 Here used figuratively, expressing a
 boastful praise of himself, in which
 Protagoras indulged. — εἰς πάντας τοὺς
 Ἕλληνας: see on 312 a.

21. μισθόν: cf. 328 b. The Ho-
 meric ἄρνησθαι had been preserved in

the expression μισθὸν ἄρνησθαι, this ³⁴⁹
 commonly taking the derived form ^a
 μισθαρνεῖν. But many other Homeric
 words are found in Plato, cf. Senge-
 busch *Homeric Dissert.* i. 122. — The
 innovation of the sophists, in asking
 pay for their instruction, must seem,
 to the high spirit of a free Athenian,
 an unworthy act of trade. — After the
 discomfort of Protagoras in 333 a b,
 and the unexpected outcome of the
 discussion of Simonides's poem, it
 would seem that the sophist would
 hardly have listened with unmixed
 pleasure to Socrates's recapitulation
 of his ample professions, closing with
 the fact that he was the first to
 charge a fee; especially when this
 rehearsal constituted an argument for
 his doing what he was especially dis-
 inclined to do: πῶς οὖν κτέ.

25. ἀναμνησθῆναι: ironically indi-
 cates the fear that he has forgotten
 some point. Cf. 350 c, l. 35 οὐ καλῶς
 μνημονεύεις.

26. ἦν τὸ ἐρώτημα: cf. 329 c, l. 35. b

ὄντα ὀνόματα, ἐπὶ ἐνὶ πράγματι ἐστίν, ἢ ἐκάστῳ τῶν
 30 ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειται τις ἴδιος οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα
 ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἕκαστον, οὐκ ὄν οἶον τὸ ἕτερον
 αὐτῶν τὸ ἕτερον; ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἐνὶ
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἕκαστον ἰδίῳ πράγματι τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων
 ἐπικεῖσθαι, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μόρια εἶναι ἀρετῆς, οὐχ ὡς c
 35 τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια ὁμοιά ἐστίν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὄλῳ
 οὗ μόριά ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια καὶ τῷ
 ὄλῳ οὗ μόριά ἐστίν καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀνόμοια, ἰδίαν ἕκαστα
 δύναμιν ἔχοντα. ταῦτα εἰ μὲν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι ὡσπερ τότε,
 φάθι· εἰ δὲ ἄλλως πως, τοῦτο διόρισαι, ὡς ἔγωγε οὐδέν
 40 σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι, εἰάν πη ἄλλη νῦν φήσης· οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ τότε ἀποπειρώμενός μου ταῦτα ἔλεγες. d

XXXIV. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι
 ταῦτα πάντα μόρια μὲν ἐστίν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὰ μὲν τέτταρα
 αὐτῶν ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ ἀνδρεία
 πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρον πάντων τούτων. ὧδε δὲ γνώσει
 5 ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω· εὐρήσεις γὰρ πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώ-
 πων ἀδικωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀνοσιωτάτους καὶ ἀκο-
 λαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφε-

³⁴⁹
 b 30. ὑπόκειται: the same idea is expressed from the other side in ἐπὶ . . . πράγματι above, and πράγματι . . . ἐπικεῖσθαι below; cf. in Eng. 'am known under such a name.'

31. ἕκαστον: partitive appos. with πρᾶγμα.

c 40. ὑπόλογον: charged to one's account (cf. ὑπολογίζεσθαι), reckoned against one. Cf. *Lach.* 189 b μηδὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἡλικίαν ὑπόλογον ποιούμενος, *Lys.* xxviii. 13 οὐδὲ ἀδίκως τούτοις φημι ἂν εἶναι ὑπόλογον τὴν ἐκείνων φυγὴν, *Dem.* xxxvi. 48 ἀξιούντες μηδὲν ὑπόλογον εἶναι, εἴ ποτε τοῦ σοῦ πατρὸς ἐγένετο.

XXXIV. 2. μὲν: (after μόρια) implies an antithesis, οὐ δὲ ὀνόματα πέντε ἐπὶ ἐνὶ πράγματι, as indicated in l. 28 above. See on 347 e, l. 29.

3. ἢ δὲ ἀνδρεία: this forms the subject of discussion in the *Laches*.

7. διαφερόντως: not in 359 b (where other points are repeated freely). This is not so much a strengthening of the superlative, as an emphasizing of ἀνδρειοτάτους above the preceding superlatives. *Peculiarly, surpassing all the rest, are they very courageous.* Thus also in *Tim.* 23 c πόλις ἀρίστη πρὸς τε τὸν πόλεμον καὶ κατὰ πάντα εὐνομωτάτη διαφερόντως, *Thuc.* viii. 68. 3

ρόντως. Ἐχε δὴ, ἔφην ἐγὼ· ἄξιον γάρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι ^e
 ὃ λέγεις. πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις
 10 ἢ ἄλλο τι; Καὶ ἴτας γε, ἔφη, ἐφ' ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται
 ἰέναι. Φέρε δὴ, τὴν ἀρετὴν καλόν τι φῆς εἶναι, καὶ ὡς
 καλοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ σὺ διδάσκαλον σαυτὸν παρέχεις;
 Κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε. Πότερον
 οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ αἰσχροῦ, τὸ δέ τι καλόν,
 15 ἢ ὅλον καλόν; Ὅλον που καλὸν ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα.
 Οἶσθα οὖν τίνες εἰς τὰ φρέατα κολυμβῶσι θαρραλέως; ³⁵⁰
 Ἐγωγε, ὅτι οἱ κολυμβηταί. Πότερον διότι ἐπίστανται ἢ δι'
 ἄλλο τι; Ὅτι ἐπίστανται. Τίνες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων πολε-
 μεῖν θαρραλέοι εἰσὶ; πότερον οἱ ἵππικοὶ ἢ οἱ ἄφιπποι;
 20 Οἱ ἵππικοί. Τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες; οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἢ
 οἱ μή; Οἱ πελταστικοί. καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γε πάντα, εἰ τοῦτο

³⁴⁹
^d παρέσχε δὲ καὶ ὁ Φρύνιχος ἑαυτὸν πάντων
 διαφερόντως προθυμότατον ἐς τὴν ὀλιγαρ-
 χίαν. Thus in some cases μάλλον with
 the comp.

^e 10. ἴτας, ἰέναι: Protagoras follows
 the etymology; ἴτης· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἰταμός,
 σκληρός, τολμηρός, καὶ δι' αὐτῶν χωρῶν
 τῶν πραγμάτων Schol. Ar. Nub. 445.
 In *Symp.* 203 d, Eros is described as ἀν-
 δρεῖος ὦν καὶ ἴτης καὶ σύντονος bold, reck-
 less, and alert.

13. εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε: cf. *Euthyd.*
 283 e ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἶόν τ' εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι;
 Νῆ Δία, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε, *Rep.* x.
 608 d σὺ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχεις λέγειν; Εἰ μὴ
 ἀδικῶ γ', ἔφην.

14. τὸ μὲν τι: not adverbial acc.,
 but nom., as αὐτοῦ shows. So ὅλον.

³⁵⁰
ⁿ 16. κολυμβῶσι: this employment
 of divers, probably for the recovery
 of articles which had fallen in, or for
 the cleaning out of wells, is mentioned
 also in *Lach.* 193 c καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἐθέλωσιν
 εἰς φρέαρ καταβαίνοντες καὶ κολυμβῶντες
 καρτερεῖν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, and by

Hesych. κολυμβητάς· τοὺς ἐκ τῶν φρεά-
 των ἀναπέμποντας τοὺς κάδους. The
³⁵⁰
^a ἐπιστάται τῶν ὑδάτων in Athens had
 special oversight of the wells and
 cisterns; an important function, in
 the meagreness of the water supply.

19. ἄφιπποι: the rare word is ex-
 plained as ἀπείρως ἔχοντας ἵππικῆς by
 the Schol. on *Rep.* i. 335 c ἀρ' οὖν τῇ
 ἵππικῇ οἱ ἵππικοὶ ἀφίππους (δύνανται
 ποιεῖν) then by the equestrian art can the
 horsemen make others bad horsemen?

20. Iphicrates, an able Athenian gen-
 eral in the first half of the fourth cen-
 tury B.C., greatly increased the effec-
 tiveness of the πελτασταί, although
 such troops are mentioned before his
 time. Thucydides, in ii. 29, iv. 28, speaks
 of Thracian, and Xenophon, in the *An-
 abasis*, distinguishes Thracian and Gre-
 cian peltasts. Cf. *An.* i. 8. 5 τὸ Ἑλλη-
 νικὸν πελταστικόν, vi. 5. 26 οἱ Ἕλληνες
 πελτασταί. In vi. 2. 16, the Thracian
 peltasts of Clearchus are distinguished
 from those which followed Xenophon.

ζητεῖς, ἔφη, οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρρα-
 λεώτεροί εἰσι, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν, ἢ **b**
 πρὶν μαθεῖν. Ἦδη δέ τινας ἑώρακας, ἔφην, πάντων
 25 τούτων ἀνεπιστήμονας ὄντας, θαρροῦντας δὲ πρὸς ἕκα-
 στα τούτων; Ἐγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ λίαν γε θαρροῦντας.
 Οὐκοῦν οἱ θαρραλέοι οὔτοι καὶ ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν; Αἰσχρὸν
 μέντ' αὖν, ἔφη, εἶη ἢ ἀνδρεία· ἐπεὶ οὔτοι γε μαινόμενοί
 εἰσιν. Πῶς οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ
 30 θαρραλέους εἶναι; Καὶ νῦν γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν οὔτοι, ἢν **c**
 δ' ἐγώ, οἱ οὕτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες, οὐκ ἀνδρείοι ἀλλὰ μαι-
 νόμενοι φαίνονται; καὶ ἐκεῖ αὖ οὐ σοφώτατοι, οὔτοι καὶ
 θαρραλεώτατοί εἰσι, θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρειότα-
 τοι; καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἢ σοφία αὖ ἀνδρεία εἶη;
 35 Οὐ καλῶς, ἔφη, μνημονεύεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀ ἔλεγόν
 τε καὶ ἀπεκρινόμην σοι. Ἐγωγε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ, εἰ
 οἱ ἀνδρείοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὡμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ

³⁵⁰
b 23. αὐτοὶ . . . μαθεῖν: Cf. e, l. 48 be-
 low. After αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν with comps.,
 a second comparison sometimes fol-
 lows by way of explanation. Cf. *Legg.*
 i. 649 a (ὁ οἶνος) πίνοντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον
 αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ ποιεῖ πρῶτον ἴλεων (*good-*
natured) εὐθύς μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον, *Hdt.*
 viii. 86 ἐγένοντο μακρῶ ἀμείνονες αὐτοὶ
 ἐωυτῶν ἢ πρὸς Εὐβοίῃ, *Thuc.* vii. 66.

29. τοὺς ἀνδρείους: *about the cour-*
ageous. λέγειν is rarely used thus
 with an acc., without a following ὅτι
 or ὡς and a finite verb. Here, instead
 of ὅτι (ὡς) θαρραλέοι εἰσί, the acc. with
 the inf. is used. Cf. *Symp.* 199 e πειρῶ
 δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἐρωτα εἰπεῖν· ὁ Ἐρως ἔρως
 ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός; 178 b Παρμενίδης
 δὲ τὴν Γένεσιν λέγει, πρῶτιστον μὲν κτέ.,
Phaedo 94 d οἶόν που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν
 Ὀδυσσεΐα πεποίηκεν, οὐ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσ-
 σέα· στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κτέ.

32. ἐκεῖ αὖ: cf. a above.

³⁵⁰
c 34. σοφία: σοφία, μάθησις, ἐπιστήμη
 are here (cf. 349 b ff.) interchanged
 as synonymous expressions (ἀμαθεστά-
 τους, μάθωσιν, ἐπιστήμονες), and to this
 refers the censure in *Arist. Eth. N.* iii.
 II δοκεῖ δὲ καλὴ ἢ ἐμπειρία ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα
 ἀνδρεία τις εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης
 φήθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. The
 true nature of ἐπιστήμη Plato leaves
 here unexamined; but Protagoras, in
 failing to take up this point in his
 contest with Socrates, is shown not
 to observe the lack of accuracy, but
 to be satisfied with the indefinite idea
 of *insight*. See *Introd.* p. 23.

37. Protagoras has maintained in
 349 d that courage and knowledge are
 frequently dissociated. In opposition
 to this, Socrates has shown that, while
 people often confound daring with

θαρραλέοι ἀνδρείοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην· εἰ γάρ με τότε ἤρου, **d**
 εἶπον ἂν ὅτι οὐ πάντες· τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρ-
 40 ραλέοι εἰσί, τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας ὡς
 οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὁμολόγησα. ἔπειτα τοὺς ἐπισταμένους αὐτοὺς
 ἐαυτῶν θαρραλεωτέρους ὄντας ἀποφαίνεις καὶ μὴ ἐπι-
 σταμένων ἄλλων, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἶει τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν
 σοφίαν ταῦτόν εἶναι. τούτῳ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ μετιῶν καὶ
 45 τὴν ἰσχὺν οἰηθείης ἂν εἶναι σοφίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἰ
 οὕτω μετιῶν ἔροίό με εἰ οἱ ἰσχυροὶ δυνατοὶ εἰσι, φαίην
 ἄν· ἔπειτα, εἰ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι παλαίειν δυνατώτεροί εἰσι **e**
 τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων παλαίειν καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴν
 μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν, φαίην ἄν· ταῦτα δὲ ἐμοῦ ὁμο-
 50 λογήσαντος ἐξείη ἄν σοι, χρωμένῳ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τεκμηρίοις

³⁵⁰
c courage, only that daring which is accompanied by knowledge can correctly be called courage; from which it follows that courage and knowledge are inseparably connected. When now Plato makes Protagoras say that his statement that the courageous are also daring, has been unfairly turned about by Socrates, this is wholly aside from the point at which Socrates was aiming. By this objection, as well as by his irrelevant illustration, Protagoras shows that he has misunderstood the purpose of Socrates. For this reason Socrates does not follow him, but from another point takes up a new line of proof.

d 38. τότε: "when you discussed this."

39. τοὺς δὲ . . . ὁμολόγησα: Protagoras might simply have said τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσί, οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας. He wishes, however, at the same time, to assert that Socrates has not overthrown his position. So, instead of οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας, he says

οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα ³⁵⁰
 οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὁμολόγησα, ὡς οἱ ἀνδρείοι οὐ **d**
 θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, while we, in our mode of thought, should have expected ὡς θαρραλέοι εἰσί (without οὐ). This use of ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι rests upon the idiom found also e.g. in *Gorg.* 482 b ἢ οὖν ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγον ὡς οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστι καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ δίδόναι ἀπάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν, ἢ κτέ. either refute her (sc. *Philosophy*, and prove) that to do wrong and escape the penalty is not the worst of all evils, or etc. Here, after ἐξέλεγον, instead of the principle to be refuted, there is added the principle which is to be established by the refutation of its opposite.

42. ἀποφαίνεις: Protagoras himself had drawn and admitted this inference, cf. 350 a.

43. ἐν τούτῳ: in consequence of this, in so far, cf. 324 e.

50 f. Protagoras introduces a singu- **e**
 lar flaw into his logic. He has admitted (350 a) that οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσι, and

τούτοις, λέγειν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὁμολογίαν ἢ σοφία ἐστὶν ἰσχὺς. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα ὁμολογῶ τοὺς δυνατοὺς ἰσχυροὺς εἶναι, τοὺς μέντοι ἰσχυροὺς δυνατούς· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν εἶναι δύναμίν τε καὶ ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καὶ 351
 55 ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γίνεσθαι, τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας τε καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ, ἰσχύν δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν σωμάτων. οὕτω δὲ κακεῖ οὐ ταῦτόν εἶναι θάρσος τε καὶ ἀνδρείαν· ὥστε συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι τοὺς γε θαρραλέους ἀνδρείους
 60 πάντας· θάρσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης γίνεται ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ τε καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας, ὥσπερ ἢ δύνα-

³⁵⁰ that (b) οἱ θαρραλέοι οὗτοι (sc. οἱ ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης) οὐκ ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν, and Socrates has drawn the inference (c) ἢ σοφία ἀν ἀνδρεία εἴη (i.e. ἐστὶ). Now, however, Protagoras declares that οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι δυνατώτεροί εἰσι τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων, then, omitting the needful premise οἱ ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δυνατοὶ οὐκ ἰσχυροὶ εἰσι, which of course no one would think of asserting, he would have Socrates draw the conclusion ἢ σοφία ἐστὶν ἰσχὺς.

51. τούτοις: does not depend upon τοῖς αὐτοῖς, but τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις simply repeats and strengthens τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ above.

³⁵¹ 57. εἶναι: depends, like οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν εἶναι above, upon ὁμολογῶ.

60 ff. Protagoras attempts to controvert the interchange, which he imputes to Socrates, of θάρσος and ἀνδρεία, by instituting an analogy between them and the two terms δύναμις and ἰσχὺς, which like them, if the derivation of the consequents (γίνεσθαι ll. 55, 60) is immediate, stand in the relation of genus and species, viz.: θάρσος: ἀνδρεία = δύναμις: ἰσχὺς. The two antecedents he derives from τέχνη

and ἐπιστήμη respectively, and from ³⁵¹ θυμός and μανία in common; the two consequents, from φύσις, and respectively from εὐτροφία τῆς ψυχῆς and εὐτροφία τοῦ σώματος. The difficulty is to ascertain the exact nature of these relations asserted to be equal, to identify the generic marks in both genus and species, and, in any view, to harmonize this with his previous statements. As all ἀνδρείοι are θαρραλέοι, and all ἰσχυροὶ are δυνατοί, the source of ἀνδρεία must be found in that of θάρσος, and of ἰσχὺς in that of δύναμις. But it is difficult, for instance, to identify φύσις, one source of ἀνδρεία, with either τέχνη or θυμός, two of the sources of θάρσος, — leaving μανία out of the question. The τὲ καί, moreover, connect θυμός so closely with μανία as almost to force us to take the former in a bad sense, anger, passion. Again, it is sufficiently difficult to identify φύσις, one source of ἰσχὺς, with ἐπιστήμη or θυμός, sources of δύναμις, but the attempt to identify with either of these the other source of ἰσχὺς, viz. εὐτροφία τοῦ σώματος, amounts to an absurdity.

μις, ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται.

XXXV. Λέγεις δέ τινας, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὖ ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς; Ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἄνθρωπος ἂν εὖ ζῆν, εἰ ἀνιώμενός τε καὶ ὀδυνώμενος ζῶη; Οὐκ ἔφη. Τί δ', εἰ ἡδέως βιοὺς τὸν βίον τελευτή-
 5 σκειεν, οὐκ εὖ ἂν σοι δοκοῖ οὕτως βεβιωκέναι; Ἔμοιγ', ἔφη. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἡδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἀηδῶς κακόν; Εἰ περ τοῖς καλοῖς γ', ἔφη, ζῶη ἡδόμενος. Τί δή, ὦ
 Πρωταγόρα; μὴ καὶ σύ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, ἡδέ' ἄττα καλεῖς κακὰ καὶ ἀνιὰρὰ ἀγαθὰ; ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω, καθ' ὃ

³⁵¹
 b XXXV. 1 f. Socrates is unable to follow the above style of reasoning, and opens another approach.

c 7. This reply of Protagoras looks as though he intended to make a distinction between higher and lower happiness, or between the agreeable and the good; but he does not carry out any such distinction.

8. μὴ καὶ σὺ κτέ.: the common notion of *agreeable* and *disagreeable* considers only the moment, the passing feeling of desire and aversion. Thus the agreeable can be viewed as harmful (*i.e.* in its results) and bad, the disagreeable, as beneficial and good. The sophists regarded it as the best gift of fortune, to be able to enjoy the pleasure of the moment without fear of consequences. Protagoras holds himself aloof from this, and follows the common view; for he does not comprehend the Socratic idea, that the truly agreeable is only that which remains such, *i.e.* the good, and that only ignorance confounds the transient with the permanent. Plato, however, who in this holds the Socratic view, does not bring out its

full contrast with that of Protagoras, since he is concerned only to show the obscurity of the sophist upon the very subject matter of his own teaching.

9. καθ' ὃ κτέ.: const. τὰ ἡδέα κατὰ τοῦτο ἀγαθὰ ἐστί, καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστί, μὴ εἴ τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται ἄλλο. κατὰ τοῦτο and εἴ τι . . . ἄλλο are contrasted. "According to the concept itself, I mean without reference to outward consequences." The emphasis is thus thrown strongly upon the thought that only the concept itself is to be considered, not the consequences of the concrete reality (*cf.* 353 d). If, with the inferior Mss., we read εἰ μὴ τι, a single case only is excepted, in which the ἡδέα are not also ἀγαθὰ. *Cf.* *Phaedo* 77 e, where μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων is added in order to heighten the contrast of ἴσως ἐνι τις ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς ὅστις φοβεῖται with the preceding ὡς (ἡμῶν) δεδιότων, *Crito* 47 d πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαιόντων δόξῃ, where μὴ with the words following enhances the contrast between that which we do and that which we ought to do (πειθεσθαι τῇ τῶν ἐπαιόντων δόξῃ). *Cf.* also 359 a, ll. 3, 6.

10 ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἄρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά, μὴ εἴ τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται ἄλλο; καὶ αὖθις αὖ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὡσαύτως οὕτως οὐ καθ' ὅσον ἀνιαρά, κακά; Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστίν, ὡς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἀγαθά ἐστίν ἅπαντα **d**
 15 καὶ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κακά· ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἅ τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθά, ἔστι δ' αὖ καὶ ἅ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἔστι κακά, ἔστι δ' ἅ ἔστι, καὶ τρίτον
 20 ἅ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτ' ἀγαθά. Ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τὰ ἡδονῆς μετέχοντα ἢ ποιοῦντα ἡδονήν; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Τοῦτο τοίνυν λέγω, καθ' ὅσον ἡδέα ἐστίν, **e**
 εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθά, τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστίν. Ὡσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, ἐκάστοτε, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 25 σκοπώμεθα αὐτό, καὶ εἰ μὲν πρὸς λόγον δοκῆ εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, συγχωρησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἤδη ἀμφισβητήσομεν. Πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σὺ βούλει ἡγεμονεύειν τῆς σκέψεως, ἢ ἐγὼ ἡγῶμαι; Δίκαιος, ἔφη, σὺ ἡγείσθαι· σὺ γὰρ καὶ

³⁵¹
c 12-20. One is tempted to believe that this guarded threefold division had actually been made by Protagoras. See on 334 a.

d 16. ἀσφαλέστερον: ἀληθέστερον would have had more ethical weight.

19. Const. ἔστι δὲ (τῶν ἡδέων καὶ ἀνιαρῶν) ἅ ἔστιν (ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά).

e 24. ὡσπερ σὺ λέγεις κτέ.: Protagoras requests that now also they follow the method for which Socrates has a preference, cf. 348 c, 349 e. σκέμμα is that which is reached by the σκοπεῖσθαι.

25. πρὸς λόγον: reasonable, in ac-

cordance with fact. Cf. 343 d, 344 a, ³⁵¹
 Phil. 33 c καὶ εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεψώμεθα, **e**
 εἰ μὲν πρὸς λόγον τι ἦ. With πρὸς λόγον, cf. κατὰ λόγον, μετὰ λόγον. — The investigation properly conducted is to reach the result that the agreeable and the good appear as one and the same thing, as is indicated by the position of μὲν, δέ.

27. εἰ δὲ μή: sc. πρὸς λόγον δοκῆ εἶναι κτέ.

29. δίκαιος: sc. εἶ, a rare ellipsis. Cf. Theaet. 143 d σοὶ δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγοις (by no means a few resort to you), καὶ δικαίως· ἄξιός γάρ, Gorg.

30 κατάρχεις τοῦ λόγου. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῆδέ πη 352
καταφανὲς ἂν ἡμῖν γένοιτο; ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἄνθρωπον σκο-
πῶν ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους ἢ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν
τοῦ σώματος ἔργων, ἰδὼν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας
ἄκρας εἴποι, Ἴθι δὴ μοι ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ στήθη καὶ
35 τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπίδειξον, ἵνα ἐπισκέψωμαι σαφέστερον·
καὶ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι ποθῶ πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν· θεασάμενος
ὅτι οὕτως ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ὡς φῆς,
δέομαι τοιοῦτόν τι εἰπεῖν, Ἴθι δὴ μοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, b
καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀποκάλυψον· πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπι-
40 στήμην; πότερον καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ ὥσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς
ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἄλλως; δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπι-
στήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ'
ἀρχικὸν εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανο-
οῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης οὐ
45 τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυ-
μόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα,
πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπι-
στήμης, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν c
ἄλλων ἀπάντων. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ σοὶ τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐ-

351 487 d καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι
e (to speak frankly), αὐτὸς τε φῆς καὶ ὁ
λόγος ὁμολογεῖ σοι. See on 319 b, l. 6.

352 30. κατάρχεις: pres., because the
a sense is you are (still) the leader.

31. The apod. of εἰ εἴποι, naturally
expected after ὥσπερ (e.g. ἂν γένοιτο),
is lost sight of, and instead of it, καὶ
ἐγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι ποθῶ follows with ana-
coluthon.

33. τὰς . . . ἄκρας: the hands. Πο-
mer often uses χεῖρ to denote the arm.

b 39. πῶς . . . ἐπιστήμην: Socrates is
still aiming at the relation of courage
to the other virtues, in order to arrive

at this relation through the identity of 352
the agreeable and the good. He now
b seeks to bring out the predominance
of the understanding in man.

40. Const. καὶ (referring to 351 c
μὴ καὶ σύ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, κτέ.) τοῦτο
(sc. ἐπιστήμη, 357 c). δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως
(sc. εἶναι or ἔχειν), ὥσπερ κτέ.

43. τοιούτου: pred.

44. πολλάκις: const. with ἄρχειν.

48. This passage is referred to by c
Arist. Eth. N. vii. 2 δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστή-
μης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι
κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὸν (τὸν ἐπι-
στάμενον) ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον.

50 τῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλόν τε εἶναι ἢ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἶον ἄρχειν
 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ εἴαν περ γιγνώσκη τις τὰγαθὰ καὶ
 τὰ κακά, μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενός, ὥστε ἄλλ'
 ἅττα πράττειν ἢ ἂν ἐπιστήμη κελεύη, ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι
 τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ;) Καὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη,
 55 ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἅμα, εἴ πέρ τω ἄλλω,
 αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ d
 πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμά-
 των. Καλῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ. οἴσθα
 οὖν ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ οὐ
 60 πείθονται, ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς φασὶ γιγνώσκοντας τὰ βέλτι-
 στα οὐκ ἐθέλειν πράττειν ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ἄλλα πράτ-
 τειν; καὶ ὅσους δὴ ἐγὼ ἠρόμην ὅ τί ποτε αἰτιόν ἐστι
 τούτου, ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασιν ἠττωμένους ἢ λύπης ἢ ὦν e
 νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὑπὸ τινος τούτων κρατουμένους ταῦτα
 65 ποιεῖν τοὺς ποιούντας. Πολλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες, καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι. Ἴθι
 δὴ μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐπιχείρησον πείθειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ
 διδάσκειν ὃ ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ φασιν ὑπὸ

³⁵²
 c 52. ἂν κρατηθῆναι: represents κρα-
 τηθείη ἂν, as though preceded by an
 opt. in the prot., making a milder
 statement of the case.

53. ἂν: i.e. ἂ ἂν, cf. Gorg. 486 e ἂν
 μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσης.

55. εἴ πέρ τω ἄλλω: cf. 329 b,
 l. 28.

d 56. μὴ οὐχί: because αἰσχρόν ἐστι,
 ἄνοιά ἐστι, αἰσχύνομαι are regarded
 as neg. expressions. See GMT.
 95, 2, n. 1, Rem.—As a teacher
 of wisdom and virtue, Protagoras
 must maintain their value; thus
 Socrates, by associating Protagoras
 with himself in combating the vul-
 gar view, involves him also in the

final conclusion, that all virtue is ³⁵²
 wisdom. d

58. λέγων: connected, as is freq. the
 partic. in conversation, with a verb
 used by the previous speaker. Here
 sc. φῆς, from φημί implied in the words
 of Protagoras.

65. Protagoras thinks it unprofita- e
 ble to follow up the idle opinions of
 ignorant men; see 353 a, l. 75, below.

68. ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἠττάσθαι: is
 pred. of ὅ (cf. 353 a c, 354 e, 357 c),
 but the true character of that which
 they call 'being controlled by the
 passions' is repeated and appended
 freely to the rel. clause, καὶ οὐ πράτ-
 τειν κτέ.

St. p. 353.

τῶν ἡδονῶν ἠττᾶσθαι καὶ οὐ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ 353
 70 βέλτιστα, ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν γε αὐτά. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν λεγόν-
 των ἡμῶν ὅτι Οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγετε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ
 ψεύδεσθε, ἔροιנט' ἂν ἡμᾶς. Ὡ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώ-
 κρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἠττᾶσθαι,
 ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστί, καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; εἴπα-
 75 τον ἡμῖν. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν
 τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἀνθρώπων, οἳ ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο
 λέγουσιν; Οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶναί τι ἡμῖν τοῦτο πρὸς b
 τὸ ἐξευρεῖν περὶ ἀνδρείας, πρὸς τᾶλλα μόρια τὰ τῆς ἀρε-
 τῆς πῶς ποτ' ἔχει. εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένειν οἷς ἄρτι
 80 ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, ἐμὲ ἠγήσασθαι, ἦ οἶμαι ἂν ἔγωγε κάλλιστα
 φανερόν γενέσθαι, ἔπου· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἴ σοι φίλον,
 ἐὼ χαίρειν. Ἄλλ', ἔφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ πέραινε ὥσπερ
 ἠρξῶ.

XXXVI. Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ ἔροιντο ἡμᾶς, Τί c
 οὖν φατέ τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς ἠττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλέ-
 γομεν; εἴποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡδί· Ἀκούετε δὴ·
 πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας φράσαι.
 5 ἄλλο τι γάρ, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, φατέ ὑμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι
 ἐν τοῖσδε, οἷον πολλάκις ὑπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ ἀφρο-

353 69. ταῦτα: see on 325 a, l. 14.

a 70. ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν: on the inf. by assimilation after ἐπεὶ in indir. disc., see GMT. 92, 2, n. 3; H. 947. Cf. *Phaedo* 109 e.

73. τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα: sc. γιγνώσκοντας τὰ βέλτιστα οὐκ ἐθέλειν πράττειν, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, cf. 352 d. — ἡδονῆς: for the gen. after verbs implying comparison, see G. 175, 2; H. 749.

74. ἀλλά: now (like at after si); not infreq. after εἰ. Cf. *Phaedo* 91 b εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ' οὖν ἠττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδῆς ἔσομαι

ὀδυρόμενος but, if all is ended when one is dead, I shall at least be less disagreeable to my friends through lamentations. 353 a

76. ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι: (sc. λέγοντες) the first thing that strikes them. Cf. *Crito* 45 d ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξουσι.

80. ἦ: const. ταύτη ἔπου, ἦ.

b 81. εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει (ἐμμένειν), ἐὼ χαίρειν, εἴ σοι φίλον (ἐμὲ χαίρειν ἐάν).

XXXVI. 5. ἄλλο τι: or ἄλλο τι ἦ, c equiv. to nonne, cf. *Apol.* 24 c. See G. 282, 3; H. 1015 b.

6. οἷον κτέ.: the particulars of the

δισίων κρατούμενοι ἡδέων ὄντων, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι πο-
 νηρά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ πράττειν; Φαίειν ἄν. Οὐκοῦν
 ἐροίμεθ' ἄν αὐτοὺς ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ πάλιν, Πονηρὰ δὲ
 10 αὐτὰ πῆ φασὶ εἶναι; πότερον ὅτι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην ἐν **d**
 τῷ παραχρῆμα παρέχει καὶ ἡδύ ἐστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ἢ
 ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον νόσους τε ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας
 καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ παρασκευάζει; ἢ κἄν, εἴ τι τού-
 των εἰς τὸ ὕστερον μηδὲν παρασκευάζει, χαίρειν δὲ μόνον
 15 ποιεῖ, ὅμως δ' ἄν κακὰ εἴη, ὅ τι παθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ
 καὶ ὀπηοῦν; ἄρ' οἴομεθ' ἄν αὐτούς, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, ἄλλο
 τι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἢ ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς τῆς ἡδονῆς
 τῆς παραχρῆμα ἐργασίαν κακὰ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ὕστε- **e**
 ρον γιγνόμενα, νόσους τε καὶ τᾶλλα; Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι,
 20 ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας, τοὺς πολλοὺς ἄν ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι.
 Οὐκοῦν νόσους ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ, καὶ πενίας ποι-
 οῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ; ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼμαι. Συνέφη ὁ

³⁵³
c general τοῖσδε follow φασὶ in the nom.
 and inf.

d 15. ὅμως δέ: see on 326 **d**, l. 45. — ὅ
 τι παθόντα κτέ.: the Mss. have ὅ τι
 μαθόντα. A difficult passage. Entirely
 suitable to the context is the thought
 that in judging whether the agree-
 able *as such* is good, the quality of that
 which is agreeable is of no importance.
 Now the phrase τί παθών (GMT. 109,
 n. 7, b) has the meaning, *what has hap-*
pened to him, what ails him that, where-
fore? Cf. Ar. Pax 699 (Κρατῖνος)
 ἀπέθανεν, ὅθ' οἱ Λάκωνες ἐνέβαλον.
 HERM. τί παθών; TRYG. ὅ τι; The
 phrase τί μαθών is regarded as having
 a similar meaning (*what put it into*
his head, with what idea, wherefore?),
 but G. Hermann (Ar. Nub. p. xlvi. ff.)
 and others rightly replace it every-
 where with τί παθών. We read then

in our passage ὅ τι παθόντα, and com- ³⁵³
 pare with it Apol. 36 **b** τί ἄξιός εἰμι **d**
 παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὅ τι παθών ἐν τῷ
 βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἡγον *what do I de-*
serve to suffer, or what fine to pay,
that I fell into such a condition that
I could not keep quiet during my life?
 and Euthyd. 299 **a** πολὺ μέντοι δικαιο-
 τερον ἂν τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτοιμι,
 ὅ τι παθών σοφοὺς υἱεῖς οὕτω ἔφυσεν
 (*whatever ailed him to beget such wise*
sons). We find then as the thought,
through whatsoever means and in what-
soever way they cause one to enjoy one-
self. With παθόντα an indef. τινά
 (acc. obj.) is understood, by a custo-
 mary use of the partic.

20. τοὺς πολλοὺς: Protagoras wa- **e**
 rily retains the original designa-
 tion, instead of saying τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
 πους.

St. p. 353.

Πρωταγόρας. Οὐκοῦν φαίνεται, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ὑμῖν, ὡς
 φαμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας, δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο ταῦτα
 25 κακὰ ὄντα ἢ διότι εἰς ἀνίας τε ἀποτελευτᾶ καὶ ἄλλων
 ἡδονῶν ἀποστερεῖ; ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν; Συνεδόκει ἡμῖν ἀμφοῖν. 354
 Οὐκοῦν πάλιν ἂν αὐτοὺς τὸ ἐναντίον ἐροίμεθα, ὦ ἄν-
 θρωποι οἱ λέγοντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀνιαρὰ εἶναι, ἄρα οὐ τὰ
 τοιάδε λέγετε, οἷον τὰ τε γυμνάσια καὶ τὰς στρατείας
 30 καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἰατρῶν θεραπείας τὰς διὰ καύσεων τε
 καὶ τομῶν καὶ φαρμακειῶν καὶ λιμοκτονιῶν γιγνομένας,
 ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ μὲν ἐστίν, ἀνιαρὰ δέ; φαῖεν ἄν; Συν-
 εδόκει. | Πότερον οὖν κατὰ τόδε ἀγαθὰ αὐτὰ καλεῖτε, ὅτι
 ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ὀδύνας τὰς ἐσχάτας παρέχει καὶ ἀλγη- b
 35 δόνας, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον ὑγίειαί τε ἀπ' αὐ-
 τῶν γίνονται καὶ εὐεξίαί τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν πόλεων
 σωτηρίαί καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχαὶ καὶ πλοῦτοι; φαῖεν ἄν, ὡς
 ἐγὼμαι. Συνεδόκει. Ταῦτα δὴ ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ δι' ἄλλο τι
 ἢ ὅτι εἰς ἡδονὰς ἀποτελευτᾶ καὶ λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγὰς τε καὶ
 40 ἀποτροπὰς; ἢ ἔχετε τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, εἰς ὃ ἀποβλέ-

³⁵³
e 23. ὡς φαμεν ... Πρωταγόρας: Protagoras allows this to pass as his opinion, and thus accepts it. If he had a different principle in mind in 351 c d, here was the place to urge it.

³⁵⁴
u 27. ἄν: is repeated in the following φαῖεν ἄν. — ὦ ἄνθρωποι οἱ λέγοντες: cf. 337 c ἡμεῖς οἱ ἀκούοντες, ὦ ἄνδρες οἱ παρόντες.

28. αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀνιαρὰ: cf. 353 c πονηρὰ . . . εἶναι.

30. καύσεων κτέ.: i.e. all forms of the healing art, surgery, medicine, diet.

31. λιμοκτονιῶν: hunger cure. Galen, 15, p. 829 K., explains it as ἀσιτία παντελής, or at least ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς πόμασι μόνοις δίαίτα a diet of drinks only.

b 37. ἄλλων: obj. gen. Cf. Gorg. 514 a

εἰ μὴ καλὴ καγαθὴ ἢ διάνοια ἢ τῶν μελ-³⁵⁴
 λόντων ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρ-
 χὴν τινῶν ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντινοῦν un-
 less there be an honorable and good mind
 in those who are to receive much money,
 or the rule of others, or any other sort of
 power. — φαῖεν ἄν: after the double
 question, refers to the second mem-
 ber, which introduces with the correc-
 tive ἢ the true belief of the speaker.

38. ταῦτα κτέ.: must refer to τὰ
 γυμνάσια κτέ., ll. 29 f. It is the con-
 clusion of the whole series beginning
 with οὐκοῦν πάλιν l. 27, and corre-
 sponds to the closing sentence of the
 first series οὐκοῦν φαίνεται κτέ. l. 23.
 For this reason δέ (which the Mss.
 have for δὴ) cannot be correct.

ψαντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖτε, ἀλλ' ἢ ἡδονὰς τε καὶ λύ-
 πας; οὐκ ἂν φαῖεν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι. Οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ c
 Πρωταγόρας. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν διώκετε ὡς ἀγα-
 θὸν ὄν, τὴν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς κακόν; Συνεδόκει.
 45 Τοῦτ' ἄρα ἡγείσθ' εἶναι κακόν, τὴν λύπην, καὶ ἀγαθόν,
 τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν τότε λέγετε κακὸν
 εἶναι, ὅταν μειζόνων ἡδονῶν ἀποστερῆ ἢ ὅσας αὐτὸ ἔχει,
 ἢ λύπας μείζους παρασκευάζῃ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν. ἐπεὶ d
 εἰ κατ' ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν κακὸν καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς
 50 ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχοιτε ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν.
 ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔξετε. Οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.
 Ἄλλο τι οὖν πάλιν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὁ αὐ-
 τὸς τρόπος; τότε καλεῖτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ὅταν
 ἢ μείζους λύπας τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐσῶν ἀπαλλάττῃ ἢ μεί-
 55 ζους ἡδονὰς τῶν λυπῶν παρασκευάζῃ; ἐπεὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλο
 τι τέλος ἀποβλέπετε, ὅταν καλῆτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι
 ἀγαθόν, ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἔχετε ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν. ἀλλ' οὐχ e
 ἔξετε. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Πάλιν τοί-
 νυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἴ με ἀνέροισθε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, Τίνος οὖν
 60 δῆποτε ἔνεκα πολλὰ περὶ τούτου λέγεις καὶ πολλαχῆ;
 συγγιγνώσκετέ μοι, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ
 ῥάδιον ἀποδείξαι τί ἔστι ποτὲ τοῦτο ὃ ὑμεῖς καλεῖτε
 τῶν ἡδονῶν ἥττω εἶναι. ἔπειτα ἐν τούτῳ εἰσὶ πᾶσαι αἱ
 ἀποδείξεις. ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστιν, εἴ πῃ

³⁵⁴ 41. ἀλλ' ἢ: cf. 329 d, l. 6, 356 a, l. 31.

^b 42. δοκεῖ: sc. αὐτοὺς ἂν φάναι.

^c 44. ὄν: for οὔσαν, under the influence of ἀγαθόν. Cf. 359 d, l. 31 οὔσα, and so freq.

^e 59. ἀνέροισθε: we should have expected εἴ με ἀνέροισθ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι (cf. 353 a c), but it is quite in the style of the Platonic Socrates, that he so far

yields to the inclination to introduce ³⁵⁴ discussions in the form of an imaginary ^e dialogue, as here, in this supposed conversation with the multitude, to imagine also a second dialogue with them.

63. ἔπειτα: see on 310 c, l. 18. — ἐν τούτῳ κτέ.: on this point the whole argument turns.

64. See on 353 e, l. 23.

St. p. 355.

65 ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ 355
 τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν· ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως
 καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ λυπῶν; εἰ δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μὴ ἔχετε
 μηδὲν ἄλλο φάναι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ὃ μὴ εἰς ταῦτα
 τελευτᾷ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούετε. φημὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν τούτου
 70 οὕτως ἔχοντος γελοῖον τὸν λόγον γίνεσθαι, ὅταν λέγητε
 ὅτι πολλάκις γινώσκων τὰ κακὰ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι κακά
 ἐστίν, ὅμως πράττει αὐτά, ἐξὸν μὴ πράττειν, ὑπὸ τῶν
 ἡδονῶν ἀγόμενος καὶ ἐκπληττόμενος· καὶ αὖθις αὖ λέ- b
 γετε ὅτι γινώσκων ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὰγαθὰ πράττειν οὐκ
 75 ἐθέλει διὰ τὰς παραχρῆμα ἡδονάς, ὑπὸ τούτων ἡττώ-
 μενος.

XXXVII. Ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖά ἐστι, κατάδηλον ἔσται,
 εἰ μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα ἄρα, ἡδέει τε καὶ ἀνιαρῶ
 καὶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ κακῶ, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ δύο ἐφάνη ταῦτα, δυοῖν
 καὶ ὀνόμασι προσαγορεύωμεν αὐτά, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγαθῶ
 5 καὶ κακῶ, ἔπειτα αὖθις ἡδέει τε καὶ ἀνιαρῶ. | θέμενοι
 δὴ οὕτω λέγωμεν ὅτι Γινώσκων ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὰ κακὰ c
 ὅτι κακά ἐστίν, ὅμως αὐτὰ ποιεῖ. εἰ οὖν τις ἡμᾶς
 ἔρηται, Διὰ τί; Ἡττώμενος, φήσομεν. Ὑπὸ τοῦ; ἐκεί-
 νος ἐρήσεται ἡμᾶς· ἡμῖν δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν ἡδονῆς οὐκέτι ἔξ-

355
 b 73. λέγετε: after ὅταν λέγητε above, we should have expected here καὶ ὅταν αὖθις αὖ λέγητε, but after the long objective clause with ὅτι, the discourse, as is frequently the case, changes to the independent form. For this reason, in order to characterize this second part of what the multitude say as also ridiculous, the words are added, ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖά ἐστι. Cf. 357 c, l. 89.

XXXVII. 2. ἄρα: the previous discussion leads to the result that the use of four words is unnecessary, two being sufficient; since good and agree-

able, bad and disagreeable, coincide. 355
 b ἄρα has its position late in the sentence also in *Gorg.* 519 b πολλά καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀπόλλυνται.

4. αὐτά: i.e. the concepts.

6. οὕτω: belongs to θέμενοι. What c follows is the assertion of the multitude (cf. 352 d, l. 60).

8. ἡττώμενος: sc. ὅμως αὐτὰ ποιεῖ.

9. ὑπὸ μὲν ἡδονῆς: sc. ἡττώμενον, τὰ κακὰ, γινώσκοντα ὅτι κακά ἐστί, ποιεῖν. Instead of having μὲν followed by its correlative, ὑπὸ δὲ ἄλλου λεκτέον, we have, with anacoluthon, ἐκείνῳ δὴ κτέ.

10 εστιν εἰπεῖν· ἄλλο γὰρ ὄνομα μετείληφεν ἀντὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς,
τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἐκείνῳ δὴ ἀποκρινώμεθα καὶ λέγωμεν, ὅτι
ἤττώμενος — Ὑπὸ τίνος; φήσει. Τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, φήσομεν
νῆ Δία. ἂν οὖν τύχη ὁ ἐρόμενος ἡμᾶς ὑβριστῆς ὢν, γε-
λάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ· Ὁ γελοῖον λέγετε πρᾶγμα, εἰ πράττει **d**
15 τις κακά, γιγνώσκων ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, οὐ δέον αὐτὸν πράτ-
τειν, ἤττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. Ἄρα, φήσει, οὐκ ἀξίων
ὄντων νικᾶν ἐν ὑμῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ κακά, ἢ ἀξίων; φή-
σομεν δῆλον ὅτι ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι Οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων·
οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξημάρτανεν ὃν φάμεν ἤττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδο-
20 νῶν. Κατὰ τί δέ, φήσει ἴσως, ἀνάξιά ἐστι τὰγαθὰ τῶν
κακῶν ἢ τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν; ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅταν
τὰ μὲν μείζω, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα ἦ; ἢ πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω **e**
ἦ; οὐχ ἔξομεν εἰπεῖν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο. Δῆλον ἄρα, φήσει,
ὅτι τὸ ἤττᾶσθαι τοῦτο λέγετε, ἀντὶ ἐλαττόνων ἀγαθῶν
25 μείζω κακὰ λαμβάνειν. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτω. μεταλά-
βωμεν δὴ τὰ ὀνόματα πάλιν τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀνιαρὸν ἐπὶ
τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις, καὶ λέγωμεν ὅτι Ἄνθρωπος πράτ-
τει — τότε μὲν ἐλέγομεν τὰ κακά, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν τὰ
ἀνιαρά, γιγνώσκων, ὅτι ἀνιαρά ἐστιν, ἤττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν
30 ἡδέων, δῆλον ὅτι ἀναξίων ὄντων νικᾶν· καὶ τίς ἄλλη **356**
δὴ ἀξία ἡδονῆ πρὸς λύπην ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπερβολὴ ἀλλή-

³⁵⁵ 13. ὑβριστῆς: *inclined to mockery.*

^c 17. ἐν ὑμῖν: *before you as judges.*
^d See on 337 b, l. 34.

19. οὐ γὰρ ἂν κτέ.: see on 348 d, l. 6.
“If the good were equal to the evil,
or greater, evidently there would be
no error in choosing it.”

20. ἀνάξια: as that is ἀξίον ὄντης
which is worth being taken for its
price, so here τὸ ἀγαθόν is ἀνάξιον τοῦ
κακοῦ when it is not worthy to be
chosen in preference to the bad, while

κακόν τι is ἀξίον ἀγαθοῦ when it de- ³⁵⁵
serves to be chosen in place of the ^d
good.

22. πλείω: see on 330 a, l. 16. **e**

26. ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς: *cf.* 349 b, l. 29
ἐπὶ ἐνὶ πράγματι.

31. ἀξία: Cicero's translation (Prisc. ³⁵⁶
v. 64), quae igitur potest esse ^a
indignitas voluptatis ad mo-
lestiam, nisi in magnitudi-
ne aut longitudine alterius
utrius posita? shows that the

λων καὶ ἔλλειψις; ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μείζω τε καὶ σμικρότερα
 γιγνόμενα ἀλλήλων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ
 ἥττον. εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι Ἄλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει, ὡ
 35 Σώκρατες, τὸ παραχρῆμα ἡδὺ τοῦ εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον
 καὶ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ, Μῶν ἄλλω τῷ, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε,
 ἢ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ; οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλω. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ^b
 ἀγαθὸς ἰστάναι ἄνθρωπος, συνθεῖς τὰ ἡδέα καὶ συνθεῖς
 τὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς καὶ τὸ πόρρω, στήσας ἐν τῷ
 40 ζυγῷ, εἶπε πότερα πλείω ἐστίν. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς
 ἡδέα ἰστῆς, τὰ μείζω αἰεὶ καὶ πλείω ληπτέα· ἐὰν δὲ
 λυπηρὰ πρὸς λυπηρά, τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ σμικρότερα· ἐὰν δὲ
 ἡδέα πρὸς λυπηρά, ἐὰν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβάλληται
 ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, ἐὰν τε τὰ ἐγγὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω ἐὰν τε
 45 τὰ πόρρω ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγύς, ταύτην τὴν πράξιν πρακτέον
 ἐν ἧ ἂν ταῦτ' ἐνῆ· ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἡδέα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν, οὐ ^c
 πρακτέα· μή πη ἄλλη ἔχει, φαίην ἂν, ταῦτα, ὡ ἄνθρωποι;
 οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν ἄλλως λέγειν. Συνεδόκει καὶ
 ἐκείνῳ. Ὅτε δὴ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τόδε μοι ἀποκρίνασθε,
 50 φήσω. φαίνεται ὑμῖν τῇ ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν

³⁵⁶
^a false reading of the Mss. ἀναξία, which arose from the preceding ἀναξίων, is very old. ἀναξία is not found as a subst., while ΔΗ and ΑΝ are often interchanged.

32. After the substs. ὑπερβολή and ἔλλειψις, we should expect ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μείζω τε καὶ σμικρότερα γίγνεσθαι, but the sentence is const. as though replying to the question καὶ πῶς ἄλλως ἄξια τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς τὰ λυπηρά, ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπερβάλλοντα ἄλληλα καὶ ἐλλείποντα;

35. ἡδύ: we should have expected ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, but, as the words stand, we must regard καὶ λυπηροῦ, which follows, as an afterthought.

38. ἀγαθὸς ἰστάναι: good at weighing. ³⁵⁶
^b

42. ἐὰν δὲ ἡδέα κτέ.: to this are subord. ἐὰν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κτέ., and ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἡδέα κτέ., and to this ἐὰν μὲν, again, are subord. ἐὰν τε — ἐὰν τε.

44. ἐὰν τε, ἐάν τε: whether, or. See H. 1045, 2.

46. ταῦτα: sc. τὰ ἡδέα.

47. πρακτέα: sc. τὰ ἡδέα. ^c

49. ὅτε: causal, quum, quando, since.

50. μεγέθη: objects of any size, magnitudes. Cf. Phil. 41 e ἐν μὲν ὄψει τὸ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύθεν ὄραν τὰ μεγέθη τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀφανίζει in vision, the near and distant seeing of mag-

μὲν μείζω, πόρρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττω· ἢ οὐ; Φήσουσιν. Καὶ
 τὰ παχέα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡσαύτως; καὶ αἱ φωναὶ αἱ ἴσαι
 ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δὲ σμικρότεραι; Φαίεν
 ἄν. Εἰ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ εἶ πράττειν, ἐν τῷ τὰ d
 55 μὲν μεγάλα μήκη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ σμι-
 κρὰ καὶ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν, τίς ἂν ἡμῖν σωτηρία
 ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἄρα ἢ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἢ ἢ τοῦ φαινο-
μένου δύναμις; ἢ αὕτη μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἄνω
 τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταῦτα καὶ μεταμέ-
 60 λειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἰρέσεσι τῶν μεγάλων
 τε καὶ σμικρῶν, ἢ δὲ μετρητικὴ ἄκυρον μὲν ἂν ἐποίησε
 τοῦτο τὸ φάντασμα, δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἡσυχίαν e
 ἂν ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ
 καὶ ἔσωσεν ἂν τὸν βίον; | ἄρ' ἂν ὁμολογοῖεν ἄνθρωποι
 65 πρὸς ταῦτα ἡμᾶς τὴν μετρητικὴν σῶζειν ἂν τέχνην, ἢ
 ἄλλην; Τὴν μετρητικὴν, ὁμολόγει. Τί δ', εἰ ἐν τῇ τοῦ
 περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου αἰρέσει ἡμῖν ἦν ἢ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου,
 ὅποτε τὸ πλεον ὀρθῶς ἔδει ἐλέσθαι καὶ ὅποτε τὸ ἔλατ-
 τον, ἢ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον, εἴτ'

³⁵⁶ nitudes obscures the true proportions,
^c *Phaedo* 111 d καὶ ἀενάων (ever-flow-
 ing) ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη.

d 54. ἐν τούτῳ: see on 310 d, l. 27.

55. μήκη πράττειν: the peculiar ex-
 pression is chosen to conform the il-
 lustration to the truth to be explained,
 namely, that it is knowledge which
 must determine us τὰ ἡδέα ἢ τὰ λυπηρὰ
 πράττειν.

57. ἢ . . . δύναμις: the (subjective)
 impression of the visible world. The pas-
 sage is directed against Protagoras's
 theory of knowledge. See *Introd.* p. 3.

58. ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει: ἄν is not add-
 ed, because the ἄν with ἐφάνη above is
 still in force. Cf. *Phaedr.* 229 c οὐκ ἂν

ἀτοπος εἶην· εἶτα φαίην, *Phaedo* 87 e ἂν-
 αγκαῖον μένταν εἶη . . . τότε ἤδη ἐπιδεικ-
 νύοι, *Lys.* 208 b ἐφεν ἄν. πόθεν ἐφεν; *Ar.*
Eq. 1057 οὐκ ἂν μαχέσαιτο· χέσαιτο γάρ.

60. πράξεσι, αἰρέσεσι: limit both
 preceding verbs.

61. ἄκυρον: without force, vain. Cf.
Crito 50 b ἐν ἣ αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν
 ἰσχύουσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροι γίγ-
 νονται.

63. μένουσαν: opp. to ἐπλάνα above. e

65. τὴν μετρητικὴν: sc. ὁμολογεῖν
 ἂν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους σῶζειν ἂν ἡμᾶς πρὸς
 ταῦτα.

69. αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτό: i.e. τὸ περιττὸν
 πρὸς τὸ περιττόν οἱ τὸ ἄρτιον πρὸς τὸ
 ἄρτιον.

St. p. 357.

70 ἐγγὺς εἶτε πόρρω εἶη, τί ἂν ἔσωζεν ἡμῖν τὸν βίον; ἄρ' 357
 ἂν οὐκ ἐπιστήμη; καὶ ἄρ' ἂν οὐ μετρητικὴ τις, ἐπειδὴ
 περ ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη; ἐπειδὴ δὲ
 περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου, ἄρα ἄλλη τις ἢ ἀριθμητικὴ;
 ὁμολογοῖεν ἂν ἡμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι· ἢ οὐ; Ἐδόκουν ἂν καὶ
 75 τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ὁμολογεῖν. Εἶεν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ
 ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὀρθῇ τῇ αἰρέσει ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ
 σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὔσα, τοῦ τε πλέονος καὶ ἐλάττουτος, καὶ
 μείζονος καὶ σμικροτέρου, καὶ πορρωτέρω καὶ ἐγγυτέρω,
 ἄρα πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετρητικὴ φαίνεται, ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ b
 80 ἐνδείας οὔσα καὶ ἰσότητος πρὸς ἀλλήλας σκέψις; Ἄλλ'
 ἀνάγκη. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητικὴ, ἀνάγκη δήπου τέχνη καὶ
 ἐπιστήμη. Συμφήσουσιν. Ἦτις μὲν τοίνυν τέχνη καὶ ἐπι-
 στήμη ἐστὶν αὕτη, εἰσαῦθις σκεψόμεθα· ὅτι δὲ ἐπιστήμη
 ἐστί, τοσοῦτον ἐξαρκεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἣν ἐμὲ δεῖ
 85 καὶ Πρωταγόραν ἀποδείξαι περὶ ὧν ἤρεσθ' ἡμᾶς. ἤρεσθε c
 δέ, εἰ μέμνησθε, ἡνίκα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογοῦμεν
 ἐπιστήμης μηδὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αἰεὶ κρατεῖν,
 ὅπου ἂν ἐνῆ, καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων· ὑμεῖς
 δὲ δὴ ἔφατε τὴν ἡδονὴν πολλάκις κρατεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος
 90 ἀνθρώπου, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑμῖν οὐχ ὁμολογοῦμεν, μετὰ τοῦτο
 ἤρεσθε ἡμᾶς ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστι
 τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ

357
 a 72. ἐστὶν: the gen. with εἶναι ex-
 presses here the object with which
 the art has to do.

74. ἂν: const. with ὁμολογεῖν.

77. τοῦ: introduces all the follow-
 ing gens., and also the advs. πορρωτέρω
 and ἐγγυτέρω. Cf. 356 a, l. 33, where
 the advs. μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον are co-ordi-
 nated with μείζω τε καὶ σμικρότερα κτέ.
 With φαίνεται is to be supplied ἡ σω-
 τηρία τοῦ βίου οὔσα.

80. πρὸς ἀλλήλας: i.e. ἡδονῆς πρὸς 357
 λύπην καὶ λύπης πρὸς ἡδονήν. b

86. ἡνίκα: cf. 352 c ff. c

88. ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ κτέ.: does not de-
 pend upon ἡνίκα, but stands inde-
 pendently; hence the repetition with
 anacoluthon of ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑμῖν οὐχ
 ὁμολογοῦμεν, μετὰ τοῦτο ἤρεσθε ἡμᾶς.
 See on 355 b, l. 73.

91. ὦ Πρωταγόρα κτέ.: cf. 353 a.

92. ἀλλά: in apod., cf. Hom. © 154.

καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; εἶπατε ἡμῖν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ^d
 τότε εὐθὺς ὑμῖν εἶπομεν ὅτι Ἀμαθία, κατεγελάτε ἂν
 95 ἡμῶν· νῦν δὲ ἂν ἡμῶν καταγελάτε, καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν
 καταγελάσεσθε. καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὠμολογήκατε ἐπιστήμης
 ἐνδεία ἐξαμαρτάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἵρεσιν καὶ
 λυπῶν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ τε καὶ
 κακὰ· καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν
 100 ἔτι ὠμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικῆς. ἡ δὲ ἐξαμαρτανομένη ^e
 πρᾶξις ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἴστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμαθία
 πρᾶττεται. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, τὸ ἡδονῆς ἥττω εἶναι, ἀμαθία
 ἡ μεγίστη. ἥς Πρωταγόρας ὅδε φησὶν ἰατρὸς εἶναι καὶ
 Πρόδικος καὶ Ἰππίας· ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ οἶεσθαι ἄλλο τι
 105 ἢ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε τοὺς ὑμετέρους παῖδας
 παρὰ τοὺς τούτων διδασκάλους τούσδε τοὺς σοφιστὰς
 πέμπετε, ὡς οὐ διδακτοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ κηδόμενοι τοῦ
 ἀργυρίου καὶ οὐ διδόντες τούτοις κακῶς πρᾶττετε καὶ ἰδίᾳ
 καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

XXXVIII. Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοι ἂν ³⁵⁸
 ἦμεν. ὑμᾶς δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρωταγόρου ἐρωτῶ, ᾧ Ἰππία τε

³⁵⁷
^d 99. ἐπιστήμης: sc. ἐνδεία. — εἰς τὸ
 πρόσθεν: going further, see on 339 d,
 l. 33.

^e 102. τοῦτο: is the subj. ("this of
 which you ask, namely τὸ ἡδονῆς ἥττω
 εἶναι"); ἀμαθία ἡ μεγίστη is the predicate.

105. οὔτε αὐτοί: sc. ἔρχεσθε. There
 should regularly follow, οὔτε οἱ ὑμέ-
 τεροι παῖδες ἔρχονται παρὰ κτέ., but with
 the second οὔτε the const. changes.
 Cf. Dem. xxix. 54 ὁ δ' οὔτ' αὐτὸς
 (ὁμόσαι) οὔτ' ἐκείνοις οὔτ' ἐμοὶ δοῦναι
 τὸν ὄρκον ἠξίωσεν, xlix. 52 οὐ γὰρ
 δήπου ἄνευ γε σταθμοῦ ἠμελλεν οὔθ'
 ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος (παραλήψεσθαι) οὔθ' ὁ
 ὑποτιθεὶς τὸν χαλκὸν παραδώσειν for it
 surely was not likely that the mortgagor

would receive the money, or the mortgagee ³⁵⁷
 pay it, without weighing it. ^e

106. τούτων: i.e. "of all that leads
 to ἡδονῆς μὴ ἥττω εἶναι." This (τοῦ
 ἡδονῆς μὴ ἥττω εἶναι) is understood with
 the following ὡς οὐ διδακτοῦ ὄντος.

108. Cf. 318 e, ll. 42 ff. — Socrates,
 with exquisite irony, supports the cus-
 tom of the sophists, and his apostrophe
 naturally pleases them marvellously
 (cf. 358 a ὑπερφυῶς).

XXXVIII. 1. Socrates has estab- ³⁵⁸
 lished the two theses at which he has ^a
 been aiming, viz., that the agreeable
 is the good, and that the understand-
 ing rules in man. He now moves on
 to connect these two principles with

καὶ Πρόδικε, — κοινὸς γὰρ δὴ ἔστω ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, — πότε-
 ρον δοκῶ ὑμῖν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. Ὑπερφυῶς
 5 ἐδόκει ἅπασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ εἰρημένα. Ὁμολογεῖτε
 ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν
 κακόν; τὴν δὲ Προδίκου τοῦδε διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων
 παραιτοῦμαι· εἴτε γὰρ ἡδὺ εἴτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἴτε χαρτόν,
 εἴτε ὀπόθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζων, ᾧ ^b
 10 βέλτιστε Πρόδικε, τοῦτό μοι πρὸς ὃ βούλομαι ἀπόκριναι.
 Γελάσας οὖν ὁ Πρόδικος συνωμολόγησε, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. Τί
 δὲ δὴ, ᾧ ἄνδρες, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ τοιόνδε; αἱ ἐπὶ τούτου

³⁵⁸
^a the relation of ἀνδρεία to the other
 virtues. See on 352 b, l. 39, 359 c,
 l. 19.

3. ἡμῖν: "for let us all make the
 examination together." Prodicus and
 Hippias had been invited at the out-
 set 317 d, but Socrates repeats particu-
 larly 343 c ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ
 ἅπαντες and 358 d συνεδόκει ἅπασιν
 ἡμῖν. By taking the others along with
 Protagoras, Socrates makes it the more
 difficult for the latter to break away
 again before the consummation of the
 argument, cf. 360 d.

7. διαίρεσιν: see on 337 a, l. 26.

^b 9. εἴτε . . . ὀνομάζων: Plato fre-
 quently alludes thus to the custom of
 using various bynames in invocations
 of the gods, as πολυωνυμία showed the
 manifold honor of the deity. Cf.
Crat. 400 e ὡς περ ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς νόμος
 ἐστὶν ἡμῖν εὐχεσθαι, ὅτινές τε καὶ ὀπό-
 θεν χαίρουσιν ὀνομαζόμενοι by whatever
 names and whence soever they please
 to be invoked, *Symp.* 212 c τοῦτον οὖν
 τὸν λόγον ὡς ἐγκώμιον νόμισον εἰρη-
 σθαι, εἰ δέ, ὅ τι καὶ ὅπῃ χαίρεις ὀνομά-
 ζων (whatever and however you choose
 to name it), τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε, *Aesch.*
Ag. 160 Ζεὺς, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν. — ὀπό-
 θεν . . . ὀνομάζων: cf. *Hom.* K 68

πατρόθεν ἐκ γενεῆς ὀνομάζων ἄνδρα ³⁵⁸
 ἕκαστον. ^b

10. τοῦτο κτέ.: "use that expression,
 that word, which pleases you best, in
 your reply to my question." Cf. *Symp.*
 212 c.

12. ἐπὶ τούτου: cannot express an
 aim, the actions directed at this (πλεῖν
 ἐπὶ Σάμου *Thuc.* i. 116 and similar ex-
 pressions are entirely different); but
 the meaning is that, "the actions be-
 longing in this sphere (*viz.* of the agree-
 able and painless life), so soon as the
 agreeable and the good are one and
 the same, are noble." ἐπὶ τούτου can
 then be compared with ἐπὶ τοῦ σοῦ
 βίου *Phaedr.* 242 a and similar pas-
 sages.—The whole passage αἱ ἐπὶ
 τούτου . . . ὠφέλιμον is somewhat
 strange. But Socrates wishes to
 show that no one who knows what
 is truly agreeable, and is aware that
 the truly and permanently agreeable
 is good, will do, or will wish to do,
 anything that does not bring this
 pleasure. Hence Socrates concludes
 that, if the agreeable is good, all ac-
 tions connected with this are noble,
 and consequently good and useful.
 For no one will wish to do anything
 else than what is good and useful.

πράξεις ἅπασαι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἠδέως, ἄρ' οὐ
 καλαί; καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον;
 15 Συνεδόκει. Εἰ ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ ἠδὺ ἀγαθόν ἐστίν,
 οὐδεὶς οὔτε εἰδὼς οὔτε οἰόμενος ἄλλα βελτίω εἶναι ἢ ἃ
 ποιεῖ, καὶ δυνατά, ἔπειτα ποιεῖ ταῦτα ἐξὸν τὰ βελτίω·
 οὐδὲ τὸ ἦττω εἶναι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλο τι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἀμα-
 20 θία, οὐδὲ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ σοφία. Συνεδόκει
 πᾶσιν. Τί δὲ δῆ; ἀμαθίαν ἄρα τὸ τοιόνδε λέγετε, τὸ
 ψευδῆ ἔχειν δόξαν καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων
 τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων; Καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσι συνεδόκει. Ἄλλο τι
 οὔν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπὶ γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἔρχεται οὐδὲ
 ἐπὶ ἃ οἶεται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἔστι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν
 25 ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ ἃ οἶεται κακὰ εἶναι ἐθέλειν ἰέναι
 ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὅταν τε ἀναγκασθῆ δυοῖν κακοῖν τὸ
 ἕτερον αἰρεῖσθαι, οὐδεὶς τὸ μείζον αἰρήσεται ἐξὸν τὸ
 ἔλαττον; Ἄπαντα ταῦτα συνεδόκει ἅπασιν ἡμῖν. Τί οὔν;
 ἔφην ἐγώ, καλεῖτέ τι δέος καὶ φόβον; καὶ ἄρα ὃ περ ἐγώ;
 30 πρὸς σὲ λέγω, ὦ Πρόδικε. προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ
 τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. Ἐδόκει Πρωταγόρα
 μὲν καὶ Ἰππία δέος τε καὶ φόβος εἶναι τοῦτο, Προδίκω

358 17. καὶ δυνατά: every one is per-
 b fectly conscious that there are deeds
 better than his own, but which he
 does not do because they are beyond
 his power. Thus ἄλλα βελτίω needs
 the limitation καὶ δυνατά, and this
 alone gives meaning to the words
 ἐξὸν τὰ βελτίω.—ἔπειτα: see on 319d,
 l. 26.

c 18. ἦττω εἶναι αὐτοῦ: less precise
 than the former expression ἠδονῆς
 ἦττᾶσθαι etc., but this marks the un-
 reasonableness of the supposed expe-
 rience. Cf. 352 b ff.—τοῦτο: repeats
 with emphasis τὸ ἦττω εἶναι αὐτοῦ.

22. ἄλλο τι: see on 353 c, l. 5.

26. ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν: 'brachylogy'
 for ἀντὶ τοῦ ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ. Cf.
 Symp. 195 c νέος μὲν οὖν ἐστί· πρὸς
 δὲ τῷ νέῳ ἀπαλός (and besides being
 young, tender), Theaet. 185 θ καλὸς
 γὰρ εἶ· πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς
 με, Phil. 41 c οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν
 ἦν ἢ ψυχὴ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίων
 ἔξεων, i.e. τῶν ἐναντίων τῶν τοῦ σώματος
 ἔξεων it was the soul then, that desired
 the states opposite to those of the body,
 Hdt. ii. 134 (Μυκερίνος) πυραμίδα . . .
 ἀπελίπετο πολλὸν ἐλάσσω τοῦ πατρός
 i.e. τῆς τοῦ πατρός.

δὲ δέος, φόβος δ' οὐ. Ἄλλ' οὐδέν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Πρόδικε, διαφέρει· ἀλλὰ τόδε. εἰ ἀληθῆ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν ἐστιν, 35 ἄρα τις ἀνθρώπων ἐθελήσει ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἰέναι ἢ δέδοικεν, ἐξὸν ἐπὶ ἢ μή; ἢ ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων; ἢ γὰρ δέδοικεν, ὠμολόγηται ἡγείσθαι κακὰ εἶναι· ἢ δὲ ἡγείται κακά, οὐδένα οὔτε ἰέναι ἐπὶ ταῦτα οὔτε λαμβάνειν ἐκόντα. Ἐδόκει καὶ ταῦτα πᾶσιν.

359

XXXIX. Οὕτω δὴ τούτων ὑποκειμένων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρόδικέ τε καὶ Ἰππία, ἀπολογείσθω ἡμῖν Πρωταγόρας ὅδε, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπεκρίνατο πῶς ὀρθῶς ἔχει, μὴ ἢ τὸ πρῶτον παντάπασιν· τότε μὲν γὰρ δὴ πέντε ὄντων μορίων 5 τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐδέν ἔφη εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, ἰδίαν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον ἔχειν δύναμιν· ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ὕστερον εἶπε. τὸ γὰρ ὕστερον ἔφη τὰ μὲν τέτταρα ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐν πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων, τὴν ἀνδρείαν· 10 γνῶσεσθαι δέ μ' ἔφη τεκμηρίῳ τῷδε. 'εὐρήσεις γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνθρώπους ἀνοσιωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀδικωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δέ. ὧ γινώσκει ὅτι πολὺ διαφέρει ἢ ἀνδρεία τῶν ἄλλων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς.' καὶ ἐγὼ εὐθύς τότε πάνυ 15 ἐθαύμασα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα μεθ' ὑμῶν διεξῆλθον. ἠρόμην δ' οὖν τοῦτον εἰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους λέγοι θαρραλέους. ὁ δὲ Καὶ ἴτας γ', ἔφη. μέμνησαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος;

358 33. δέος, φόβος δ' οὐ: Prodicus's distinction was probably the one made by Ammonius, p. 39 δέος καὶ φόβος διαφέρει. δέος μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ πολυχρόνιος κακοῦ ὑπόνοια, φόβος δὲ ἢ παραντίκα πτόησις. But the distinction is often neglected.

359 34. τόδε: sc. διαφέρει.

a XXXIX. 1. ὑποκειμένων: used as

a perf. pass. of ὑποτίθεσθαι. See on 359 339 d, l. 32. a

4. τότε: cf. 330 a b.

7. ὕστερον: cf. 349 d.

15. καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον: sc. θαυμάζω. b

16. ἠρόμην: cf. 349 e. — δ' οὖν: introduces a confirmation and development of the preceding statement.

ὁμολόγει. Ἰθι δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰπέ ἡμῖν, ἐπὶ τί λέγεις
 20 ἵτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἢ ἔφ' ἅ περ οἱ δειλοί; Οὐκ
 ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἕτερα. Ναί, ἢ δ' ὅς. Πότερον οἱ μὲν
 δειλοὶ ἐπὶ τὰ θαρραλέα ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρείοι ἐπὶ τὰ
 δεινά; Λέγεται δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώ-
 πων. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις· ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, **d**
 25 ἀλλὰ σὺ ἐπὶ τί φῆς ἵτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἄρ' ἐπὶ
 τὰ δεινά, ἡγουμένους δεινὰ εἶναι, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰ μή; Ἀλλὰ
 τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ἐν οἷς σὺ ἔλεγες τοῖς λόγοις ἀπεδείχθη
 ἄρτι, ὅτι ἀδύνατον. Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθὲς λέγεις.
 ὥστ' εἰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἀπεδείχθη, ἐπὶ μὲν ἅ δεινὰ ἡγεῖ-
 30 ται εἶναι οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἥττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ
 εὐρέθη ἀμαθία οὔσα. ὁμολόγει. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπὶ ἅ γε
 θαρροῦσι πάντες αὖ ἔρχονται, καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ἀνδρείοι,
 καὶ ταύτη γε ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔρχονται οἱ δειλοὶ τε καὶ οἱ
 ἀνδρείοι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πᾶν γε τοῦν- **e**
 35 αντίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ἅ οἱ τε δειλοὶ ἔρχονται καὶ οἱ ἀνδρείοι.

³⁵⁹ 19. Ἰθι δὴ: a new argument, start-
^c ing from the previous concessions.
 Cf. 357 e.

20. οὐκ . . . ὅς κτέ.: here appears
 the irrelevance of Protagoras's con-
 tention in 350 c f. See on 351 b,
 l. 61.

22. θαρραλέα: "matters in which
 one can be θαρραλέος." Cf. *Rep.* v.
 450 e τὰ ληθῆ εἰδότα λέγειν ἀσφαλὲς καὶ
 θαρραλέον, *Lach.* 194 e (τὴν ἀνδρείαν
 φησὶν εἶναι) τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων
 ἐπιστήμην, 198 b.

d 27. ἐν οἷς . . . τοῖς λόγοις: i.e. as
 Socrates had been leading the dis-
 cussion. Cf. 351 e, l. 29. On the
 const., see on 342 b οὗς . . . τοὺς
 σοφιστάς.

28. ἄρτι: cf. 358 c, ll. 22 ff.

30. ἐπειδὴ . . . οὔσα: several critics

would strike out these words; but ³⁵⁹
 they contain a brief repetition of the ^d
 argument to which Protagoras has
 just referred. People commonly say
 that one sometimes does the evil
 knowingly, suffering oneself to be
 overcome by ἡδονή (cf. 352 d ff.,
 353 c). But now Socrates has shown
 that no one does this, but he who
 seems to do it, simply lacks the
 proper knowledge of good and evil;
 that consequently the ἥττω εἶναι ἡδο-
 νῆς or, as in 358 c, ἥττω εἶναι αὐτοῦ
 is only ἀμαθία. It is entirely correct
 therefore to say here briefly "we can
 assert that no man chooses that which
 he holds to be evil, because ἥττω
 εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ has been shown to be
 ἀμαθία."

33. ταύτη: in this respect.

αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. Πότερον, ἔφην ἐγώ, καλὸν ὄν ἰέναι ἢ αἰσχροῦν; Καλόν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν εἴ περ καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὠμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν· τὰς γὰρ καλὰς πράξεις
 40 ἀπάσας ἀγαθὰς ὠμολογήσαμεν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, καὶ αἰεὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Ὁρθῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ ποτέρους
 360 φῆς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἰέναι, καλὸν ὄν καὶ ἀγαθόν; Τοὺς δειλοὺς, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴ περ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡδύ; Ὁμολόγηται γοῦν, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν
 45 γινώσκοντες οἱ δειλοὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιον τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ ἡδιον; Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ὀμολογῶμεν, ἔφη, διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς ἔμπροσθεν ὀμολογίας. Τί δ' ὁ ἀνδρείος; οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιον τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ ἡδιον ἔρχεται; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὀμολογεῖν. Οὐκοῦν
 50 ὅλως οἱ ἀνδρείοι οὐκ αἰσχροὺς φόβους φοβοῦνται, ὅταν φοβῶνται, οὐδὲ αἰσχροὺς θάρρη θαρροῦσιν. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρά, ἄρ' οὐ καλά; Ὁμολόγει. Εἰ δὲ καλά, καὶ ἀγαθά; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι τούναντίον αἰσχροὺς τε φόβους φοβοῦνται καὶ αἰσχροὺς
 55 θάρρη θαρροῦσιν. Ὁμολόγει. Θαρροῦσι δὲ τὰ αἰσχροὺς καὶ κακὰ δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν; Οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; τοῦτο δι' ὃ δειλοὶ εἰσιν οἱ δειλοὶ, δειλίαν ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς; Δειλίαν ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Δειλοὶ δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν δεινῶν ἀμαθίαν ἐφάνησαν ὄντες; Πάνυ
 60 γ', ἔφη. Διὰ ταύτην ἄρα τὴν ἀμαθίαν δειλοὶ εἰσιν; Ὁμολόγει. Δι' ὃ δὲ δειλοὶ εἰσι, δειλία ὀμολογεῖται παρὰ σοῦ; Συνέφη. Οὐκοῦν ἢ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμα-

359 e 36. αὐτίκα: see on 318 b, l. 17.

39. ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν: cf. 358 b.

360 b 54. As οἱ δειλοὶ corresponds to αἰσχροὶ φόβοι, so οἱ μαινόμενοι to αἰσχροὺς θάρρη.

62. See the definition, Xen. Mem. iv. 360 c

6. 11 οἱ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἐπικινδύνοις καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ διαμαρτάνοντες τούτου δειλοὶ. Cf. Lach. 194 e, and above, 359 c.

θία δειλία ἂν εἴη; Ἐπένευσεν. Ἄλλὰ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ^d
 ἐναντίον ἀνδρεία δειλία; Ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἢ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ
 65 μὴ δεινῶν σοφία ἐναντία τῇ τούτων ἀμαθία ἐστίν; Καὶ
 ἐνταῦθα ἔτι ἐπένευσεν. Ἡ δὲ τούτων ἀμαθία δειλία;
 Πάνυ μόγις ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν. Ἡ σοφία ἄρα τῶν δει-
 νῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἐναντία οὔσα τῇ τού-
 των ἀμαθία; Οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα οὔτ' ἐπινεῦσαι ἠθέλησεν
 70 ἐσίγα τε. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Τί δή, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὔτε
 σὺ φῆς ἂ ἐρωτῶ οὔτε ἀπόφης; Αὐτός, ἔφη, πέρανον.
 Ἐν γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, μόνον ἐρόμενος ἔτι σέ, εἴ σοι ὡσπερ τὸ ^e
 πρῶτον ἔτι δοκοῦσιν εἶναί τινες ἄνθρωποι ἀμαθέστατοι
 μέν, ἀνδρειότατοι δέ. Φιλονεικεῖν μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς, ὦ
 75 Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον. χαριοῦμαι
 οὖν σοι, καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἀδύνατόν μοι
 δοκεῖ εἶναι.

XL. Οὔτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄλλου ἔνεκα ἐρωτῶ πάντα ταῦτα
 ἢ σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος, πῶς ποτ' ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς
 ἀρετῆς καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἢ ἀρετή. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι
 τούτου φανεροῦ γενομένου μάλιστα ἂν κατάδηλον γένοιτο ³⁶¹
 5 ἐκεῖνο, περὶ οὗ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ μακρὸν λόγον ἐκάτερος

³⁶⁰
^d 63. ἐπένευσεν: the growing percep-
 tion of Protagoras that ἀνδρεία and
 σοφία coincide, and consequently that
 his position (cf. 349 d) has been com-
 pletely overthrown, is admirably
 brought out in his increasing un-
 willingness to assent.

67. πάνυ μόγις: cf. 348 c, l. 55.

71. αὐτὸς πέρανον: in *Gorg.* 506 c
 Callicles says to Socrates, λέγε ὦ γαθὲ
 αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.

^e 74. φιλονεικεῖν: insist pertinaciously,
 contentiously. Cf. *Rep.* i. 338 a προσε-
 ποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονεικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι
 τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον. Here in freer form
 is the art. with the inf. Cf. *Thuc.* ii.

53 τὸ μὲν προσταλαιπωρεῖν οὐδεὶς πρόθυ-
 μος ἦν, *Soph. Phil.* 1252 ἀλλ' οὐδέ τοι
³⁶⁰
^e σῆ χειρὶ πείθομαι τὸ δρᾶν but neither am
 I persuaded by your hand to act; *Plato*
Soph. 247 b αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν ὁμο-
 λογεῖν they are ashamed to venture to
 confess. Thucydides has also the sim-
 ple acc. in v. III. 4 τὰ χείρω φιλονει-
 κῆσαι.

XL. 3: αὐτὸ ἢ ἀρετή: virtue in itself.
 See on 330 c, l. 33. Cf. *Crat.* 411 d αὐτὸ
 ἢ νόησις τοῦ νέου ἐστὶν ἔσις mental percep-
 tion in itself is an impulse towards the
 new, *Theaet.* 146 e ἀλλὰ γινῶναι ἐπιστή-
 μην αὐτὸ ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, and so fre-
 quently.

ἀπετείναμεν, ἐγὼ μὲν λέγων ὡς οὐ διδακτὸν ἀρετή, σὺ δ' ὡς διδακτόν. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἢ ἄρτι ἕξοδος τῶν λόγων ὡσπερ ἄνθρωπος κατηγορεῖν τε καὶ καταγελαῖν, καὶ εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι, εἰπεῖν ἂν ὅτι Ἄτοποί γ' ἐστέ, ὦ Σώ-
 10 κρατές τε καὶ Πρωταγόρα· σὺ μὲν, λέγων ὅτι οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, νῦν σεαυτῷ τὰναντία σπεύδεις, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδείξαι ὡς πάντα χρήματά ἐστιν ^b ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, ὧ τρόπῳ μάλιστ' ἂν διδακτὸν φανείη ἡ ἀρετή.
 15 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀρετὴ, ὡσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἐπεχείρει λέγειν, σαφῶς οὐκ ἂν ἦν διδακτόν· νῦν δὲ εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη ὅλον, ὡς σὺ σπεύδεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, θαυμάσιον ἔσται μὴ διδακτὸν ὄν. Πρωταγόρας δ' αὖ, διδακτὸν τότε ὑποθέμενος, νῦν τούναντίον ἔοικε
 20 σπεύδοντι ὀλίγου πάντα μᾶλλον φανῆναι αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπι- ^c στήμην· καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤκιστα εἴη διδακτόν. Ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πάντα ταῦτα καθορῶν ἄνω κάτω ταραττόμενα δεινῶς, πᾶσαν προθυμίαν ἔχω καταφανῆ αὐτὰ γενέσθαι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας ἡμᾶς

³⁶¹
^a 6. ἀπετείναμεν: see on 329 a, l. 20, and for the discourses themselves, 319 a f. and 323 c ff.

8. ὡσπερ ἄνθρωπος: Plato not infrequently employs such personifications. The most celebrated is that of the laws, cf. *Crito* 50 a ff.

^b 12. πάντα χρήματα: with a touch of contempt, *everything imaginable*. ἐπιστήμη is predicate.

13. δικαιοσύνη: cf. 333 d ff.—σωφροσύνη: cf. 332 a ff.—ἀνδρεία: cf. 349 d ff.

17. ὅλον: *nothing more nor less than, absolutely*. Cf. 349 e, l. 15, *Meno* 79 b ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετὴν when I asked you to tell me completely

the nature of virtue, and ^c εἰρηκῶς ὅ τι ³⁶¹ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ τὸ ὅλον, 81 d τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα ^b καὶ τὸ μαθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν.

19. ὑποθέμενος: see on 339 d, l. 32.—ἔοικε σπεύδοντι: equiv. to ἔοικε σπεύδειν. A very common const. in Plato, cf. *Apol.* 27 a ἔοικε γὰρ ὡσπερ αἰνίγμα ξυντιθέντι.

20. πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμην: *anything else rather than knowledge*. The real change was not in the position of the disputants, but in the concept of virtue under examination. Socrates had maintained that the sophistic virtue could not be taught; he has proved that the true virtue can be taught. See *Introd.* p. 23.

25 ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὃ τί ἐστὶ, καὶ πάλιν ἐπι-
 σκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτὸν,
 μὴ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ὃ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐν τῇ σκέψει **a**
 σφήλη ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ διανομῇ ἡμελησεν
 ἡμῶν, ὡς φῆς σύ. ἤρεσεν οὖν μοι καὶ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὃ
 30 Προμηθεὺς μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἐπιμηθέως· ᾧ χρώμενος ἐγὼ καὶ
 προμηθούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ παντὸς πάντα
 ταῦτα πραγματεύομαι, καὶ εἰ σὺ ἐθέλεις, ὅπερ καὶ κατ'
 ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον, μετὰ σοῦ ἂν ἥδιστα ταῦτα συνδιασκοποίην.
 Καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἐπαινῶ
 35 σου τὴν προθυμίαν καὶ τὴν διέξοδον τῶν λόγων. καὶ **e**
 γὰρ οὔτε τᾶλλα οἶμαι κακὸς εἶναι ἄνθρωπος, φθονερός τε
 ἤκιστ' ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ σοῦ πρὸς πολλοὺς δὴ
 εἶρηκα, ὅτι ὦν ἐντυγχάνω πολὺ μάλιστα ἄγαμαι σέ, τῶν
 μὲν τηλικούτων καὶ πάνυ· καὶ λέγω γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν
 40 θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ τῶν ἐλλογίμων γένοιο ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ.
 καὶ περὶ τούτων δὲ εἰσαῦθις, ὅταν βούλη, διέξιμεν· νῦν
 δ' ὥρα ἤδη καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλο τι τρέπεσθαι. Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, **362**
 οὔτω χρή ποιεῖν, εἰ σοι δοκεῖ. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ οἶ περ ἔφην

³⁶¹ **c** 25. ἐξελθεῖν: a rare use, *go on from* one thing to another. Cf. Thuc. i. 70. *Ἔκρατοῦντές τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐξέρχονται when they conquer their enemies, they push their victories to the farthest extent, Soph. O. C. 981 σοῦ γ' εἰς τόδ' ἐξελθόντος ἀνόσιον στόμα when you give vent to so unhallowed words.*

d 27. πολλάκις: frequent in Plato after μή and εἰ, meaning *perchance*.

28. "That we may not later, grown wise by misfortune, have to come back to sound views (ἐπιμηθεῖσθαι), but may think out the whole matter clearly beforehand (προμηθεῖσθαι)."

29. φῆς: cf. 321 b ff.

30. ᾧ: *i.e.* Prometheus in the myth. What is related of him Socrates will use as a model.

32. κατ' ἀρχάς: cf. 320 b, 335 c, 348 d.

35. διέξοδον: see on 326 a, l. 19.

39 f. τηλικούτων, γένοιο: Protagoras avails himself of Socrates's modesty (cf. c above) to recover his own position of superiority, as the elder of Socrates, and one who is *already* famous. Cf. 314 b, 316 c, 317 c, 320 c, 335 a.

41. εἰσαῦθις: cf. 347 b, l. 7.

43. ἔφην: cf. 335 c, l. 38.

³⁶¹ **d**

³⁶² **a**

ἰέναι πάλαι ὄρα, ἀλλὰ Καλλία τῷ καλῷ χαριζόμενος
45 παρέμεινα.

Ταῦτ' εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀπήμην.

³⁶²
^a 44. τῷ καλῷ: lovers and admirers in Athens saluted those dear to them through their beauty or amiability with the word *καλός*. Sitalces, in his admiration for the Athenians, ἐν τοῖσι τοίχοις ἔγραφ' Ἀθηναῖοι καλοί (cf. *Ar. Ach.* 144). Theramenes throws off as in the 'cottabus' the last drops of the fatal hemlock, exclaiming, Κριτὶα τοῦτ' ἔστω τῷ καλῷ (see *Xen. Hell.* ii.

3. 56). Hence the frequent *καλός* upon vases. Socrates in Plato often uses it with mild irony; here it is also a play upon *Καλλία*.

46. This closing line reverts to 310 a. Hippocrates is not again mentioned, as he early retreated into the background, and has remained there during the entire conversation with Protagoras.

APPENDIX.

I. MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.

A. MANUSCRIPTS.

Diogenes Laërtius, in his work on the Lives of the Philosophers, III. 61, states that among others Aristophanes of Byzantium (about 225 B.C.) arranged the dialogues of Plato in trilogies, and he enumerates the first five. A second attempt at arrangement was made by Thrasyllus the astrologer, and instructor of Tiberius, who arranged the works of Plato which were supposed to be genuine in nine tetralogies, which Diogenes III. 56 enumerates in full, as follows:—

TETRALOGIES OF THRASYLLUS.

I.	Euthyphro.	Apology.	Crito.	Phaedo.
II.	Cratylus.	Theaetetus.	Sophist.	Statesman.
III.	Parmenides.	Philebus.	Symposium.	Phaedrus.
IV.	Alcibiades I.	Alcibiades II.	Hipparchus.	Rivals.
V.	Theages.	Charmides.	Laches.	Lysis.
VI.	Euthydemus.	Protagoras.	Gorgias.	Meno.
VII.	Hippias maior.	Hippias minor.	Io.	Menexenus.
VIII.	Clitophon.	Republic.	Timaeus.	Critias.
IX.	Minos.	Laws.	Epinomis.	Letters.

The Ms. tradition of Plato, as it has come down to us, is based wholly upon the arrangement of Thrasyllus, from which it follows that the source or sources of our Mss. cannot be traced beyond the beginning of our era. The order of Thrasyllus was apparently at once adopted; but we are told that others existed, of which no trace appears in existing Mss.

All extant Mss. of Plato are referred by Schanz to an original collection or Archetypus, which contained the nine Tetralogies of Thrasyllus, then the *Definitiones* and seven spurious Dialogues. This Archetypus appears to have been comprised in two volumes, of which the former contained the first seven tetralogies.

The Mss. derived from this first volume are many, but only the following are of special value as affording the basis of a correct text.

CODEX CLARKIANUS, or B. This Ms. is one of several derived from an incomplete copy of the first volume of the Archetypus, comprising only the first six tetralogies. It is named from Edward Daniel Clarke, who in the year 1801 discovered it in the library of a monastery in the isle of Patmos. The writing is upon vellum, in the most exquisite character. At the end, following the dialogue of *Meno*, is a subscription, from which we learn that the Ms. was written in the year 896 A.D., by the scribe John, for the use of Arethas, then a Deacon, afterwards Archbishop of Caesarea. The manuscript was purchased by Clarke and given to Porson. It is now in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and hence is also termed *Bodleianus*, and designated by the letter B. As an authority, it holds foremost rank among all Mss. of Plato. See Clarke's *Travels in Various Countries*, Vol. III., and Schanz, *Novae Commentationes Platonicae*, pp. 105–118.

CODEX VENETUS T (Bekker t). This Ms., of uncertain age, is in the Library of St. Mark's in Venice. It contains the first eight tetralogies, excepting the *Timaeus*. It represents a tradition independent of that of B, but is of special value where we lose the help of Clarkianus, viz., in the seventh tetralogy. See Schanz, *Ueber den Platocodex der Marcus-Bibliothek in Venedig*; also his critical edition of Plato's works, Preface to Volume IX.

Much inferior in value to the two just mentioned are the following:—

CODEX CRUSIANUS or TUBIGENSIS, of the eleventh or twelfth century. This contains *Euthyphro*, *Crito*, *Phaedo*, *Parmenides*, *Alcibiades I.*, *Alcibiades II.*, *Timaeus*.

CODEX VENETUS D (Bekker II), No. 185, of the twelfth century. It comprises the first four tetralogies, *Clitophon*, and the *Republic*.

CODEX VATICANUS Δ Θ, Nos. 225, 226. These are two volumes of one Ms. by a single writer, probably of the twelfth century. They contain the first seven tetralogies, the eighth, excepting *Critias*, and the *νοθεύόμενα*.

The three Mss. last mentioned are regarded by Schanz as closely affiliated with B, — all being derived from the Archetypus through a common line of ancestry. In the first six tetralogies, textual criticism rests almost wholly upon this class.

CODEX PARISINUS A, No. 1807, is a copy of the second volume of the Archetypus, and contains the eighth and ninth tetralogies, the *Definitiones*, and the seven *νοθεύόμενα*. For a further description of this Ms., see Schanz in *Rhein. Mus.* xxxiii. (1878) 303–307; on the Mss. previously mentioned and on the whole subject, see also Schanz, *Studien zur Geschichte des Platonischen Textes*, and in Bursian's *Jahresbericht*.

B. EDITIONS.

a. COMPLETE EDITIONS OF PLATO.

The only edition deserving of notice which was published before this century is

Platonis Opera quae extant omnia ex nova Ioannis Serrani interpretatione. Henrici Stephani de quorundam locorum interpretatione iudicium, et multorum contextus Graeci emendatio. 3 vols. Folio. Paris, 1578. The pages and page-divisions (a, b, etc.) of this edition are noted in the margin of modern editions, and form the recognized standard for reference.

The text of Stephanus was the vulgate until the appearance of *Platonis Dialogi (Graece et Latine) ex recensione Imm. Bekker.* 8 vols. Berlin, 1816, 1817. This contained a systematic collation of Mss.

Far the best edition with exegetical commentary is

Platonis Opera Omnia. Recensuit, prolegomenis et commentariis illustravit Godofredus Stallbaum. 10 vols. Gotha and Leipzig, 1835-1877. (The last editions are the most valuable.)

The most full and accurate critical apparatus is found in

Platonis Opera quae feruntur omnia ad codices denuo collatos edidit Martinus Schanz. Leipzig, 1875 ff. (Not yet complete.)

Convenient text editions are:—

Platonis Dialogi secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi. Ex recognitione C. F. Hermann. 6 vols. Leipzig, 1851-53. (In the *Bibliotheca Teubneriana.*)

Platonis Opera edidit Schanz. Editio Minor. (Not yet complete.) Leipzig.

b. SEPARATE EDITIONS OF THE PROTAGORAS.

The most important and convenient editions with commentaries are these:—

Platonis Protagoras cum prolegomenis et commentariis iterum edidit Kroschel. Leipzig, 1882. (A revision of the Stallbaum edition.)

Plato's Protagoras für den Schulgebrauch erklärt von Kroschel. 4te Auflage, bearbeitet von Cron. Leipzig, 1884.

Platons Protagoras für den Schulgebrauch erklärt von Bertram. Gotha, 1885. (With simpler commentary.)

With the above may be mentioned (though it has *no text*):—

Der Protagoras des Plato zur Einführung in das Verständniss der ersten platonischen Dialoge erklärt von Westermayer. Erlangen, 1882.

II. CRITICAL NOTES.

The following embrace the more important of Sauppe's notes upon the text, with some slight additions. The first reading is the one adopted in this edition. B denotes Codex Clarkianus (or Bodleianus). T denotes Codex Venetus T, which is not equally valuable in all dialogues, but has proved particularly useful in establishing the text of the *Protagoras*. S denotes the reading adopted by Schanz; K that adopted by Kroschel; C that adopted by Cron.

The title *Πρωταγόρας* is followed in B by ἡ σοφισταί· ἐνδεικτικός. These additions are usually regarded as the work of a later hand. Schanz brackets only ἐνδεικτικός, which is wanting in T.

309 c (ch. i. l. 25). *υἱέος*: *υἱός* S as everywhere. Schanz (vol. xii. p. viii.) quotes the testimony of the Attic inscriptions and of cod. A of the Platonic Dialogues, as showing that Plato wrote the word *υἱός*. But in the metrical inscriptions in trochaic metre *υἱός* is used (*C. I. A.* iv. 373 e, i. 374, 397), and also in prose *υἱε* is found since the fifth century B.C. (*Mitteil. d. Arch. Inst.* vii. 320). Since B always has *υἱός*, while T varies, *υἱός* should prob. be retained.

309 c (i. 26). *σοφώτερον*: with Ficinus. *σοφώτατον* B T C. The neut. *κάλλιον* shows that the *σοφώτατον* of the Mss. cannot designate Protagoras.

310 a (i. 35). *πάνυ γε, πολλά*: *πάνυ γε πολλά* S.

312 a (iii. 37). *σαντόν*: S K. *αὐτόν* B T C. In the orators (from Isocrates on) and later writers, the use of the refl. of the 3d pers. for the 1st and 2d pers. in both sing. and pl. is established. In the earlier Attic (Aristophanes), however, and also in Plato, the usage is as stated by Apoll. *Synt.* p. 195, 25 Bk. οὐ γάρ φαμεν ἑαυτὸν ὑβρισα ἢ ἑαυτὸν ὑβρισας, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ ὑβρίσαμεν. The few exceptional passages, already diminished in number, must on other grounds or can so easily be amended, that they have little weight.

312 d (iv. 15). *ἀποκρινοίμεθα*: Kroschel regards Bekker's *ἀποκριναίμεθα* as necessary, but the aor. (311 d, 329 b) and the pres. (331 b, freq. in the inf., 333 d, 334 d, 336 a) are equally correct.

312 d (iv. 16 ff.). *τί ἂν . . . λέγειν*: *τί ἂν, εἰ εἴπομεν . . . ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιστάτην . . . λέγειν*; S, but this means "what would you say, if etc." Madvig conjectures *τί ἂν ἀποκρινοίμεθα αὐτῷ; ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; τί ἂν εἴπομεν αὐτὸν εἶναι; ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιστάτην . . . λέγειν*, but the introduction of the answer with the voc. is contrary to Plato's usage, esp. here, where Hippocrates certainly cannot as yet speak with confidence. Still less can Kroschel's arrangement *τί ἂν εἴπομεν; αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιστάτην . . . λέγειν* be sustained by any similar passages. If, however, before *ἦ*, which has been added in two

late Mss., an interr. point be placed, giving the meaning *or* (should we) *perhaps* (call him) *etc.*, this would seem to involve the least difficulty.

314 a (v. 44). *παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου*: [*παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμπορίου*] S after Hirschig and Hercher. *παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμπορίου* B T C. Objections to the Ms. reading are (1) elsewhere *ἐμπορος* always stands first, (2) here the *ἐμπορος* has nothing to do, but only the *κάπηλος*, (3) the reading should have been *τοῦ καπήλου ἢ τοῦ ἐμπορίου*, or at least *τοῦ καπήλου ἢ ἐμπορίου*.

314 c (vi. 5). *στάντες*: *ἐπιστάντες* S C; but *στάντες* can stand precisely as well as *ἐπιστάντες* above, and *ἐστάντες* in B has simply arisen from the preceding *ἐσίοιμεν*.

314 e (vi. 20). *προστῶφ*: with B S. *προστῶφ* T. Cf. Herodian ii. 516, 12. So 315 a.

315 a (vi. 27). *ὄπισθεν οἷ*: with Baiter. *ὄπισθεν* B T, *οἷ ὄπισθεν* S with some late Mss. *οἷ* could drop out most easily before *η*.

315 b (vii. 1, 7). *ἔφη "Ὀμηρος* and *ἀστρονομικά*: both bracketed by S, the latter prob. correctly.

316 a (viii. 2). *θ' ὁ* (i.e. Θ Ο) : *ὁ* B, *τε ὁ* T S.

316 b (viii. 7). *μόνφ*: *μόνοι μόνφ* S after Cobet.

316 c (viii. 15). *μάλιστ' ἄν*: with S after Stephanus, C. *μάλιστα* B T.

316 c (viii. 18). *καὶ λόντα*: with B T S. *κατιόντα* Ast, K, Cobet, and on the margin of T; but *κατιέναι* means only *go down* or *return*.

316 c (viii. 20). *ἀπολιπόντας*: with Hirschig. *ἀπολείποντας* B T S C. Themistius, p. 347 b *ὅτι δὲ οἱ σοφισταὶ οὕτω καλοῦσι τοὺς νέους εἰς τὰς μεγάλας πόλεις ἰόντες καὶ ἐν ταύταις πείθοντες τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας καὶ οἰκείων καὶ ὀθνείων—οὐκ ἐμὸς οὗτος ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλὰ Πλάτωνος τοῦ σοφοῦ ἀντικρυς τοῖς ῥήμασιν οἷς ἄρτι εἶπον*, with which Heusde has compared *Apol.* 20 a.

317 c (viii. 60). *εἶμεν*: with S. *εἶημεν* B T, but see Veitch, *Greek Verbs*, p. 226.

317 d (viii. 64). *καθιζόμενοι*: with B S C. *καθεζόμενοι* T and perhaps rightly preferred by K.

319 a (x. 1). *εἴ περ κέκτησαι*: with B T C. *εἴπερ ἔκτῃσαι* S; but the passages quoted by Schanz, in the preface to vol. xii. p. xviii., show that both the reduplicated and the unreduplicated forms may be regarded as correct after words ending in a consonant. See note on 340 d, l. 75.

319 d (x. 20). *περὶ . . . διοικήσεως*: [*διοικήσεως*] S.

321 a (xi. 17). *εὐμάρειαν*: so C. *εὐμαρίαν* B T S, but see Schanz, preface to vol. ii. 2, pp. viii., x.

321 b (xi. 22). *δέρμασι*: *θριξὶ καὶ δέρμασι* B T. [*θριξὶν καὶ*] *δέρμασιν* S ('nonnulla intercidisse et θριξί e superioribus pro alio nomine illatum esse mihi quidem liquet,' Ast.). Before *δέρμασι* Stephanus would read *τύλοις καί*, Baiter *ὄνυξι καί*, but the former would be the same as *δέρμασι στερεοῖς καὶ ἀναίμοις*, and the latter is inapt since nothing further is said of weapons. *θριξί* is wholly unsuitable, and has simply been repeated from above.

321 c (xi. 29). δ' ἀκόσμητον: δὲ ἀκόσμητον Paris. 3017. δὴ ἀκόσμητον T S. διακόσμητον B.

321 e (xi. 49). ὕστερον: [δι' Ἐπιμηθέα] ὕστερον S. δι' Ἐπιμηθέα ὕστερον B T C.

322 a (xii. 2). διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν: with C. F. Hermann. διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν B T C; these words are bracketed by S after Deuschle. διὰ τὴν τῶν θεῶν συγγένειαν K.

323 d (xiii. 13). τὰ κακά: with Ficinus (haec mala eorumque contraria), Hier. Müller, Susemihl, K. [τὰ καλά] S. τὰ καλά B T C. This καλά of the Mss. can be neither in the narrower sense *the beautiful*, nor in the wider (equiv. to ἀγαθά) *the good*. For the opposites ἀγαθά and κακά are under discussion; ugliness, smallness, weakness are cited only as examples of the κακά, so that beauty, size, strength can be taken only as examples of the ἀγαθά.

326 b (xv. 26). ἐντείνοντες: prob. ἐντείναντες is the correct reading. Cf. Ar. Nub. 969 ἐντειναμένους τὴν ἁρμονίαν, Plato Phaedo 60 d ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους, Phil. 38 e τὰ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν ῥηθέντα ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν φθέγγαιτο, Dion. H. περὶ δεινότητος Δημοσθένους 48 τὸ κάλλιστον ἐντείνας μέλος.

326 b (xv. 32). βέλτιον: after Cobet. βελτίω B T S.

326 c (xv. 35). οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι μάλιστα, μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται: S after Sauppe. μάλιστα οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι, μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται Heindorf. οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι, μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται B T.

326 d (xv. 40). ζῆν: ζῆν [κατὰ παράδειγμα] S. ζῆν κατὰ παράδειγμα B T C. Although elsewhere ὡς is freq. omitted before preds. (cf. Isocr. iv. 31 ὑπόμνημα τῆς παλαιᾶς εὐεργεσίας ἀπαρχὰς τοῦ σίτου ἀποπέμπουσι), yet, on account of the preps., κατὰ παράδειγμα cannot be a pred. of κατὰ τούτους, nor can it be assumed that ὡς has been accidentally dropped after ζῆν. Moreover the laws are not a παράδειγμα. On the other hand, some one may easily have wished to sum up the following words of Protagoras in the expression κατὰ παράδειγμα, and have written this beside κατὰ τούτους. Schanz has therefore rightly recognized the words as a gloss.

327 c (xvi. 23). γ' ἄν: with S after Nattmann, Hirschig, Shilleto, C. γοῦν B T.

327 c (xvi. 25). ᾧου κᾶν: οἶου καί B T S.

327 c (xvi. 26). ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις: with B T C. ἐν ἐννόμοις ἀνθρώποις S. The speaker has already in mind the contrast between the ἄνθρωποι and the ἄγριοι soon to be mentioned.

327 d (xvi. 31). οἶους: with Athen. v. 218 d. οἶοί περ οὓς B T C. οἶους περ S with Hirschig and Cobet; although the latter afterwards abandons this conjecture. οἶοί περ οὓς of the Mss. prob. arose from the writing of the gloss οἶοι οὓς over οἶους so that οὓς came over the first syllable of πέρυσι. The speaker had no occasion here to add περ to the relative.

327 e (xvi. 38). εἶναι ὥσπερ: with S after Heindorf, C. εἶθ' ὥσπερ B, εἶθ' ὥσπερ T. Against Kroschel's proposed ἔσθ' ὥσπερ, on which he compares 335 e, is the asyndeton.

328 a (xvi. 46). δὲ καί: δέ B T S.

328 b (xvi. 49). *ὀνήσαι*: with S after Dobree. *νοῆσαι* B T.

328 b (xvi. 54). *βούληται*: *βούληται*, [ἀποδέδωκεν] S. *βούληται*, ἀποδέδωκεν B T C. The manuscript reading cannot be sustained by examples like Aesch. *Theb.* 604 ἢ γὰρ ξυνεισβάς πλοῖον εὐσεβῆς ἀνὴρ | ναύταισι θερμοῖς . . . | ὄλωλεν, or *Phaedo* 80 d (ἡ ψυχὴ) ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσεται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν.

328 e (xvii. 8). *πολλοῦ γὰρ ποιῶμαι*: for this phrase Plato wrote either *περὶ πολλοῦ γὰρ ποιῶμαι*, which is preferred by Ast and Cobet, or *πρὸ πολλοῦ γὰρ ποιῶμαι*, the conjecture of W. Dindorf (cf. Schneider on Isocrates v. 14).

329 a (xvii. 15). *τούτου τοιούτους*: so S after Sauppe. *τοιούτους* B T C. *καὶ* cannot, in consistency with the thought, belong to *τοιούτους*, nor, in its present position, can it be connected with *Περικλέους*, a connection which would have led us to expect *τοιούτους μὲν λόγους τάχ' ἂν καὶ Περικλέους ἀκούσειεν*.

329 a (xvii. 19). *χαλκία*: *χαλκεία* S. But the former is the only form that can be sustained.

329 b (xvii. 28). *ἀνθρώπων, πειθοίμην ἂν καὶ σοί*: with Heindorf, S, C. *ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἂν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι* B T. In the Ms. reading the opt. with ἂν in the prot. is a grammatical error; and to this reading, as well as to Kroschel's conjecture (*ἀνθρώπων, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι*) there is the objection that, while Socrates might gladly be convinced by Protagoras, this still requires a little explanation from the latter.

329 d (xviii. 5). *τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων*: so C. *τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων ἀλλήλων* B T (but in B *ἀλλήλων* is only inserted by a second hand in a gap). [*τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων*] *ἀλλήλων* S. See also Kroschel's remarks. *ἀλλήλων* is a gloss, derived from 349 c, cf. 330 e, 331 a d, 349 c, 359 a, *Gorg.* 471 e *καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἐτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν*.

331 e (xix. 43). *ἔχη*: with Henneberger. *ἔχη τὸ ὅμοιον* a late Viennese Ms. so C. *ἔχει τὸ ὅμοιον* B T. *ἔχη* [τὸ ὅμοιον] S. The words, if any, following *ἔχη*, must have been either *τὸ ὁμοῖον ἢ τὸ ἀνόμοιον*, or at any rate *τὸ ἀνόμοιον* referring only to the last member, cf. *Phaedo* 98 a *πῆ ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἂ πάσχει*. To go back to the first member and disregard the second is wholly unnatural. Prob. the addition *τὸ ὁμοῖον* has come from the following *ὁμοῖόν τι σμικρόν*.

332 b (xx. 5). *ἢ τοῦναντίον*: with Stallbaum, C. *ἢ [εἰ] τοῦναντίον* [ἔπραττον] S. *ἢ εἰ τοῦναντίον ἔπραττον* B T. That the Ms. reading is incorrect is seen in the reply *σωφρονεῖν*.

333 b (xx. 46). *πλείω*: with Heindorf, S, C. *πλείοσιν* B. *πλείοσι* T.

333 c (xx. 56). *ποιήσωμαι*: with Heindorf. *ποιήσομαι* B T S C.

333 d (xxi. 7). *ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν*: bracketed by S. *ὅτε ἀδικοῦσιν* C. F. Hermann.

333 e (xxi. 13). *παρατετάχθαι*: B T C. *παρατετάσθαι* S after Th. Kock and Madvig; *παρατείνεσθαι* however means not *to be wearied*, but *to be completely exhausted, half-dead*, which Socrates would not here say of Protagoras.

335 e (xxii. 51). τῷ Ἱμεραίῳ: with Groen van Prinsterer and Dobree. τῷ Ἱμεραίῳ [δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι] S. τῷ Ἱμεραίῳ δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι B T. The words δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι of the Mss., in an allusion to a man then so famous, can be nothing else than a later addition. Prob. ἔπεισθαι should also be stricken out.

337 c (xxiv. 4). ἡμᾶς: so S with Heindorf, C. ὑμᾶς B T. Hippias cannot wish to exclude himself; moreover the following ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχροὺν κτέ. relates chiefly to what is said here. ὑμᾶς of the Mss. therefore cannot be correct.

338 a (xxiv. 23). ποιήσετε καὶ πείσεσθε: with a late Ms. ποιήσετε καὶ πείθεσθε B T C. ποιήσατε καὶ πείθεσθε Madvig. ποιήσατε καὶ πίθεσθε S.

339 a (xxvi. 7). νῦν δὴ διελεγόμεθα: with S after Stallbaum, C. νῦν διαλεγόμεθα B T. Upon νῦν δὴ (or νῦνδῆ) — νῦν (or νῦν δέ) see Cobet *Var. Lect.* p. 233 f., Meineke *Com. Gr.* ii. 11.

339 b (xxvi. 18). ἐγώ, καλῶς τε καί: S after Bekker. ἐγώ τε καί B. ἔγωγε καί T.

339 e (xxvi. 42). ἱλιγγίασα: so C. εἰλιγγίασα B T S, but the considerations urged by Schanz in the preface to vol. vii. p. v. seem to sustain ἱλιγγιᾶν.

341 e (xxvii. 49). εἶτα: with a period after γέρας, and οὐ δήπου beginning a new sent., the words express the same thought which Kroschel thinks to bring out by changing εἶτα to εἶπερ. εἶτα after partic. is by no means so frequent in Plato as in Aristophanes, from whom O. Bachmann has collected 152 passages, still this is not rare in Plato; see Ast's *Lex. s.v.*

342 d (xxviii. 24). γνοῖτε: with S. γνοίητε B T C, see on 317 c.

343 a (xxviii. 43). εἰρημένα ἃ οὔτοι: with C. F. Hermann. εἰρημένα οὔτοι B T C. εἰρημέν' ἃ οὔτοι S. εἰρημένα, ὅτι οὔτοι Deuschle. εἰρημένα, ὅτι K. The remark beginning with ἃ οὔτοι is not an argument to prove the character of the wisdom of the Seven, but, as a description of their course, it confirms the main position of the speaker, cf. l. 47 below. It is doubtful whether ὅτι is used with the meaning *from the fact that*. εἰρημέν' ἃ cannot be correct, since a more marked pause is demanded between the words.

343 e (xxix. 15). θεῖμεν: with S. θείημεν B T C, see on 317 c.

344 e (xxx. 26). δυνατὸν δέ: with Schneidewin. δυνατὸν δὲ [ἐσθλόν] S. δυνατὸν δὲ ἐσθλόν B T C.

345 c (xxxi. 9). ἐπὶ δὴ μιν: ἔπειθ' ὑμῖν B T, but this the metre will not allow. Bergk has proposed ἐπὶ τ' (or ἐπὶ δ') ὕμμιν (the latter after G. Hermann). But this does not entirely agree with the lyric use of tmesis. Hence the reading adopted in the text. It must be assumed that Plato quoted the words of the poet accurately, without arbitrary change.

346 c (xxxi. 48). φιλόμωμός εἰμι: εἰμι φιλόμωμος B T C. Bergk thinks the words belong not to Simonides but to Plato.

346 d (xxxi. 57). ἐπὶ δὴ μιν: see on 345 c.

347 d (xxxii. 23). καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι: with Athen. iii. 97 b, c. [πεπαιδευμένοι] S. πεπαιδευμένοι B T.

348 c (xxxiii. 4). The art. with "Ὀμηρον and the τό after λέγειν τι are both doubtful. Schanz is prob. correct in striking out τὸν "Ὀμηρον, leaving τό with the following lines as subj. of λέγειν. Cf. Ar. *Eq.* 334 ὡς οὐδὲν λέγει τὸ σωφρόνως τραφήναι, Plato *Phaedo* 60 e ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγει.

350 b (xxxiv. 30). θαρραλέους: [τοὺς] θαρραλέους S. τοὺς θαρραλέους B T C. The art., after the preceding context, cannot be sustained. It is found thus in neither 349 e nor 350 c e, 351 a, 359 b. After these words Protagoras could not have replied καὶ νῦν γε, and Socrates does not say that the statement οἱ ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης θαρραλέοι οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι contradicts this, as would be the case if the assertion were οἱ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν οἱ θαρραλέοι.

350 c (xxxiv. 32). οἱ σοφώτατοι: with R. Schoene. οἱ σοφώτατοι B T S C.

350 d (xxxiv. 38). τοτ': with B T. τοῦτ' S with Hirschig.

352 c (xxxv. 53). ἄν: so S after Sauppe, C. ἀ ἡ B. ἄν T. ἀ ἄν late Mss.

353 d. (xxxvi. 15). παθόντα: S with Stallbaum, K. μαθόντα B T C. παρόντα Hermann.

354 a (xxxvi. 27). ἄν . . . ἐροίμεθα: αὐ . . . εἰ ἐροίμεθα S. ἄν . . . εἰ ἐροίμεθα B T C.

355 a (xxxvi. 71). ἄνθρωπος: S after Sauppe. ἄνθρωπος B T C. So 355 e.

355 b (xxxvi. 73). αὐ λέγετε: B T. αὐ [λέγετε] S. αὐ Hirschig.

356 a (xxxvii. 30). ἄλλη δὴ ἀξία: with S. ἄλλη ἀξία Schleiermacher. ἄλλη ἀναξία B T C and Cicero in *Prisc.* v. 64.

357 e (xxxvii. 105). οὔτε αὐτοί: B T S. οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἴτε Madvig. The change οὔτε ἴτε αὐτοί would be somewhat easier, and ἴναι is used much like φοιτᾶν in *Lach.* 187 a and *Rep.* i. 328 d. Still the emendation is unnecessary, considering the freedom with which, in similar antitheses, the Greeks left one member to be supplied by the reader or hearer.

358 b (xxxviii. 14). καλαί: with Schleiermacher, C. καλαὶ [καὶ ὠφέλιμοι] S. καλαὶ καὶ ὠφέλιμοι B T. Schleiermacher rightly says, 'as the ὠφέλιμον is immediately given as one of the elements of the καλόν, this would be a case of dialectic confusion such as the Platonic Socrates is not wont to fall into.' Cf. 359 e (xxxix. 37).

358 b (xxxviii. 17). καὶ δυνατά: S with Schleiermacher, C. καὶ δύναται B T. The words are not necessary, as the thought is contained in ἐξόν following (cf. 358 d e); and Ast's proposal, approved by Kroschel, to strike them out, has much in its favor. Still they are not superfluous. For when one has to choose between what one has, and what one knows to be better, it is only when the latter is known to be attainable, that there is a true freedom of choice.

360 b (xxxix. 53). δειλοί: with Dobree. δειλοὶ [καὶ οἱ θαρσεῖς] S. δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θαρσεῖς B. δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς T. θρασύς is very rare in Plato, and occurs nowhere else in the *Protagoras*; in 350 b μαινόμενοι stands alone. Hence Dobree has stricken out the words, as a late addition. Plato would have said οἱ θαρραλέοι.

GREEK INDEX.

[The references to the Greek text are by chapters and thirds of chapters; to the notes, by chapters and line of text annotated: *e.g.*, VIII. a refers to the Greek text at the first third of ch. VIII.; and XIII. 28 refers to the note on line 28 of ch. XIII.]

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| <p>ἀγένητον XIII. 28.
 ἀγοραῖος XXXII. 17.
 ἄγριοι XVI. 31, 33.
 ἀγῶν λόγων XXII. 19.
 ἀγωνιᾶν XXI. 13.
 ἀδικεῖν, equiv. to ἡδικη-
 κένοι II. 23.
 αἰδώς XII. 17, XVII. 31.
 αἰρεῖσθαι fut. perf.
 XXV. 7.
 αἰστοῦν XI. 1.
 ἀλλ' οὖν XVI. 23.
 ἀλληλοφθορία XI. 1.
 ἀλλόκοτος XXXI. 27.
 ἄλλος (<i>besides</i>) VIII.
 24; ἄλλο τι, ἄλλο τι
 ἦ, equiv. to nonne
 XXXVI. 5.
 ἀμπόσχω XI. 1.
 ἄν in final clauses XV.
 23; with opt. in pro-
 tasis XXX. 39; with
 ὅστις and the subjv.,
 omitted by the poets
 XXXI. 13.
 ἀναβολή XXVIII. 13.
 [ἀναξία] XXXVII. 31.
 ἀνατιθέναι XXVIII. 44.
 ἀνδρεία XVIII. 14,
 XXXIV. 60, XL. 13.
 ἀνήρ, Athenian youth
 legally became ἀνήρ
 at eighteen I. 3.
 ἀνολοφύρομαι XVI b.</p> | <p>ἀνόσιος XIX. 15.
 ἀνωφελής XXI. 19.
 ἀξία XXXVII. 31.
 ἄοπλος XI. 1.
 ἀπάλαμνος XXXI. 45.
 ἀποτείνειν XVII. 20,
 XXII. 38, XL. 6.
 ἀπείρων XXXI. 49.
 ἀποκρύπτειν XXIV. 22.
 ἄρα XIV. 30.
 ἄρνησθαι (μισθόν)
 XXXIII. 21.
 ἀσέβεια XIII. 17.
 ἀτάρ XXII. 48.
 αὐτίκα (<i>for example</i>)
 IX. 17.
 αὐτός resembling μόνος
 I. 4, XXIII. 40.
 ἄφιππος XXXIV. 19.
 ἀφροσύνη XX. 1.
 βαθέος ὄρθρου II. 1.
 βάθρον VII. 3.
 βάρβαρος XXVII. 36.
 βραβευτής XXIV. 23.
 γέρας XXVII. 50.
 γραμμή XV. 43.
 γραφίς XV. 43.
 δέ without preceding
 μέν II. 2; δ' οὖν VII.
 19.
 δεινός XXVII. 20 f.
 δείπνον II. 15.</p> | <p>δέος XXXVIII. 33.
 δῆλον ὅτι XIII. 19,
 XVII. 11.
 δηλοῦν, equiv. to δῆλον
 εἶναι XXXI. 2.
 δημηγορεῖν XXII. 63.
 διαγγέλλειν VIII. 43.
 διαθεῖν XXII. 53.
 διαίρειν V c, XXVI. 5,
 55, XXVII. 35.
 διαίρεσις XXXVIII. 7.
 δαιτήτης XXIV. 15.
 διακινδυνεύειν V. 3.
 διαλαμβάνειν (<i>punctu-
 ate</i>) XXXI. 63.
 διαρθροῦν XII. 4.
 διατελεῖν XXX. 47.
 διδάσκειν (<i>bring out a
 play</i>) XVI. 32.
 διέξοδος XV. 19, XL.
 35.
 δίκαιός εἰμι X. 6.
 δικαιότης XIX. 20.
 δίκη XII. 17; δίκη κλο-
 πῆς XI. 50.
 δοκεῖν redundant
 XXVII. 44.
 δολιχοδρόμος XXII. 52.
 δόλιχος XVII. 21.
 δόξαν ταῦτα VI. 1.
 δύναμις XXXIV. 60,
 XXXVII. 57.
 εἶεν related to εἶα III. 18.</p> |
|---|---|---|

- εἰς : εἰς διδασκάλων XV. 12; εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν XXVI. 33.
 ἐκ : ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα VI. 21; ἐκ διδασκάλων XV. 39.
 ἐκ- : ἐξέρχεται XL. 25; ἐκκρούειν XXIII. 9; ἐκτείνειν XXIV. 20.
 ἐκτῆσθαι, and κεκτῆσθαι XXVI. 75.
 ἐν : ἐν τινι εἶναι II. 27, V. 8; ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ VIII. 54; ἐν Ἀρίφρονος X. 38; (*in the presence of*) XXIII. 34.
 ἐν- : ἐνάμιλλος VIII. 13; ἐνδεικνύειν VIII. 59; XVII. 1; ἐμμελῶς ἔχειν XI. 32; ἔμπορος V. 22, 28.
 ἐνδον XI. 3.
 ἔπειτα after a partic. X. 26; correl. with μέν XII. 4.
 ἐπί : ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ III. 43; ἐπὶ τέχνῃ III. 42; ἐπὶ τούτου XXXVIII. 12.
 ἐπι- : ἐπαίνημι XXXI. 60; ἐπανόρθωμα XXVII. 2; ἐπεξέρχεται XXXI. 10; ἐφιέναι XXIV. 21; ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι XXII. 4; ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι ὑπότινος II. 15; ἐπιλήσμων XXII. 3.
 ἐπιστήμη XXX c, XXXIV. 34, XXXVII c, XL. 20.
 ἐπιστάτης equiv. to ἐπιστήμων XXIV. 23.
 ἔπος XXVI. 3.
 ἐρυθρίαζειν III. 33.
 ἔρχεται with dat. of interest XI. 31.
 ἔστιν οἷς etc. XI. 24; ἔστιν ὅπῃ XIX. 34.
 ἔσπερας (*last evening*) II. 13.
 ἔτι μέν, ἔπειτα II. 18.
 εὖ πράττειν XXX. 28.
 εὐθύνη XV. 50.
 ἔχειν with adv. of cond. VII. 25; ἔχεται with gen. X. 31.
 ζημία XIV. 26.
 ἡμεροδρόμος XXII. 52.
 θαρραλέος XXXIX. 22.
 θάρσος XXXIV. 60.
 θάπτον XV. 3.
 θαυμασίως γίνονται XIV. 22.
 θυρωρός VI. 6.
 ιδιωτεύειν XVI. 5.
 ιδιώτης III. 44, XXX. 10.
 ἰέναι διὰ XII. 35.
 ἰλιγγιᾶν XXVI. 42.
 ἴσος XXIII. 24.
 ἰσχύς XXXIV. 50, 60.
 ἴτης XXXIV. 10.
 καί : καί (*and so*) XVI. 38; καὶ δὴ καί XXXI. 22, XXXIII. 12; καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι I. 12; καὶ τᾶλλα IV. 14; κἂν, ἂν IX. 14; κἂν εἰ without opt. XVI. 46.
 κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι VIII. 38.
 κατα- : καταγνύειν XXVIII. 12; καθαιρεῖν XXVIII. 52, XXX. 8.
 κακῶς πράττειν XXX. 28, 37.
 καλλωπίζειν VIII. 59, XXI. 1.
 κάλων XXIV. 20.
 κάπηλος V. 22, 28.
 κηλεῖν VI. 30.
 κοινός XXIII. 24.
 κολάζειν XIII. 29.
 κολούειν XXVIII. 55.
 κολυμβᾶν XXXIV. 16.
 κυβεύειν V. 41.
 κῶδιον VII. 15.
 λακωνίζειν XXVIII. 11.
 λέγειν τι XXXIII. 3.
 Ληναῖον XVI. 32.
 λόγον ὑπέχειν XXV. 19.
 μάθησις XXX. 31.
 μέγεθος XXXVII. 50.
 μελοποιός XV. 25.
 μέν : μέν solitarium IV. 8; μέν, ἀτάρ XXII. 48; μέν, δέ repeated V. 9; μέν, ἔπειτα XII. 4.
 μεταλαμβάνειν with acc. XVIII. 10.
 μή μοι XIX. 28; μή ὅτι, ἀλλά X. 27.
 μισάνθρωπος XVI. 33.
 μόγις VI. 17, XXXII. 55, XXXIX. 67.
 μοῖρα XII. 1.
 μουσική XXVI. 54.
 μουσικῶς XX. 43.
 μῦθος X. 50, XIV. 6.
 νέμειν X. 33, XI a.
 νέον in sense of κακόν II. 7.

νόμος, XXIV. 6.
 νόσος poetically of persons XII. 27.
 νύκτες, use of pl. II. 19.
 ξηνηλασία XXVIII. 17.

οίκημα VII. 11.
 οίομαι δεῖν VIII. 16.
 οἶος attracted VIII. 29.
 ὁμολογεῖν, ὁμολογεῖσθαι XXVI. 28.
 ὀνομάζειν XXXVIII. 9.
 ὅπως, ὅπως μή, with fut. V. 26.
 ὄρθριος V. 13.
 ὄρθρος βαθύς II. 1.
 ὀσιότης XIX. 15.
 ὅ τι παθῶν XXXVI. 15.
 οὐδεις ὅστις οὐ VIII. 55, XII. 51; οὐδενὸς βελτίων XIV. 5, XXII. 22; οὐδενὸς ἤττων VIII. 32; οὐδ' εἰς XVI. 39.
 οὔτε, τέ I. 14.
 οὐχ ὅτι XXIII. 13.

παιδεία XXVI a.
 παιδοτρίβης XV. 31.
 πανάμωμος XXXI. 7, 56.
 παρα-: παρέχειν (*submit one's self*) XXXII. 42; παρατάττειν XXI. 13.
 πάσσοφος VII. 26.
 πέρυσι XVI. 31.

προ-: πρόθυρον VI. 2; προμηθεῖσθαι VIII. 17; προστῶν VI. 20.
 πρὸς λόγον XXIX. 5, 21, XXXV. 25.
 πρυτανεῖον XXIV. 10.
 πρύτανις XXIV. 23.
 πρώην (equiv. to τρίτην ἡμέραν) II. 10.
 ῥάβδουχος XXIV. 23.
 Σιμόεις XXVI. 50.
 Σκάμανδρος XXVI. 50.
 σμικρότης XI. 1.
 σοφία XVIII. 14, XX. 1, XXXIV. 34.
 συν-: συμβαίνειν XXIV. 15; συγκαθιέναι XXII. 56; συστρέφειν (of speech) XXVIII. 30.
 σχεδόν τι XXXI. 18, XXXII. 55.
 σχολή VI. 10.
 σωφροσύνη XII. 35, XX. 1, XL. 13.

ταμειον VII. 12.
 τέμνειν XXIV. 23.
 τετράγωνος XXVI. 12.
 τιμωρεῖν XIII. 34.
 τις intens. force with adjs. and advs. I. 24; (*a sort of*) V. 22; (*somewhat*) XXII. 3.
 τό with a clause XIX. 29, XX. 38.

τοξότης X. 17.
 τρίβων XXII. 42, XXVIII. 13.
 τρυφᾶν XVI b.
 τυγχάνω without a partic. V. 38.
 τύπος XXIX. 28.
 τῷ ὄντι XVII. 4.

ὑμνεῖν VIII. 44, XXVIII. 46.
 ὑπερβατόν XXIX. 14.
 ὑπηγήτης I. 7.
 ὑπό with neut. verb II. 15.
 ὑπο-: ὑπειπεῖν XXIX. 15; ὑποκεῖσθαι XXXIII. 30; ὑποκηρύττειν XXXIII. 19; ὑπόλογος XXXIII. 40; ὑποτίθεσθαι XXVI. 32, XL. 19.

φαίνεσθαι (*make one's appearance*) I. 1.
 φιλονεικεῖν XXXIX. 74.
 φιλοσοφία XXII. 48.
 φόβος XXXVIII. 33.


χορός VI. 32.


ὡς δ' αὐτως V. 36; ὡς εἶναι XIX. 4.
 ὡς XV. 45.
 ὡσπερ ἄν, ἄν III. 6, XVI. 38.
 ὠφέλιμος XXI. 19.

ENGLISH INDEX.

- Acc. absolute VI. 1, XXVIII. 14; acc. of person with ποιῆν τι XIII. 10.
- Adimantus, son of Cepis; son of Leucolophides VII. 22.
- Agathocles VIII. 34.
- Agathon VII. 17.
- Alcibiades, a model for statues of Hermes I. 7; VIII a, X. 36, XXIII. 1, XXXII a c.
- Anacoluthon XIV. 10, 12, 28, XVI. 44, XVIII. 5, XXXI. 66.
- Anaphora X. 22.
- Andron VII a.
- Antimoerus VI. 25.
- Aorist, with τί οὐ in questions, containing an exhortation I. 36, VIII. 61; expressing suddenness XXVIII. 29; gnomic *ib.*, XVI. 54; inceptive XI. 41, XII. 2.
- Apodosis omitted III. 20, XV. 9.
- Apollodorus II a.
- Apposition, partitive XXXIII. 31.
- Ariphron X. 38.
- Article, neut. with a clause XIX. 29, XX. 38; with rel. clauses XI. 4; sometimes omitted when the noun is followed by a rel. XIV. 1.
- Asyndeton VIII. 55, XIV. 31, XXVII. 5, XXIX. 7.
- Athena XI. 45.
- Attraction of verb by pred. XX. 46.
- Bias XXVIII c.
- Callias II c, VI b, VII. 12, XXII b, XXV a, XXXII c, XL c.
- Ceos XXVII. 52.
- Charmides VI. 23.
- Chilon XXVIII c.
- Cicero I. 1, XXXVII. 31.
- Cleobulus XXVIII c.
- Clinias I b, X. 36.
- Crete XXVIII. 2, 20.
- Crison XXII. 51.
- Critias VIII. 3, XXIII b.
- Dat. of manner XVII. 4; ethical XXIV. 20; of means XXVIII. 55.
- Epimetheus XI a b, XL b.
- Eryximachus VII. 3.
- Eurybatus XVI. 31, 34.
- Gen., of exclam. XXVII. 23; objective XII. 34, XXXVI. 37; partitive XXVIII. 5; subjective XII. 11.
- Hephaestus XI. 45.
- Herodicus VIII. 33.
- Hesiod VIII b, XXVI. 71 f.
- Hippias of Elis V. c, VII. 1, IX. 40.
- Hippocrates of Cos III. 7.
- Hipponicus II c, VII b.
- Homer I. 7, III b, VII. 1, VIII b, XXVI. 50, XXXIII. 5.
- Homoeoteleuton VIII. 21.
- Hyperbaton XVI. 17, XXIX. 14.
- Iccus VIII. 32.
- Impf. by assimilation XVI. 8, 20.
- Incorporation in rel. clause XXVIII. 7.
- Ind., secondary tense in final clause XXII. 35.
- Inf., by assimilation XXXI. 26, XXXV. 70; absolute (loose const.) I. 4, VIII. 42; redundant III. 29, VIII. 38, XXVII. 44.
- Iphicrates XXXIV. 20.
- Lacedaemon XXVIII. 2.
- Lenaeon, Lenea XVI. 32.
- Litotes XI. 28.
- Musaeus VIII. 30.

- Myson XXVIII. 38.
- Negative doubled XIX. 46, XXX. 7, XXXV. 56.
- Nom. with impersonal verb and inf. VIII. 16.
- Oenoe II. 14.
- Opt., potential in mild command IX. 2; derived from delib. subjv. X. 40.
- Orpheus VIII. 30.
- Orthagoras IX. 25.
- Paralus VI. 22, XVI. 61.
- Parataxis X. 39, XVI. 38.
- Paronomasia IX. 38.
- Participle, pred. (supplementary) IX. 34.
- Pausanias VII. 17.
- Pericles VI. 22, X. 36.
- Phaedrus VII. 3.
- Pherecrates XVI. 31.
- Phidias III. 12, b.
- Philippides VI. 24.
- Phrynondas XVI. 31, 34.
- Pittacus XXVI. 23 c, XXVIIb, XXVIII b-XXX b, XXXI.
- Plural neut. of prons. and pred. adjs. used for sing. XV. 14.
- Police X. 17.
- Polycletus III. 12, XVI. 61.
- Prodicus of Cos V c, VII. 1; attention to synonyms XXIII. 24.
- Prolepsis V. 19, XVI. 21, XXVII. 44, XXXI. 5.
- Prometheus XI a-c, XL b.
- Pronoun, reflexive used for reciprocal XXXII. 25.
- Pythocles VIII. 34.
- Relative, incorporation and assimilation of the antec. XXVIII. 7; sing. referring to pl. antec. XXXI. 13.
- Sages, the Seven XXVIII b.
- Satyrus II. 14.
- Scopas XXVI. 9.
- Simonides VIII. 29, XXVI. 9, 53, a-XXVII c, XXVIII c-XXIX b, XXXI a b, XXXII a.
- Slaves in Athens, manners of I. 37.
- Solon XXVIII b.
- Subjv., deliberative VIII. 63, X. 4.
- Synonyms, Prodicus's attention to XXIII. 24.
- Tantalus VII. 1.
- Temporal adj. for adv. V. 13.
- Thales of Miletus XXVIII b.
- Xanthippus VI b, XVI. 61.
- Youth, training in Athens XV. 1.
- Zeuxis or Zeuxippus IX. 19.





Date Due

8.10.37	McLaughlin		
SEP-13-54	Thayer S. J.		
7-1-54	" " W		
JUL-22-61	631179		
	631179	7/5/61	
10-14-72	Thayer S. J.		
JAN 14 1988		SEP 09 2006	
		SEP 27 2002	
NOV 24 1998			
JAN 23 2002			
MAY 21 2008			
©			

PA3411
.C7P78

7.00

13989

Author Plato

Title Protagoras

DATE DUE

BORROWER'S NAME

JAN 3

~~10-14-72~~ ~~Thayer, J.~~

PATRICK H MC NALLY

16 FAIRMOUNT ST

QUINCY MA 2 AS 2 7:

FEB 22 1974

letter sent
6/3/74

TR 6/22/74

PATRICK H MC NALLY

16 FAIRMOUNT ST

QUINCY MA

2 AS 2 72

87 MASON TER

Brookline 02146

18 MAR 87

22 12/4/74


DATE DUE

BORROWER'S NAME

OCT 17 1979

SEP 14 1981

DEC 4 1982



BOSTON COLLEGE



3 9031 01408657 3

13989

Plato
PA3411
.C7P78

BOSTON COLLEGE LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS
CHESTNUT HILL, MASS.

Books may be kept for two weeks and may be renewed for the same period, unless reserved.

Two cents a day is charged for each book kept overtime.

If you cannot find what you want, ask Librarian who will be glad to help you.

The borrower is responsible for books drawn on his card and for all fines accruing on the same.



